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THE

HISTORY

OF

ANCIENT GREECE,

ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earlieſt Accounts till the

Diviſion of the Macedonian Empire in the Eaſt.

INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF

LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

By JOHN GILLIES, LL. D. F. A. S.

Εκ μεν τοιγε της ἁπαντων προς αλληλα συμπλοκης και παραθεσεως, ετι δε ὁμοιοτητος και διαφορας, μονως αν τις εφικοιτο και δυνηθειη κατοπτευσας, ἁμα και το χρησιμον και το τερπνον εκ της ἱστοριας λαβειν. POLYBIUS, l. i. c. v.

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CHAP. XVII. Physical calamities conspire with the

IT would be agreeable to diversify the dark and melancholy scenes of the Peloponnesian war; by introducing occurrences and transactions of a different and more pleasing kind. But such, unfortunately, is the settled gloom of our present

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evils of war. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

ſubject, that the epiſodes commonly reflect the ſame color with the principal action. The miſerable period now under our review, and already diſtinguiſhed by revolt and ſedition, was ſtill farther deformed by a return of the peſtilence, and by innumerable earthquakes. The diſeaſe carried off five thouſand Athenian troops, and a great but uncertain number of other citizens. It raged, during a twelvemonth, with unabating violence; many remedies were employed, but all equally ineffectual. The poiſon at length ſpent its force, and the malady diſappeared by a ſlow and inſenſible progreſs, ſimilar to that obſerved in the Levant, and other parts of the world, which are ſtill liable to be viſited by this dreadful calamity[1]. The earthquakes alarmed Attica and Bœotia, but proved moſt deſtructive in the neighbouring iſles. The dreadful concuſſions of the land were accompanied, or perhaps produced, by a violent agitation of the ſea. The reflux of the waves overwhelmed the flouriſhing city of Orobia, on the weſtern coaſt of Eubœa. Similar diſaſters happened in the ſmall iſlands of Atalanta and Peperathus. Nor did theſe alarming events terminate the afflictions of the Greeks; for Nature, as if ſhe had delighted to produce at one period every thing moſt awful, poured forth a torrent of fire from Mount Ætna, which demoliſhed the induſtrious labors of the Cataneans. A dreadful eruption had happened fifty years before this period; and the preſent was the third, and moſt memorable, by which Sicily

Olymp. lxxxviii. 3. A. C. 426.

[1] Voyage de Tournefort, vol. ii. Diſcourſe on the Plague, in the Phil. Tranſ. vol. lxiv.

had been agitated and inflamed, ſince the coaſts of that iſland were adorned by Grecian colonies[a]. CHAP. XVII.

If the Peloponneſian war had not been carried on with an animoſity unknown to the mildneſs of modern times, the long ſufferings of the contending parties would have diſpoſed them eagerly to deſire the bleſſings of tranquillity. But ſuch virulent paſſions rankled in Athens and Sparta, that while calamities were equally balanced, and the capitals of both republics were ſecure, no combination of adverſe circumſtances ſeemed ſufficient to determine either ſide to purchaſe peace by the ſmalleſt diminution of honor. Yet to this neceſſity, Sparta in the following year was reduced by a train of events, equally ſudden and ſingular. Demoſthenes, a general of merit and enterpriſe, commanded the Athenian forces at Naupactus. This town, as related above, had been beſtowed on the unfortunate Meſſenians; by whoſe aſſiſtance, together with that of the Athenian allies in Acarnania, Cephallenia, and Zacynthus, Demoſthenes undertook to reduce the hoſtile provinces of Ætolia, Ambracia, and Leucadia. But the operations neceſſary for this purpoſe were obſtructed by the jealouſies and diſſenſions which prevailed among the confederates; each ſtate inſiſting, that the whole force of the war ſhould be immediately directed againſt its particular enemies.

Expedition of Demoſthenes to Ætolia. Olymp. lxxxviii. 4. A. C. 425.

The allied army, thus diſtracted by contrariety, and weakened by defection, performed nothing deciſive againſt Leucadia or Ambracia. In Ætolia

Miſunderſtanding among the Athenian allies.

[a] Thucydid. p. 250.

CHAP. XVII.

they were extremely unfortunate. The Meſſenians, who were continually haraſſed by the natives of that barbarous province, perſuaded Demoſthenes that it would be eaſy to over-run their country, before the inhabitants, who lived in ſcattered villages, widely ſeparated from each other, could collect their force, or attempt reſiſtance. In purſuance of this advice, Demoſthenes entered Ætolia, took and plundered the towns, and drove the inhabitants before him. During ſeveral days he marched unreſiſted; but having proceeded to Ægitium, the principal, or rather only city in the province, he found that his deſign had by no means eſcaped the notice of the enemy. Ægitium is ſituate among lofty mountains, and about ten miles diſtant from the Corinthian gulf. Among theſe intricate, and almoſt inacceſſible heights the flower of the Ætolian nation were poſted. Even the moſt diſtant tribes had come up, before the confederate army entered their borders.

Singular mode of battle.

Ægitium was ſtormed; but the inhabitants eſcaped to their countrymen concealed among the mountains. While the Athenians and their allies purſued them, the Ætolians ruſhed, in ſeparate bodies, from different eminences, and checked the purſuers with their darts and javelins. Having diſcharged their miſſile weapons, they retired, being light-armed, and incapable to reſiſt the impreſſion of pikemen. New detachments continually poured forth from the mountains, and in all directions annoyed the confederates. The latter loſt no ground, as long as their archers had darts, and were able to uſe them. But when the greateſt

part of their light troops were wounded or ſlain, the heavy-armed men began to give way. They ſtill, however, maintained their order; and the battle long continued, in alternate purſuits and retreats, the Ætolians always flying before the enemy as ſoon as they had diſcharged their javelins. But at length the confederates were exhauſted by ſo many repeated charges, and totally defeated by opponents who durſt not wait their approach. CHAP. XVII.

Their conductors through this intricate country had all periſhed. They miſtook their road to the ſea. The enemy were light-armed, and in their own territories. The purſuit, therefore, was unuſually deſtructive. Many fell into caverns, or tumbled headlong from precipices. A large party wandered into an impervious wood, which being ſet on fire by the enemy, conſumed them in its flames. A miſerable remnant returned to Naupactus, afflicted by the loſs of their companions, and highly mortified at being defeated by Barbarians, alike ignorant of the rules of war, and of the laws of civil ſociety, who ſpoke an unknown dialect, and fed on raw fleſh [3]. Unfortunate iſſue of the expedition.

This diſaſter deterred Demoſthenes from returning to Athens, till fortune gave him an opportunity to retrieve the honor of his arms. The Ætolians and Ambraciots, the moſt formidable enemies of the republic on that weſtern coaſt of Greece, ſolicited and obtained aſſiſtance from Lacedæmon and Corinth, vigorouſly attacked the towns of Naupactus and Amphilochian Argos, and Demoſthenes defends Naupactus, &c.

[3] Thucydid. p. 237, et ſeqq.

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threatened to reduce the whole province of Acarnania, in which the latter was ſituated. The vigilance and activity of Demoſthenes not only ſaved theſe important cities, but obtained the moſt ſignal advantages over the aſſailants. With profound military ſkill he divided the ſtrength of the enemy, and, by a well-conducted ſtratagem, totally defeated the Ambraciots among the heights of Idomené. A ſtrong detachment of that brave nation had advanced the preceding day to Olpæ, a place fortified by the Acarnanians, and the ſeat of their courts of juſtice. Demoſthenes obliged them to retreat with conſiderable loſs, and intercepted their return homeward. Meanwhile the collected force of the Ambraciots marched to ſupport their detachment, with whoſe misfortunes they were totally unacquainted. Apprized of this deſign, Demoſthenes beſet the paſſes, and ſeized the moſt advantageous poſts on their route. With the remainder of his force he advanced to attack them in front. They had already proceeded to Idomené, and encamped on the loweſt ridge of that mountain [4].

Defeats the Ætolians and Ambraciots.

Demoſthenes placed his Meſſenians in the van, and commanded them, as they marched along, to diſcourſe in their Doric dialect. This circumſtance, as the morning was yet in its dawn, effectually prevented the advanced guards from ſuſpecting them to be enemies. Demoſthenes then ruſhed forward with the Meſſenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciots were yet in their beds. The camp was no ſooner aſſaulted, than the rout began. Many were ſlain on the ſpot; the reſt fled amain; but the

Surpriſes their camp.

[4] Thucydid. p. 244, et ſeqq.

paſſes were beſet, and the purſuers light-armed. Some ran to the ſea, and beheld a new object of terror, in ſome Athenian ſhips then cruiſing on the coaſt. In this complication of calamities, they plunged into the water, and ſwam to the hoſtile ſquadron, chuſing rather to be deſtroyed by the Athenians, than by the enemies from whom they had eſcaped.

Conſternation of an Ambraciian herald.

On the following day, the victors, who remained at Idomené, ſtripping the dead, and erecting a trophy, were addreſſed by a herald ſent on the part of the detachment who had ſo much ſuffered in its retreat from Olpæ. This herald knew nothing of the freſh diſaſter that had befallen his countrymen. Obſerving the arms of the Ambraciots, he was aſtoniſhed at their number. The victors perceiving his ſurpriſe, aſked him, before he explained his commiſſion, "What he judged to be the amount of the ſlain"? "Not more than two hundred, replied the herald. The demander then ſaid, "It ſhould ſeem otherwiſe, for there are the arms of more than a thouſand men." The herald rejoined, "They cannot then belong to our party." The other replied, "They muſt, if you fought yeſterday at Idomené," "We fought no where yeſterday; we ſuffered the day before, in our retreat from Olpæ." "But *we* fought yeſterday againſt theſe Ambraciots, who were marching to your relief." When the herald heard this, he burſt into a groan, and went abruptly off, without further explaining his commiſſion[5].

[5] Thucydid. p. 244, et ſeqq.

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Demoſthenes ſails to the Peloponneſus. Olymp. lxxxviii. 4. A. C. 425.

Theſe important ſucceſſes enabled Demoſthenes to return with honor to Athens. The term of his military command had expired; but his mind could not brook inactivity. He therefore ſolicited permiſſion to accompany, as a volunteer, the armament which ſailed to Corcyra, the ſucceſs of which has already been related, with leave to employ the Meſſenians, whom he carried along with him, on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, ſhould any opportunity occur there, for promoting the public ſervice. While the fleet ſlowly coaſted along the ſouthern ſhores of that peninſula, the Meſſenians viewed, with mingled joy and ſorrow, the long loſt, but ſtill beloved, ſeats of their anceſtors. They regretted, in particular, the decay of ancient Pylus, the royal reſidence of their admired Neſtor, whoſe youth had been adorned by valor, and his age renowned for wiſdom. Their immortal reſentment againſt Sparta was inflamed by beholding the ruins of Meſſene. A thouſand ideas and ſentiments, which time had obliterated, revived at the ſight of their native ſhores.

Emotions of the Meſſenians at the ſight of their native ſhores.

The Athenians and Meſſenians fortify Pylus.

When the tumult of their emotions ſubſided, they explained their feelings to Demoſthenes, and to each other. He ſuggeſted, or at leaſt warmly approved, the deſign of landing, and rebuilding Pylus, which had been abandoned by the Spartans, though it enjoyed a convenient harbour, and was ſtrongly fortified by nature. Demoſthenes propoſed this meaſure to Eurymedon and Sophocles, who anſwered him with the inſolence congenial to their character, "That there were many barren capes on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, which thoſe

might fortify who wiſhed to entail an uſeleſs expenſe on their country." He next applied to the ſeveral captains of the fleet, and even to the inferior officers, but without better ſucceſs, although he aſſured them that the place abounded in wood and ſtone, with which a wall, ſufficient for defence might ſpeedily be completed. He had deſiſted from farther entreaties, when a fortunate ſtorm drove the whole fleet towards the Pylian harbour. This circumſtance enabled him to renew his inſtances with greater force, alleging that the events of fortune confirmed the expedience of the undertaking. At length the ſailors and ſoldiers, weary of idleneſs (for the weather prevented them from putting to ſea), began the work of their own accord, and carried it on with ſuch vigor and activity, that in ſix days the place was ſtrongly fortified on every ſide[f]. The Athenian fleet then proceeded to Corcyra, Demoſthenes retaining only five ſhips to guard this new acquiſition. CHAP. XVII.

The Spartans attempt to diſlodge them.

The Spartans were no ſooner apprized of this daring meaſure, than they withdrew their army from its annual incurſion into Attica, and recalled their fleet from Corcyra. The citizens, reſiding at home, immediately flew to arms, and marched towards Pylus, which was only fifty miles diſtant from their capital. They found the new fortreſs ſo well prepared for defence, that nothing could be undertaken againſt it with any proſpect of ſucceſs, until their whole forces had aſſembled. This occaſioned but a ſhort delay; after which Pylus was vigorouſly aſſaulted by ſea and land. The

[f] Thucydid. p. 256, et ſeqq.

CHAP. XVII.

walls were weakeſt towards the harbour; the entrance of which, however, was ſo narrow, that only two ſhips could ſail into it abreaſt. Here the attack was moſt furious, and the reſiſtance moſt obſtinate.

Gallantry of Braſidas.

Demoſthenes encouraged his troops by his voice and arm. The gallant Braſidas, a man deſtined to act ſuch an illuſtrious part in the following ſcenes of the war, called out to the Lacedæmonian pilots to drive againſt the beach; and exhorted them, by the deſtruction of their ſhips, to ſave the honor of their country. He farther recommended this boldneſs by his example; but, in performing it, received a wound which rendered him inſenſible. His body dropped into the ſea, ſeemingly deprived of life, but was recovered by the affectionate zeal of his attendants. When his ſenſes returned, he perceived the loſs of his ſhield, a matter highly puniſhable by the Spartan laws, if the ſhield of Braſidas had not been loſt with more glory than ever ſhield was defended[7].

About four hundred Spartans blocked up in Sphacteria.

During three days, Demoſthenes, with very unequal ſtrength, reſiſted the enemy; when the approach of the Athenian fleet from Corcyra, which he had apprized of his danger, terminated the incredible labors of his exhauſted garriſon. A naval engagement enſued, in which the Lacedæmonians were defeated. But neither this defeat, nor the loſs of five ſhips, nor the total diſperſion of their fleet, nor the unexpected relief of Pylus, gave them ſo much uneaſineſs, as an event principally occaſioned by their own imprudence. The iſland

[7] Thucydid. p. 258.

of Sphacteria, ſcarce two miles in circumference, barren, woody, and uninhabited, lies before the harbour of Pylus. In this iſland the Spartans had poſted four hundred and twenty heavy-armed men, with a much greater proportion of Helots, not reflecting that the Athenians, as ſoon as they had reſumed the command of the neighbouring ſea, muſt have theſe forces at their devotion. This circumſtance occurred not to the Spartans till after their defeat; and then affected them the more deeply, becauſe the troops blocked up in the iſland belonged to the firſt families of the republic. CHAP. XVII.

Conſternation in Sparta.

Advice of this misfortune was immediately ſent to the capital. The annual magiſtrates, attended by a deputation of the ſenate, haſtened to examine matters on the ſpot. The evil appeared to be incapable of remedy; and of ſuch importance was this body of Spartans to the community, that all preſent agreed in the neceſſity of ſoliciting a truce, until ambaſſadors were ſent to Athens to treat of a general peace. The Athenians granted a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, on condition that the Spartans, as a pledge of their ſincerity, ſurrendered their whole fleet (conſiſting of about ſixty veſſels) into the harbour of Pylus. Even this mortifying propoſal was accepted. Twenty days were conſumed in the embaſſy; during which time the troops intercepted in Sphacteria were ſupplied with a ſtated proportion of meal, meat, and wine[a], that of the

[a] Thucydides does not aſcertain the quantity of meat. He ſays, two chœnixes of meal, and two cotyls of wine; that is, two pints of meal, and one pint of wine English meaſure, a very ſmall allowance; but the Athenians were afraid leſt the beſieged might hoard their proviſions, if allowed more for daily ſupport; which, if the negociation

CHAP. XVII.

freemen amounting to double the quantity allowed to the ſlaves.

The Spartans ſolicit peace

When the Spartan ambaſſadors were admitted to an audience at Athens, they artfully apologized for the intended length of their diſcourſes. In all their tranſactions with the Greeks, they had hitherto affected the dignified brevity [9] inſpired by conſcious pre-eminence: "Yet on the preſent occaſion, they allowed that it was neceſſary to explain, at ſome length, the advantages which would reſult to all Greece, and particularly to Athens herſelf, if the latter accepted the treaty and alliance, the free gifts of unfeigned friendſhip, ſpontaneouſly offered by Sparta. They pretended not to conceal or extenuate the greatneſs of their misfortune; but the Athenians ought alſo to remember the viciſſitudes of war. It was full time to embrace a hearty reconcilement, and to terminate the calamities of their common country. The war had as yet been carried on with more emulation than hatred, neither party had been reduced to extremity, nor had any incurable evil been yet inflicted or ſuffered. Terms of agreement, if accepted in the moment of victory, would redound to the glory of Athens; if rejected, would aſcertain, who were the authors of the war, and to whom the public calamities ought thenceforth to be imputed; ſince it was well known, that if Athens and Sparta were unanimous, no power in Greece would venture to diſpute their commands [10]."

failed, would enable them to hold out the place longer than they could otherwiſe have done.

[9] Imperatoria brevitas. TACITUS.

[10] Thucydid. p. 262, et ſeqq.

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The meek ſpirit of this diſcourſe only diſcovered to the Athenians the full extent of their good fortune; of which they determined completely to avail themſelves. Inſtigated by the violence of Cleon, they anſwered the ambaſſadors with great haughtineſs; demanding, as preliminaries to the treaty, that the Spartans in Sphacteria ſhould be ſent to Athens; and that ſeveral places of great importance, belonging to the Spartans or their allies, ſhould be delivered into their hands. Theſe lofty pretenſions, which were by no means juſtified by military ſucceſs, appeared totally inadmiſſible to the ambaſſadors, who returned in diſguſt to the Spartan camp.

Arrogant demands of the Athenians.

Nothing, it was evident, could be expected from the moderation of Athens; but it was expected from her juſtice, that ſhe would reſtore the fleet, which had been ſurrendered as a pledge of the treaty. Even this was, on various pretences, denied [11]. Both parties, therefore, prepared for hoſtilities; the Athenians to maintain their arrogance, the Spartans to avenge it.

The Negociation fruitleſs.

The former employed the operation of famine, as the readieſt and leaſt dangerous mode of reducing the ſoldiers in Sphacteria. The Athenian fleet, now greatly augmented, carefully guarded the iſland night and day. But notwithſtanding their utmoſt vigilance, ſmall veſſels availed themſelves

Obſtinate defence of Sphacteria.

[11] The Athenians objected, "an incurſion towards their fortreſs during the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, και αλλα μικρα αξιολογα," and other matters of little moment, ſays Thucydides, with his uſual impartiality, p. 266.

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of ſtorms and darkneſs to throw proviſions into the place; a ſervice undertaken by ſlaves from the promiſe of liberty; and by freemen, from the proſpect of great pecuniary rewards. The Athenians redoubled their diligence, and often intercepted theſe victuallers; but they found it more difficult to interrupt the expert divers, who, plunging deep under water, dragged after them bottles of leather, filled with honey and flour. The blockade was thus fruitleſsly protracted ſeveral weeks. Demoſthenes was averſe to attack an iſland difficult of acceſs, covered with wood, deſtitute of roads, and defended on the ſide of Pylus by a natural fortification, ſtrengthened by art. Meanwhile the Athenians began to ſuffer inconveniences in their turn. Their garriſon in Pylus was cloſely preſſed by the enemy; there was but one ſource of freſh water, and that ſcanty, in the place; proviſions grew ſcarce: the barrenneſs of the neighbouring coaſt afforded no ſupply: while they beſieged the Spartans, they themſelves experienced the hardſhips of a ſiege.

Artifices and impudence of Cleon.

When their ſituation was reported at Athens, the aſſembly fell into commotion: many clamored againſt Demoſthenes; ſeveral accuſed Cleon. The artful demagogue, whoſe oppoſition had chiefly prevented an advantageous peace with Sparta, affected to diſbelieve the intelligence, and adviſed ſending men of approved confidence to Pylus, in order to detect the impoſture. The populace called aloud, "that Cleon himſelf ſhould undertake that commiſſion." But the diſſembler dreaded to

become the dupe of his own artifice. He perceived, that if he went to Pylus, he muſt, at his return, either acknowledge the truth of the report, and thus be ſubjected to immediate ſhame, or fabricate falſe intelligence, and thus be expoſed to future puniſhment. He therefore eluded his own propoſal, by declaring, "that it ill became the dignity of Athens to ſtoop to a formal and tedious examination; and that, whatever were the ſtate of the armament, if the commanders acted like men, they might take Sphacteria in a few days: that if *he* had the honor to be general, he would ſail to the iſland with a ſmall body of light infantry, and take it at the firſt onſet."

Character of Nicias.

Theſe ſarcaſtic obſervations were chiefly directed againſt Nicias, one of the generals actually preſent in the aſſembly; a man of a virtuous but timid diſpoſition; endowed with much prudence, and little enterpriſe; poſſeſſed of moderate abilities, and immoderate riches; a zealous partiſan of ariſtocracy, and an avowed enemy to Cleon, whom he regarded as the worſt enemy of his country.

He cedes the command to Cleon.

A perſon of this character could not be much inclined to engage in the hazardous expedition to Sphacteria. When the Athenians, with the uſual licentiouſneſs that prevailed in their aſſemblies, called out to Cleon, "that if the enterpriſe appeared ſo eaſy, it would better ſuit the extent of his abilities;" Nicias roſe up, and immediately offered to cede to him the command. Cleon at firſt accepted it, thinking Nicias's propoſal merely a feint; but when the latter appeared in earneſt,

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his adverſary drew back, alleging, "that Nicias, not Cleon, was general." The Athenians, with the malicious pleaſantry natural to the multitude, preſſed Cleon the cloſer, the more eagerly he receded. He was at length overcome by their importunity, but not forſaken by his impudence[12]. Advancing to the middle of the aſſembly, he declared, "that he was not afraid of the Lacedæmonians; and engaged, in twenty days, to bring the Spartans as priſoners to Athens, or to die in the attempt[13]." This heroic language excited laughter among the multitude; the wife rejoiced in thinking, that they muſt obtain one of two advantages, either the deſtruction of a turbulent demagogue (which they rather hoped), or the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria.

Boaſtful promiſe of the latter;

which is performed by accident. Olymp. lxxxviii. 4. A. C. 425.

The latter event was haſtened by an accident; while ſome ſoldiers were preparing their victuals, the wood was ſet on fire, and long burned unperceived, till a briſk gale ariſing, the conflagration raged with ſuch violence, as threatened to conſume the iſland. This unforeſeen diſaſter diſcloſed the ſtrength and poſition of the Spartans; and Demoſthenes was actually preparing to attack them, when Cleon, with his light-armed troops, arrived in the camp. The iſland was invaded during night; the advanced guards were taken or ſlain. At the dawn, the Athenians made a deſcent from

[12] Thucydid, p. 271.

[13] Η αυτα απκτανειν, or, "kill them on the ſpot." A little alteration in the text will give the meaning which I preferred as moſt agreeable to what follows; but the other tranſlation better ſuits the boaſtful character of Cleon.

ſeventy

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ſeventy ſhips. The main body of the enemy retired to the ſtrong poſt oppoſite to Pylus, haraſſed in their march by ſhowers of arrows, ſtones, and darts, involved in the aſhes of the burnt wood, which, mounting widely into the air, on all ſides intercepted their ſight, and increaſed the gloom of battle. The Spartans, cloſely embodied, and preſenting a dreadful front to the aſſailants, made good their retreat. Having occupied the deſtined poſt, they boldly defended it wherever the enemy approached, for the nature of the ground hindered it from being ſurrounded. The Athenians uſed their utmoſt efforts to repel and overcome them; and during the greateſt part of the day, both parties obſtinately perſevered in their purpoſe, under the painful preſſures of battle, thirſt, and a burning ſun. At length the Meſſenians, whoſe ardor had been ſignally diſtinguiſhed in every part of this enterpriſe, diſcovered an unknown path leading to the eminence which defended the Lacedæmonian rear. The Spartans were thus encompaſſed on all ſides, and reduced to a ſimilar ſituation to that of their illuſtrious countrymen who fell at Thermopylæ.

The Spartans in Sphacteria carried priſoners to Athens.

Nor did their commanders diſgrace the country of Leonidas. Their general, Epitades, was ſlain. Hippagretes was dying of his wounds. Styphon, the third in command, ſtill exhorted them to perſevere. But Demoſthenes and Cleon, deſirous rather to carry them priſoners to Athens, than to put them to death, invited them, by the loud proclamation of a herald, to lay down their arms.

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The greater part dropped their ſhields, and waved their hands, in token of compliance. A conference followed between Demoſthenes and Cleon on one ſide, and Styphon on the other. Styphon deſired leave to ſend over to the Lacedæmonians on the continent for advice. Several meſſages paſſed between them; in the laſt of which it was ſaid, "the Lacedæmonians permit you to conſult your own utility, provided you ſubmit to nothing baſe:" in conſequence of which determination, they ſurrendered their arms and their perſons. They were conducted to Athens, within the time aſſigned by Cleon; having held out fifty-two days after the expiration of the truce, during which time they had been ſo ſparing of the proviſions conveyed to them by the extraordinary means above-mentioned, that, when the place was taken, they had ſtill ſome thing in reſerve [14].

Humiliation of Sparta.

The Athenians withdrew their fleet, leaving a ſtrong garriſon in Pylus, which was ſoon reinforced by an enterpriſing body of Meſſenians from Naupactus. The Meſſenians, though poſſeſſed of no more than one barren cape on their native and once happy coaſt, reſumed their inveterate hatred againſt Sparta, whoſe territories they continually infeſted by incurſions, or haraſſed by alarms. This ſpecies of war, deſtructive in itſelf, was rendered ſtill more dangerous by the revolts of the Helots, attracted by every motive of affection towards their ancient kinſmen, and animated by every principle of reſentment againſt their tyrannical maſters. Meanwhile the

[14] Thucydid. p. 271 — 279.

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Athenian fleet renewed and multiplied their ravages on the coaſt of Peloponneſus. Reduced to extremity by ſuch proceedings, the Spartans ſent to Athens repeated overtures of accommodation. But the good fortune of the Athenians had only nouriſhed their ambition. At the inſtigation of Cleon, they diſmiſſed the Spartan ambaſſadors more inſolently than ever [15]. Such was their deference to the opinion of this arrogant demagogue; at the ſame time that, with the moſt inconſiſtent levity, they liſtened with pleaſure to the plays of Ariſtophanes, which laſhed the character and adminiſtration of Cleon with the boldeſt ſeverity of ſatire, ſharpened by the edge of the moſt poignant ridicule.

Authority and inſolence of Cleon.

The taking of Pylus, the triumphant return of Cleon, a notorious coward transformed by caprice and accident into a brave and ſucceſsful commander, were topics well ſuiting the comic vein of Ariſtophanes. The imperious demagogue had deſerved the perſonal reſentment of the poet, by denying the legitimacy of his birth [16], and thereby conteſting his title to vote in the aſſembly. On former occaſions, Ariſtophanes had ſtigmatized the incapacity and inſolence of Cleon, together with his perfidious ſelfiſhneſs in embroiling the affairs of the republic. In the comedy [17] firſt repreſented in the ſeventh year of the war, he attacks him in the moment of victory, when fortune had rendered

Expoſed by Ariſtophanes.

[15] Ariſtoph. Equit. v. 794. [16] Vit. anonym. Ariſtoph.

[17] The *Ιππεις*.

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him the idol of a licentious multitude, when no comedian was ſo daring as to play his character, and no painter ſo bold as to deſign his maſk [18].

Account of his comedy, entitled, the Knights.

Ariſtophanes, therefore, appeared for the firſt time on the ſtage, only diſguiſing his own face, the better to repreſent the part of Cleon. In this ludicrous piece, which ſeems to have been celebrated even beyond its merit, the people of Athens are deſcribed under the allegory of a capricious old dotard, whoſe credulity, abuſed by a malicious ſlave lately admitted into his houſe [19], perſecutes and torments his faithful old ſervants. Demoſthenes bitterly complains, that, intending to gratify the palate of the old man, he had brought a delicate morſel from Pylus; but that it had been ſtolen by Cleon, and by him ſerved up to their common maſter. After lamenting, with his companion Nicias, the hardſhips of their condition, they hold counſel together, and contrive various expedients for putting an end to their common calamities. The deſponding Nicias propoſes drinking bull's blood, after the example of Themiſtocles; Demoſthenes, with more courage, adviſes a hearty draught of wine. Finding Cleon aſleep, they ſeize the opportunity not only to purloin this liquor, but to rifle his pockets, in which they diſcover ſome ancient oracles, typically repreſenting the ſucceſſion of Athenian magiſtrates. Towards the end of the prophecy, it was ſaid, that the dragon

[18] Ὑπο τυ δεος γαρ αυτον αδεις ηθελε
Των σκευοποιων εικασαι. Equites, v. 231.

[19] Νεοκτητον κακον, "the new-bought miſchief."

ſhould overcome the devouring vulture. The rapacious avarice of Cleon correſponded to the type of the vulture; and the dragon darkly ſhadowed out Agoracritus, an eminent maker of puddings and ſauſages, the ſhape and contents of which alluded to the figure and food of that terrible ſerpent. Nicias and Demoſthenes hail this favorite of fortune, as the deſtined maſter of the republic. Agoracritus alleges in vain, that he is totally unacquainted with political affairs, ignorant of every liberal art, and has hardly learned to read. They reply, by announcing to him the oracle, and by proving that his pretended imperfections better qualified him to conduct the government of Athens. This office required none of the talents, the want of which he lamented. He matched Cleon in impudence, and ſurpaſſed him in ſtrength of lungs. His profeſſion had taught him to ſqueeze, to amaſs, to bruiſe, to embroil, and to confound; and long experience had rendered him accompliſhed in all the frauds and chicane of the market [20]. He might therefore boldly enter the liſts with Cleon, being aſſured of aſſiſtance from the whole body of Athenian knights [21]. Agoracritus, thus encouraged, prepares for encountering his adverſary. The conteſt, long doubtful, is maintained in a ſtyle of the loweſt buffoonery, always ludicrous, often indecent. The old dotard, or rather the Athenians whom he repreſents,

[20] The ſame word in Greek denotes the market and the forum. Indeed the ſame place uſually ſerved for both.

[21] The ἱππεις, or Equites, the ſecond rank of citizens at Athens, who deteſted Cleon, and from whom the play takes its name.

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finally acknowledge their paſt errors; and regret being ſo long deceived by an upſtart ſlave, through whoſe obſtinacy in continuing the war, they had been cooped up within the walls of an unwholeſome city, and hindered from enjoying their beautiful fields and happy rural amuſements. Agoracritus ſeizes this favorable moment to produce two ancient treaties with the Lacedæmonians, perſonified by two beautiful women, whom he had found cloſely mewed up in the houſe of Cleon. Of theſe females the old Athenian becomes ſuddenly enamoured, and they retire together to the country.

The Athenians take Cythera, Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A. C. 424.

The people of Athens permitted, and even approved, the licentious boldneſs of Ariſtophanes; but neither the ſtrength of reaſon, nor the ſharpneſs of ſatire, could reſiſt the impetuoſity of their ambition. The war was rendered popular by ſucceſs; they prepared for carrying it on with redoubled vigor. The firſt operations of the enſuing ſummer gratified their utmoſt hopes. The principal diviſion of the fleet, conducted by the prudence of Nicias, took the fertile and populous iſland of Cythera, ſtretching from the ſouthern promontory of Laconia towards the Cretan ſea, and long enriched by the commerce of Egypt and Libya. The Lacedæmonian garriſon, as well as the Spartan magiſtrates in the iſland, ſurrendered priſoners of war. The more dangerous part of the inhabitants were removed to the Athenian iſles; the remainder were ſubjected to an annual tribute of eight hundred pounds ſterling; an Athenian garriſon took poſſeſſion of the fortreſs.

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Soon after this important conqueſt, the arms of Demoſthenes and Hippocrates reduced the town of Nicæa, the principal ſea-port of the Megareans; and the Athenian fleet ravaged with impunity ſeveral maritime cities on the eaſtern coaſt of Peloponneſus. Thyrea was condemned to a harder fate. This city, together with the ſurrounding diſtrict, had been granted, by the compaſſion of Sparta, to the miſerable natives of Ægina, who (as above mentioned) had been driven from their once powerful iſland by the cruelty of Athens. This cruelty ſtill continued to purſue them. Their newly-raiſed walls were taken by aſſault; their houſes burned; and the inhabitants, without diſtinction, put to the ſword.

Reduce Nicæa, and ravage Peloponneſus.

Hitherto all the enterpriſes of the Athenians were crowned with ſucceſs. Fortune firſt deſerted them in Bœotia. During ſeveral months their generals, Demoſthenes and Hippocrates, availing themſelves of the political factions of that country, had been carrying on ſecret intrigues with Chæronea, Siphæ, and Orchomenus, places abounding in declared partiſans of democracy, and eternally hoſtile to the ambition of Thebes. The inſurgents had agreed to take arms, in order to betray the weſtern parts of Bœotia to Demoſthenes, who ſailed with forty gallies from Naupactus; while Hippocrates, at the head of ſeven thouſand heavy-armed Athenians, and a much greater proportion of light-armed auxiliaries, invaded the eaſtern frontier of that province. It was expected, that, before the Thebans could bring a ſufficient force into

Endeavour to produce a revolution in Bœotia.

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the field, the invaders and inſurgents, advancing from oppoſite extremities of the country, might unite in the centre, and perhaps ſubdue Thebes itſelf, the moſt powerful, as well as moſt zealous, ally of Sparta.

Their plan too complicated for execution.

This plan, though concerted with much ability, was found too complicated for execution. Demoſthenes ſteered towards Siphæ, before his coadjutor was ready to take the field; ſome miſtake, it is ſaid, having happened about the time appointed for action; and the whole contrivance was betrayed by Nicomachus, a Phocian, to the Spartans, and by them communicated to the Bœotians. The cities which meditated revolt were thus ſecured, before Demoſthenes appeared at Siphæ, and before Hippocrates had even marched from Attica.

They are defeated in the battle of Delium, Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A. C. 424.

The latter at length entered the eaſtern frontier of Bœotia; and, as the principal deſign had miſcarried, contented himſelf with taking and fortifying Delium, a place ſacred to Apollo. Having garriſoned this poſt, he prepared for returning home. But while his army ſtill lay in the neighbourhood of Delium, the Thebans, encouraged by Pagondas, a brave and ſkilful leader, marched with great rapidity from Tanagra, in order to intercept his retreat. Their forces amounted to eighteen thouſand; the Athenians were little leſs numerous. An engagement enſued, which national emulation rendered bloody and obſtinate. Before the battle, Pagondas had detached a ſmall ſquadron of horſe, with orders to ride up after the commencement of the action. This ſtratagem

was deciſive. The Athenians, terrified at the ſight of a reinforcement, which their fears magnified into a new army, were thrown into diſorder, and put to flight. Approaching darkneſs ſaved them from total deſtruction. They eſcaped diſgracefully into Attica, after leaving in the field of battle a thouſand pikemen, with their commander Hippocrates.

The victorious army immediately formed the ſiege of Delium, which was taken by means of a machine firſt contrived for that purpoſe. Several parts of the fortification, which had been raiſed in great haſte, conſiſted chiefly of wood. The beſiegers therefore, joining together a number of large beams, formed a huge maſt, perforated in the middle; to one of its extremities they appended a prodigious maſs of pitch and ſulphur; and to the other a bellows, which, when this unuſual inſtrument of deſtruction was raiſed above the wooden rampart, immediately threw the whole into flames. The Athenian garriſon, diminiſhed by death or deſertion to two hundred men, ſurrendered priſoners of war [22].

The Thebans take Delium by means of a machine invented for that purpoſe.

The Athenians had ſcarcely time to lament their loſſes in Bœotia, when they received intelligence of a calamity in another quarter, equally unexpected, and ſtill more alarming. This event is the more remarkable, becauſe it naturally aroſe out of the preceding proſperity of Athens, and the paſt misfortunes of Sparta. The uninterrupted

Commotions in Thrace.

[22] Thucydid. p. 304—320.

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train of ſucceſs which attended the arms of Nicias and Demoſthenes in the eighth year of the war, alarmed the citizens of Olynthus and other places of the Chalcidicé, which having embraced the earlieſt opportunity of revolting from the Athenians, juſtly dreaded the vengeance of an incenſed and victorious people. Every ſoutherly wind threatened them with the approach of an Athenian fleet. Their apprehenſions were not leſs painful on the ſide of Theſſaly. The ſlighteſt movement in that country terrified them with the apprehenſions of an Athenian army, which, victorious in the ſouth, ſhould advance to puniſh its northern enemies. But as none of theſe dreaded dangers were realized, the inhabitants of the Chalcidicé gradually reſumed courage, put their towns in a poſture of defence, and craved aſſiſtance from their Peloponneſian allies. At the ſame time Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who regarded the Athenians as his ancient and natural enemies, and the rapacious invaders of his coaſt, ſent money into the ſouth of Greece, for the purpoſe of hiring ſoldiers, whom he intended to employ in reſiſting the encroachments of that ambitious people, as well as in ſubduing the Elymeans, Lynceſtæ, and other barbarous tribes, not yet incorporated in the Macedonian kingdom.

Fomented by the Spartans.

Such were the enemies, whoſe activity the good fortune of Athens had rouſed; while the calamities of Sparta prompted her to ſupply the reinforcement of troops, which both Perdiccas and the Chalcidians demanded. During the ſeventh and

eighth years of the war, that republic fatally experienced the truth of Pericles's maxim, "that thoſe who command the ſea, may alſo become maſters at land." The Athenian fleets domineered over the coaſt of Peloponneſus. It was impoſſible to foreſee what places would be the next objects of their continual deſcents. The maritime parts were ſucceſſively laid waſte, and finally abandoned by the inhabitants, who found reſiſtance ineffectual and uſeleſs. Theſe misfortunes were increaſed by the frequent deſertion of the Helots to the neighbouring garriſons in Pylus and Cythera, and by the dread of a general inſurrection among thoſe numerous and unhappy victims of Spartan tyranny. To prevent this evil, the Spartans had recourſe to ſuch expedients as excite aſtoniſhment and horror. They commanded the Helots to chuſe two thouſand of their braveſt and moſt meritorious youths, who, by the general conſent of their companions, deſerved the crown of liberty; and when inveſted with this perfidious ornament, the unſuſpecting freemen had paraded the ſtreets, and ſacrificed in the temples, exulting in their late emancipation, theſe new members of the community gradually diſappeared from the ſight of men, nor was it ever known by what means they had been deſtroyed. But the veil of myſtery, which concealed that dark and bloody ſtratagem, prevented neither the reſentment of the ſlaves, nor the juſt ſuſpicion of their maſters. The latter were eager to embrace any meaſure that might deliver their country from its dangerous domeſtic foes. With much ſatisfaction,

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therefore, they ſent ſeven hundred Helots to the ſtandard of Braſidas, whoſe merit had recommended him to Perdiccas and the Chalcidians, as the general beſt qualified to manage the Macedonian war. About a thouſand ſoldiers were levied in the neighbouring cities of Peloponneſus. Several Spartans cheerfully accompanied a leader whom they admired. With this inconſiderable force Braſidas, towards the beginning of autumn, undertook an expedition highly important in its conſequences, and conducted with conſummate prudence and bravery [31].

Braſidas's expedition to Thrace. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A. C. 424.

Having traverſed the friendly countries of Bœotia and Phocis, he arrived at the foot of Mount Oëta, and penetrated through the narrow defiles confined between that ſteep and woody range of hills, and the boiſterous waves of the Malian gulf. The ſight of Thermopylæ animated the enthuſiaſm of the Spartans, and encouraged them to force their way through the hoſtile plains of Theſſaly; a country actually torn by domeſtic diſcord, but always friendly to the Athenians. The celerity of Braſidas anticipated the ſlow oppoſition of a divided enemy. Having reached the Macedonian town of Dium, he joined forces with Perdiccas, who propoſed directing the firſt operations of the combined army againſt Arribæus, the king or leader of the barbarous Lynceſtæ. But even this Barbarian knew the valor of the Spartans, and the equity of Braſidas. To the deciſion of the

[31] Thucydid. p. 304.

Grecian general he offered to ſubmit the differences between Perdiccas and himſelf, and engaged to abide by the award, however unfavorable to his intereſt. The Spartan liſtened to a propoſal extremely reaſonable in itſelf, though altogether inconſiſtent with the ambitious views of Perdiccas, who diſdained to accept as a judge the man whom he paid as an auxiliary. Braſidas, on the other hand declined in firm but decent terms, to employ his valor againſt thoſe who implored his juſtice. The generals thus ſeparated in mutual diſguſt; and Perdiccas thenceforth reduced his contribution of ſubſidy from a moiety to a third; but even that was extorted from his fears, not beſtowed by his munificence. CHAP. XVII.

His tranſactions with the Acanthians.

Braſidas haſtened to join the Chalcidians, by whom he was received with a degree of joy ſuitable to the impatience with which he had been expected. Amidſt the general defection of their neighbours, the towns of Acanthus and Stagirus ſtill maintained their allegiance to Athens. Braſidas appeared before the gates of Acanthus, while the peaceful inhabitants were preparing for the labors of the vintage. He ſent a meſſenger, craving leave to enter the place, and to addreſs the aſſembly. The Acanthians were divided in opinion; but the majority, fearing to expoſe their ripe fields and vineyards to the reſentment of his army, agreed to admit the general alone and unattended, and impartially to weigh whatever he propoſed for their deliberation. Braſidas, though a Spartan, was an able ſpeaker. He obſerved to the Acanthians,

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convened in full aſſembly, "that, in compliance with the generous reſolution of Sparta, he had undertaken, and finally accompliſhed, a long and dangerous journey, to deliver them from the tyranny of Athenian magiſtrates and garriſons, and to reſtore them, what the common oppreſſors of Greece had ſo long withheld, the independent government of their own equitable laws. This was the object, which, amidſt all the calamities of war, the Spartans had ever kept in view; this was the purpoſe, which, before his departure from home, the principal magiſtrates had ſworn unanimouſly to maintain. *That* freedom and independence, which formed the domeſtic happineſs of Sparta, his countrymen were ambitious to communicate to all their allies. But if the Acanthians refuſed to ſhare the general benefit, they muſt not complain of experiencing the unhappy effects of their obſtinacy. The arms of Sparta would compel thoſe whom her arguments had failed to perſuade. Nor could this be blamed as injuſtice; firſt, becauſe the reſources with which the Acanthians furniſhed Athens, under the ignominious name of tribute, ſerved to rivet the chains of Greece; and ſecondly, becauſe the example of a people, ſo wealthy and flouriſhing, and long renowned for their penetration and ſagacity, might influence the reſolutions of neighbouring ſtates, and deter them from concurring with the meaſures neceſſary to promote the public welfare and ſecurity."

His merit and ſucceſs.

This judicious diſcourſe, enforced by the terror of the Spartan army, engaged the Acanthians to

accept the friendſhip of Braſidas. Stagirus, another city on the Strymonic gulf, readily followed the example, and opened its gates to the deliverer. During the enſuing winter, the meaſures of the Spartan general were conducted with equal ability and enterpriſe. His ſucceſsful operations againſt the inland towns facilitated the ſurrender of ſuch places, as, by their maritime or inſular ſituation, were moſt expoſed to the vengeance of Athens, and therefore moſt averſe to revolt. His moderate uſe of victory enſured the good-will of the vanquiſhed. The various parts of a plan, thus artfully combined, mutually aſſiſted each other; the ſucceſs of one undertaking contributed to that of the next which followed it; and, at length, without any conſiderable miſcarriage, he had rendered himſelf maſter of moſt places in the peninſulas of Acta, Sithonia, and Pallené.

Amphipolis revolts to Braſidas,

The loſs of Amphipolis was that which moſt deeply afflicted the Athenians: a rich and populous city, beautifully ſituate on a ſmall but well cultivated iſland, ſurrounded by the river Strymon, the banks of which ſupplied excellent timber, and other materials of naval ſtrength. By poſſeſſing this town, the Spartans now commanded both branches of the river, and might thus paſs, without interruption, to the Athenian colonies, or ſubjects, on the coaſt of Thrace; ſeize, or plunder, the gold mines oppoſite to the iſle of Thaſos; and ravage the fertile fields of the Thracian Cherſoneſus. The conqueſt of a place ſo eſſential to the enemy, had exerciſed the courage, the eloquence,

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and the dexterity of Braſidas. He formed a conſpiracy with the malecontents in the place, ſkilfully diſpoſed his army before the walls, harangued the aſſembly of the people. A moſt ſeaſonable promptitude diſtinguiſhed all his meaſures; yet the Athenian Eucleus, who commanded the garriſon, found time to ſend a veſſel to Thaſos, requeſting immediate and effectual relief.

notwithſtanding the activity of Thucydides the hiſtorian;

The Athenians had committed the government of that iſland, as well as the direction of the mines on the oppoſite continent, to the celebrated hiſtorian of a war, in which he was a meritorious, though unfortunate, actor. Without a moment's delay, Thucydides put to ſea with ſeven gallies, and arrived in the mouth of the Strymon the ſame day on which his aſſiſtance had been demanded. But it was already too late to ſave Amphipolis [24]. The Spartan general, who had exact information of all the meaſures of the beſieged, well knew the importance of anticipating the arrival of Thucydides, whoſe name was highly reſpected by the Greek colonies in Thrace, and whoſe influence was conſiderable among the native Barbarians. Braſidas, therefore, propoſed ſuch a capitulation to the Amphipolitans as it ſeemed imprudent to refuſe. They were to be releaſed from the tribute which they had hitherto paid the Athenians; to enjoy the utmoſt degree of political independence, not inconſiſtent with the alliance of Sparta; even the Athenian garriſon, if they continued in the place, were to be entitled to all the rights of citizens; and ſuch

[24] Thucydid. p. 322.

perſons

perſons as choſe to leave it, were granted a reaſonable time to remove their families and their property. The laſt condition was embraced by the Athenians, and their more determined partiſans. They retired to the neighbouring town of Eion, ſituate near the ſea, on the northern branch of the Strymon; a place ſecured againſt every hoſtile aſſault by the ſkill and activity of Thucydides.

which ſaves Eion

Towards the end of winter, the full extent of Braſidas's ſucceſs was made known at Athens. The aſſembly was in commotion; and the populace were the more enraged at their loſſes, as it now appeared ſo eaſy to have prevented them, either by guarding the narrow defiles which led to their Macedonian poſſeſſions, or by ſending their fleet with a ſeaſonable reinforcement to their feeble garriſons in thoſe parts. Their own neglect had occaſioned the public diſgrace; but with the uſual injuſtice and abſurdity accompanying popular diſcontents, they exculpated themſelves, and baniſhed their generals. Thucydides was involved in this cruel ſentence. An armament was ſent to Macedon; and new commanders were named to oppoſe Braſidas.

Braſidas's ſucceſs occaſions clamors and impeachments in Athens.

But the deſigns of that commander, who had begun to build veſſels on the Strymon, and aſpired at nothing leſs than ſucceeding to the authority, without exerciſing the oppreſſion, of Athens, over thoſe extenſive ſhores, were more ſucceſsfully oppoſed by the envy of the Spartan magiſtrates. The pride of the nobility was wounded by the glory of an expedition, in which they had no ſhare; and

The Spartans avail themſelves of it to obtain a truce for a year.

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their ſelfiſhneſs, while it obſtinately prevented the ſupplies neceſſary to complete the plan of Braſidas, was eager to reap the profit of his paſt ſucceſs. The reſtoration of their kinſmen taken at Sphacteria formed the object of their fondeſt wiſh; and they expected that the Athenians might liſten to a propoſal for that purpoſe, in order to recover the places which they had loſt, and to check the fortunate career of a prudent and enterpriſing general. The Athenians readily entered into theſe views; it was determined that matters of ſuch importance ſhould be diſcuſſed with leiſure and impartiality; a truce was therefore agreed on for a year between the contending republics.

Olymp. lxxxix. 2. A. C. 423.

This tranſaction was concluded in the ninth ſummer of the war. It was totally unexpected by Braſidas, who received the voluntary ſubmiſſion of Scioné and Menda, two places of conſiderable importance in the peninſula of Pallené; of the former, indeed, before he was acquainted with the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities; but of the latter, even after he was apprized of that treaty.

The war renewed. Olymp. lxxxix. 3. A. C. 422.

While the active valor of Braſidas prevented the confirmation of peace, the conſcious worthleſſneſs of Cleon promoted the renewal, or rather the continuance, of war. The glory of Athens was the perpetual theme of his diſcourſe. He exhorted his countrymen to puniſh the perfidy of Sparta, in abetting the inſolent revolt of Menda and Scioné; and to employ his own ſkill and bravery, which had been ſo ſucceſsfully exerted on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, to repair their declining fortune in

Macedonia. The Athenians liſtened to the ſpecious advice of this turbulent declaimer, who, in the enſuing ſpring, ſailed to the Macedonian coaſt with a fleet of thirty gallies, twelve hundred citizens, heavy-armed, a ſquadron of three hundred horſe, and a powerful body of light-armed auxiliaries. The ſurrender of Menda and Torona, whoſe inhabitants were treated with every exceſs of cruelty, encouraged him to attack Amphipolis. With this deſign, having collected his forces at Eion, he waited the arrival of ſome Macedonian troops, promiſed by Perdiccas, who having quarrelled with the Spartan general, deceitfully flattered the hopes of his antagoniſt. CHAP. XVII.

Battle of Amphipolis.

The army of Cleon contained the flower of the Athenian youth, whoſe ardent valor diſdained a precarious dependence on Barbarian aid. They accuſed the cowardice of their leader, which was only equalled by his incapacity, and lamented their own hard fate in being ſubjected to the authority of a man ſo unworthy to command them. The impatient temper of an arrogant demagogue was ill fitted to endure theſe ſeditious complaints. He haſtily led his troops before the place, without previouſly examining the ſtrength of the walls, the ſituation of the ground, the number or diſpoſition of the enemy. Braſidas, meanwhile, had taken proper meaſures to avail himſelf of the known imprudence of his adverſary. A conſiderable body of men had been concealed in the woody mountain Cerdylium, which overhangs Amphipolis. The greater part of the army were drawn up, ready for

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action, at the ſeveral gates of the city. Clearidas, who commanded there, had orders to ruſh forth at a given ſignal, while Braſidas in perſon, conducting a ſelect band of intrepid followers, watched the firſt opportunity for attack. The plan, contrived with ſo much ſkill, was executed with equal dexterity and preciſion. Confounded with the rapidity of ſuch an unexpected and complicated charge, the enemy fled amain, abandoning their ſhields, and expoſing their naked backs to the ſwords and ſpears of the purſuers. The forces on either ſide amounted to about three thouſand; ſix hundred Athenians fell victims to the folly of Cleon, who, though foremoſt in the flight, was arreſted by the hand of a Myrcinian targeteer.

Death of Cleon.

Death and honors of Braſidas.

His death might appeaſe the manes of his unfortunate countrymen; but nothing could alleviate the ſorrow of the victors for the loſs of their admired Braſidas, who received a mortal wound while he advanced to the attack. He was conveyed alive to Amphipolis, and enjoyed the conſolation of his laſt victory, in which only ſeven men had periſhed on the Spartan ſide. The ſad magnificence of his funeral was adorned by the ſplendor of military honors; but what was ſtill more honorable to Braſidas, he was ſincerely lamented by the grateful tears of numerous communities, who regarded his virtues and abilities as the ſureſt pledges of their own happineſs and ſecurity. The citizens of Amphipolis paid an extraordinary tribute to his memory. Having demoliſhed every monument of their ancient leaders and patriots,

they erected the ſtatue of Braſidas in the moſt conſpicuous ſquare of the city, appointed annual games to be celebrated at his tomb, and ſacrificed to his revered ſhade, as to the great hero and original founder of their community [25].

Peace of Nicias. Olymp. lxxxix 4. A. C. 421.

The battle of Amphipolis removed the principal obſtacles to peace. There was not any Spartan general qualified to accompliſh the deſigns of Braſidas. The Athenians, dejected by defeat, and humbled by diſgrace, wanted the bold impoſing eloquence of Cleon, to diſguiſe their weakneſs, and varniſh their misfortunes. With the diſheartened remains of an enfeebled armament, they deſpaired of recovering their Macedonian poſſeſſions; and the greater part returned home, well diſpoſed for an accommodation with the enemy. Theſe diſpoſitions were confirmed by the pacific temper of Nicias, who had ſucceeded to the influence of Cleon, and who fortunately diſcovered in the moderation of Pleiſtoanax, king of Sparta, a coadjutor extremely ſolicitous to promote his views. During winter, ſeveral friendly conferences were held between the commiſſioners of the two republics; and, towards the commencement of the enſuing ſpring, a treaty of peace, and ſoon afterwards a defenſive alliance, for fifty years, was ratified by the kings and ephori of Sparta on the one ſide, and by the archons and generals of Athens on the other. In conſequence of this negociation, which was intended to comprehend the reſpective allies of the contracting powers, all places and priſoners, taken in

[25] Thucydid. p. 307.

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the courſe of the war, were to be mutually reſtored; the revolted cities in Macedon were ſpecified by name; but it was regulated that the Athenians ſhould not require from them any higher revenue than that apportioned by the juſtice of Ariſtides [26].

Diſſatisfaction of the Lacedæmonian allies.

In all their tranſactions, the Greeks were ever prodigal of promiſes, but backward in performance; and, amidſt the continual rotation of authority, magiſtrates eaſily found excuſes for violating the conditions granted by their predeceſſors. The known principles of republican inconſtancy, ever ready to vibrate between exceſſive animoſity and immoderate friendſhip, might likewiſe ſuggeſt a reaſon for converting the treaty of peace into a contract of alliance. But this meaſure, in the preſent caſe, was the effect of neceſſity. Athens and Sparta might make mutual reſtitution, becauſe their reſpective intereſts required it. But no motive of intereſt engaged the former power to reſtore Nicæa to the Megareans, or the towns of Solium and Anactorium to Corinth. The Thebans, ſhortly before the peace, had ſeized the Athenian fortreſs of Panactum, ſituate on the frontier of Bœotia. They were ſtill maſters of Platæa. Elated by their ſignal victory at Delium, they could not be ſuppoſed willing to abandon their conqueſts, or even much inclined to peace. It was ſtill leſs to be expected that the Macedonian cities ſhould, for the convenience of Sparta, ſubmit to the ſevere yoke

[26] Thucydid. p. 354. et ſeqq.

of Athens, from which they had recently been delivered; nor could it be hoped that even the inferior ſtates of Peloponneſus ſhould tamely lay down their arms, without obtaining any of thoſe advantages with which they had been long flattered by their Spartan allies. CHAP. XVII.

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Diſcontents fomented by the Corinthians. — The Argive Alliance. — To which Athens accedes. — Birth and Education of Alcibiades. — His Friendſhip with Socrates. — His character — And Views — Which are favored by the State of Greece. — He deceives the Spartan Ambaſſadors. — Renewal of the Peloponneſian War. — Battle of Mantinæa. — Tumults in Argos. — Maſſacre of the Scioneans. — Cruel Conqueſt of Melos.

CHAP. XVIII. Diſcontents fomented by the Corinthians.

THE voluptuous, yet turbulent citizens of Corinth, enjoy the odious diſtinction of renewing a war which their intrigues and animoſities had firſt kindled. Under pretence of having taken an oath never to abandon the Macedonian cities, they declined being parties in the general treaty of peace. The alliance between Athens and Sparta, in which it was ſtipulated, that theſe contracting powers ſhould be entitled to make ſuch alterations in the treaty as circumſtances might require, the Corinthians affected, with ſome reaſon, to conſider as a conſpiracy againſt the common liberties of Greece [1]. Fired with this idea, they haſtened to Argos, in order to animate that republic with the ſame paſſions which rankled in their own breaſts. Having

[1] The clauſe was worded in ſuch a manner as might naturally excite alarm: Προσθεναι και αφελειν ὁτι αν ΑΜΦΟΙΝ τοιν πολεμοιν δοκη Thucydid. l. v. p. 284.

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rouſed the ambition of the *magiſtrates*, they artfully reminded the *people* of the glory of Agamemnon, recalled to the Argives their ancient and juſt pre-eminence in the Peloponneſus, and conjured them to maintain the honor of that illuſtrious peninſula, which had been ſo ſhamefully abandoned by the puſillanimity, or betrayed by the ſelfiſhneſs, of Sparta.

The Argive alliance. Olymp. lxxxix. 4. A. C. 421.

The Argives wanted neither power nor inclination to aſſume that important office. During the Peloponneſian war, they had obſerved the principles of a prudent neutrality, equally favorable to their populouſneſs and their wealth. Their protection was courted by Mantinæa, the moſt powerful city in Arcadia, which had recently conquered ſome villages in its neighbourhood, to which Sparta laid claim. The Elians, long hoſtile to Sparta, eagerly promoted the Argive alliance, which was farther ſtrengthened by the ſpeedy acceſſion of the Macedonian allies, whoſe inhabitants were not more flattered by the kind zeal of Corinth, than provoked by the cruel indifference of Sparta. Thebes and Megara were equally offended with their Lacedæmonian allies, and equally inclined to war. But a rigid ariſtocracy prevailed in thoſe ſtates, whoſe ambitious magiſtrates, trembling for their perſonal authority, and that of their families, declined entering into confederacy with free democratical republics [2].

To which Athens accedes.

But this democratical aſſociation ſoon acquired an acceſſion ſtill more important, and received into

[2] Thucydid. l. v. p. 371.

CHAP. XVIII. Olymp. xc. 1. A. C. 420.

its boſom the fountain of liberty itſelf; even the republic of Athens. This extraordinary event happened in the year following the negociation between Athens and Sparta. It was effected by means extremely remote from the experience of modern times; means which it is incumbent on us to explain, leſt the political tranſactions of Greece ſhould appear too fluctuating and capricious to afford a proper ſubject for hiſtory.

Birth and education of Alcibiades.

Amidſt the factious turbulence of ſenates and aſſemblies, no meaſure could be adopted by one party, without being condemned by another. Many Athenians diſapproved the peace of Nicias[3]; but the general blaze of oppoſition was eclipſed by the ſplendor of one man, who, on this occaſion, firſt diſplayed thoſe ſingular but unhappy talents, which proved fatal to himſelf and to his country. Alcibiades had not yet reached his thirtieth year, the age required by the wiſdom of Solon for being entitled to ſpeak in the aſſembly. But every advantageous circumſtance of birth and fortune, talents natural and acquired, accompliſhments of mind and body, pleaded an exception in favor of this extraordinary character, which, producing at once flowers and fruit, united with the blooming vivacity of youth, the ripened wiſdom of experience[4]. His father, the rich and generous Clinias, derived his extraction from the heroic

[3] The Greeks ſometimes diſtinguiſhed treaties by the names of thoſe who made them: the peace of Cimon; the peace of Nicias; and, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, the peace of Antalcidas.

[4] Plut. et Nepos in Alcibiad.

Ajax, and had diſtinguiſhed his own valor and patriotiſm in the glorious ſcenes of the Perſian war. In the female line, the ſon of Clinias was allied to the eloquence and magnanimity of Pericles, who, as his neareſt ſurviving kinſman, was intruſted with the care of his minority. But the ſtateſman, who governed with undivided ſway the affairs of Athens and of Greece, could not beſtow much attention on this important domeſtic taſk. The tender years of Alcibiades were committed to the illiberal diſcipline of mercenary preceptors; his youth and inexperience were beſet by the deſtructive adulation of ſervile flatterers,— until the young Athenian, having begun to reliſh the poems of Homer, the admiration of which is congenial to every great mind, learned from thence to deſpiſe the pedantry of the one, and to deteſt the meanneſs of the other [f].

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From Homer Alcibiades early imbibed that ambition for excellence which is the great leſſon of the immortal bard. Having attained the verge of manhood, he readily diſtinguiſhed, among the crowd of rhetoricians and ſophiſts, the ſuperior merit of Socrates, who, rejecting all factitious and abſtruſe ſtudies, confined his ſpeculations to matters of real importance and utility; who, having never travelled to Egypt and the Eaſt in ſearch of *myſterious* knowledge, reaſoned with an Attic perſpicuity and freedom; and who, being unbiaſſed by the ſyſtem of any maſter, and always maſter of himſelf, thought,

His early attachment to Socrates.

[f] Plut. in Alcibiad.

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ſpoke, and acted with equal independence and dignity. An amiable and moſt inſtructive writer, the diſciple and friend of Socrates, has left an admirable panegyric of the uniform temperance, the unſhaken probity, the diffuſive benevolence invariably diſplayed in his virtuous life of ſeventy years[6]. His diſtinguiſhing excellences are juſtly appreciated by Xenophon, a ſcholar worthy of his maſter[7]; but the youthful levity of Alcibiades (for youth is ſeldom capable of eſtimating the higheſt of all merits, the undeviating tenor of an innocent and uſeful life) was chiefly delighted with the ſplendor of particular actions. The eloquence, rather than the innocence of Socrates, excited his admiration. He was charmed with that inimitable raillery, that clear comprehenſive logic, which baffled the moſt acute diſputants of the Athenian ſchools[8]; that erect independence of mind, which diſdained the inſolence of power, the pride of wealth, and the vanity of popular fame, was well fitted to attract the congenial eſteem of Alcibiades, who aſpired beyond the beaten paths of vulgar greatneſs; nor could the gallant youth be leſs affected by the invincible intrepidity of Socrates, when, quitting the ſhade of ſpeculation, and covered with the helm and cuiraſs, he graſped the maſſy ſpear, and juſtified, by his ſtrenuous exertion in the field of battle, the uſeful leſſons of his philoſophy[9].

Their mutual obligations and friendſhip.

Socrates in his turn (ſince it is eaſier for a wiſe man to correct the errors of reaſon than to conquer

[6] Xenoph. Memorabil. Socrat.

[7] See particularly Xenoph. Apolog. Socrat. [8] Plato, paſſim.

[9] Xenoph. Memorab. Socrat. pp. 449. 804. 818.

the deluſions of ſentiment) was deeply affected with the beauty of Alcibiades[10]; a beauty depending, not on the tranſient flower of youth, and the ſeductive delicacy of effeminate graces, but on the ineffable harmony of a form which realized the ſublime conceptions of Homer and Phidias concerning their fabulous divinities, and which ſhone in the autumn of life with undiminiſhed effulgence[11]. The affection of Socrates, though infinitely removed from impurity, reſembled rather the ardor of love than the calm moderation of friendſhip. The ſage, whoſe company was courted by his other diſciples, himſelf courted the company of Alcibiades; and when the ungrateful youth ſometimes eſcaped to his licentious companions, the philoſopher purſued him with the eagerneſs of a father or maſter, anxious to recover a fugitive ſon or ſlave[12]. At the battle of Potidæa he ſaved the life of his pupil, and in order to gratify the love of military glory, which already animated his youthful boſom, the ſage obtained for Alcibiades the prize of valor, which the univerſal conſent of the Athenians thought due to himſelf. At the fatal engagement of Delium, Alcibiades, it is ſaid, had an opportunity of returning the more ſubſtantial favor, by ſaving the precious life of Socrates[13]; and it may

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[10] Vid. Xenoph. and Plato, paſſim. Socrates often acknowledges the danger of beauty, and its power over himſelf; but loſes no opportunity to caution his diſciples againſt the ſhameful paſſions, and abominable vices, which flow from this fair ſource. Vid. Memorab. Socrat. l. ii. paſſim, et l. v. c. iii. Sympoſ. c. iv. p. 246.

[11] Plut. in Alcibiad. [12] Plut. ibid.

[13] Strabo, p. 330. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

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well be ſuppoſed that an interchange of ſuch important favors would ſtraiten the bands of their mutual friendſhip, during which the powers of reaſon and fancy were directed, with unabating diligence, to improve the underſtanding, and excite the virtue of Alcibiades.

Deceitful character of Alcibiades.

But this favorite youth labored under a defect, which could not be compenſated by the higheſt birth, the moſt ſplendid fortune, the nobleſt endowments of mind and body, and even the ineſtimable friendſhip of Socrates. He wanted an honeſt [24] heart. This we are warranted to affirm on the authority of contemporary writers, who acknowledge, that firſt admiration, and then intereſt, was the foundation of his attachment to the illuſtrious ſage, by whoſe inſtruction he expected to become, not a good, but an able, man. Some inclination to virtue he might, in ſuch company, perhaps feel, but more probably feign; and the niceſt diſcernment might miſtake the real character of a man, who could adopt, at pleaſure, the moſt oppoſite manners; and who, as will appear from the ſubſequent events of his various life, could ſurpaſs the ſplendid magnificence of Athens, or the rigid frugality of Sparta; could conform, as intereſt required, to the laborious exerciſes of the Thebans, or to the voluptuous indolence of Ionia; aſſume the ſoft effeminacy of an Eaſtern prince, or rival the ſturdy vices of the drunken Thracians [25].

[24] Lyſias cont. Alcibiad. et Xenoph. Memorab. Socrat. l. i. p. 715.
[25] Nepos in Alcibiad.

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The firſt ſpecimen of his political conduct diſcovered the extraordinary reſources of his verſatile mind. He oppoſed the peace of Nicias, as the work of a rival, whom he wiſhed to diſgrace. His ambition longed for war, and the Spartans deſerved his reſentment, having, in all their tranſactions with Athens, teſtified the utmoſt reſpect for Nicias, while they were at no pains to conceal their want of regard for himſelf, though his family had been long connected with their republic by an intercourſe of hoſpitality, and he had endeavoured to ſtrengthen that connexion by his perſonal good offices to the Lacedæmonians taken in Sphacteria. To gratify at once his reſentment, his ambition, and his jealouſy, he determined to renew the war with Sparta; a deſign by no means difficult at the preſent juncture.

His views

In compliance with the peace of Nicias, the Spartans withdrew their troops from Amphipolis; but they could reſtore neither that city, nor the neighbouring places in Macedon, to the dominion of Athens. The Athenians, agreeably to the treaty, allowed the captives taken in Sphacteria to meet the longing embraces of their kinſmen and friends; but good policy forbade their ſurrendering Pylus, until the enemy had performed ſome of the conditions ſtipulated in return. Mutual unwillingneſs, or inability, to comply with the articles of peace, ſowed the ſeeds of animoſity, which found a favorable ſoil in both republics. The authority of thoſe magiſtrates, who ſupported the pacific meaſures of Nicias and Pleiſtoanax, had expired. The

favored by the ſtate of Greece. Olymp. xc. 1. A. C. 420.

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Spartan youth wiſhed, by new hoſtilities, to cancel the memory of a war, which had been carried on without profit, and terminated with diſhonor. But the wiſer part perceived that better ſucceſs could not be expected while the Athenians poſſeſſed Pylus. In their eagerneſs to recover that fortreſs, they renewed their alliance with the Thebans, from whom they received Panactum, which they hoped to exchange for Pylus; forgetting, in this tranſaction, an important clauſe in their treaty with Athens, "that neither of the contracting powers ſhould, without mutual communication and conſent, conclude any new alliance." The Thebans rejoiced in the proſpect of embroiling the affairs of Athens and Sparta; and the Corinthians, guided by the ſame hoſtile views, readily concurred with the Thebans, and openly re-entered into the Lacedæmonian confederacy [16].

He outwits the Spartan ambaſſadors. Olymp. xc. 1. A. C. 420.

Having concluded this negociation, the Spartans, who yielded to none in the art of diſſembling, diſpatched ambaſſadors to Athens, excuſing what they termed an apparent infringement of the treaty, and requeſting that ſtate to accept Panactum (which had been carefully diſmantled) in exchange for Pylus. The ſenate of Athens heard their propoſal without ſuſpicion, eſpecially as they declared themſelves inveſted with full powers to embrace every reaſonable plan of preſent accommodation and permanent friendſhip. It now remained for the ambaſſadors to propoſe their demand in the

[16] Thucydid. l. v. paſſim.

popular

popular aſſembly, which, they had reaſon to hope, might be deceived ſtill more eaſily than the ſenate. But in this expectation they were diſappointed by a contrivance of Alcibiades, no leſs ſingular than audacious. Having invited the ambaſſadors to an entertainment, during which he talked of their republic with more than his wonted reſpect, and teſtified the utmoſt ſolicitude for the ſucceſs of their negociation, he obſerved to them, that one circumſtance gave him much concern, their having mentioned full powers. They muſt beware of repeating that error in the aſſembly, becauſe the natural rapacity of the populace, apprized of that circumſtance, would not fail to inſiſt on ſuch conditions as the honor of Sparta could not poſſibly comply with. If they concealed the extent of their commiſſion, the declaring of which could only ſerve to indicate timidity on the one ſide, and to provoke inſolence on the other, he pledged himſelf to obtain the recovery of Pylus, and the gratification of their utmoſt hopes. On this occaſion the Spartans injudiciouſly confided in a man, who had been irritated by the former neglect and ingratitude of their country. When they appeared next day in the aſſembly, Alcibiades demanded, with a loud voice, the object and extent of their commiſſion. According to the concerted plan, they denied their having full powers. The artful Athenian, affecting a tranſport of indignation, arraigned the audacity and baſeneſs of a people by whom his own unſuſpecting temper had been egregiouſly abuſed. "But yeſterday they declared their full powers in the ſenate;

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they denied to-day what yeſterday they diſplayed with oſtentation. Such (I now perceive it) is the uſual duplicity of their republic. It is thus they have reſtored Amphipolis. It is thus, Athenians! they have reſtored the neighbouring towns in Macedon: it is thus they have, indeed, put you in poſſeſſion of Panactum, but with demoliſhed walls; and after concluding an alliance with Athens, ratified by ſolemn oath, moſt treacherouſly and daringly infringed it, by entering into a league with Thebes, your determined and inveterate enemy. Can you ſtill, men of Athens! tamely ſubmit to ſuch indignities? Do you not expel ſuch traitors (pointing to the ambaſſadors) from your preſence, and from your city?" This extraordinary harangue totally diſconcerted the Spartans. Had their confuſion allowed them to extenuate their fault by declaring the truth, the leaſt reflection muſt have ſuggeſted, that Alcibiades would repreſent their ſimple ſtory as a new turn of ingenious artifice. They retired abruptly from the aſſembly[17]; Nicias, and the other partiſans of Sparta, ſhared their diſgrace; and the Athenians were ſoon afterwards perſuaded by Alcibiades to embrace the Argive alliance [18].

The Peloponneſian war renewed.

It might be expected, that the weight of ſuch a powerful confederacy ſhould have ſpeedily cruſhed the debility of Sparta, already exhauſted by the

[17] Thucyd. mentions the ſhock of an earthquake, which occaſioned the diſſolution of that aſſembly, before coming to any concluſion.

[18] Thucydid. l. v. p. 374, et ſeqq. Plut. in Alcibiad.

former war. But the military operations of Greece depended less on the relative strength of contending powers, than on the alternate preponderance of domestic factions. In the year following the treaty, the Athenians sent a small body of troops to assist their Peloponnesian allies in the reduction of Epidaurus, Tegea, and other hostile cities in Argolis and Arcadia. Yet in the ensuing year, when the Spartans, dreading the loss of some cities, and the defection of others, made a vigorous effort to retrieve their authority in Peloponnesus, the Athenians alone discovered little inclination, and exerted no activity, to obstruct their measures for that purpose. Pleistoanax being a partisan of the peace of Nicias, the Spartans intrusted the command to Agis, his more warlike colleague. All Lacedæmonians of the military age were summoned to the field. The dangerous expedient of arming the Helots was adopted on this important emergency. The Spartan allies showed unusual ardor in their cause. The Thebans sent ten thousand foot, and one thousand horsemen [19]; the Corinthians two thousand heavy-armed men; the Megarians almost an equal number; the ancient cities of Pallené and Sicyon in Achaia gave a powerful and ready assistance; while the small, but generous republic of Phlius, whose territory, bordering on Argolis, was appointed for the

CHAP. XVIII. Olymp. xc. 2. A. C. 419.

[19] They had, however, but five hundred horses; ἱππεις πεντακοσιοι και ανιπποι ισοι. Perhaps the ανιπποι, those not provided with horses, served as attendants on the horsemen. The mixing of light infantry with the cavalry was frequent in later times; but of this hereafter.

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rendez-vous of the confederates, took the field with the whole body of citizens and ſlaves capable of bearing arms [20].

The Spartan and Argive armies face each other, but part without engaging. Olymp. xc. 3. A. C. 418.

The Argives obſerved the approaching ſtorm, and prepared to reſiſt it. The Eleans and Mantineans joined them; and although the Athenians were long expected in vain, the Argives did not loſe courage, but boldly took the field to oppoſe the invaders. The ſkilful movements of king Agis intercepted their return to Argos; the high grounds above them were occupied by the Corinthians and Phliaſians; their retreat towards Nemea was cut off by the Bœotians and Megarians. A battle ſeemed inevitable in the winding vale of Argos; but it is eaſier to admire, than explain, the ſubſequent conduct of either army. Whether the Argive commanders [21] were diſconcerted by the judicious poſition of the enemy, or that compaſſion touched their minds on perceiving ſuch numerous bodies of men, chiefly natives of the ſame peninſula, ſprung from the ſame blood, and ſpeaking the ſame Doric tongue, prepared to embrue their parricidal hands in kindred blood; or that, being ſecretly partiſans of ariſtocracy [22], they were unwilling to come to extremities with Sparta; it is certain, that inſtead of joining battle, they entered

[20] Thucydid. l. v. p. 384, et ſeqq.

[21] Or rather Thraſyllus, who was one of five generals, but who ſeems to have enjoyed ſome pre-eminence over his colleagues. Perhaps it was his turn to command.

[22] Alciphron, who, with Thraſyllus, was the principal agent in this affair, was the "προξενος Λακεδαιμονιων," the public hoſt of the Lacedæmonians. Thucydid. p. 386.

into conference, with the Lacedæmonian king. In conſequence of this unexpected meaſure, a truce was concluded between the chiefs, without the concurrence or knowledge of the officers or troops in either army. The Argives, Thraſyllus and Alciphron, engaged that their countrymen ſhould give complete ſatisfaction for the injuries of which they were accuſed; and king Agis, whoſe authority, by the Spartan laws, was abſolute in the field, led off his obſequious army. CHAP. XVIII.

Diſcontents hereby occaſioned in both ſtates.

Whatever might be the cauſe of this meaſure, it occaſioned (after the firſt pauſe of ſilent aſtoniſhment) univerſal diſcontent, followed by loud and licentious clamors. The Spartans complained, "That, after aſſembling ſuch a body of men as had ſcarcely ever been collected in Peloponneſus, whoſe attachment to their cauſe was ardent, whoſe numbers and courage were invincible, and after ſurrounding their enemies on every ſide, and depriving them of every reſource, the glorious hope, or rather certainty, of the moſt complete and important victory, ſhould have been ſacrificed, in one moment, by the caprice, the cowardice, or the corruption of their general." The Argives lamented, "That their numerous enemies, whom they had a fair opportunity of engaging in their own country, ſhould have been allowed to eſcape from their hands by a haſty and ill-judged compoſition." Nor did they confine their reſentment to vain complaints. The moſt daring or moſt ſeditious attacked the houſes of Thraſyllus and Alciphron. The reſt ſoon joined in the tumult. The

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effects of the generals were plundered or confiſcated; and their lives were ſaved, with difficulty, by the reſpected ſanctuary of Argive Juno.

Alcibiades perſuades the Argives to break the truce. Olymp. xc. 3. A. C. 418.

Though the Greeks, and indeed the ancients in general, ſeldom employed reſident ambaſſadors in foreign ſtates, Alcibiades was then inveſted with that character at Argos. His activity would not fail to promote the popular tumult, in which his own and the Athenian intereſt was concerned. On a future occaſion he boaſted, that, chiefly at his inſtigation, the Argives and their allies were perſuaded to break the truce; a meaſure greatly facilitated by the long-expected arrival of the Athenian tranſports, conveying a reinforcement of twelve hundred ſoldiers, and a body of three hundred cavalry. Encouraged by this event, the Argives, regardleſs of the truce, attacked the ancient and wealthy city of Orchomenus in Arcadia, which, after a feeble reſiſtance, ſubmitted to their arms. They next proceeded to lay ſiege to the neighbouring town of Tegea, a deſign extremely contrary to the inclination of the Eleans, who were eager to chaſtiſe the inhabitants of Lepreum, a diſtrict on their own frontier. The Argives, however, paid no regard to their demands; and the Eleans, offended by this inſtance of contempt, returned home in diſguſt.

The Spartans take the field.

The Lacedæmonians learned with indignation the ſubmiſſion of Orchomenus, the ſiege of Tegea, and the open infraction of the treaty. They had formerly murmured againſt the imprudent or perfidious meaſures of king Agis; but when they felt

the effects of his miſconduct, their reſentment became outrageous. In the firſt emotions of their animoſity, they determined to deſtroy his houſe, and to ſubject him to a fine of ſeveral thouſand pounds ſterling, which, in all probability, he would have been unable to pay. But his eloquence and addreſs appeaſed the general clamor; and, as the anger of popular aſſemblies is eaſily converted into pity, he was again taken into favor. His known talents for war recommended him to the command of the army; and he aſſured his countrymen, that his future ſervices ſhould ſpeedily wipe off the ſtain from his character. The Spartans, however, firſt elected on this occaſion ten counſellors to attend their kings in the field, to reſtrain their too precipitate reſolves, and control their too abſolute authority.

Battle of Mantinæa.

Having taken this precaution, the neceſſity of which ſeemed juſtified by recent experience, they ſummoned the aſſiſtance of their allies, whoſe ardor to renew hoſtilities was equal to their own. They proceeded with a numerous army (though inferior to that formerly collected, as their confederates beyond the Iſthmus had not yet time to join them), and marched directly to the town of Mantinæa, expecting either to take that place, or to oblige the enemy to defend it, by withdrawing their troops from the ſiege of Tegea. The approach of the Argives prevented the ſurpriſe of Mantinæa; and both armies, whoſe ambition or reſentment had been ſo lately diſappointed of an opportunity to

CHAP. XVIII. Military orations.

diſplay their valor or their fury, eagerly prepared for an engagement.

According to ancient cuſtom, the leaders of the ſeveral nations addreſſed their reſpective troops. The Mantinæans were animated "by the ſight of their city, for the defence of which, as well as for the ſafety of their wives and children, they were exhorted valiantly to contend. The event of the battle muſt determine the important alternative of dominion and ſervitude; dominion which they had lately aſſumed over various cities in Arcadia, and ſervitude, which they had already ſuffered under the cruel tyranny of Sparta." The Argives were reminded "of their ancient pre-eminence in Peloponneſus, which they had recently recovered, and which their honor was now called to maintain. They were reminded of the long and bloody wars which they had formerly carried on, in order to repel the uſurpation of a powerful and ambitious neighbour. This was the ſame enemy who actually provoked their arms, and gave them an opportunity of revenging, in one day, the accumulated injuſtice of many centuries." The Athenians heard, and repeated, "That it was glorious to march at the head of gallant and faithful allies, and to ſhow themſelves deſerving of their hereditary renown. They yielded to none in bravery; their power was unrivalled; and when they had overcome the Lacedæmonians, even in the Peloponneſus, their dominion would be more extenſive and ſecure."

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The Spartans victorious.

The Spartans briefly exhorted their followers, and each other, "to exert that innate valor which had ever animated their breaſts, and which could receive no additional force from a tedious diſplay of uſeleſs words." Thus ſaying, they marched with a ſlow and firm ſtep, regulated by the ſound of the flute, to meet the impetuous onſet[23] of the Argives and Athenians. Above a thouſand of the former, choſen from the flower of the nobleſt youth of Argos, had been employed, ſince the firſt diſſenſions occaſioned by the peace of Nicias, in the conſtant exerciſe of arms, in order to maintain the honorable pretenſions of their country. They behaved with ſignal bravery. The Athenians were not wanting to their ancient fame. The Mantinæans ſtrenuouſly defended every thing moſt dear to them. But the allied army had been conſiderably weakened by the deſertion of the Eleans; and the martial enthuſiaſm of king Agis, ſeconded by the perſevering valor of the Spartans[24], decided the

[23] The admirable verſes of Milton, who was a diligent reader of Thucydides, are the beſt commentary on this battle.

Anon they move
In perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood
Of flutes and ſoft recorders, ſuch as rais'd
To height of nobleſt temper heroes old,
Arming to battle; and inſtead of rage,
Deliberate valor breath'd firm and unmov'd, etc.

Par. Loſt, b. i.

[24] If the text is not corrupt, the words of Thucydides are very remarkable: Αλλα μαλιϛα δη κατα παντα τῃ εμπειριᾳ Λακεδαιμονιοι ελασσωθεντες, τῃ ανδρειᾳ εδειξαν ουχ ἡσσον περιγενομενοι, p. 394. "That the Lacedæmonians, exceedingly inferior as they appeared on this occaſion to the enemy in military skill, showed themſelves as much ſuperior to them in true manly courage." It appears from the

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fortune of the battle. The allies were repulſed, broken, thrown into diſorder, and put to flight. The Spartans, unwilling to irritate their deſpair, or ſuperſtitiouſly obſerving an ancient maxim, which enjoined them "to make a bridge for a flying enemy," did not continue the purſuit, but ſpeedily returned home to celebrate the Carnean feſtival, rejoicing in having reſtored the luſtre of their arms, and recovered their authority in the Peloponneſus.

Tumults in Argos.

This, in fact, proved the immediate conſequence of a battle, which was not ſo bloody as might have been expected, the vanquiſhed having loſt *eleven*, and the victors only *three*, hundred. But the revolutions of Greece chiefly depended on the fluctuating politics of domeſtic factions. The Spartans had a numerous party in Argos itſelf, who, emboldened by the recent victory of their friends, immediately took arms, aboliſhed the popular government, deſtroyed the partiſans of Athens, abjured the league with that ſtate, and entered into a new confederacy with Sparta. This event happened a

deſcription of the battle, that the Lacedæmonians were defective, not in skill, but in diſcipline. In approaching the enemy, their right wing extended too far, which frequently happened from the deſire of every ſoldier to cover his unarmed ſide by the ſhield of the next perſon on his right. In conſequence of this tendence, the Lacedæmonian left wing was over-reached by the enemy's right. Agis ordered the Skiritæ and Braſidians to wheel from their places on the right, and lengthen the front of the left wiog: commanding the battalions of Hipponoidas and Ariſtocles to fill up the vacuity occaſioned by this movement. But theſe generals abſolutely refuſed to obey orders, and were afterwards banished Sparta on that accouut. Thucydid. p. 393, et ſeqq.

few weeks after the engagement, and towards the close of the fourteenth winter of the Peloponnesian war. During the two following years, Argos paid dearly for a moment of transient splendor, having undergone three bloody revolutions, which renewed the atrocities of Corcyrean sedition. The contest ended, as in Corcyra, in favor of the Athenians and democracy. CHAP. XVIII.

Massacre of the Scioneans.

The affairs of the Peloponnesus had long occupied, without engrossing, the attention of Athens. The year preceding her alliance with Argos, the Athenians reduced the rebellious city of Scioné, in the peninsula of Pallené, against which their resentment had been provoked to the utmost fury, because the Scioneans, though inhabiting a country almost surrounded by the sea, had defied the naval power of Athens, and, amidst the misfortunes of that state, revolted to her enemies. The citizens of Scioné became the victims of a revenge equally cruel and imprudent. The males, above the age of puberty, were put to the sword; the women and children dragged into servitude; the name and honors of the city extinguished for ever; and the territory planted with a new colony, consisting chiefly of Platæan exiles. These atrocious cruelties alarmed the terror, exasperated the resentment, and invigorated the resistance, of the neighbouring republics. Their defence was undertaken by Perdiccas, king of Macedon, whom the Athenians therefore interdicted the use of the Grecian seas. But that ambitious people made so little progress in reducing the Macedonian coast,

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that they finally desisted from this design, contenting themselves with guarding those places which still preserved their allegiance, with re-establishing domestic order, and with collecting the customary tribute from their numerous colonies and dependences

The Athenians attack Melos. Olymp. xci. 1. A. C. 416.

The productive industry diffused through all branches of the community, the equality of private fortune, the absence of habitual luxury, together with the natural advantages of their soil and climate, enabled the Greeks to flourish amidst furious and bloody wars. After a short period of tranquillity, their exuberant population overflowed, and was obliged to discharge itself in foreign colonies or conquests. Such a period Athens enjoyed for five years after the peace of Nicias as the Macedonian and Argive wars only employed her activity, without exhausting her strength. The necessity of exerting her superfluous vigor in some useful and honorable design, was fatally experienced, in the year following, by the unfortunate island of Melos, one of the largest of the Cyclades, lying directly opposite to the Cape of Malea, the southern promontory of Laconia.

Description of that island.

This beautiful island, sixty miles in circumference, of a circular form, of an agreeable temperature, and affording, in peculiar perfection [25], the usual productions of a fine climate, had early invited

[25] The island of Melos is every where impregnated with iron, bitumen, sulphur, and other minerals. It is described by Tournefort as a great laboratory Its subterranean fires are supposed to give peculiar force and flavor to its wines and fruits.

the colonization of the Spartans; and the happy settlement had enjoyed political independence for seven hundred years. The ſtrength and importance of the capital, which had the ſame name with the iſland, may be underſtood by the armament, of thirty ſhips, and near three thouſand ſoldiers, which the Athenians brought againſt it. Before they commenced hoſtilities, either by attacking the city, or by ravaging the country, they ſent ambaſſadors to the Melians, in order to perſuade them to ſurrender, without incurring the danger or the puniſhment of an unequal, and probably a fruitleſs, reſiſtance. The cautious iſlanders, well acquainted with the eloquence and addreſs of the enemy with whom they had to contend, denied them the permiſſion to ſpeak before the public aſſembly, but appointed a deputation of the magiſtrates, to hear and examine their demands. The Athenian ambaſſadors were received in the ſenate-houſe, where a moſt important and intereſting conference was held [26], which, while it engages our compaſſion for the unhappy victims of ambition, explains the prevailing ſentiments and opinions of the Greeks in matters of war and government, and illuſtrates the daring injuſtice of the Athenian republic. The ambaſſadors began the dialogue, by obſerving, "That ſince the diſtruſt of the Melians, probably ariſing from the conſcious weakneſs of their cauſe, had refuſed them the liberty of ſpeaking, in a continued oration, to the aſſembly of the people, they ſhould uſe that mode of conference which ſeemed

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Conference between the commiſſioners of Athens and Melos.

[26] Thucydid. l. v. p. 400, et ſeqq.

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moſt agreeable to the inclinations of their adverſaries, and patiently liſten to the objection which might occur to any part of their diſcourſe." *Melians.* "The propoſal is juſt and reaſonable; but you have come hither with an armed force, which renders you judges in your own cauſe. Though vanquiſhed in debate, you may ſtill conquer by arms; but if *we* yield in argument, *we* muſt ſubmit to ſlavery." *Athenians* "If you intend to talk of matters foreign to the ſubject, we have done." *M.* "It is ſurely excuſable for thoſe, whoſe all is at ſtake, to turn themſelves on every ſide, and to ſuggeſt their ſuſpicions and their doubts. But let the conference be carried on in the manner which you have propoſed." *A.* "And, on both ſides, let all ſuperfluous arguments be omitted; either that *we*, having repelled and conquered the Perſians, are entitled to govern the Greeks; or that *you*, being a colony of Lacedæmon, are entitled to independence. Let us ſpeak like men of ſenſe and experience, who know that the equal rules of juſtice are obſerved only by men of an equal condition; but that it belongs to the ſtrong to command, and to the weak to obey; becauſe ſuch is the intereſt of both." *M.* "How can our intereſt and yours coincide?" *A.* "By ſubmiſſion, you will ſave your lives; and by preſerving you, we will increaſe our own power." *M* "Conſider (for this alſo muſt be mentioned, ſince diſregarding *juſtice*, you are governed only by *utility*) that your unprovoked invaſion of the Melians will rouſe the reſentment of all Greece; will render all

neutral ſtates your enemies; and, if ever your empire ſhould decline, (as what human grandeur is not ſubject to decay?) will expoſe you to a dreadful and juſt puniſhment." *A.* "The continuance of our empire is the care of fortune and the gods; the little that man can do to preſerve it, *we* will not neglect. The liberty of Melos offends the pride of the neighbouring iſles, and ſtirs them to rebellion. The intereſt of our preſent power muſt prevail over the apprehenſion of future danger." *M.* "While the Athenians are thus prepared to incur danger for the preſervation of empire, and their ſubject iſlands to defy death for the hopes of freedom, would it not be the baſeſt and moſt infamous cowardice in us, who have long enjoyed liberty, to decline any toil or danger for maintaining the moſt valuable and the moſt glorious of all human poſſeſſions?" *A.* "We are not come hither to diſpute the prize of valor, but to offer terms of ſafety." *M.* "The event of war is uncertain; there is ſome hope in reſiſtance, none in ſubmiſſion. *A.* "Flattering hope often deceives the proſperous and the powerful, but always deſtroys the weak and unfortunate, who, diſregarding natural means of preſervation, have recourſe to idle dreams of the fancy, to omens, oracles, divination, and all the fallacious illuſions of a vain ſuperſtition." *M.* "We know that it will be difficult for the Melians to contend with the ſtrength and fortune of Athens: yet we truſt that the gods will ſupport the juſtice of our cauſe; and that the Lacedæmonians, from whom we are deſcended,

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moved by a ſenſe of honor, will defend their own blood." *A.* "Believe not that Athens will be forſaken by the gods. Ambition is implanted in man. The wiſdom of providence, not an Athenian decree, has eſtabliſhed the inevitable law, that the ſtrong ſhould govern the weak. As to the aſſiſtance of the Lacedæmonians, we ſincerely congratulate your happy ignorance of their principles. Whatever equity prevails in their domeſtic inſtitutions, they have but one rule reſpecting their neighbours, which is, to regulate all their tranſactions with them by their own convenience." *M.* "It is chiefly that conſideration which affords us hope, that they will not forſake an iſland which they have planted, leſt they ſhould be regarded as traitors, than which nothing could be more unfavorable to their intereſt, eſpecially ſince Melos, lying in the neighbourhood of their own territories, would be a dangerous poſſeſſion in the hands of an enemy." *A.* "The timid caution of the Lacedæmonians ſeldom takes the field, even againſt their inveterate enemies in the Peloponneſus, unleſs when their ſtandard is attended by numerous allies. It is not to be imagined that, for the ſafety of a colony, they will alone croſs the Cretan ſea, to contend with the ſuperior navy of Athens." *M.* "Should the Lacedæmonians be averſe to ſail, they can tranſport others in their ſtead; and the extent of the Cretan ſea may elude the vigilance of your ſhips; or ſhould that probability fail, the Lacedæmonians may attack your ſubjects on the continent, and accompliſh the deſigns of the warlike

Braſidas.

Braſidas." *A.* "You are determined, it ſeems, to learn, by fatal experience, that fear never compelled the Athenians to deſiſt from their deſigns; eſpecially never to raiſe the ſiege of any place which they had once inveſted. For during the whole of this long conference, you have not mentioned a ſingle particular capable of affording any juſt ground of confidence. Deceived by the ſplendor of words, you talk of honor and independence, rejecting the offers of a powerful ſtate, whoſe arms you are unable to reſiſt, and whoſe protection you might obtain at the expenſe of a moderate tribute. Leſt ſhame ſhould have any ſhare in this dangerous behaviour, we ſhall leave you to conſult privately, only reminding you once more, that your preſent deliberations involve the fate of your country." CHAP. XVIII.

Magnanimity of the Melians.

The Athenian ambaſſadors retired; and ſhortly afterwards, the Melians recalled them, and "declared their unanimous reſolution not to betray, in one unlucky hour, the liberty which they had maintained for ſeven hundred years; depending on the vigorous aſſiſtance of their Lacedæmonian kinſmen, and truſting eſpecially in that divine providence which had hitherto moſt wonderfully preſerved them amidſt the general convulſions of Greece. But they entreated the Athenians to accept their offers of neutrality, and to abſtain from unprovoked violence." The ambaſſadors prepared for returning to the camp, leaving the commiſſioners with a ſarcaſtic threat, "That of all men, in ſuch a delicate ſituation, the Melians alone

Conqueſt of Melos, and cruel treatment of the inhabitants.

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thought the future more certain than the paſt, and would grievouſly ſuffer for their folly, in preferring to the propoſals of certain and immediate ſafety, the deceitfulneſs of hope, the inſtability of fortune, and the vain proſpect of Lacedæmonian aid." The Athenians, irritated by oppoſition, inveſted, without delay, the capital of Melos, which was blocked up for ſeveral months by ſea and land. The beſieged, after ſuffering cruelly by famine, made ſeveral deſperate ſallies, ſeized the Athenian magazines, and deſtroyed part of their works. But towards the end of winter, their reſiſtance was defeated by the vigorous efforts of the enemy, combined with domeſtic treaſon. The males above the age of fourteen ſhared the unhappy fate of the Scioneans. The women and children were ſubjected to perpetual ſervitude, and five hundred new inhabitants, drawn from the neighbouring colonies of Athens, were ſent to occupy the vacant lands, which had been cultivated and adorned for ſeven centuries by the labor of the exterminated Melians [27].

[27] Thucydid. l. v. p. 410. ad fin.

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Alcibiades promotes the Sicilian Expedition. — Revolutions in that Island. — Embaſſy to Athens. — Extravagant Views of Alcibiades. — Oppoſed by Nicias. — The Athenians prepare to invade Sicily. — Their Armament beheld with Suſpicion by the Italian States. — Deliberations concerning the Mode of carrying on the War. — Alcibiades takes Catana by Stratagem. — His Intrigues in Meſſené. — He is unſeaſonably recalled to Athens. — Charged with Treaſon and Impiety. — Eſcapes to Sparta. — Nicias determines to attack Syracuſe. — Deſcription of that City. — The Athenians prevail in a Battle. — Return to Catana and Naxos.

CHAP. XIX. Alcibiades promotes the expedition into Sicily.

THE inhuman maſſacre of the Melians has been aſcribed by an inſtructive, though often inaccurate biographer[1], to the unfeeling pride of Alcibiades. But more ancient and authentic writers[2], whoſe ſilence ſeems to exculpate the ſon of Clinias from this atrocious accuſation, repreſent him as the principal author of the expedition againſt Sicily; an expedition not more unjuſt in its principle than fatal in its conſequences.

Revolutions in that island. A. C. 479 — 468.

The ſalutary union between the princes of Syracuſe and Agrigentum triumphed, as we had

[1] Plut. in Alcib.

[2] Thucyd. l. v. Lyſias Orat. cont. Alcib.

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occaſion to relate, over the ambition and reſources of Carthage. Sicily flouriſhed under the virtuous adminiſtration of Gelon [3] and Theron; but its tranquillity was diſturbed by the diſſenſions of their immediate ſucceſſors. Hieron king of Syracuſe proved victorious in a long and bloody war, during which the incapacity and misfortunes of his rival Thraſideus emboldened the reſentment of his ſubjects, already provoked by his injuſtice and cruelty [4]. He eſcaped the popular fury, but fell a victim to his own deſpair, and the Agrigentines, having expelled the family of an odious tyrant, inſtituted a republican form of policy.

Reign of Hieron in Syracuſe.

The falſe, cruel, and avaricious Hieron (for ſuch at leaſt he is deſcribed [5] in the firſt years of his reign) probably received little benefit from the dangerous influence of proſperity. But his mind was not incapable of reflection; and, in the courſe of a long ſickneſs and confinement, he diſcovered the emptineſs of ſuch objects as kings are taught to admire, and had recourſe to the ſolid pleaſures of the mind. By converſing with Grecian philoſophers, he learned the moſt important of all leſſons, that of converſing with himſelf; a converſation which none but the moſt virtuous or the moſt vicious of men can long and frequently maintain, without deriving from it eſſential profit. With the improvement of his underſtanding, the ſentiments of Hieron improved; his character and manners underwent a total change; and the latter

[3] See vol. ii. p. 170.
[4] Diodor. l. xi. c. lx. et ſeqq.
[5] Diodor. Sic. l. xi. c. lxvi.

years of his reign adorn the hiſtory of Sicily, and the age in which he lived [6]. The poets Simonides, Æſchylus, and Bacchilides, frequented his court, and admired the greatneſs of his mind, rather than of his fortune. The ſublime genius of Pindar has celebrated the magnificent generoſity of his illuſtrious patron. And in an age when writing was the picture of converſation, becauſe men talked as they needed not have been aſhamed to write, the impartial diſciple of Socrates, who had nothing to hope or to fear from the aſhes of a king of Sicily, has repreſented Hieron, in the Dialogue entitled from his name [7], as a model of wiſdom and virtue. CHAP. XIX.

The tyranny of Thraſybulus, and eſtabliſhment of democracy. Olymp. lxxviii. 3. A. C. 466.

It is a mortifying reflection that the inimitable qualities of a virtuous prince ſhould naturally encourage the ſloth, or irritate the vices, of a degenerate ſucceſſor. The glorious reign of Hieron was followed by the bloody tyranny of Thraſybulus; a wretch who, diſgracing the throne and human nature, was expelled from Sicily by the juſt indignation of his ſubjects. Reſentment is more permanent than gratitude. The Syracuſans forgot the fame of Gelon; they forgot the recent merit of Hieron; and, that they might never be again ſubjected to a tyrant like Thraſybulus, exchanged the odious power of kings for the dangerous fury of democracy [8].

Effects of that revolution.

The inferior cities having ſucceſſively imitated the example of Agrigentum and Syracuſe, the

[6] Ælian. l. ix. c. vii. [7] Xenophont. Hieron.
[8] Ariſtot. de Repub. l. v. c. xii.

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Grecian colonies in Sicily experienced the diſorders of that tumultuous liberty which had ſo long prevailed in the mother-country. Diſtracted by internal diſcord, and haraſſed by external hoſtility, they had neither leiſure nor inclination to attend to the politics of Greece. The republic of Syracuſe, which was alone capable of interpoſing, with effect, in the quarrels of that country, imitated, inſtead of oppoſing, the ambition of Athens. Moſt of the Dorian ſettlements had become confederates, or rather tributaries, to the Syracuſans; and towards the commencement of the Peloponneſian war, that aſpiring people, though torn by domeſtic factions, ſtrenuouſly exerted their valor againſt the Ionic ſettlements of Leontium, Catana, and Naxos.

Diſſenſions in Sicily, in which the Athenians interfere. Olymp. lxxxviii. 3. A. C. 426.

While theſe unhappy iſlanders ſtruggled with the turbulence of a government more ſtormy than the whirlpools of Scylla and Charybdis, they likewiſe enjoyed, however, the peculiar advantages of democracy; which, of all political conſtitutions, preſents the wideſt ſcope to the exerciſe of ſuperior talents, and has always been the moſt productive in great men. The active fermentation of popular aſſemblies had given the eloquence of a Gorgias to Leontium, and the abilities of a Hermocrates to Syracuſe. In the ſixth year of the Peloponneſian war, the former came to Athens to ſolicit the protection of that republic againſt the unjuſt uſurpation of the Sicilian capital. His arguments convinced the judgment, and the brilliant harmony of his ſtyle tranſported the ſenſibility of the Athenians.

They immediately diſpatched twenty ſhips of war to the aſſiſtance of their Ionic brethren. Two years afterwards a ſimilar requeſt was made, and as readily complied with; and the Athenians ſeemed diſpoſed to engage with vigor in the war, when the foreſight of Hermocrates, alarmed by the intruſion of theſe ambitious ſtrangers, promoted a general congreſs of the ſtates of Sicily. CHAP. XIX.

Appeaſed by Hermocrates. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A. C. 424.

This convention was held at the central town of Gela; it was attended by the plenipotentiaries of all the Doric and Ionic cities. Hermocrates repreſented Syracuſe; and illuſtrious as that republic was, his conduct proved him worthy its higheſt honors. While the repreſentatives of other ſtates dwelt on their particular grievances, and urged their ſeparate intereſts, Hermocrates regarded and enforced only the general intereſt of Sicily. His arguments finally prevailed, and all parties were engaged to terminate their domeſtic conteſts, leſt the whole iſland ſhould fall a prey to a foreign power [9].

New diſſenſions. Olymp. xci. 1. A. C. 416.

But a plan of union, ſo ſeaſonable and ſalutary, depended on the tranſient influence of a ſingle man, while the principles of diſcord were innumerable and permanent. Within a few years after this event, Leontium was taken and deſtroyed, its inhabitants reduced to the wretched condition of exiles, and its confederates, the Egeſtæans, cloſely beſieged by the conjunct arms of Selinus and Syracuſe. The unfortunate communities again ſent an embaſſy to Athens, pleading the rights of

Demands of the Egeſtæans;

[9] Thucydid. p. 290.

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conſanguinity, and addreſſing not only the paſſions but the intereſt of their powerful allies. "The Athenians," they inſiſted, "were bound by every principle of ſound policy to repreſs the growing greatneſs of Syracuſe, which muſt otherwiſe become a formidable acceſſion to the Peloponneſian league; and now was the time for undertaking that enterpriſe, while their Ionian kinſmen in Sicily were ſtill capable of exerting ſome vigor in their own defence." In order to enforce theſe arguments, the ambaſſadors of Egeſta or Segeſta gave an oſtentatious, and even a very falſe, deſcription of the wealth of their republic; which, according to their account, was capable of furniſhing the whole expenſe of the war. Their fellow-citizens at home carried on the deception by a moſt unjuſtifiable artifice, diſplaying to the Athenian commiſſioners ſent to confer with them, the borrowed riches of their neighbours, and raiſing, by extraordinary expedients, the ſum of ſixty talents of ſilver, to maintain, for a month, an Athenian fleet of ſixty ſail, as if they had purpoſed monthly to repeat this large ſubſidy, which at once exhauſted their faculties [10].

with which the Athenians imprudently comply.

The arguments of their Sicilian allies were doubtleſs entitled to conſiderable weight with the Athenians; yet various reaſons might have diſſuaded that ambitious people from undertaking, at the preſent juncture, an expedition againſt the powerful republic of Syracuſe. The cloud of war, which Pericles ſaw advancing with rapid motion from the

[10] Thucydid. p. 444.

Peloponneſus, had been at length diſpelled by the valor and fortune of the Athenians; not, however, before the arms of Braſidas had ſhaken their empire to the foundation. The ſame ſtorm might be again collected, if the Athenians removed their armies from home, eſpecially if they were unfortunate abroad, ſince the wounded pride of Sparta would eagerly ſeize the firſt opportunity of revenge. The rebellion of the Macedonian cities was ſtill unſubdued, and it would be highly imprudent and dangerous, before recovering the allegiance of theſe ancient poſſeſſions, to attempt the acquiſition of new territories. Should the Athenian expedition againſt Sicily be crowned with the moſt flattering ſucceſs, it would ſtill be difficult, nay, impoſſible, to preſerve ſuch a diſtant and extenſive conqueſt; but ſhould this ambitious deſign fail in the execution, as there was too good reaſon to apprehend, the misfortunes of the Athenians, whoſe greatneſs was the object both of terror and of envy, would encourage the rebellious ſpirit of their ſubjects and allies, excite the latent animoſity of the Peloponneſians, and reinforce their ancient enemies by the reſentment and hoſtility of Syracuſe and her confederates, juſtly provoked by the daring invaſion of their iſland. CHAP. XIX.

Extravagant views of Alcibiades.

Theſe prudential conſiderations were unable to cool the ardor of the Athenian aſſembly, inflamed by the breath of their favorite Alcibiades. It is a juſt and profound obſervation of Machiavel, that the real powers of government are often contracted to a narrower point in republics than in

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monarchies; an obſervation which that ſagacious ſtateſman had learned from the experience of his native city, and which he might have confirmed by the hiſtory of the Greeks, whoſe political meaſures, and even whoſe national character, depended on the tranſient influence of a few individuals. Under the direction of Ariſtides and Themiſtocles, the Athenians diſplayed the ſoundeſt policy, adorned by unſhaken probity, and by heroic valor. Cimon inſpired the generous ambition which animated his own breaſt: a dignified grandeur and magnanimous firmneſs diſtinguiſhed the long adminiſtration, I had almoſt ſaid reign, of Pericles. The ſon of Clinias ſucceeded to the power and authority, without ſucceeding to the virtues of thoſe great men, whom his pride diſdained to imitate. Regardleſs of order and decency, with a licentious magnificence moſt offenſive to the ſpirit of republican equality, he blended a certain elegance of manners, which not only repelled cenſure, but attracted applauſe. Thus diſpenſed from obſerving the eſtabliſhed formalities of private life, he expected that the glory of his adminiſtration might ſoar above the ordinary dictates of political prudence[11]. Though he preferred what was uſeful to what was virtuous, he preferred what was brilliant to what was uſeful, and, diſdaining the common gifts of valor and fortune, aſpired at objects extraordinary and unattainable. The recovery of the Athenian poſſeſſions, and the re-eſtabliſhment of an empire,

[11] See Plut. in Alcibiad. Iſocrat. de Pace above all, the animated picture in Plato's Republic (l. viii. cap. cc. et ſeqq.), of which Alcibiades, doubtleſs, was the original.

already too extenſive, might have ſatisfied the ambition of a bold and active ſtateſman. But the extravagant hopes of Alcibiades expatiated in a wider field. The acquiſition of Sicily itſelf he regarded only as a neceſſary introduction to farther and more important conqueſts. The intermediate ſituation of that beautiful and fertile iſland opened, on the one hand, an eaſy communication with the eaſtern front of Italy, which, from Brunduſium to the Sicilian frith, was adorned by populous and flouriſhing cities; and on the other, afforded a ſhort and ſafe paſſage to the northern ſhores of Africa, which, for many ages, had been cultivated and enriched by the united labors of the Greeks and Carthaginians. In his waking or ſleeping dreams, Alcibiades graſped the wide extent of thoſe diſtant poſſeſſions, by the reſources of which he expected finally to ſubdue the pertinacious ſpirit, and obſtinate reſiſtance, of the Peloponneſians. Thus ſecure at home, and ſovereign of the ſea, Athens might incorporate with her own the troops of the conquered provinces, and maintain an unſhaken dominion over the moſt delightful portion of the earth, while her fortunate citizens, delivered from all laborious and mercenary cares, would be ſupported by the contributions of ſubject nations, and enabled to diſplay, in their full extent, that taſte for ſplendor and magnificence, that greatneſs of ſoul and ſuperiority of genius, which juſtly entitled them to the empire of the world [22].

[22] Iſocrat. de Pace. Andocid. Orat. iii. p. 269. et Ariſtoph. Veſp. ver. 656.

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The Sicilian expedition oppoſed by Nicias. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

Allured by theſe extravagant, but flattering proſpects of grandeur, the Athenians, in two ſucceſſive aſſemblies, held at the ſhort interval of five days, agreed to the reſolution of making war againſt Sicily, and of raiſing ſuch naval and military force as ſeemed neceſſary for carrying it on with vigor and ſucceſs. While they ſtill deliberated on the latter object, the virtuous Nicias, who had been named with Alcibiades and Lamachus to the command of the projected armament, omitted nothing that prudence could ſuggeſt, and patriotiſm enforce, to deter his countrymen from ſuch a dangerous and fatal deſign. On this memorable occaſion, he threw aſide his uſual timidity, and diveſted himſelf of that rigid regard for eſtabliſhed forms, which was natural to his age and character. Though the aſſembly was convened to determine the proportion of ſupplies and troops, and the means of collecting them with the greateſt expedition and facility, he ventured, contrary to ancient cuſtom, to propoſe a different ſubject of debate; affirming, "That the intereſt of Athens was concerned, not in providing the preparations for the Sicilian invaſion, but in re-examining the expedience of the war. The aſſembly ought not to be moved by the arguments and entreaties of the perſecuted Egeſtæans, and fugitive Leontines, whom reſentment had taught to exaggerate, and miſery to deceive. Nor ought the vain phantom of glory and ambition to engage Athens in a deſign perhaps altogether impracticable, and, in the preſent juncture, peculiarly unſeaſonable; ſince it would be

madneſs to excite the flames of a new war, before the aſhes of the old were extinguiſhed. The pleas of danger and ſelf-defence were in the higheſt degree frivolous; for, ſhould the dreaded power of Syracuſe be extended over the whole of Sicily, the Athenians would have nothing to apprehend: this event would rather increaſe their ſecurity. In the actual ſtate of the iſland, particular cities might be perſuaded by fear, or intereſt, to court the protection of the Peloponneſian confederacy; but the victorious Syracuſe would diſdain to follow the ſtandard of Sparta. Should the former republic, by an effort of uncommon generoſity, ſubject the partial dictates of her pride to the general ſafety and honor of the Dorian name, ſound policy, however, would ſtill prevent her from endangering the precarious empire which ſhe had obtained over her neighbours, by ſtrengthening the confederacy of Peloponneſus, of which the avowed deſign was to give liberty and independence to the Grecian cities. Should all remote views of policy be diſregarded, yet immediate fear would deter the Syracuſans from provoking the reſentment of Athens, the effects of which they had not as yet experienced, but which, being unknown, muſt appear the more formidable. It was evident, therefore, that the Sicilian expedition might be omitted without danger; but if this enterpriſe, which had been haſtily reſolved on, were injudiciouſly executed, or if any of thoſe misfortunes ſhould happen, which are but too frequent in war, the Athenians would be expoſed not only to danger, but to diſgrace and

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ruin. The result of such an important deliberation ought not to be committed to the rash decision of youthful levity; which viewed the Sicilian war, as it did every other object, through the delusive medium of hope, vanity, and ambition; and, totally disregarding the expense and danger to be incurred by the republic, considered only the profits of military command, which might repair the wreck of exhausted fortunes, and supply a new fund for the indulgence of extravagant and licentious pleasures. He had in his eye a youth of that description, the principal author of the expedition, who was surrounded by a numerous band of adherents, determined to applaud his discourse and to promote his measures. It became the wisdom and dignity of the assembly to resist with firmness that juvenile conspiracy. In such a dangerous crisis, it was the duty of the president to dispense with ordinary forms, and to act, not merely as the instrument, but as the physician of a diseased republic. The question ought to be debated a second time; and the Athenians ought to rescind the decree against Sicily, which had passed without sufficient examination, in the absence of several aged and respectable counsellors [15].

His discourse answered by Alcibiades.

This discourse immediately called up Alcibiades, who, presuming on his credit with the assembly, acknowledged, "That he had aspired to the

[15] Thucydid. l. vi. p. 417, et seqq. The Sicilian expedition is uninterruptedly related through the remainder of the sixth and seventh books of Thucydides. The collateral authority of Diodorus, Plutarch, and the orators, is of little importance.

command in Sicily, and that he thought himſelf juſtly entitled to that honor. The extravagance of which he was accuſed, had redounded to the profit of his country; ſince his magnificence at the Olympic games, however it might be traduced by an abuſive epithet, had extended the glory of Athens, and deſerved the admiration of Greece. His youth and inexperience had effected what the policy of the wiſeſt ſtateſmen had often attempted in vain. A powerful confederacy had been formed againſt Sparta, even in the boſom of the Peloponneſus; and the terror of a domeſtic foe would long prevent the enmity of that rival ſtate from interrupting the progreſs of Athenian grandeur. In an expedition, evidently directed to this glorious end, expenſe and danger ought not to be regarded, ſince wealth was uſefully ſacrificed to purchaſe victory and renown; and power was only to be preſerved by ſeizing every favorable opportunity to increaſe it. To the undertaking which he adviſed, no reaſonable objection could be made; its expenſe would be furniſhed by the Egiſtæans, and other confederates; and the danger could not be great, as Sicily, however extenſive and populous, was inhabited by a promiſcuous crowd of various nations, without arms or diſcipline, devoid of patriotiſm, and incapable of union [14]".

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The aſſembly murmured applauſe, confirmed their former decree, and teſtified for the war greater alacrity than before. Nicias perceived the violence

Nicias explains the difficulties of the war.

[14] Thucydid. p. 422—426.

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of the popular current; ſtill, however, he made one ineffectual effort to reſiſt its force. "The ſucceſs of an invader," he obſerved, "commonly depended on the weight and rapidity of his firſt unexpected impreſſion, which confirmed the confidence of his friends, and excited diſmay and terror in his enemies. If the expedition into Sicily muſt be undertaken in defiance of every difficulty and danger, it ought therefore to be carried into execution with the utmoſt vigor. The Athenians might thus ſecure the aſſiſtance of Naxos and Catana, which were connected by affinity with the Egeſtæans and Leontines. But there remained ſeven cities, and thoſe far more powerful, with which they muſt prepare to contend; particularly Selinus and Syracuſe, places well provided with ſhips, magazines, cavalry, archers, heavy-armed troops, and every object and reſource moſt uſeful in defenſive war. An armament ſimply naval would not be ſufficient to cope with ſuch a ſtrength. Five thouſand pikemen, with a proportional number of archers and cavalry, could not render the invaſion ſucceſsful. After arriving in Sicily, the towns muſt be beſieged or ſtormed; workmen, with all ſorts of machines and implements, muſt be collected for thoſe purpoſes, and tranſported to an iſland from which, in the four winter-months, a meſſenger could ſcarcely return to Athens. This neceſſary train, which would greatly encumber the fleet and army, muſt be ſubſiſted in a hoſtile country. Beſides an hundred gallies, a great number of tenders and victuallers would be required for the

the expedition. To collect such an immense mass of war, demanded, doubtless, astonishing ardor and perseverance; but if the Athenians intended to employ a smaller force, he must, in justice to his country and himself, decline accepting the command, since nothing less than what he had described could promise a hope of victory, or prevent the certainty of defeat [15]". CHAP. XIX.

The Athenians prepare for invading Sicily. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

The last attempt of Nicias to dissuade his countrymen from this fatal enterprise, by magnifying the difficulty of its execution, produced an opposite effect. The obstacles, which were unable to conquer, only animated the courage of the assembly; and it was determined, that the generals should be invested with full authority to raise such sums of money, and to levy such a body of troops, as might ensure success to their arms. The domestic strength of the Athenians was unequal to the greatness of the undertaking: proper agents were dispatched to demand an extraordinary contribution from their dependent states, as well as to summon the reluctant assistance of their more warlike allies. These auxiliary squadrons were ordered to sail to Corcyra, in which rendezvous the Athenians, towards the middle of summer, were ready to join their confederates.

The magnitude of their preparations.

The magnitude of the preparations increased the hopes and the ardor of all ranks of men in the republic. The old expected that nothing could resist such a numerous and well-equipped armament.

[15] Thucydid. p. 427 — 429.

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The young eagerly ſeized an occaſion to gratify their curioſity and love of knowledge in a diſtant navigation, and to ſhare the honors of ſuch a glorious enterpriſe. The rich exulted in diſplaying their magnificence; the poor rejoiced in the immediate aſſurance of pay ſufficient to relieve their preſent wants [16], and in the proſpect of obtaining by their arms the materials of future eaſe and happineſs. Inſtead of finding any difficulty to complete the levies, the great difficulty conſiſted in deciding the preference of valor and merit among thoſe who ſolicited to ſerve; and the whole complement of forces, to be employed by ſea and land, conſiſted of choſen men [17].

The general alacrity to embark.

Amidſt the general alacrity felt, or at leaſt expreſſed, by people of all deſcriptions (for the dread of incurring public cenſure made ſeveral expreſs what they did not feel,) Socrates [18] alone ventured openly and boldly to condemn the expedition, and to predict the future calamities of his country. But the authority of a ſage was incapable to check the courſe of that enthuſiaſm, which had not been interrupted by the anniverſary

[16] The moſt expert and able ſeamen received a drachma (ſeven pence three farthings) as daily pay, beſides donatives from their reſpective captains. Thucydid. et Plut.

[17] Thucydid. p. 430 — 433.

[18] Plutarch joins Meton the aſtrologer with Socrates. But the ſtory of Meton, who pretended madneſs, burned his houſe, and entreated the Athenians, that, amidſt his domeſtic misfortunes, he might not be deprived of the comfort of his only ſon, is inconſiſtent with the narrative of Thucydides, which proves, that inſtead of compelling reluctance, there was occaſion to repreſs forwardneſs, to embark.

festival of Adonis, an ancient and melancholy rite, which inauspiciously returned a few days preceding the embarkation. During this dreary ceremony, the streets of Athens were crowded with spectres clothed in funereal robes; the spacious domes and temples resounded with lugubrious cries; while the Grecian matrons, marching in slow procession, tore their dishevelled hair, beat their naked bosoms, and lamented in mournful strains the untimely death of the lover, and beloved favorite, of Venus [49].

The armament sails from Athens;

When the appointed day arrived, the whole inhabitants of Athens, whether citizens or strangers, assembled early in the Piræus, to admire the greatest spectacle ever beheld in a Grecian harbour. An hundred gallies were adorned with all the splendor of naval pomp: the troops destined to embark, vied with each other in the elegance of their dress, and the brightness of their arms: the alacrity painted in every face, and the magnificence displayed with profusion in every part of the equipage, represented a triumphal show, rather than the stern image of war. But the solidity and greatness of the armament proved that it was intended for use, not for ostentation. Amidst this glare of external pageantry which accompanied the adventurous youth, their friends and kinsmen could not suppress a few parting tears, when they considered the length of the voyage, the dangers of the sea, and the uncertainty of beholding again the

[49] Plut. in Nic. et Alcibiad.

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deareſt pledges of their affections. But theſe partial expreſſions of grief were ſpeedily interrupted by the animating ſounds of the trumpet, which iſſued at once from an hundred ſhips, and provoked ſympathetic acclamations from the ſhore. The captains then offered ſolemn prayers to the gods, which were anſwered by correſponding vows from the ſpectators: the cuſtomary libations were poured out in goblets of gold and ſilver; and, after the triumphant Pæan had been ſung in full chorus, the whole fleet at once ſet ſail, and contended for the prize of naval ſkill and celerity, until they reached the lofty ſhores of Ægina, from whence they enjoyed a proſperous navigation to the rendezvous of their confederates at Corcyra [20].

It reviewed at Corcyra.

At Corcyra the commanders reviewed the ſtrength of the armament, which conſiſted of an hundred and thirty-four ſhips of war, with a proportional number of tranſports and tenders. The heavy-armed troops, exceeding five thouſand, were attended with a ſufficient body of ſlingers and archers. The army, abundantly provided in every other article, was extremely deficient in horſes, which amounted to no more than thirty. But, at a moderate computation, we may eſtimate the whole military and naval ſtrength, including ſlaves and ſervants, at twenty thouſand men.

The Athenians ſail along the coaſt of Italy.

With this powerful hoſt, had the Athenians at once ſurpriſed and aſſailed the unprepared ſecurity of Syracuſe, the expedition, however adventurous

[20] Thucydid. l. vi. p. 432, et ſeqq. Plut. in Nicia. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 332.

and imprudent, might, perhaps, have been crowned with ſucceſs. But the timid mariners of Greece would have trembled at the propoſal of truſting ſuch a numerous fleet on the broad expanſe of the Ionian ſea. They determined to croſs the narroweſt paſſage between Italy and Sicily, after coaſting along the eaſtern ſhores of the former, until they reached the Strait of Meſſina. That this deſign might be executed with the greater ſafety, they diſpatched three light veſſels to examine the diſpoſition of the Italian cities, and to ſolicit admiſſion into their harbours. The greateſt part of Magna Græcia had, indeed, been peopled by Dorians, naturally hoſtile to Athens. But from one Italian city the Athenians had reaſon to expect a very favorable reception. The effeminate Sybaris had been demoliſhed, as related above [21], by the warlike inhabitants of Crotona, about the time that the Athenians, growing more powerful than their neighbours, began to ſeize every opportunity to extend their colonies and their dominion. Governed by ſuch principles, they could not long overlook the happy ſituation of Sybaris, near to which they early formed an eſtabliſhment that aſſumed the name of Thurium, from a ſalubrious fountain of freſh water [22]; and the colony was increaſed by a numerous ſupply of emigrants, who, under Athenian leaders, ſailed from Greece thirteen years before the Peloponneſian war [23].

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[21] Vol. ii. p. 169.

[22] Ωνομασαν απο της κρηνης θουριον. Diodor. l. xii. p. 295.

[23] Suid. ad voc. Lyſias.

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Are regarded with ſuſpicion by the Italian cities.

The armament at Corcyra, whatever jealouſy its power might create in other cities, was entitled to the gratitude of Thurium; preſuming on which, the commanders, without waiting the return of the advice-boats, ordered the fleet to proceed, in three diviſions, to the Italian coaſt. But neither the ties of conſanguinity, nor the duties acknowledged by colonies towards their parent ſtate, could prevail on the ſuſpicious Thurians to open their gates, or even to furniſh a market, to their Athenian anceſtors. The towns of Tarentum and Locris prohibited them the uſe of their harbours, and refuſed to ſupply them with water; and they coaſted the whole extent of the ſhore, from the promontory of Iapygium to that of Rhegium, before any one city would allow them to purchaſe the commodities for which they had immediate uſe. The magiſtrates of Rhegium granted this favor, but they granted nothing more; notwithſtanding the earneſt ſolicitations of Alcibiades and his colleagues, who exhorted them, as a colony of Eubœa, to aſſiſt their brethren of Leontium, whoſe republic the Athenians had determined to re-eſtabliſh and to defend [24].

Rhegium alone ſupplies them with a market.

They are informed of the artifice of the Egeſtæans.

While the armament continued at Rhegium, they were informed by veſſels which had been purpoſely diſpatched from Corcyra, that the Egeſtæans, notwithſtanding the boaſted accounts lately given of their riches, poſſeſſed only thirty talents in their treaſury. This diſagreeable intelligence, together

[24] Thucydid. p. 443.

with the disappointment of assistance from any Italian city, occasioned a council of war, to consider what measures ought to be pursued in the Sicilian expedition. It was the opinion of Nicias, "that the Egestæans ought to be furnished with that proportion of ships only, the charges of which they were able to defray; and that the Athenian fleet having settled, either by arms or by persuasion, the quarrels between them and their neighbours, should return to their own harbours, after sailing along the coast of Sicily, and displaying to the inhabitants of that island both their inclination and their power to protect the weakness of their allies."

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They deliberate on the mode of carrying on the war.

Alcibiades declared, "That it would be shameful and ignominious to dissolve such a powerful armament, without performing some exploit worthy the renown of the republic; that, by the prospect of immediate and effectual support, the inferior cities might easily be alienated from their reluctant confederacy with Selinus and Syracuse; after which, the war ought to be carried on with the utmost vigor against those republics, unless they re-established the Leontines in their territory, and gave complete satisfaction to the injured Egestæans."

Judicious advice of Lamachus;

Lamachus not only approved the active counsels of Alcibiades, but proposed a measure still more enterprising. "The Athenians ought not to waste time in unimportant objects. Instead of striking at the extremities, they ought to assault at once the heart and strength of the enemy. If they immediately attacked Syracuse, it would not only be

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the firſt, but the laſt city, which they would have occaſion to beſiege. Nor could the attempt fail, if undertaken without delay, before the Syracuſans had time to recollect themſelves, and to provide for their own defence; and while the Athenian troops, as yet undaunted by any check, enjoyed unbroken courage and blooming hopes."

Is rejected.

This advice, which does equal honor to the ſpirit and good ſenſe of Lamachus, was rejected by the timidity of Nicias, and probably by the vanity of Alcibiades. The latter perceived a flattering opportunity of exhauſting all the reſources of his eloquence and intrigue to get poſſeſſion of the dependent cities, before he illuſtrated the glory of his arms in the ſiege of Syracuſe. The fleet ſailed from Rhegium to execute *his* plan, which was adopted by his colleagues, as forming the middle between the extremes of their reſpective opinions. A conſiderable detachment was ſent to examine the preparations and the ſtrength of Syracuſe, and to proclaim liberty, and offer protection, to all the captives and ſtrangers confined within its walls.

Alcibiades takes Catana by ſtratagem.

With another detachment Alcibiades ſailed to Naxos, and perſuaded the inhabitants to accept the alliance of Athens. The remainder of the armament proceeded to Catana, which refuſed to admit the ſhips into the harbour, or the troops into the city. But on the arrival of Alcibiades, the Cataneans allowed him to addreſs the aſſembly, and propoſe his demands. The artful Athenian tranſported the populace, and even the magiſtrates

themſelves, by the charms of his eloquence; the citizens flocked from every quarter, to hear a diſcourſe which was purpoſely protracted for ſeveral hours; the ſoldiers forſook their poſts; and the enemy, who had prepared to avail themſelves of this negligence, burſt through the unguarded gates, and became maſters of the city. Thoſe of the Cataneans who were moſt attached to the intereſt of Syracuſe, fortunately eſcaped death by the celerity of their flight. The reſt accepted the proffered friendſhip of the Athenians. This ſucceſs would probably have been followed by the ſurrender of Meſſené, which Alcibiades had filled with diſtruſt and ſedition. But when the plot was ripe for execution [25], the man who had contrived, and who alone could conduct it, was diſqualified from ſerving his country. The arrival of the Salaminian galley recalled Alcibiades to Athens, that he might ſtand trial for his life.

His intrigues in Meſſené.

It would be improper to ſuſpend the courſe of an intereſting narrative, by deſcribing the cauſes and circumſtances of this unexpected event, if they were not immediately connected with the ſubſequent hiſtory of the Sicilian expedition, and with the future fortune of the Athenians, who, after engaging, by the advice of one man, in the moſt

He is unſeaſonably recalled to Athens.

[25] Thucydides ſays, "When Alcibiades knew he ſhould be banished, he betrayed his accomplices to the party favorable to Syracuſe, who immediately put their adverſaries to death." Thucydid. p. 462. We ſhall ſee hereafter ſtill more fatal conſequences of his reſentment againſt his country. But nothing can more ſtrongly atteſt the turpitude of his character.

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romantic ſchemes of conqueſt which the madneſs of ambition had ever dared to entertain, injudiciouſly arreſted the activity of that man in the execution of ſuch extraordinary deſigns, as could only be accompliſhed by the wonderful reſources of his ſingular and eccentric genius. It happened, that on the night preceding the intended navigation to Sicily, all the ſtatues of Mercury, which had been erected in the Athenian ſtreets as the boundaries of different edifices and tenements, were thrown down, broken, and defaced. One only image of the god, of uncommon ſize and beauty, was ſaved from the general wreck; it was afterwards called the ſtatue of Andocides, as it ſtood before the houſe of the Athenian orator of that name. This daring inſult was firſt aſcribed to the wicked artifices of the Corinthians, who, it was ſuppoſed, might employ ſuch an abominable and ſacrilegious contrivance, to deter the Athenian armament from ſailing againſt their colony and kinſmen of Syracuſe. But the enemies of Alcibiades availed themſelves of the impious levity [26] of his character, to direct the popular ſtorm againſt the head of their deteſted foe. On the evidence of ſlaves, he was

The cauſe of his recal.

[26] Democritus, the chief promoter of the Atomic philoſophy, was younger than Anaxagoras, and elder than Socrates. His ſcholars, Diagoras and Protagoras, propagated his wild ſyſtem at Athens towards the commencement of the Peloponneſian war. Whether Alcibiades embraced the barren doctrines of that miſerable ſect, or adhered to the divine philoſophy of his maſter Socrates, or, more probably, fluctuated between them, he muſt, in all caſes alike, have been obnoxious to the ſuſpicion of impiety. Comp. Strabo, l. lxv. p. 703. Sext. Empiric. l. lix. 11. Laert. l. ii. in Democrit. Socrat. et Protag.

accuſed of having treated, with rude familiarity, other adored images of the gods; and Theſſalus, the degenerate ſon of the magnanimous Cimon, impeached him of impiety towards the goddeſſes Ceres and Proſerpine, whoſe awful ceremonies he had polluted and profaned; aſſuming, though uninitiated, the name and robes of the high-prieſt, calling Polytion (in whoſe houſe this dreadful ſcene had been repreſented), the torch-bearer, Theodorus the herald, and his other licentious companions the ſacred brethren and holy miniſters of thoſe myſterious rites [27].

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He is charged with impiety and treaſon. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

Such an atrocious accuſation alarmed the terrors of the Athenians; one aſſembly was ſummoned after another; and the panic became the more general, when it was underſtood that, during the ſame night in which the ſtatues had been mutilated, a body of Peloponneſian troops had marched towards the Iſthmus of Corinth. In the confuſed imagination of the vulgar, it was poſſible to unite the incompatible intereſts of ſuperſtition and of freedom; and they were perſuaded by Androcles, and other artful demagogues, that the profanation of the myſteries, the defacing of the ſtatues of Mercury, the movement of the Peloponneſian troops, all announced a conſpiracy to demoliſh the eſtabliſhed form of popular government, the ſafety of which had, ever ſince the expulſion of the Piſiſtratidæ, formed an object of univerſal and moſt anxious ſolicitude.

[27] Plutarch. in Alcibiad.

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The artifices of his accuſers.

Alcibiades defended himſelf, with his uſual eloquence and addreſs, againſt the malignity of a charge, unſupported by any adequate evidence. The ſoldiers and ſailors, whoſe eagerneſs already graſped the conqueſt of Sicily, interceded for the deliverance of their commander, whom they regarded as the ſoul of that glorious enterpriſe. A thouſand Argives and Mantineans, who had inliſted, on this occaſion, under the Athenian banners, declared their unwillingneſs to ſail, unleſs they were accompanied by Alcibiades, whoſe valor and abilities alone had determined them to engage in ſuch an important, but dangerous ſervice. This powerful combination in his favor diſappointed the preſent hopes, without diſconcerting the future meaſures, of his enemies. They perceived that, were he brought to an immediate trial, it would be impoſſible to obtain ſentence againſt him; but that were his perſon and influence removed to a diſtance from Athens, every thing might be hoped from the weakneſs, inconſtancy, and credulity of the populace. It was therefore determined by this perfidious cabal, that ſuch orators as had hitherto diſguiſed, under the maſk of friendſhip or admiration, their envy and hatred of Alcibiades, ſhould declare in full aſſembly, "that it would be inconſiſtent with the cleareſt dictates of prudence and propriety, to involve in the tedious formalities of a judicial procedure, a citizen who had been elected general by the unanimous ſuffrage of his country, and whoſe preſence was eagerly demanded by the affectionate ardor

of his troops. The charges againſt him deſerved, doubtleſs, to be ſeriouſly examined; but the preſent was not a proper time for ſuch an inveſtigation, which muſt blunt the courage of his followers, and interrupt the ſervice of the republic. Let him ſail, therefore, for Sicily, and at his return home he will either vindicate his innocence, or ſuffer the puniſhment of his guilt." Alcibiades perceived the poiſon concealed under this affected lenity, and teſtified his reluctance to leave behind him ſuch abundant materials for the malice of informers. But his petition for an immediate trial was rejected by the aſſembly. He therefore ſet ſail, probably flattering himſelf, that by the glory and ſucceſs of his arms, he would ſilence the clamors, and defeat the machinations, of his accuſers.

Favored by popular deluſion.

But this expectation was unfortunately diſappointed. In a republican government, it is not more eaſy to excite, than it is difficult to appeaſe, the fermentation of public diſcontents, eſpecially if occaſioned by any real or pretended diminution of freedom. The removal of Alcibiades gave full ſcope to the ebullitions of popular frenzy. The Athenians were continually aſſembled to inquire into the violation of the ſtatues. Many reſpectable citizens were ſeized on ſuſpicion, becauſe they had, on former occaſions, diſcovered principles hoſtile to the wild extravagance of democracy. Others were impriſoned on the evidence of Teucer, an obſcure ſtranger, and Diopeithes, a calumnious demagogue. The violence of the public diſorder opened a door to private vengeance. Every

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individual was desirous to see his personal enemies among the number of state-criminals, and his resentment was invited falsely to accuse them, by an injudicious decree of the assembly, offering high rewards to those who should denounce the guilty, and even to the guilty themselves, who should denounce their associates.

Alcibiades escapes to Sparta. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

Among the persons who had been seized on suspicion, was the crafty and intriguing Timæus, and the profligate and impious Andocides, the same whose statue of Mercury had escaped the general mutilation. The known character of these men naturally marked them out as peculiar victims of popular fury. As they were confined in the same prison, they had an opportunity of communicating their apprehensions, and of contriving means of safety. Timæus persuaded his friend (for the ties of common danger create between knaves a temporary friendship), that it would be weakness to die by a false accusation, when he might save himself by a lie. Andocides turned informer. The prisoners whom he named were banished or put to death; the rest were set at liberty. The absent, among whom was Alcibiades, were recalled to stand trial. But they did not obey the summons sent them by the Salaminian galley. The wanderings and misfortunes of more obscure names are unknown. Alcibiades escaped to Thurium, and afterwards to Argos; and when he understood that the Athenians had set a price on his head, he finally took refuge in Sparta; where his active genius seized

the firſt opportunity to adviſe and to promote thoſe fatal meaſures, which, while they gratified his private reſentment, occaſioned the ruin of his country[28]. CHAP. XIX.

Languid operations in Sicily.

The removal of Alcibiades ſoon appeared in the languid operations of the Athenian armament. The cautious timidity of Nicias, ſupported by wealth, eloquence, and authority, gained an abſolute aſcendant over the more warlike and enterpriſing character of Lamachus, whoſe poverty expoſed him to contempt. Inſtead of making a bold impreſſion on Selinus or Syracuſe, Nicias contented himſelf with taking poſſeſſion of the inconſiderable colony of Hyccara. He ravaged, or laid under contribution, ſome places of ſmaller note, and obtained thirty talents from the Egeſtæans, which, added to the ſale of the booty, furniſhed about thirty thouſand pounds ſterling[29], a ſum that might be uſefully employed in the proſecution of an expenſive war. But this advantage did not compenſate for the courage inſpired into the Syracuſans by delay, and for the diſhonor ſuſtained by the Athenian troops, in their unſucceſsful attempts againſt Hybla and Himera, as well as for their dejection at being confined, during the greateſt part

[28] Plut. in Alcibiad. et Iſocrates, and Lyſias, in the Orations for and againſt the ſon of Alcibiades. Several facts and circumſtances are differently repreſented in the orations of Andocides; but that orator was a party concerned.

[29] Thirty talents from the Egeſtæans, amount to L 5,812
The ſale of ſlaves, etc. — — — 23,259
Sum L 29,071

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of the ſummer, in the inactive quarters of Naxos and Catana.

Nicias determines to attack Syracuſe.

The impatience of the Athenians murmured againſt theſe dilatory and ignoble proceedings, which appeared altogether unworthy the greatneſs of their armament, the generous ſpirit with which they felt themſelves animated, and the ancient glory of the republic. Nicias, reſiſting the wary dictates of his own fear or foreſight, determined to gratify the inclination of his troops by the vigor of his winter-campaign. The conqueſt of Syracuſe, againſt which he intended to lead them, might well excite the emulation of the combatants, ſince that powerful city formed the main obſtacle to their ambition, and the principal bulwark not only of Sicily, but of the Italian and African ſhores.

Deſcription of that city.

Ancient Syracuſe, of which the ruined grandeur ſtill forms an object of admiration, was ſituate on a ſpacious promontory, waſhed on three ſides by the ſea, and defended on the weſt by abrupt and almoſt inacceſſible mountains. The town was built in a triangular form, whoſe ſummit may be conceived at the lofty mountains Epipolé. Adjacent to theſe natural fortifications, the weſtern or inland diviſion of the city was diſtinguiſhed by the name of Tycha, or Fortune, being adorned by a magnificent temple of that flattering divinity. The triangle gradually widening towards the baſe, comprehended the vaſt extent of Achradina, reaching from the northern ſhore of the promontory to the ſouthern iſland Ortygia. This ſmall iſland, compoſing the whole of modern Syracuſe, formed but the third

third and the leaſt extenſive diviſion of the ancient; which was fortified by walls eighteen miles in circuit, enriched by a triple harbour, and peopled by above two hundred thouſand warlike citizens or induſtrious ſlaves[30].

Temper of the Syracuſans.

When the Syracuſans heard the firſt rumors of the Athenian invaſion, they deſpiſed, or affected to deſpiſe them, as idle lies invented to amuſe the ignorance of the populace. The hoſtile armament had arrived at Rhegium before they could be perſuaded, by the wiſdom of Hermocrates, to provide againſt a danger which their preſumption painted as imaginary. But when they received undoubted intelligence that the enemy had reached the Italian coaſt; when they beheld their numerous fleet commanding the ſea of Sicily, and ready to make a deſcent on their defenceleſs iſland, they were ſeized with a degree of juſt terror and alarm proportional to their falſe ſecurity. They condemned their former incredulity and indifference, which had been nouriſhed by the intereſted adulation of the demagogue Athenagoras, who vainly aſſured them that the ſtrength of Syracuſe was ſufficient not only to defy the aſſaults, but to deter the attempts, of any Grecian foe. From the heights of preſumption they plunged into the depths of deſpair, and their ſpirits were, with difficulty, reſtored by the animating voice of Hermocrates, who was not more prudent in proſperity than intrepid in danger[31].

[30] Strabo, p. 266, et ſeqq. et Thucydid. paſſim. l. vi.

[31] Thucydid. p. 436, et ſeqq.

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They insult the Athenians.

By *his* exhortations they were encouraged to make ready their arms, to equip their fleet, to ſtrengthen their garriſons, and to ſummon the aſſiſtance of their allies. Theſe meaſures were undertaken with ardor, and carried on with unremitting activity; and the dilatory operations of the enemy not only removed the recent terror and trepidation of the Syracuſans, but inſpired them with unuſual firmneſs. They requeſted the generals, whom they had appointed to the number of fifteen, to lead them to Catana, that they might attack the hoſtile camp. Their cavalry haraſſed the Athenians by frequent incurſions, beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, deſtroyed their advanced poſts, and even proceeded ſo near to the main body, that they were diſtinctly heard demanding, with loud inſults, Whether thoſe boaſted lords of Greece had left their native country, that they might form a precarious ſettlement at the foot of Mount Ætna [12].

Stratagem of Nicias for getting poſſeſſion of Syracuſe.

Provoked by theſe indignities, and excited by the impatient reſentment of his own troops, Nicias was ſtill reſtrained from an open attempt againſt Syracuſe by the difficulties attending that enterpriſe. The diſtance between Catana and the Sicilian capital was more than thirty miles; but, after the moſt proſperous voyage, the Athenians could not expect, without extreme danger, to make a

[12] Plutarch. The ſneer is differently expreſſed in Thucydides: "Whether they had not come to gain a ſettlement for themſelves in a *foreign* country, rather than to replace the Leontines in *their own*." Thucydid. p. 455.

deſcent on the fortified coaſt of a powerful and vigilant enemy. If they determined to march by land, they muſt be haraſſed by the numerous cavalry of Syracuſe, which actually watched their motions, and with whoſe activity, in a broken and intricate country, the ſtrength of heavy-armed troops was exceedingly ill qualified to contend. To avoid both inconveniences, Nicias employed a ſtratagem. A citizen of Catana, whoſe ſubtile and daring genius, prepared alike to die or to deceive, ought to have preſerved his name from oblivion, appeared in Syracuſe as a deſerter from his native city; the unhappy fate of which, in being ſubjected to the imperious commands, or licentious diſorder of the Athenians, he lamented with perfidious tears, and with the plaintive accents of well-diſſembled ſorrow. "*He* was not the only man who bewailed, with filial compaſſion, the misfortunes and ignominy of his country. A numerous band of Catanæans, whoſe reſentment was repreſſed by fear, longed to take up arms, that they might deliver themſelves from a diſgraceful yoke, and repel the tyranny of the invaders. Nor could the deſign fail of ſucceſs, if Syracuſe ſhould ſecond their generous ardor. The Athenians, ſo liberally endowed with courage and ambition, were deſtitute of wiſdom and of diſcipline. They ſpurned the confinement of the military life; their poſts were forſaken, their ſhips unguarded; they diſdained the duties of the camp, and indulged in the pleaſures of the city. On an appointed day it would be eaſy for the Syracuſans, aſſiſted by the

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conſpirators of Catana, to attack them unprepared, to mount their undefended ramparts, to demoliſh their encampment, and to burn their fleet." This daring propoſal well correſponded with the keen ſentiments of revenge which animated the inhabitants of Syracuſe. The day was named, the plan of the enterpriſe was concerted, and the treacherous Catanean returned home to revive the hopes, and to confirm the reſolution, of his pretended aſſociates.

Fails through the activity of the Syracuſans.

The ſucceſs of this intrigue gave the utmoſt ſatisfaction to Nicias, whoſe armament prepared to ſail for Syracuſe on the day appointed by the inhabitants of that city for aſſaulting, with their whole force, the Athenian camp. Already had they marched, with this view, to the fertile plain of Leontium, when, after twelve hours ſail, the Athenian fleet arrived in the great harbour, diſembarked their troops, and fortified a camp without the weſtern wall, near to a celebrated temple of Olympian Jupiter; a ſituation which had been pointed out by ſome Syracuſan exiles, and which was well adapted to every purpoſe of accommodation and defence. Meanwhile the cavalry of Syracuſe, having proceeded to the walls of Catana, had diſcovered, to their infinite regret, the departure of the Athenians. The unwelcome intelligence was conveyed, with the utmoſt expedition, to the infantry, who immediately marched back to protect Syracuſe. The rapid return of the warlike youth reſtored the courage of the aged Syracuſans. They were joined by the forces of Gela,

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Nicias defeats the Syracuſans in a battle. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

Selinus, and Camarina; and it was determined, without loſs of time, to attack the hoſtile encampment[33].

Only a few days elapſed before the Athenians gave them a fairer opportunity of revenge. The two armies prepared to engage, reſpectively inflamed by reſentment and ambition; the one formidable in courage and numbers, the other elated by ſuperior diſcipline and habitual victory. The Syracuſan generals drew up their troops, ſixteen, and the Athenians only eight, deep: but the latter had, in their camp, a body of reſerve, which was kept ready for action on the firſt ſignal. Nicias went round the ranks, exhorting his ſoldiers by a ſhort diſcourſe, in which he obſerved, "that the ſtrength of their preſent preparations was better fitted to inſpire confidence, than the moſt eloquent ſpeech with a weak army, eſpecially as they contended againſt the Syracuſans, a promiſcuous crowd, whoſe preſumption was founded on inexperience, and whoſe deſultorious ardor, however ſucceſsful in predatory incurſions, would yield to the firſt ſhock of regular war. They fought, indeed, in defence of their city; ſo did the Athenians and their allies, whom nothing but military valor and ſucceſs would reſtore in ſafety to their reſpective countries[34]." Having thus ſpoken, he led his troops to the enemy, who did not decline the engagement. The light-armed archers[35] ſkirmiſhed

[33] Thucydid. p. 445—457.

[34] Thucydid. p. 458 et 459.

[35] Thucydides mentions, beſides the archers (τοξόται), the λιθοβόλοι and σφενδονῆται, "the throwers of ſtones and ſlingers." P. 449. They were all ψιλοί, as he ſays immediately below.

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in the van: the prieſts brought forth the accuſtomed ſacrifices: the trumpets ſummoned for a general charge.

Cauſe of their defeat.

The attack was begun with fury, and continued with perſeverance for ſeveral hours. Both ſides were animated by every principle that can inſpire and urge the utmoſt vigor of exertion, and victory was ſtill doubtful, when a tempeſt ſuddenly aroſe, accompanied with unuſual peals of thunder. This event, which little affected the Athenians, confounded the unexperienced credulity of the enemy, who were broken and put to flight. Nicias reſtrained the eagerneſs of his men in the purſuit, leſt they ſhould be expoſed to danger from a body of twelve hundred Syracuſan cavalry, who had not engaged in the battle, but who impatiently watched an opportunity to aſſault the diſordered phalanx. The Syracuſans eſcaped to their city, and the Athenians returned to their camp. In ſuch an obſtinate conflict the vanquiſhed loſt two hundred and ſixty, the victors only fifty men; numbers that might occaſion much ſurpriſe, if we reflected not that, to oppoſe the offenſive weapons uſed by antiquity, the warriors of Greece (in every circumſtance ſo unlike the miſerable and naked peaſants of modern Europe, whoſe lives are ſacrificed without defence, as without remorſe, to the ambition of men whom the Greeks would have ſtyled tyrants) being armed with the helmet and cuiraſs, the ample buckler, the firm corſelet, and the manly greaves, they often diſplayed their ſkill, their courage, and their love of liberty, at a very ſmall expenſe of human blood.

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The voyage, the encampment, and the battle, employed the dangerous activity, and gratified the impetuous ardor of the Athenians, but did not facilitate the conqueſt of Syracuſe. Without more powerful preparations, Nicias deſpaired of taking the place, either by aſſault, or by a regular ſiege. Soon after his victory he returned with the whole armament to Naxos and Catana; a meaſure which ſufficiently proves that the late enterpriſe had been undertaken, not in conſequence of any permanent ſyſtem of operations formed by the general, but in compliance with the ungovernable[66] temper of his troops, whoſe ideas of military ſubordination were confined to the field of battle.

The Athenians return to Catana and Naxos.

[66] Without attending to this circumſtance, the conduct of Grecian generals muſt, on many occaſions, appear altogether unaccountable. The ſame obſervation applies to modern hiſtory preceding the peace of Munſter. The famous war of thirty years, which ended in that peace, laid the foundation for the exact military ſubordination which diſtinguiſhes the preſent century. See Pere Bougeant, Hiſtoire de la Guerre de 30 Ans.

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Preparations for the enſuing Campaign. — The Athenians begin the Siege with Vigor. — Diſtreſs and Sedition in Syracuſe. — Arrival of Gylippus — Who defeats the Athenians. — Tranſactions in Greece. — A ſecond Armament arrives at Syracuſe — Its firſt Operations ſucceſsful. — The Athenians defeated. — Prepare to raiſe the Siege. — Naval Engagement in the Great Harbour. — Deſpondency of the Athenians. — Stratagem of Hermocrates. — The Athenians raiſe their camp. — Melancholy Firmneſs of Nicias. — Demoſthenes capitulates. — Nicias ſurrenders. — Cruel Treatment of the Athenian Captives. — Singular Exception.

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Nicias prepares for the enſuing campaign. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

NICIAS had reaſon to expect that his victory over the Syracuſans would procure him reſpect and aſſiſtance from the inferior ſtates of Sicily. His emiſſaries were diffuſed over that iſland and the neighbouring coaſt of Italy. Meſſengers were ſent to Tuſcany, where Piſa and other cities had been founded by Greek colonies [1]. An embaſſy was diſpatched to Carthage, the rival and enemy of Syracuſe. Nicias gave orders to collect materials for circumvallation, iron, bricks, and all neceſſary ſtores. He demanded horſes

[1] Strabo, p. 243, et p. 283, et ſeqq.

from the Egeſtæans; and required from Athens reinforcements and a large pecuniary ſupply; and neglected nothing that might enable him to open the enſuing campaign with vigor and effect[2].

The Syracuſans prepare for defence.

While the Athenians thus prepared for the attack of Syracuſe, the citizens of that capital diſplayed equal activity in providing for their own defence. By the advice of Hermocrates, they appointed *himſelf*, Heraclides, and Sicanus; three, inſtead of fifteen generals. The commanders newly elected, both in civil and military affairs, were inveſted with unlimited power, which was uſefully employed to purchaſe or prepare arms, daily to exerciſe the troops, and to ſtrengthen and extend the fortifications of Syracuſe. They likewiſe diſpatched ambaſſadors to the numerous cities and republics with which they had been connected in peace, or allied in war, to ſolicit the continuance of their friendſhip, and to counteract the dangerous deſigns of the Athenians.

Both parties court the friendſhip of the Camerineans. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

The importance of the city Camerina, ſituate on the ſouthern coaſt of Sicily, demanded the preſence of Hermocrates himſelf. The Camerineans had given a very feeble and reluctant aſſiſtance to their allies of Syracuſe; and the orator Euphemus employed all the reſources of his genius to unite

[2] It is remarkable that though Nicias, after the removal of Alcibiades, enjoyed the principal, or rather ſole, command of the army, he acted quite contrary to the opinion which he had declared at the commencement of the expedition. The plan which he purſued was that of Alcibiades, not his own: the views of the baniſhed general ſtill actuated the army; but the ardent ſpirit was withdrawn, that could alone enſure their ſucceſs.

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Arguments of the Syracuſans.

them to the Athenian confederacy. An aſſembly being ſummoned, Hermocrates informed them, "That a deſire to prevent the deception of the Camerineans, not the dread of the Athenian power, had occaſioned his preſent journey. That reſtleſs and ambitious nation, which had ſo often kindled the flames of war on the continent of Greece, had lately ſailed to Sicily, under pretence of re-eſtabliſhing the affairs of the Leontines and Egeſtæans, but from a motive more ſelfiſh, which it was eaſy to conjecture, and impoſſible to miſtake. Their real and only deſign was to ſow diſſenſion and diſagreement among the Sicilian ſtates, which, fighting ſingly, might be ſucceſſively ſubdued. How could effrontery affirm, or ſimplicity believe, that the Athenians ſhould undertake a voyage to vindicate the freedom of Egeſta; they who oppreſſed, with all the rigors of ſlavery, the unhappy iſlanders of Eubœa, by whom Egeſta had been built, and from whom its inhabitants were deſcended! Under pretence of delivering from the tyranny of the great king, the Greeks of Aſia, of the Helleſpont, of Thrace, and of the Ægean, they had conquered and enſlaved thoſe various countries. They actually employed the ſame perfidious contrivance againſt the ſafety of the Sicilians; but he truſted that their preſent undertaking, though carried on with equal artifice, would be attended with very different ſucceſs; and that they would learn, by experience, to diſtinguiſh between the effeminate Ionians and Helleſpontines, whoſe minds had been enfeebled and debaſed by the Perſian yoke, and the

magnanimous Dorians of Sicily, the genuine offspring of Peloponneſus, the ſource of valor and of liberty[3]."

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Euphemus, the Athenian, repelled, with force and ſpirit, theſe reproachful accuſations. "The colonies of Athens were kept in a dependence, not leſs advantageous to themſelves than honorable to the parent ſtate. The general intereſt of Greece required that the ſame republic which at firſt had ſo bravely eſtabliſhed, ſhould ſtill continue to maintain, the national independence. They who yield protection, muſt aſſume authority; but this authority the Athenians had exerted in a manner eſſential to their own and to the public ſafety. If they had ſubjected the neighbouring coaſts and iſlands, their *intereſt* might juſtify that odious but neceſſary meaſure; and the ſame dictates of ſound policy which induced them to conquer and to enſlave the Helleſpontine and Aſiatic Greeks, would engage them to emancipate and to deliver the oppreſſed Sicilians. To this office they were invited by the Leontines and Egeſtæans; to this duty they were prompted by the ties of friendſhip and conſanguinity; to this enterpriſe they were determined by the ſtrongeſt of all motives, a well-grounded fear leſt the inhabitants of Sicily (whoſe numbers and diſtance rendered it impoſſible for Athens to ſubdue, far leſs to retain them in ſubjection) ſhould fall a prey to the watchful encroachments of Syracuſe, and thus become an acceſſion to the Peloponneſian confederacy." The Camerineans dreaded

Of the Athenians.

[3] Thucydid. l. vi. p. 463, et ſeqq.

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The Camerineans determine to observe neutrality.

the distant ambition of Athens, but dreaded still more the neighbouring hostility of Syracuse. Their fears dictated a reply in friendly and respectful terms; but they craved leave to reserve a neutrality between the contending powers, hoping, by this expedient, to irritate the resentment of neither, yet to defeat the designs of both.

The Athenians are reinforced, and begin the siege with vigor. Olymp. xci. 3. A. C. 414.

Meanwhile the expected reinforcements arrived from Athens. In addition to his original force, Nicias had likewise collected a body of six hundred cavalry, and the sum of four hundred talents; and, in the eighteenth summer of the war, the activity of the troops and workmen had completed all necessary preparations for undertaking the siege of Syracuse. The Athenian armament enjoyed a prosperous voyage to the northern harbour of Trogilé, and the troops were no sooner disembarked than they seized an opportunity of signalizing their valor against a body of seven hundred men, who marched to reinforce the garrison of Labdalus; an important fortress, situate on the highest of the mountains which overlook and command the city. Three hundred Syracusans were killed in the pursuit; the rest took refuge behind their walls; and the castle of Labdalus was taken, and strongly guarded by the victors. The plan which Nicias adopted for conquering the city, was to draw a wall on either side from the neighbourhood of Labdalus, towards the port of Trogilé on the north, and towards the gulph, extending two leagues in circumference, and justly called the Great Harbour, on the south. When these circumvallations had

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ſurrounded the place by land, he expected, by his numerous fleet, to block up the wide extent of the Syracuſan harbours. The whole ſtrength of the Athenian armament was employed in the former operations; and, as all neceſſary materials had been provided with due attention, the works roſe with a rapidity which ſurpriſed and terrified the beſieged. Their former, as well as their recent defeat, deterred them from oppoſing the enemy in a general engagement; but the advice of Hermocrates perſuaded them to raiſe walls, which might traverſe and interrupt thoſe of the Athenians [4]. The imminent danger urged the activity of the workmen; the hoſtile bulwarks approached each other; frequent ſkirmiſhes took place, in one of which the brave Lamachus unfortunately fell a victim to his raſh valor [5]; but the Athenian troops maintained their uſual ſuperiority.

Diſtreſs and ſedition in Syracuſe.

Encouraged by ſucceſs, Nicias puſhed the enemy with vigor. The Syracuſans loſt hopes of defending their new works, or of preventing the complete circumvallation of their city; and this deſpair was increaſed by the abundant ſupplies which arrived from all quarters to the beſiegers, while the intereſt of Syracuſe ſeemed to be univerſally abandoned by the indifference or cowardice of her allies. In the turbulent democracies of Greece, the moment of public danger commonly gave the ſignal for domeſtic ſedition. The populace clamored, with their uſual licentiouſneſs, againſt the incapacity or perfidy of their leaders, to whom

[4] Thucydid. l. vi. p. 482, et ſeqq. [5] Plutarch. in Nicia.

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alone they aſcribed their misfortunes. New generals were named in the room of Hermocrates and his colleagues; and this injudicious alteration increaſed the calamities of Syracuſe, which at length prepared to capitulate [6].

The Syracuſans unexpectedly relieved by their Peloponneſian allies. Olymp. xci. 3. A. C. 414.

While the aſſembly deliberated concerning the execution of a meaſure, which, however diſgraceful, was declared to be neceſſary, a Corinthian galley, commanded by Gongylus, entered the central harbour of Ortygia, which being ſtrongly fortified, and penetrating into the heart of the city, ſerved as the principal and moſt ſecure ſtation for the Syracuſan fleet. The news immediately reached the aſſembly, and all ranks of men eagerly crowded around Gongylus the Corinthian, that they might learn the deſign of his voyage, and the intentions of their Peloponneſian allies. Gongylus announced a ſpeedy and effectual relief to the beſieged city [7]. He acquainted the Syracuſans, that the embaſſy, ſent the preceding year, to crave the aſſiſtance of Peloponneſus, had been crowned with ſucceſs. His own countrymen had warmly embraced the cauſe of their kinſmen, and moſt reſpectable colony. They had fitted out a conſiderable fleet, the arrival of which might be expected every hour. The Lacedæmonians alſo had ſent a ſmall ſquadron, and the whole armament was conducted by the Spartan Gylippus, an officer of tried valor and ability.

Arrival of the Spartan Gylippus;

While the deſponding citizens of Syracuſe liſtened to this intelligence with pleaſing aſtoniſhment,

[6] Thucydid. p. 487. [7] Id. p. 490.

a meſſenger arrived by land from Gylippus himſelf. That experienced commander, inſtead of purſuing a direct courſe to Sicily, which might have been intercepted by the Athenian fleet, had landed with four gallies on the weſtern coaſt of the iſland. The name of a Spartan general determined the wavering irreſolution of the Sicilians. The troops of Himera, Selinus, and Gela, flocked to his ſtandard; and he approached Syracuſe on the ſide of Epipolé, where the line of contravallation was ſtill unfiniſhed, with a body of ſeveral thouſand men. CHAP. XX.

who defeats the Athenians.

The moſt courageous of the citizens ſallied forth to meet this generous and powerful protector. The junction was happily effected; the ardor of the troops kindled into enthuſiaſm; and they diſtinguiſhed that memorable day by ſurpriſing ſeveral important Athenian poſts. This firſt ſucceſs re-animated the activity of the ſoldiers and workmen. The traverſe wall was extended with the utmoſt diligence, and a vigorous ſally deprived the enemy of the ſtrong caſtle of Labdalus. Nicias perceiving that the intereſt of the Athenians in Sicily would be continually weakened by delay, wiſhed to bring the fortune of the war to the deciſion of a battle. Nor did Gylippus decline the engagement. The firſt action was unfavorable to the Syracuſans, who had been imprudently poſted in the defiles between their own and the enemy's walls, which rendered of no avail their ſuperiority in cavalry and archers. The magnanimity of Gylippus acknowledged this error, for which he

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completely atoned by his judicious conduct in the ſucceeding engagements. His forces were drawn up in a more ſpacious ground. The pikemen received the ſhock of the enemy's front. The horſes and light-armed troops aſſailed and haraſſed their undefended flanks. The Athenians were thrown into diſorder, repulſed, and purſued to their camp with conſiderable loſs, and with irreparable diſgrace.

Conſequences of the victory.

The important conſequences of this victory appeared in the ſubſequent events of the ſiege. The Syracuſans ſoon extended their works beyond the line of circumvallation, ſo that it was impoſſible to block up their city, without forcing their ramparts. The beſiegers, while they maintained the ſuperiority of their arms, had been abundantly ſupplied with neceſſaries from the neighbouring territory; but every place was alike hoſtile to them after their defeat. The ſoldiers who went out in queſt of wood and water, were unexpectedly attaked and cut off by the enemy's cavalry, or by the reinforcements which arrived from every quarter to the aſſiſtance of Syracuſe; and they were at length reduced to depend, for every neceſſary ſupply, on the precarious bounty of the Italian ſhore.

Nicias demands a reinforcement from Athens.

Nicias, whoſe ſenſibility deeply felt the public diſtreſs, wrote a moſt deſponding letter to the Athenians. He honeſtly deſcribed, and lamented, the misfortunes and diſorders of his army. The ſlaves deſerted in great numbers; the mercenary troops, who fought only for pay and ſubſiſtence, preferred the

the more ſecure and lucrative ſervice of Syracuſe; even the Athenian citizens, diſguſted with the unexpected length and intolerable hardſhips of the war, abandoned the care of the gallies to unexperienced hands; an abuſe too eaſily permitted by the captains, whoſe weakneſs and partiality had corrupted the diſcipline, and ruined the ſtrength of the fleet. Nicias frankly acknowledged his inability to check the diſorder; obſerving, that he wrote to thoſe who knew the difficulty of governing the licentious ſpirit of their domeſtic troops. He therefore exhorted the aſſembly, either to call them home without delay, or to ſend immediately a ſecond armament, not leſs powerful than the firſt. CHAP. XX.

Naval operations. Olymp. xci. 4. A. C. 413.

Gylippus and Hermocrates (for the latter had again aſſumed the authority due to his abilities) were acquainted with the actual diſtreſs, as well as the future hopes of the beſiegers, who might derive, in conſequence of Nicias's letter, more effectual ſuccours from Attica than the beſieged city could expect from Peloponneſus. They were prompted by intereſt, therefore, as well as by inclination, to preſs the enemy on every ſide, and at once to aſſail them by ſea and land. Beſides the bad condition of the Athenian fleet, the abſence of a conſiderable number of gallies employed in conducting the convoys of proviſions, encouraged this reſolution. The Corinthian ſquadron of twelve ſail, long expected with anxiety, had eſcaped the dangers of a winter's voyage; and at the commencement of the enſuing ſpring, the harbours of

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Syracuſe were crowded with the whole naval ſtrength of Sicily. Hermocrates perſuaded his countrymen, "That the advantages of ſkill and experience, which he honeſtly aſcribed to the Athenians, could not compenſate their terror and confuſion at being ſuddenly attacked by a ſuperior force, on an element which they affected to command. Athens had aſſumed this boaſted empire of the ſea in repelling the invaſion of Perſia. Syracuſe had a ſimilar, yet ſtronger motive; and as ſhe poſſeſſed greater power, was entitled to expect more diſtinguiſhed ſucceſs."

Alternate ſucceſs.

The principal ſquadrons of Syracuſe lay in the harbour of Ortygia, ſeparated, by an iſland of the ſame name, from the ſtation of the Athenian fleet. While Hermocrates ſailed forth with eighty gallies, to venture a naval engagement, Gylippus attacked the hoſtile fortifications at Plemmyrium, a promontory oppoſite to Ortygia, which confined the entrance of the Great Harbour. The defeat of the Syracuſans at ſea, whereby they loſt fourteen veſſels, was balanced by their victory at land, in which they took three fortreſſes, containing a large quantity of military and naval ſtores, and a conſiderable ſum of money. In ſome ſubſequent actions, which ſcarcely deſerve the name of battles, their fleet was ſtill unſucceſsful; but as they engaged with great caution, and found every where a ſecure retreat on a friendly ſhore, their loſs was extremely inconſiderable. The want of ſucceſs, in their firſt attempt, did not abate their reſolution to gain the command at ſea. The hopes of defending their

country ſharpened their invention, and animated their activity. They could not, indeed, contend with the Athenians in the rapidity of naval evolution, or in the ſkill of ſeamanſhip; but in the deſtined ſcene of action, there was little opportunity for diſplaying thoſe advantages; and by ſtrengthening, with unremitting labor, the prows of their ſhips, they compenſated, by ſuperior weight, the defect of velocity. They provided alſo a great number of ſmall veſſels, which might approach ſo near the hoſtile fleet, that the light-armed troops with which they were filled could aim their darts againſt the Athenian mariners.

The Athenians defeated at ſea.

By unexampled aſſiduity in completing theſe preparations, the Syracuſans at length prevailed in a general engagement, which was fought in the Great Harbour. Seven Athenian ſhips were ſunk, many more were diſabled, and Nicias ſaved the remains of his ſhattered and diſhonored armament, by retiring behind a line of merchantmen and tranſports, from the maſts of which had been ſuſpended huge maſſes of lead, named dolphins from their form, ſufficient to cruſh, by their falling weight, the ſtouteſt gallies of antiquity. This unexpected obſtacle arreſted the progreſs of the victors; but the advantages already obtained elevated them with the higheſt hopes, and reduced the enemy to deſpair.

Tranſactions in Greece, Olymp. xci. 3. A. C. 414.

The Athenian misfortunes in Sicily were attended by misfortunes at home, ſtill more dreadful. In the eighteenth year of the war, Alcibiades accompanied to Sparta the ambaſſadors of Corinth and

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Syracuſe, who had ſolicited and obtained aſſiſtance to the beſieged city. On that occaſion, the Athenian exile firſt acquired the confidence of the Spartans, by condemning, in the ſtrongeſt terms, the injuſtice and ambition of his ungrateful countrymen, "whoſe cruelty towards himſelf equalled their inveterate hoſtility to the Lacedæmonian republic; but that republic might, by following his advice, diſarm their reſentment. The town of Decelia was ſituated on the Attic frontier, at an equal diſtance of fifteen miles from Thebes and Athens. This place, which commanded an extenſive and fertile plain, might be ſurpriſed and fortified by the Spartans[a], who, inſtead of haraſſing their foes by annual incurſions, might thus infeſt them by a continual war. The wiſdom of Sparta had too long neglected ſuch a ſalutary and deciſive meaſure, eſpecially as the exiſtence of a ſimilar deſign had often been ſuggeſted by the fears of the enemy, who trembled even at the apprehenſion of ſeeing a foreign garriſon in their territory."

The Peloponneſians raiſe a fortreſs in Attica. Olymp. xci. 4. A. C. 413.

This advice, firſt propoſed, and often urged, by Alcibiades, was adopted in the commencement of the enſuing ſpring, when the warlike Agis led a powerful army into Attica. The defenceleſs inhabitants of the frontier fled before his irreſiſtible arms; but inſtead of purſuing them, as uſual, into the heart of the country, he ſtopped ſhort at Decelia. As all

[a] The Athenians, with their uſual imprudence, facilitated the ſucceſs of Alcibiades's intrigues. At the time they ought, if poſſible, to have ſoothed, they exaſperated the Spartans to the utmoſt, by frequent incurſions from Pylus, and by openly aſſiſting the Argives. Thucydid. l. vi. ſub. fine.

neceſſary materials had been provided in great abundance, the place was ſpeedily fortified on every ſide, and the walls of Decelia, which might be diſtinctly ſeen acroſs the intermediate plain, bid defiance to thoſe of Athens[9].

The miſerable ſtate of that country.

The latter city was kept in continual alarm by the watchful hoſtility of a neighbouring garriſon. The open country was entirely laid waſte, and the uſual communication was interrupted with the valuable iſland of Eubœa, from which, in ſeaſons of ſcarcity, or during the ravages of war, the Athenians commonly derived their ſupplies of corn, wine, and oil, and whatever is moſt neceſſary to life. Haraſſed by the fatigues of unremitting ſervice, and deprived of daily bread, the ſlaves murmured, complained, and revolted to the enemy; and their defection robbed the ſtate of twenty thouſand uſeful artiſans. Since the latter years of Pericles, the Athenians had not been involved in ſuch diſtreſs. But their preſent were far more grievous than their paſt ſufferings. Theſe had been chiefly occaſioned by the temporary rage of the peſtilence, the abatement of which there was always reaſon to expect; but thoſe were inflicted by the unextinguiſhable hatred of a cruel and unrelenting foe[10].

The Athenians exert great vigor in the midſt of their calamities.

The domeſtic calamities of the republic did not, however, prevent the moſt vigorous exertions abroad. Twenty gallies, ſtationed at Naupactus, watched the motions of the Peloponneſiam fleet deſtined to the aſſiſtance of Syracuſe: thirty carried on the war in Macedonia, to reduce the rebellion

[9] Thucydid. p. 500, et ſeqq.

[10] Id. ibid.

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of Amphipolis; a conſiderable ſquadron collected tribute, and levied ſoldiers, in the colonies of Aſia; another, ſtill more powerful, ravaged the coaſt of Peloponneſus. Never did any kingdom or republic equal the magnanimity of Athens; never, in ancient or modern times, did the courage of any ſtate entertain an ambition ſo far ſuperior to its power, or exert efforts ſo diſproportionate to its ſtrength. Amidſt the difficulties and dangers which encompaſſed them on every ſide, the Athenians perſiſted in the ſiege of Syracuſe, a city little inferior to their own; and, undaunted by the actual devaſtation of their country, unterrified by the menaced aſſault of their walls, they ſent, without delay, ſuch a reinforcement into Sicily, as afforded the moſt promiſing hopes of ſucceſs in their expedition againſt that iſland [11].

The Athenian armament, commanded by Demoſthenes, arrives at Syracuſe. Olymp. xci. 4. A. C. 413

The Syracuſans had ſcarcely time to rejoice at their victory, or Nicias to bewail his defeat, when a numerous and formidable armament appeared on the Sicilian coaſt. The foremoſt gallies, their prows adorned with gaudy ſtreamers, purſued a ſecure courſe towards the harbours of Syracuſe. The emulation of the rowers was animated by the mingled ſounds of the trumpet and clarion; and the regular decoration, the elegant ſplendor, which diſtinguiſhed every part of the equipment, exhibited a pompous ſpectacle of naval triumph. Their appearance, even at a diſtance, announced the country to which they belonged; and both the joy

[11] Thucydid. p. 501, et ſeqq.

of the beſiegers, and the terror of the beſieged, acknowledged that Athens was the only city in the world capable of ſending to the ſea ſuch a beautiful and magnificent contribution. The Syracuſans employed not unavailing efforts to check the progreſs, or to hinder the approach, of the hoſtile armament; which, beſides innumerable foreign veſſels and tranſports, conſiſted of ſeventy-three Athenian gallies, commanded by the experienced valor of Demoſthenes and Eurymedon. The pikemen on board exceeded five thouſand; the light-armed troops were nearly as numerous; and, including the rowers, workmen, and attendants, the whole ſtrength may be reckoned equal to that originally ſent with Nicias [12], which amounted to above twenty thouſand men. CHAP. XX.

The misfortunes hitherto attending the operations in Sicily had lowered the character of the general; and this circumſtance, as well as the ſuperior abilities of Demoſthenes, entitled him to aſſume the tone of authority in their conjunct deliberations. His advice, which Eurymedon highly approved, and in which the dilatory caution of Nicias finally acquieſced, was clear and ſimple. "They ought to avail themſelves of the alarm which the unexpected arrival of ſuch a powerful reinforcement had ſpread among the enemy; and inſtead of ſubmitting to the tedious formalities of a ſiege, at once aſſault the walls of Syracuſe. He truſted, by the valor of his troops, to obtain, in one day, The combined forces aſſault Syracuſe.

[12] Comp. Thucydid. ſupra citat. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 336. Plut. in Nicia.

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the valuable reward of long and ſevere labors. But if the gods had otherwiſe determined, it would be time to deſiſt from an enterpriſe, in which delay was equal to defeat, and to employ the bravery of the Athenian youth in repelling the invaders of their country [13].

Their firſt operations ſucceſsful.

After ravaging the banks of the Anapus, and making ſome ineffectual attempts againſt the fortifications on that ſide, probably with a view to divert the attention of the enemy, Demoſthenes choſe the firſt hour of a moonſhine night, to proceed with the flower of the army to ſeize the fortreſſes in Epipolé. The march was performed with ſucceſsful celerity; the out-poſts were ſurpriſed; the guards put to the ſword; and three ſeparate encampments, of the Syracuſans, the Sicilians, and allies, formed a feeble oppoſition to the Athenian ardor. As if their victory had already been complete, the aſſailants began to pull down the wooden battlements, or to urge the purſuit with a rapidity which diſordered their ranks.

A general engagement, in which the Athenians are defeated.

Meanwhile, the vigilant activity of Gylippus had aſſembled the whole force of Syracuſe. At the approach of the enemy his vanguard retired. The Athenians were decoyed within the intricate windings of the walls, and their irregular fury was firſt checked by the firmneſs of a Theban phalanx. A reſiſtance ſo ſudden and unexpected might alone have been deciſive; but other circumſtances were adverſe to the Athenians: their ignorance of the

[13] Thucydid. l. vii. p. 519.

ground, the alternate obſcurity of night, and the deceitful glare of the moon, which, ſhining in the front of the Thebans, illumined the ſplendor of their arms, and multiplied the terror of their numbers. The foremoſt ranks of the purſuers were repelled; and, as they retreated to the main body, encountered the advancing Argives and Corcyreans, who, ſinging the Pœan in their Doric dialect and accent, were unfortunately taken for enemies. Fear, and then rage, ſeized the Athenians, who thinking themſelves encompaſſed on all ſides, determined to force their way, and committed much bloodſhed among their allies, before the miſtake could be diſcovered. To prevent the repetition of this dreadful error, their ſcattered bands were obliged at every moment to demand the watch-word, which was at length betrayed to their adverſaries. The conſequence of this was doubly fatal. At every rencounter the ſilent Athenians were ſlaughtered without mercy, while the enemy, who knew their watch-word, might at pleaſure join, or decline, the battle, and eaſily oppreſs their weakneſs, or elude their ſtrength. The terror and confuſion increaſed; the rout became general; Gylippus purſued in good order with his victorious troops. The vanquiſhed could not deſcent in a body with the celerity of fear, by the narrow paſſages through which they had mounted. Many abandoned their arms, and explored the unknown paths of the rocky Epipolé. Others threw themſelves from precipices, rather than await the purſuers. Several thouſands were left dead or wounded on the ſcene

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of action; and in the morning the greater part of the ſtragglers were intercepted and cut off by the Syracuſan cavalry [24].

The ſalutary meaſures propoſed by Demoſthenes prevented by Nicias.

This dreadful and unexpected diſaſter ſuſpended the operations of the ſiege. The Athenian generals ſpent the time in fruitleſs deliberations concerning their future meaſures, while the army lay encamped on the marſhy and unhealthy banks of the Anapus. The viciſſitudes of an autumnal atmoſphere, corrupted by the foul vapors of an unwholeſome ſoil, made a ſevere impreſſion on the irritable fibres of men, exhauſted by fatigue, dejected by diſgrace, and deprived of hope. A general ſickneſs broke out in the camp. Demoſthenes urged this calamity as a new reaſon for haſtening their departure, while it was yet poſſible to croſs the Ionian ſea, without riſking the danger of a winter's tempeſt. But Nicias diſſuaded the deſign of leaving Sicily until they ſhould be warranted to take this important ſtep by the poſitive authority of the republic. "Thoſe who were actually the moſt bent on ignominious flight, would, after their return, be the foremoſt to accuſe the weakneſs or the treachery of their commanders; and for his own part, he would rather die honorably in the field of battle, than periſh by the unjuſt ſentence of his country.". Demoſthenes and Eurymedon knew, by fatal experience, the iraſcible temper of an Athenian aſſembly; they only inſiſted, that the armament ſhould at leaſt remove to

[24] Thucydid. p. 520, et ſeqq.

a more convenient ſtation, from whence, after the troops had recovered their uſual health and ſpirits, they might haraſs the enemy by continual deſcents, until they obtained an opportunity of fighting the Syracuſan fleet on the open ſea. CHAP. XX.

But even this reſolution was ſtrenuouſly oppoſed by Nicias, who knew by the ſecret correſpondence which he maintained with certain traitors in Syracuſe, that the treaſury of that city had been exhauſted by the enormous expenſe of two thouſand talents already incurred in the war, and that the magiſtrates had ſtretched their credit to its utmoſt limits, in borrowing from their allies; and who therefore naturally flattered himſelf, that the vigor of their reſiſtance would abate with the decay of their faculties. The colleagues of Nicias were confounded with the firmneſs of an oppoſition ſo unlike the flexible timidity of his ordinary character, and ſo inconſiſtent with the ſentiments which he had often expreſſed concerning the Sicilian expedition. They imagined that he might rely on ſome more important ground of confidence, which his caution was unwilling to explain; they ſubmitted therefore to his opinion, an opinion equally fatal to himſelf and to them, and to the armament which they commanded [25]. His motives.

Meanwhile the prudence of Gylippus profited of the fame of his victory, to draw a powerful reinforcement from the Sicilian cities; and the tranſports, ſo long expected from Peloponneſus, finally The Syracuſans receive a reinforcement.

[25] Comp. Thucydid. p. 524. et Plut. in Nicia.

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arrived in the harbour of Ortygia. The Peloponneſian forces had ſailed from Greece early in the ſpring; and it is not explained for what reaſon they touched on the coaſt of Cyrenaica. There they continued for ſome months, that they might defend their Grecian brethren, actually threatened by the barbarous aſſaults of the Lybians; and having conquered that dangerous enemy, they augmented their fleet with a few Cyrenian gallies [16], and ſafely reached Syracuſe, the place of their firſt deſtination. This ſquadron formed the laſt aſſiſtance ſent to either of the contending parties, and nothing farther was required to complete the actors in the following dreadful ſcene; for by the acceſſion of the Cyrenians, Syracuſe was either attacked or defended by all the various diviſions of the Grecian name, which formed, in that age, the moſt civilized portion of the inhabitants of Aſia, Africa, and Europe.

The Athenians prepare to raiſe the ſiege.

The arrival of ſuch powerful auxiliaries to the beſieged, and the increaſing force of the malady, totally diſconcerted the Athenians. Even Nicias agreed to ſet ſail. Every neceſſary preparation was made for this purpoſe, and the cover of night was choſen, as moſt proper for concealing their own diſgrace, and for eluding the vengeance of the enemy. But the night appointed for their departure was diſtinguiſhed by an inauſpicious eclipſe of the moon, for ſo at leaſt it was judged by the ſuperſtitious fears of Nicias, and by the ignorance

[16] Thucydid. p. 527.

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of his diviners [17], even in the vain art which they profeſſed. The voyage was deferred till the myſtical number of thrice nine days. But before the expiration of that time it was no longer practicable; for the deſign was ſoon diſcovered to the Syracuſans, and this diſcovery, added to the encouragement derived from the circumſtances of which we have already taken notice, increaſed their eagerneſs to attack the enemy by ſea and land. Their attempts failed to deſtroy, by fire-ſhips, the Athenian fleet. They were more ſucceſsful in employing ſuperior numbers to divide the ſtrength, and to weaken the reſiſtance, of an enfeebled and dejected foe. During three days there was a perpetual ſucceſſion of military and naval exploits. On the firſt day fortune hung in ſuſpenſe; the ſecond deprived the Athenians of a conſiderable ſquadron commanded by Eurymedon; and this misfortune was embittered, on the third, by the loſs of eighteen gallies, with their crews [18].

Their purpoſe oppoſed by the enemy;

The Syracuſans celebrated their victory with triumphant enthuſiaſm; while their orators "extolled and magnified the glory of a city, which, by its native proweſs and ſingle danger, had not only maintained the independence of Sicily, but avenged the injuries of the whole Grecian name, too long diſhonored and afflicted by the oppreſſive tyranny of Athens. That tyranny had been acquired and confirmed by the uſurped ſovereignty of

[17] The rules of divination, we are told, ſhould have taught them, that the obſcurity of an eclipſe betokened a ſucceſsful retreat. Plutarch. in Nicia.

[18] Thucydid. p. 528, et ſeqq.

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the ſea; but even on that element, the courage of Syracuſe had defeated the experience of the enemy. Their renown would be immortal, if they accompliſhed the uſeful and meritorious work; and if, by intercepting the retreat, and deſtroying the armament of the Athenians, they cruſhed at once the power, and for ever humbled the pride, of that aſpiring people".

who throw a chain acroſs the Great Harbour.

This deſign, ſuggeſted by the wiſdom of Hermocrates, was eagerly adopted by the active zeal of his fellow-citizens, who ſtrove, with unremitting ardor, to throw a chain of veſſels acroſs the mouth of the Great Harbour, about a mile in breadth. The labor was complete before Nicias, totally occupied by other objects, attempted to interrupt it. After repeated defeats, and although he was ſo miſerably tormented by the ſtone, that he had frequently ſolicited his recal, that virtuous commander, whoſe courage roſe in adverſity, uſed the utmoſt diligence to retrieve the affairs of his country. The ſhattered gallies were ſpeedily refitted; and again prepared, to the number of an hundred and ten, to riſk the event of a battle. As they had ſuffered greatly, on former occaſions, by the hardneſs and maſſive ſolidity of the Syracuſan prows, Nicias provided them with grappling-irons, fitted to prevent the recoil of their opponents, and the repetition of the hoſtile ſtroke. The decks were crowded with armed men, and the contrivance to which the enemy had hitherto chiefly owed their ſucceſs, of introducing the firmneſs and ſtability of a military, into a naval engagement, was adopted

in its full extent by the Athenians. When the fleet was ready for ſea, Nicias recalled the troops from the various poſts and fortreſſes ſtill occupied by their arms, and formed them into one camp on the ſhore, where, on the day of battle, their ranks might be extended as widely as the vicinity of the Syracuſan ramparts could ſafely permit; that a ſpacious retreat might be ſecured to the Athenian ſhips, if perſecuted by their uſual bad fortune; in which fatal alternative nothing remained, but to retire by land with the miſerable remnant of the army. But Nicias did not yet deſpair, that the laſt efforts of his countrymen would break the enemy's chain at the mouth of the Great Harbour; and that they would return victorious, to tranſport their encamped companions to the friendly ports of Naxos and Catana. CHAP. XX.

Elevated by this hope, he forgot his bodily infirmities, and ſuppreſſed the anguiſh of his ſoul. With a cheerful and magnanimous firmneſs, he removed the dejection of the Athenians, exhorting them, before they embarked, by an affecting and manly ſpeech, "to remember the viciſſitudes of war, and the inſtability of fortune". Though hitherto unſucceſsful, they had every thing to expect from the ſtrength of their actual preparations; nor ought men, who had tried and ſurmounted ſo many dangers, to yield to the weak prejudices of unexperienced folly, and cloud the proſpect of future victory, by the gloomy remembrance of paſt Both ſides prepare for battle.

[19] Thucydid. p. 535, et ſeqq.

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defeat. They yet enjoyed an opportunity to defend their lives, their liberty, their friends, their country, and the mighty name of Athens; an opportunity which never could return, ſince the whole fortune of the republic was embarked in the preſent fleet". When Gylippus and the Syracuſan commanders were apprized of the deſigns of the enemy, they haſtened to the defence of the bar which had been thrown acroſs the entrance of the harbour. It is uncertain for what reaſon they had left open one narrow paſſage [20], on either ſide of which they ſtationed a powerful ſquadron. Gylippus animated the ſailors with ſuch topics as the occaſion naturally furniſhed, and returned to take the conduct of the land-forces, leaving Sicanus, Agatharchus, and Pythen, the two firſt to command the wings, and the laſt, a citizen of Corinth, to command the centre, of the Syracuſan fleet, which fell ſhort of the Athenian by the number of twenty gallies. But the former was admirably provided with whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for attack or for defence; even the Athenian grappling-irons had not been overlooked; to elude the dangerous graſp of theſe inſtruments, the prows of the Syracuſan veſſels were covered with wet and ſlippery hides.

Naval engagement in the Great Harbour.

Before the Athenians ſet ſail, Nicias, that nothing might be neglected to obtain ſucceſs, went round the whole armament, addreſſing, in the moſt pathetic terms, the ſeveral commanders by name,

[20] Και τον καταλειφθεντα διεκπλουν. Thucydid. p. 451.

recalling

recalling to them the objects moſt dear and moſt reſpectable, which they were engaged by every tie of honor and affection to defend, and conjuring them by their families, their friends, and their paternal gods, to exert whatever ſkill or courage they collectively, or as individuals, poſſeſſed, on this ever memorable and moſt important occaſion. He then returned to the camp with an enfeebled body and an anxious mind, committing the laſt hope of the republic to the active valor of Demoſthenes, Eudemus, and Menander. The firſt impreſſion of the Athenians was irreſiſtible; they burſt through the paſſage of the bar, and repelled the ſquadrons on either ſide. As the entrance widened, the Syracuſans, in their turn, ruſhed into the harbour, which was more favorable than the open ſea to their mode of fighting. Thither the foremoſt of the Athenians returned, either compelled by ſuperior force, or that they might aſſiſt their companions. The engagement became general in the mouth of the harbour; and in this narrow ſpace two hundred gallies fought, during the greateſt part of the day, with an obſtinate and perſevering valor. It would require the expreſſive energy of Thucydides, and the imitative, though inimitable, ſounds and expreſſions of the Grecian tongue, to deſcribe the noiſe, the tumult, and the ardor of the contending ſquadrons. The battle was not long confined to the ſhock of adverſe prows, and to the diſtant hoſtility of darts and arrows. The neareſt veſſels grappled, and cloſed with each other, and their decks were ſoon converted

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into a field of blood. While the heavy-armed troops boarded the enemy's ſhips, they left their own expoſed to a ſimilar misfortune; the fleets were divided into maſſive cluſters of adhering gallies; and the confuſion of their mingled ſhouts overpowered the voice of authority; the Athenians exhorting, not to abandon an element on which their republic had ever acquired victory and glory, for the dangerous protection of an hoſtile ſhore; and the Syracuſans encouraging each other not to fly from an enemy, whoſe weakneſs or cowardice had long meditated flight [21].

The Athenians defeated.

The ſingular and tremendous ſpectacle of an engagement more fierce and obſtinate than any that had ever been beheld in the Grecian ſeas, reſtrained the activity, and totally ſuſpended the powers, of the numerous and adverſe battalions which encircled the coaſt. The ſpectators and the actors were equally intereſted in the important ſcene; but the former, the current of whoſe ſenſibility was undiverted by any exertion of mind or body, felt more deeply, and expreſſed more forcibly, the various emotions by which they were agitated [22]. Hope, fear, the ſhouts of victory, the ſhrieks of deſpair, the anxious ſolicitude of doubtful ſucceſs, animated the countenances, the voice, and the geſture of the Athenians, whoſe whole reliance centered in their fleet. When at length their gallies evidently gave way on every ſide, the contraſt of alternate, and the rapid tumult of ſucceſſive

[21] Thucydid. p. 543, et ſeqq. [22] Id. p. 544.

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paſſions, ſubſided in a melancholy calm. This dreadful pauſe of aſtoniſhment and terror was followed by the diſordered trepidation of flight and fear: many eſcaped to the camp: others ran, uncertain whither to direct their ſteps; while Nicias, with a ſmall, but undiſmayed band, remained on the ſhore, to protect the landing of their unfortunate gallies. But the retreat of the Athenians could not probably have been effected, had it not been favored by the actual circumſtances of the enemy, as well as by the peculiar prejudices of ancient ſuperſtition. In this well-fought battle, the vanquiſhed had loſt fifty, and the victors forty veſſels. It was incumbent on the latter to employ their immediate and moſt ſtrenuous efforts to recover the dead bodies of their friends, that they might be honored with the ſacred and indiſpenſable rites of funeral. The day was far ſpent; the ſtrength of the ſailors had been exhauſted by a long continuance of unremitting labor; and both they and their companions on ſhore were more deſirous to return to Syracuſe to enjoy the fruits of victory, than to irritate the dangerous deſpair of the vanquiſhed Athenians [23].

Their extreme deſpondency.

It is obſerved by the Roman orator [24], with no leſs truth than elegance, that not only the navy of Athens, but the glory and the empire of that republic, ſuffered ſhipwreck in the fatal harbour of Syracuſe. The deſpondent degeneracy which immediately followed this ever memorable engagement was

[23] Thucydid. p. 545. [24] Cic. in Verr. v. 37.

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teſtified in the neglect of a duty which the Athenians had never neglected before, and in denying a part of their national character, which it had hitherto been their greateſt glory to maintain. They abandoned to inſult and indignity the bodies of the ſlain; and when it was propoſed to them by their commanders to prepare next day for a ſecond engagement, ſince their veſſels were ſtill more numerous than thoſe of the enemy, they, who had ſeldom avoided a ſuperior, and who had never declined the encounter of an equal force, declared, that no motive could induce them to withſtand the weaker armament of Syracuſe. Their only deſire was to eſcape by land, under cover of the night, from a foe whom they had not courage to oppoſe, and from a place where every object was offenſive to their ſight, and moſt painful to their reflection [25].

The Syracuſans celebrate the feſtival of Hercules with licentious joy.

The behaviour of the Syracuſans might have proved extremely favorable to this deſign. The evening after the battle was the vigil of the feaſt of Hercules; and the ſtill agitated combatants awakened, after a ſhort and feveriſh repoſe, to celebrate the memory of their favorite hero, to whoſe propitious influence they probably aſcribed the merit of the moſt ſplendid trophy that ever adorned the fame of Syracuſe. From the triumph of victory, and grateful emotions of religious enthuſiaſm, there was an eaſy tranſition, in the creed and in the practice of the Greeks, to the extravagance of licentious joy, and the exceſſes of ſenſual indulgence.

[25] Thucydid. p. 545.

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Sports, proceſſions, muſic, dancing, the pleaſures of the table, of the elegant arts, and of unguarded converſation, were incorporated in the texture of their religious worſhip. But the coincidence of a feſtival and a victory demanded an accumulated profuſion of ſuch objects as ſooth the ſenſes and pleaſe the fancy. Amidſt theſe giddy tranſports, the Syracuſans loſt all remembrance of an enemy whom they deſpiſed; even the ſoldiers on guard joined the diſſolute or frivolous amuſements of their companions; and, during the greateſt part of the night, Syracuſe preſented a mixed ſcene of ſecure gaiety, of thoughtleſs jollity, and of mad and dangerous diſorder [24].

Stratagem of Hermocrates to prevent the Athenian retreat.

The firm and vigilant mind of Hermocrates alone withſtood, but was unable to divert, the general current. It was impoſſible to rouſe to the fatigues of war men buried in wine and pleaſure, and intoxicated with victory; and, as he could not intercept by force, he determined to retard by ſtratagem, the intended retreat of the Athenians, whoſe numbers and reſentment would ſtill render them formidable to whatever part of Sicily they might remove their camp. A ſelect band of horſemen, aſſuming the character of traitors, fearleſsly approached the hoſtile ramparts, and warned the Athenians of the danger of departing that night, as many ambuſcades lurked in the way, and all the moſt important paſſes were occupied by the enemy. The frequency of treaſon gained credit to the

[24] Thucydid. p. 546.

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perfidious advice; and the Athenians, having changed their firſt reſolution, were perſuaded by Nicias to wait two days longer, that ſuch meaſures might be taken as ſeemed beſt adapted to promote the ſafety and celerity of their march [27].

The Athenians raiſe their camp.

The camp was raiſed on the third morning after the battle. Forty thouſand men, of whom many were afflicted with wounds and diſeaſe, and all exhauſted by fatigue, and dejected by calamity, exhibited the appearance, not of a flying army, but of a great and populous community, driven from their ancient habitations by the cruel vengeance of a conqueror. They had miſerably fallen from the lofty expectations with which they ſailed in triumph to the harbour of Syracuſe. They had abandoned their fleet, their tranſports, the hopes of victory, and the glory of the Athenian name; and theſe collective ſufferings were enhanced and exaſperated by the painful images which ſtruck the eyes and the fancy of each unfortunate individual. The mangled bodies of their companions and friends, deprived of the ſacred rites of funeral, affected them with a ſentiment of religious horror, on which the weakneſs of human nature is happily unable to dwell. They removed their attention from this dreadful ſight; but they could not divert their compaſſion from a ſpectacle ſtill more melancholy, the numerous crowds of ſick and wounded, who followed them with enfeebled and unequal ſteps, entreating, in the accent and attitude of unutterable

Their dreadful afflictions.

[27] Thucydid. p. 547.

anguiſh, to be delivered from the horrors of famine, or the rage of an exaſperated foe. Amidſt ſuch affecting ſcenes, the heart of a ſtranger would have melted with tender ſympathy; but how much more muſt it have afflicted the Athenians, to ſee their parents, brothers, children, and friends, involved in unexampled miſery! to hear, without the poſſibility of relieving, their lamentable complaints! and reluctantly to throw the clinging victims from their wearied necks and arms! Yet the care of perſonal ſafety prevailed over every other care; for the ſoldiers, either deſtitute of ſlaves, or diſtruſting their fidelity, were not only encumbered by their armor, but oppreſſed by the weight of their proviſions [28]. CHAP. XX.

Melancholy firmneſs of Nicias.

The ſuperior rank of Nicias entitled him to a pre-eminence of toil and of woe; and he deſerves the regard of poſterity by his character and ſufferings, and ſtill more by the melancholy firmneſs of his conduct. The load of accumulated diſaſters did not ſink him into inactive deſpondency. He moved with a rapid pace around every part of the army, and the ardor of his mind re-animating the languor of his debilitated frame, he exclaimed, with a loud and diſtinct voice, "Athenians and allies! there is yet room for hope. Many have eſcaped from ſtill greater evils; nor ought you raſhly to accuſe either fortune or yourſelves. As to me, who, in bodily ſtrength, excel not the weakeſt among you (for you ſee to what a miſerable condition my diſeaſe has reduced me), and

[28] Thucydid. p. 548.

CHAP. XX. who, in the happineſs of private life, and the deceitful gifts of proſperity, had long been diſtinguiſhed above the moſt illuſtrious of my contemporaries, I am now confounded in affliction with the meaneſt and moſt worthleſs. Yet am I unconſcious of deſerving ſuch a fatal reverſe of fortune. My conduct towards men has been irreproachable; my piety towards the gods conſpicuous and ſincere. For this reaſon I am ſtill animated with confidence; calamities, unmerited by guilt, are diſarmed of their terrors. If we have incurred the indignation of the gods by our ambitious deſigns againſt Sicily, our offence, ſurely, is ſufficiently expiated by paſt ſufferings, which now render us the objects of compaſſion. Other nations have attacked their neighbours with leſs provocation, and have yet eſcaped with a gentler puniſhment; nor will experience warrant the belief, that for the frailties and errors of paſſion, providence ſhould impoſe penalties too heavy to be borne. We have the leſs reaſon to adopt an impious prejudice, ſo diſhonorable to the gods, when we conſider the means which their goodneſs has ſtill left us to provide for our defence. Our numbers, our reſolution, and even our misfortunes, ſtill render us formidable. There is not any army in Sicily capable to intercept our courſe; much leſs to expel us from the firſt friendly territory in which we may fix our camp. If we can ſecure, therefore, our preſent ſafety, by a prudent, ſpeedy, and courageous retreat, we may afterwards retrieve our loſt honor, and reſtore the fallen glory of Athens;

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ſince the chief ornament of a ſtate conſiſts in brave and virtuous men, not in empty ſhips and undefended walls[29]."

The retreat of the Athenians.

The actions of Nicias fully correſponded with his words. He neglected none of the duties of a great general. Inſtead of leading the army towards Naxos and Catana, in which direction there was reaſon to apprehend many ſecret ambuſhes of the enemy, he conducted them by the weſtern route towards Gela and Camerina; expecting, by this meaſure, to find proviſions in greater plenty, as well as to elude the latent ſnares of the Syracuſans. That nothing might be omitted which promiſed the hope of relief, meſſengers were immediately diſpatched to the neighbouring cities, which might poſſibly be tempted by their natural jealouſy of the growing proſperity of Syracuſe, to favor the retreat of the vanquiſhed. The troops were then divided into two ſquares, as the moſt ſecure and capacious arrangement. Nicias led the van; Demoſthenes conducted the rear; the baggage, and unarmed multitude, occupied the centre. In this order of march they paſſed the river Anapus, the ford of which was feebly diſputed by an inconſiderable guard; and having proceeded the firſt day only five miles, they encamped in the evening on a riſing ground, after being much haraſſed during the latter part of their journey by the Syracuſan cavalry and archers, who galled them at a diſtance, intercepted the ſtragglers, and avoided, by a ſeaſonable retreat, to commit the ſecurity of their own

[29] Thucydid. p. 550.

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fortune with the dangerous deſpair of the Athenians. Next day, having marched only twenty furlongs, they reached a ſpacious plain, the convenience of which invited them to repoſe; eſpecially as they needed a ſupply of water and proviſions, which might be eaſily obtained from the ſurrounding country [19].

Interrupted by the enemy.

Before this time, the enemy were apprized of their line of march; and, in order to interrupt it, they ſent a numerous detachment to fortify the mountain of Acræum. This mountain, which probably gave name to the ſmall town ſituate in its neighbourhood, interſected the direct road to Gela and Camerina. It was diſtant a few miles from the Athenian encampment, and a ſmall degree of art might render it impregnable, ſince it was of a ſteep and rapid aſcent, and encompaſſed on every ſide by the rocky channel of a loud and foaming torrent. In vain the Athenians attempted, on three ſucceſſive days, to force the paſſage. They were repelled with loſs in every new attack, which became more feeble than the preceding. In the firſt and moſt deſperate, an accidental ſtorm of thunder increaſed the courage of the Syracuſans and the terror of the Athenians. A ſimilar event had, in the firſt engagement after the invaſion of Sicily, produced an oppoſite effect on the contending nations. But the hopes and the fears of men change with their fortune.

Change their line of march.

In the evening after the laſt unſucceſsful conteſt, the condition of the Athenians was peculiarly

[19] Thucydid. p. 552, et ſeqq.

deplorable. The numbers of the wounded had been increaſed by the fruitleſs attempts to paſs the mountain; the enemy had continually galled and inſulted them as they retreated to their camp; the adjacent territory could no longer ſupply them with the neceſſaries of life; and they muſt be compelled, after all their hardſhips and fatigues, to make a long circuit by the ſea-ſhore, if they expected to reach, in ſafety, the places of their reſpective deſtination. Even this reſolution (for there was no alternative), however dreadful to men in their comfortleſs and exhauſted ſtate, was recommended by Nicias, who, to conceal his deſign from the enemy, cauſed innumerable fires to be lighted in every part of the camp [31]. The troops then marched out under cover of the night, and in the ſame order which they had hitherto obſerved. But they had not proceeded far in this nocturnal expedition, when the obſcurity of the ſkies, the deceitful tracks of an unknown and hoſtile country, filled the moſt timid or unfortunate with imaginary terrors. Their panic, as is uſual in great bodies of men, was ſpeedily communicated to thoſe around them; and Demoſthenes, with above one half of his diviſion, fatally miſtook the road, and quitted, never more to rejoin, the reſt of the army.

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The ſcouts of Gylippus and the Syracuſans immediately brought intelligence of this important event, which furniſhed an opportunity to attack the divided ſtrength of the Athenians. His ſuperior knowledge of the country enabled Gylippus, by

The diviſion commanded by Demoſthenes ſurrenders to Gylippus.

[31] Thucydid. p. 552, et ſeqq.

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the celerity of his march, to intercept the ſmaller diviſion, and to ſurround them on every ſide, in the difficult and intricate defiles which led to the ford of the river Erinios. There he aſſaulted them with impunity, during a whole day, with darts, arrows, and javelins. When the meaſure of their ſufferings was complete, he proclaimed towards the evening, by the ſound of the trumpet, and with the loud voice of the herald, freedom, forgiveneſs, and protection to all who ſhould deſert and abandon the bad fortune of their leaders; an offer which was accepted by the troops of ſeveral Aſiatic iſlands, and other dependent and tributary countries. At length he entered into treaty with Demoſthenes himſelf, whoſe ſoldiers laid down their arms, and delivered their money (which filled the capacious hollow of four broad bucklers), on condition that they ſhould not ſuffer death, impriſonment, or famine [32]. Notwithſtanding the number of the deſerters and of the ſlain, the remainder ſtill amounted to ſix thouſand, who were ſent to Syracuſe with their captive general, under a powerful and vigilant eſcort, while the activity of Gylippus followed the flying battalions of the enemy, which had been conducted by Nicias to the diſtance of twenty miles, towards the fatal banks of the river Aſſinaros.

The diviſion under Nicias overtaken by the enemy.

The Syracuſans overtook the rear before the van could arrive at the lofty and abrupt margin of this rapid ſtream; and an herald was ſent to Nicias,

[32] Thucydid. p. 553.

exhorting him to imitate the example of his colleague, and to ſurrender, without farther bloodſhed, to the irreſiſtible valor of his victorious purſuers. Nicias diſbelieved, or affected to diſbelieve, the report; but when a confidential meſſengers, whom he was allowed to diſpatch for information, brought certain intelligence of the ſurrender and diſgrace of Demoſthenes, he alſo condeſcended to propoſe terms, in the name of the Athenians, engaging, on the immediate ceſſation of hoſtilities, to reimburſe the magiſtrates of Syracuſe for the expenſe of the war, and to deliver Athenian hoſtages (a citizen for a talent) until the debt ſhould be liquidated [33].

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Theſe terms were rejected by the Syracuſans with diſdain; and Gylippus having occupied the moſt advantageous poſts on every ſide, attacked the army of Nicias with the ſame mode of warfare which had, two days before, proved ſo deſtructive to their unfortunate companions. During the whole day they bore, with extraordinary patience, the hoſtile aſſault, ſtill expecting, under cover of the night, to eſcape the cruel vigilance of the enemy. But that hope was vain: Gylippus perceived their departure; and although three hundred men of determined courage gallantly broke through the guards, and effected their eſcape, the reſt were no ſooner diſcovered than they returned to their former ſtation, and laid down their arms in ſilent deſpair. Yet the return of the morning brought back their courage. They again took up their arms, and marched towards

Their melancholy defence.

[33] Thucydid. p. 554.

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the river, miſerably galled and afflicted by the hoſtile archers and cavalry. Their diſtreſs was moſt lamentable and incurable: yet hope did not totally forſake them; for like men in the oppreſſion and languor of a conſuming diſeaſe, they ſtill entertained a confuſed idea, that their ſufferings would end, could they but reach the oppoſite banks of the neighbouring river [84].

Horrid ſcene on the banks of the Aſſinaros.

The deſire of aſſuaging their thirſt encouraged this daring deſign. They ruſhed with frantic diſorder into the rapidity of the ſtream; the purſuing Syracuſans, who had occupied the rocky banks, deſtroying them with innumerable volleys of miſſile weapons. In the Aſſinaros they had a new enemy to contend with. The depth and force of the waters triumphed over their ſingle, and ſhook their implicated ſtrength. Many were borne down the ſtream. At length the weight of their numbers reſiſted the violence of the torrent; but a new form of danger and of horror preſented itſelf to the eyes of Nicias. His ſoldiers turned their fury againſt each other, diſputing, with the point of the ſword, the unwholeſome draughts of the agitated and turbid current. This ſpectacle melted the firmneſs of his manly ſoul. He ſurrendered to Gylippus, and aſked quarter for the miſerable remnant of his troops, who had not periſhed in the Aſſinaros, or been deſtroyed by the Syracuſan archers and cavalry [85]. Before the commands of the Lacedæmonian general could pervade the army, many of the ſoldiers had, according to the barbarous

[84] Thucydid. p. 554. [85] Ibid. p. 555.

practice of the age, ſeized their priſoners and ſlaves; ſo that the Athenian captives were afterwards diſtributed among ſeveral communities of Sicily, which had ſent aſſiſtance to Syracuſe. The reſt, upon laying down their arms, were entitled to the pity and protection of Gylippus; who, after ſending proper detachments to intercept and collect the ſtragglers, returned in triumph to the city with the ineſtimable trophies of his valor and conduct. CHAP. XX.

Death of the Athenian generals.

Nicias had little to expect from the *humanity* of a proud and victorious Spartan; but Demoſthenes might naturally flatter himſelf with the hope of *juſtice*. He urged with energy, but urged in vain, the obſervance of the capitulation which had been ratified with due forms, on the faith of which he had ſurrendered himſelf and the troops intruſted to his command. The public priſoners, conducted ſucceſſively to Syracuſe, and exceeding together the number of ſeven thouſand, were treated with the ſame inhuman cruelty. They were univerſally condemned to labor in the mines and quarries of Sicily [16]: their whole ſuſtenance was bread and water: they ſuffered alternately the ardors of a ſcorching ſun, and the chilling damps of autumn. For ſeventy days and nights they languiſhed in this dreadful captivity, during which, the diſeaſes incident to their manner of life were rendered infectious by the ſtench of the dead bodies, which corrupted the purity of the ſurrounding air. At length an eternal ſeparation was made between

Cruel treatment of the captives.

[16] Thucydid. p. 556.

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those who should enjoy the happier lot of being sold as slaves into distant lands, and those who should for ever be confined to their terrible dungeons. The Athenians, with such Italians and Sicilians as had unnaturally embraced their cause, were reserved for the latter doom. Their generals, Nicias and Demosthenes, had not lived to behold this melancholy hour. Gylippus would have spared their lives, not from any motives of humanity and esteem, but that his joyous return to Sparta might have been graced by their presence. But the resentment of the Syracusans, the fears of the Corinthians; above all, the suspicious jealousy of those perfidious traitors who had maintained a secret correspondence with Nicias, which they dreaded lest the accidents of his future life might discover, loudly demanded the immediate execution of the captive generals[37]. The Athenians of those times justly regretted the loss of Demosthenes, a gallant and enterprising commander; but posterity will for ever lament the fate of Nicias, the most pious, the most virtuous, and the most unfortunate man of the age in which he lived.

A singular exception to this general cruelty.

Amidst this dark and dreadful scene of cruelty and revenge, we must not omit to mention one singular example of humanity, which broke forth like a meteor in the gloom of a nocturnal tempest. The Syracusans, who could punish their helpless captives with such unrelenting severity, had often melted into tears at the affecting strains of Euripides[38], an Athenian poet, who had learned in the Socratic

[37] Thucydid. l. vii. ad fin.

[38] See above, vol. ii. p. 274.

school

ſchool to adorn the leſſons of philoſophy with the charms of fancy, and who was regarded by the taſte of his contemporaries, as he ſtill is by many enlightened judges, as the moſt tender and pathetic, the moſt philoſophical and inſtructive, of all tragic writers. The pleaſure which the Syracuſans had derived from his inimitable poetry, made them long to hear it rehearſed by the flexible voices and harmonious pronunciation of the Athenians, ſo unlike, and ſo ſuperior, to the rudeneſs and aſperity of their own Doric dialect. They deſired their captives to repeat the plaintive ſcenes of their favorite bard. The captives obeyed; and affecting to repreſent the woes of ancient kings and heroes, they too faithfully expreſſed their own. Their taſte and ſenſibility endeared them to the Syracuſans, who releaſed their bonds, received them with kindneſs into their families[39], and, after treating them with all the honorable diſtinctions of ancient hoſpitality, reſtored them to their longing and afflicted country, as a ſmall but precious wreck of the moſt formidable armament that had ever ſailed from a Grecian harbour. At their return to Athens, the grateful captives walked in ſolemn proceſſion to the houſe of Euripides, whom they hailed as their deliverer from ſlavery and death[40]. This acknowledgment, infinitely more honorable than

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[39] Ητοι τεθνηκεν ἡ διδασκει γραμματα, "he is either dead or teaching verſes;" an expreſſion firſt introduced at this time, was afterwards applied proverbially, in ſpeaking of travellers in foreign countries, whoſe fate was uncertain.

[40] Plutarch. in Nicia.

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all the crowns and ſplendor that ever ſurrounded the perſon, and even than all the altars and temples that ever adorned the memory of a poet [91], muſt have tranſported Euripides with the *ſecond* triumph which the heart of man can feel. He would have enjoyed the *firſt*, if his countrymen had owed to his virtues the tribute which they paid to his talents; and if, inſtead of the beauty and elegance of his verſes, they had been ſaved by his probity, his courage, or his patriotiſm; qualities which, ſtill more than genius and fancy, conſtitute the real excellence and dignity of human nature.

[91] See above, chapter VI.

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Conſequences of the Athenian Misfortunes in Sicily. — Formidable Confederacy againſt Athens. — Peculiar Reſources of free Governments. — Naval Operations. — Battle of Miletus. — Intrigues of Alcibiades. — The Athenian Democracy ſubverted. — Tyrannical Government of the Four Hundred. — Battle of Eretria. — Democracy re-eſtabliſhed in Athens. — Naval Succeſs of the Athenians. — Triumphant Return of Alcibiades. — The Eleuſinian Myſteries — and Plynteria.

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Extent of the Athenian misfortunes in Sicily.

IN the populous and extenſive kingdoms of modern Europe, the revolutions of public affairs ſeldom diſturb the humble obſcurity of private life; but the national tranſactions of Greece involved the intereſt of every family, and deeply affected the fortune and happineſs of every individual. Had the arms of the Athenians proved ſucceſsful in Sicily, each citizen would have derived from that event an immediate acceſſion of wealth, as well as of power, and have felt a proportional increaſe of honor and ſecurity. But their proud hopes periſhed for ever in the harbour of Syracuſe. The ſucceeding diſaſters ſhook to the foundation the fabric of their empire. In one raſh enterpriſe they loſt their army, their fleet, the prudence of

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their experienced generals, and the flouriſhing vigor of their manly youth[1]—Irreparable diſaſters! which totally diſabled them to reſiſt the confederacy of Peloponneſus, reinforced by the reſentment of a new and powerful enemy. While a Lacedæmonian army inveſted their city, they had reaſon to dread that a Syracuſan fleet ſhould aſſault the Piræus; that Athens muſt finally yield to theſe combined attacks, and her once proſperous citizens deſtroyed by the ſword, or dragged into captivity, atone by their death or diſgrace for the cruelties which they had recently inflicted on the wretched republics of Melos and Scioné,

The news brought to Athens. Olymp. xci. 4. A. C. 413.

The dreadful alternative of victory and defeat, renders it little ſurpriſing that the Athenians ſhould have rejected intelligence, which they muſt have received with horror. The firſt meſſengers of ſuch ſad news were treated with contempt: but it was impoſſible long[2] to with-hold belief from the miſerable fugitives, whoſe ſqualid and dejected countenances too faithfully atteſted the public cala-

[1] Thucydid. l. vii. p. 557. Cicero goes ſerther. Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depreſſæque ſunt: io hoc portu Athenienſium nobilitatis, imperij, gloriæ naufragium factum exiſtimatur. Cicer. in Verrem, v. 37.

[2] The calamity was ſo great thât the boldeſt imagination hed never dared to conceive its exiſtence. Their minds being thus unprepared, the Athenians, ſays Thucydides, disbelieved καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου διαπεφευγόσι; even thoſe ſoldiers who eſcaped from this melancholy buſineſs. The ſtories of Plutarch in Nicle, of Athenæus, etc. may be ſafely condemned as fictions, ſince they are inconſiſteot with Thucydides's narrative.

mity. Such evidence could not be refuſed; the arrogance of incredulity was abaſhed, and the whole republic thrown into conſternation, or ſeized with deſpair. The venerable members of the Areopagus expreſſed the majeſty of ſilent ſorrow; but the piercing cries of woe extended many a mile along the lofty walls which joined the Piræus to the city; and the licentious populace raged with unbridled fury againſt the diviners and orators, whoſe blind predictions, and ambitious harangues, had promoted an expedition eternally fatal to their country [3].

Combination in Greece againſt Athens.

The diſtreſs of the Athenians was too great to admit the comfort of ſympathy; but had they been capable of receiving, they had little reaſon to expect, that melancholy conſolation. The tidings ſo afflicting to *them* gave unſpeakable joy to their neighbours; many feared, moſt hated, and all envied a people who had long uſurped the dominion of Greece. The Athenian allies, or rather ſubjects, ſcattered over ſo many coaſts and iſlands, prepared to aſſert their independence; the confederates of Sparta, among whom the Syracuſans juſtly aſſumed the firſt rank, were unſatisfied with victory, and longed for revenge: even thoſe communities, which had hitherto declined the danger of a doubtful conteſt, meanly ſolicited to become parties in a war, which they expected muſt finally terminate in the deſtruction of Athens [4].

[3] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 558, et ſeqq.

[4] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 558, et ſeqq. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 348.

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Abetted by the reſentment of Perſia.

Should all the efforts of ſuch a powerful confederacy ſtill prove inſufficient to accompliſh the ruin of the devoted city, there was yet another enemy behind, from whoſe ſtrength and animoſity the Athenians had every thing to fear. The long and peaceful reign of Artaxerxes, king of Perſia, expired four hundred and twenty-five years before the Chriſtian æra. The two following years were remarkable for a rapid ſucceſſion of kings, Xerxes, Sogdianus, Ochus; the laſt of whom aſſumed the name of Darius, to which hiſtorians have added the epithet of Nothus, the baſtard, to diſtinguiſh this effeminate prince from his illuſtrious predeceſſor [5]. The firſt years of Darius Nothus were employed in confirming his diſputed authority, and in watching the dangerous intrigues of his numerous kinſmen who aſpired to the throne. When every rival was removed that could either diſturb his quiet or offend his ſuſpicion, the monarch ſunk into an indolent ſecurity, and his voluptuous court was governed by the feeble adminiſtration of women and eunuchs [6]. But in the ninth year of his reign Darius was roufed from his lethargy by the revolt of Egypt and Lydia. The defection of the latter threatened to tear from his dominion the valuable provinces of Aſia Minor; a conſequence which he determined to prevent by employing the bravery of Pharnabazus, and the

[5] Diodor. l. xii p. 322. Cteſias, Perſic. c. xlv. et ſeqq.
[6] Cteſias, c. xvij.

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policy of the crafty Tiſſaphernes, to govern reſpectively the northern and ſouthern diſtricts of that rich and fertile peninſula. The abilities of theſe generals not only quelled the rebellion in Lydia, but extended the arms of their maſter towards the ſhores of the Ægean, as well as of the Helleſpont and Propontis; in direct oppoſition to the treaty which forty years before had been ratified between the Athenians, then in the height of their proſperity, and the unwarlike Artaxerxes. But the recent misfortunes of that ambitious people flattered the Perſian commanders with the hope of reſtoring the whole Aſiatic coaſt to the great king [7], as well as of inflicting exemplary puniſhment on the proud city, which had reſiſted the power, diſmembered the empire, and tarniſhed the glory of Perſia.

The Athenian allies prepare to revolt.

The terror of ſuch a formidable combination might have reduced the Athenians to deſpair; and our ſurpriſe that this conſequence ſhould not immediately follow, will be increaſed by the following reflection. Not to mention the immortal trophies of Alexander, or the extenſive ravages of Zingis Khan, Tamerlane, and the Tartar princes of their race; the Spaniards, the Portugueſe, and other nations of modern Europe, have, with a handful of men, marched victorious over the effeminate or barbarous coaſts of the eaſtern and weſtern world. The hardy diſcipline of Europe eaſily prevailed

[7] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 560. et Cteſias, Perſic. c. li.

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over the unwarlike ſoftneſs of India and the ſavage ignorance of America. But the rapid ſucceſs of all theſe conquerors was owing to their military knowledge [a] and experience. By the ſuperiority of their arms and of their diſcipline, the Romans ſubdued the nations of the earth. But the Athenians afford the only example of a people, who, by the virtues of the mind alone, acquired an extenſive dominion over men equally improved with themſelves in the arts of war and government. They poſſeſſed, or were believed to poſſeſs, ſuperior courage and capacity to the nations around them; and this opinion, which ſhould ſeem not entirely deſtitute of foundation, enabled them to maintain, by very feeble garriſons, an abſolute authority in the iſlands of the Ægean, as well as in the cities of the Aſiatic coaſt. Their diſaſters and diſgrace in Sicily deſtroyed at once the real and the ideal ſupports of their power; the loſs of one third of their citizens made it impoſſible to ſupply, with freſh recruits, the exhauſted ſtrength of their garriſons in foreign parts; the terror of their fleet was no more; and their multiplied defeats, before the walls of Syracuſe, had converted into contempt that admiration in which Athens had been long held by Greeks and Barbarians.

Peculiar reſources of free governments.

But in free governments there are many latent reſources which public calamities alone can bring to

[a] If that of the Tartars ſhould be doubted, the reader may conſult Monſ. de Guignes's Hiſt. des Huns, and Mr. Gibbon's admirable deſcription of the manners of the paſtoral nations, iv. 273.

light; and adverſity, which, to individuals endowed with inborn vigor of mind, is the great ſchool of virtue and of heroiſm, furniſhes alſo to the enthuſiaſm of popular aſſemblies the nobleſt field for the diſplay of national honor and magnanimity. Had the meaſures of the Athenians depended on one man, or even on a few, it is probable that the ſelfiſh timidity of a prince, and the cautious prudence of a council, would have ſunk under the weight of misfortunes, too heavy for the unſupported ſtrength of ordinary minds. But the firſt ſpark of generous ardor, which the love of virtue, of glory, and the republic, or even the meaner motives of ambition and vanity, excited in the aſſembled multitude, was diffuſed and increaſed by the natural contagion of ſympathy; the patriotic flame was communicated to every breaſt; and the ſocial warmth, reflected from ſuch a variety of objects, became too intenſe to be reſiſted by the coldneſs of caution and the damps of deſpair.

Prudent and vigorous meaſures of the Athenians.

With one mind and reſolution the Athenians determined to brave the ſeverity of fortune, and to withſtand the aſſaults of the enemy. Nor did this noble deſign evaporate in uſeleſs ſpeculation: the wiſeſt meaſures were adopted for reducing it to practice. The great work began, as national reformation ought always to begin, by regulating the finances, and lopping off every branch of ſuperfluous expenſe. The clamor of turbulent demagogues was ſilenced; aged wiſdom and

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experience were allowed calmly to direct the public councils; new levies were raiſed; the remainder of their fleet was equipped for ſea; the motions of the colonies and tributary ſtates were watched with an anxious ſolicitude, and every proper expedient was employed that might appeaſe their animoſity, or render it impotent [9]. Yet theſe meaſures, prudent and vigorous as they were, could not, probably, have ſuſpended the fall of Athens, had not ſeveral concurring cauſes facilitated their operation. The weak, dilatory, and ineffectual proceedings of the Spartan confederacy; the temporizing, equivocal, and capricious conduct of the Perſian governors; above all, the intrigues and enterpriſing genius of Alcibiades, who, after involving his country in inextricable calamities, finally undertook its defence, and retarded, though he could not prevent, its deſtiny.

The Peloponneſians and Perſians prepare to act againſt the Aſiatic dependences of Athens. Olymp. xcii. 1. A. C. 412.

In the year following the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Spartans prepared a fleet of an hundred ſail, of which twenty-five gallies were furniſhed by their own ſea-ports; twenty-five by the Thebans; fifteen by the Corinthians; and the remainder by Locris, Phocis, Megara, and the maritime cities on the coaſt of Peloponneſus. This armament was deſtined to encourage and ſupport the revolt of the Aſiatic ſubjects of the Athenians. The iſlands of Chios and Leſbos, as well as the city Erythræ on the continent, ſolicited the

[9] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 559. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 349.

Spartans to join them with their naval force. Their requeſt was enforced by Tiſſaphernes, who promiſed to pay the ſailors, and to victual the ſhips. At the ſame time, an ambaſſador from Cyzicus, a populous town ſituate on an iſland of the Propontis, entreated the Lacedæmonian armament to ſail to the ſafe and capacious harbours which had long formed the wealth and the ornament of that city, and to expel the Athenian garriſons, to which the Cyzicenes and their neighbours reluctantly ſubmitted. The Perſian Pharnabazus ſeconded their propoſal; offered the ſame conditions with Tiſſaphernes; and ſo little harmony ſubſiſted between the lieutenants of the great king, that each urged his particular demand with a total unconcern about the important intereſts of their common maſter[10].

Dilatory meaſures of the confederates.

The Lacedæmonians held many conſultations among themſelves, and with their allies; heſitated, deliberated, reſolved, and changed their reſolution; and at length were perſuaded by Alcibiades to prefer the overture of Tiſſaphernes and the Ionians to that of the Helleſpontines and Pharnabazus.

The Athenians diſcover and defeat the deſigns of the Corinthians and the Chians.

The delay occaſioned by this deliberation was the principal, but not the only cauſe; which hindered the allies from acting expeditiouſly, at a time when expedition was of the utmoſt importance. A variety of private views diverted them from the general aim of the confederacy; and the

[10] Thucydid. p. 561 et 562.

CHAP. XXI. Olymp. xcii. 1. A. C. 412.

ſeaſon was far advanced before the Corinthians, who had been diſtinguiſhed by exceſs of antipathy to Athens, were prepared to ſail. They determined, from pride perhaps, as well as ſuperſtition, to celebrate [11], before leaving their harbours, the Iſthmian games, conſecrated to Neptune, the third of the Grecian feſtivals in point of dignity and ſplendor. From this ceremony the Athenians, though enemies, were not excluded by the Corinthian magiſtrates; nor did they exclude themſelves, though oppreſſed by the weight of paſt misfortunes, and totally occupied by the thoughts of providing againſt future evils. While their repreſentatives ſhared the amuſements of this ſacred ſpectacle, they neglected not the commiſſion recommanded by their country. They ſecretly informed themſelves of the plan and particular circumſtances of the intended revolt, and learned the preciſe time fixed for the departure of the Corinthian fleet. In conſequence of this important intelligence, the Athenians anticipated the deſigns of the rebels of Chios, and carried off ſeven ſhips as pledges of their fidelity. The ſquadron which returned from this uſeful enterpriſe, intercepted the Corinthians as they ſailed through the Saronic gulph; and having attacked and conquered them, purſued and blocked them up in their harbours [12].

[11] "Πριν τα Ισθμια διεορτασωσι." The ſcholiaſt juſtly obſerves, the force of the "δια," "thoroughly, completely," *i. e.* until they had celebrated the games, the complete number of days, appointed by antiquity. Vid. Æ. Port. ad loc. p. 563.

[12] Thucydid. p. 564.

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Meanwhile the Spartans and their allies ſent to the Ionian coaſt ſuch ſquadrons as were ſucceſſively ready for ſea, under the conduct of Alcibiades, Chalcideus, and Aſtyochus. The firſt of theſe commanders ſailed to the iſle of Chios, which was diſtracted by contending factions. The Athenian partiſans were ſurpriſed, and compelled to ſubmit; and the city, which poſſeſſed forty gallies, and yielded in wealth and populouſneſs to none of the neighbouring colonies, became an acceſſion to the Peloponneſian confederacy. The ſtrong and rich town of Miletus followed the example: Erythræ and Clazomené ſurrendered to Chalcideus, ſeveral places of leſs note were conquered by Aſtyochus.

Succeſsful operations of the confederates.

When the Athenians received the unwelcome intelligence of theſe events, they voted the expenditure of a thouſand talents, which, in more proſperous times, they had depoſited in the citadel, under the ſanction of a decree of the ſenate and people, to reſerve it for an occaſion of the utmoſt danger. This ſeaſonable ſupply enabled them to increaſe the fleet, which ſailed, under Phrynichus and other leaders, to the iſle of Leſbos. Having ſecured the fidelity of the Leſbians, who were ripe for rebellion, they endeavoured to recover their authority in Miletus, anciently regarded as the capital of the Ionic coaſt. A bloody battle was fought before the walls of that place, between the Athenians and Argives on one ſide, and the Peloponneſians, aſſiſted by the troops of Tiſſaphernes

Battle of Miletus. Olymp. xcii. 2. A. C. 412.

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and the revolted Mileſians, on the other. The Athenian bravery defeated, on this occaſion, the ſuperior numbers of Greeks and Barbarians to whom they were oppoſed; but their Argive auxiliaries were repulſed by the gallant citizens of Miletus: ſo that, in both parts of the engagement, the Ionic race, commonly reckoned the leſs warlike, prevailed over their Dorian rivals and enemies. Elevated with the joy of victory, the Athenians prepared to aſſault the town, when they were alarmed by the approach of a fleet of fifty-five ſail, which advanced in two diviſions, the one commanded by the celebrated Hermocrates, the other by Theramenes the Spartan. Phrynichus prudently conſidered, that his own ſtrength only amounted to forty-eight gallies, and refuſed to commit the laſt hope of the republic to the danger of an unequal combat. His firmneſs deſpiſed the clamors of the Athenian ſailors, who inſulted [11], under the name of cowardice, the caution of their admiral; and he calmly retired with his whole force to the iſle of Samos, where the popular faction having lately treated the nobles with ſhocking injuſtice and cruelty, too frequent in Grecian democracies, were ready to receive with open arms

The Athenian fleet retires.

[11] Like Fabius,

Non ponebat enim rumores ante ſalutem."

ENNIUS apud Cic.

which Thucydides expreſſes with more vigor, "μὴ ποτε τῳ σισχρᾳ ονειδει εἑξας αλογως διακινδυνευσεω," p. 574.

the patrons of that fierce and licentious form of government.

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The retreat of the Athenian fleet acknowledged the naval ſuperiority of the enemy; a ſuperiority which was alone ſufficient either to acquire or to maintain the ſubmiſſion of the neighbouring coaſts and iſlands. In other reſpects too, the Peloponneſians enjoyed the moſt deciſive advantages. Their gallies were victualled, their ſoldiers were paid by Tiſſaphernes, and they daily expected a re-inforcement of an hundred and fifty Phœnician ſhips, which, it was ſaid, had already reached Aſpendus, a ſea-port of Pamphylia. But, in this dangerous criſis, fortune ſeemed to reſpect, the declining age of Athens, and, by a train of accidents, ſingular and almoſt incredible, enabled Alcibiades, ſo long the misfortune and the ſcourge, to become the defence and the ſaviour, of his country.

The Athenian affairs retrieved by Alcibiades.

During his long reſidence in Sparta, Alcibiades aſſumed the outward gravity of deportment, and conformed himſelf to the ſpare diet, and laborious exerciſes, which prevailed in that auſtere republic; but his character and his principles remained as licentious as ever. His intrigue with Timea, the ſpouſe of king Agis, was diſcovered by an exceſs of female levity. The queen, vain of the attachment of ſo celebrated a character, familiarly gave the name of Alcibiades to her ſon Leotychides; a name which, firſt confined to the privacy of her female companions, was ſoon ſpread abroad in the world. Alcibiades puniſhed her folly by a moſt

His intrigues.

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mortifying, but well-merited declaration, boasting that he had solicited her favors from no other motive but that he might indulge the ambitious desire of giving a king to Sparta. The offence itself, and the shameless avowal, still more provoking than the offence, excited the keenest resentment in the breast of the injured husband [24]. The magistrates and generals of Sparta, jealous of the fame, and envious of the merit of a stranger, readily sympathized with the misfortune, and encouraged the revenge of Agis; and, as the horrid practice of assassination still disgraced the manners of Greece, orders were sent to Astyochus, who commanded in chief the Peloponnesian forces in Asia, secretly to destroy Alcibiades, whose power defied those laws which in every Grecian republic condemned adulterers to death [25]. But the active and subtile Athenian had secured too faithful domestic intelligence in the principal families of Sparta to become the victim of this execrable design. With his usual address he eluded all the snares of Astyochus; his safety, however, required perpetual vigilance and caution, and he determined to escape from a situation, which subjected him to such irksome constraint.

His conference with Tissaphernes.

Publicly banished from Athens, secretly persecuted by Sparta, he had recourse to the friendship of Tissaphernes, who admired his accomplishments, and respected his abilities; which, though far superior in degree, were similar in kind to his own.

[24] Plutarch, ii. 49. in Alcibiad.

[25] Lysias in defence of Euphiletus, etc. p. 419.

Tissaphernes,

Tiſſaphernes was of a temper the more readily to ſerve a friend, in proportion as he leſs needed his ſervices. Alcibiades, therefore, carefully concealed from him the dangerous reſentment of the Spartans. In the ſelfiſh breaſt of the Perſian no attachment could be durable unleſs founded on intereſt; and Alcibiades, who had deeply ſtudied his character, began to flatter his avarice, that he might enſure his protection. He informed him, that by allowing the Peloponneſian ſailors a drachma, or ſeven-pence ſterling, of daily pay, he treated them with an uſeleſs and even dangerous liberality; that the pay given by the Athenians, even in the moſt flouriſhing times, amounted only to three oboli; which proceeded, not from a diſinclination to reward the ſkill and valor of their ſeamen, but from an experience, that if they received more than half a drachma each day, the ſuperfluity would be ſquandered in ſuch profligate pleaſures as enfeebled and corrupted their minds and bodies, and rendered them equally incapable of activity and of diſcipline. Should the ſailors prove diſſatisfied with this equitable reduction, the Grecian character afforded an eaſy expedient for ſilencing their licentious clamors. It would be ſufficient to bribe the naval commanders and a few mercenary orators; and the careleſs and improvident ſeamen would ſubmit, without ſuſpicion, the rate of their pay, as well as every other concern, to the influence and authority of thoſe who were accuſtomed to govern them[16].

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[16] Thucydid. p. 584, et ſeqq.

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Perſuades him to diminish his ſubſidies to the Peloponneſians.

Tiſſaphernes heard this advice with the attention of an avaricious man to every propoſal for ſaving his money, and ſo true a judgment had Alcibiades formed of the Greeks, that Hermocrates the Syracuſan was the only officer who diſdained, meanly and perfidiouſly, to betray the intereſt of the men under his command: yet through the influence of his colleagues, the plan of œconomy was univerſally adopted, and on a future occaſion, Tiſſaphernes boaſted that Hermocrates, though more coy, was not leſs corruptible than others, and that the only reaſon for which he undertook the patronage of the ſailors, was to compel his own reluctance to comply with the exorbitance of his demands. This reproach illuſtrates the opinion entertained by foreign nations of Grecian virtue; but it is probably an aſperſion on the fame of the illuſtrious Syracuſan.

Alienates him from the intereſt of Sparta.

The intrigues of Alcibiades had ſown jealouſy and diſtruſt in the Peloponneſian fleet: they had alienated the minds of the troops both from Tiſſaphernes and their commanders: the Perſian was ready to forſake thoſe whom he had learned to deſpiſe; and Alcibiades profited of this diſpoſition to inſinuate that the alliance of the Lacedæmonians was equally expenſive and inconvenient for the great king and his lieutenants. "That theſe haughty republicans were accuſtomed to take arms to defend the liberties of Greece, a deſign totally inconſiſtent with the views of the Perſian court. If the Aſiatic Greeks and iſlanders aſpired at independ-

ence, and hoped to deliver themſelves from Athenian governors and garriſons, without ſubmitting to pay tribute to Perſia, they ought to carry on the war at their own expenſe, ſince they would alone reap the benefit of its ſucceſs. But if Tiſſaphernes purpoſed to recover the ancient poſſeſſions of his maſter, he muſt beware of giving a decided ſuperiority to either party, eſpecially to the warlike Spartans. By an attention to preſerve the balance even, between the hoſtile republics, he would force them to exhauſt each other. Amidſt their domeſtic conteſts an opportunity would ſoon arrive, when Darius, without danger or expenſe, might cruſh both, and vindicate his juſt hereditary claim to the dominion of all Aſia." CHAP. XXI.

Alcibiades, in order to pave the way for his return to Athens, conſpires againſt the democracy.

Theſe artful repreſentations produced almoſt an open breach between Tiſſaphernes and his confederates. The advantage which Athens would derive from this rupture might have paved the way for Alcibiades to return to his country: but he dreaded to encounter that popular fury, whoſe effects he had fatally experienced, and whoſe mad reſentment no degree of merit could appeaſe; he therefore applied ſecretly to Piſander, Theramenes, and other perſons of diſtinction in the Athenian camp. To them he deplored the deſperate ſtate of public affairs, expatiated on his own credit with Tiſſaphernes, and inſinuated that it might be yet poſſible to prevent the Phœnician fleet at Aſpendus from ſailing to aſſiſt the enemy. Aſſuming gradually more boldneſs, as he perceived the ſucceſs of his

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intrigues, he finally declared that the Athenians might obtain not merely the neutrality, but perhaps the aſſiſtance of Artaxerxes, ſhould they conſent to aboliſh their turbulent democracy, ſo odious to the Perſians, and intruſt the adminiſtration of government to men worthy to negociate with ſo mighty a monarch.

This meaſure had been already in agitation both in the city and in the camp.

When the illuſtrious exile propoſed this meaſure, it is uncertain whether he was acquainted with the ſecret cabals which had been already formed, both in the city and in the camp, for executing the deſign which he ſuggeſted. The misfortunes, occaſioned by the giddy inſolence of the multitude, had thrown the principal authority into the hands of the noble and wealthy, who, corrupted by the ſweets of temporary power, were deſirous of rendering it perpetual. Many prompted by ambition, ſeveral moved by inconſtancy, a few directed by a juſt ſenſe of the incurable defects of democracy, were prepared to encounter every danger, that they might overturn the eſtabliſhed conſtitution. In the third and moſt honorable claſs was Antiphon, a man of an exalted character, and endowed with extraordinary talents. The irreſiſtible energy of his eloquence was ſuſpected by the people. He appeared not in the courts of juſtice, nor in the aſſembly; but his artful and elaborate compoſitions often ſaved the lives of his friends. *He* was the inviſible agent who governed all the motions of the conſpiracy; and when compelled, after the ruin of his party to ſtand trial for his life, he diſcovered

an activity and force of mind that aſtoniſhed the moſt diſcerning of his contemporaries [17]. Piſander, Theramenes, and the other leaders of the ariſtocratical party, warmly approved the views of Alcibiades. The Athenian ſoldiers likewiſe, though they deteſted the impiety, admired the valor, of the illuſtrious exile, and longed to ſee him reſtored to the ſervice of his country. All ranks lamented the dangerous ſituation of Athens; many thought that their affairs muſt become deſperate, ſhould Tiſſaphernes command the Phœnician fleet to cooperate with that of Peloponneſus; and many rejoiced in the proſpect of a Perſian alliance, in conſequence of which they would enter at once into the pay of that wealthy ſatrap [18]. CHAP. XXI.

[17] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 600. A few lines above, Thucydides deſcribes the character of Antiphon with expreſſive energy: ανηρ Αθηναιων των καθ' ἑαυτον αρετη τε βουλης ὑστερος, και κρατιστος ενθυμηθηναι γενομενος, και ἁ γνοιη, ειπειν. "An Athenian, in virtue ſecond to no man then living, endowed with the greateſt vigor of thought, and the greateſt power of expreſſion." Plutarch in the very inaccurate and imperfect work, entitled, The Lives of the Ten Orators, tells us, that Antiphon was the firſt who wrote inſtitutions of oratory; and that his pleadings were the moſt ancient that had come down to poſterity. The character given by Plutarch of the writings of Antiphon agrees with the high commendation of Thucydides.

[18] What influence this conſideration muſt have had, may be conjectured from the information of Andocides, Orat. iii. who ſays, that in the courſe of this war the Spartans received, from their Perſian allies, ſubſidies to the amount of five thouſand talents, about a million ſterling. The ſum is prodigious, conſidering the value of money in that age.

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Phrynichus counterplots Alcibiades.

One man, the perſonal enemy of Alcibiades, alone oppoſed the general current. But this man was Phrynichus, whoſe prudent firmneſs as a commander we have already had occaſion to remark. The courage with which he invited dangers many have equalled, but none ever ſurpaſſed the boldneſs with which he extricated himſelf from difficulties. When he perceived that his colleagues were deaf to every objection againſt recalling the friend of Tiſſaphernes, he ſecretly informed the Spartan admiral Aſtyochus, of the intrigues which were carrying on to the diſadvantage of his country. Daring as this treachery was, Phrynichus addreſſed a traitor not leſs perfidious than himſelf. Aſtyochus was become the penſioner and creature of Tiſſaphernes, to whom he communicated the intelligence. The Perſian again communicated it to his favorite Alcibiades, who complained in ſtrong terms to the Athenians of the baſeneſs and villany of Phrynichus. The latter exculpated himſelf with conſummate addreſs; but as the return of Alcibiades might prove fatal to his ſafety, he ventured, a ſecond time, to write to Aſtyochus, gently reproaching him with his breach of confidence, and explaining by what means he might ſurpriſe the whole Athenian fleet at Samos; an exploit that muſt for ever eſtabliſh his fame and fortune. Aſtyochus again betrayed the ſecret to Tiſſaphernes and Alcibiades; but before *their* letters could be conveyed to the Athenian camp, Phrynichus, who, by ſome unknown channel, was

informed of this ſecond treachery, anticipated the dangerous diſcovery, by apprizing the Athenians of the enemy's deſign to ſurpriſe their fleet. They had ſcarcely employed the proper means to counteract that purpoſe when meſſengers came from Alcibiades to announce the horrid perfidy of a wretch who had baſely ſacrificed to private reſentment the laſt hope of his country. But the meſſengers arrived too late; the prior information of Phrynichus, as well as the bold and ſingular wickedneſs of his deſign, which no common degree of evidence was thought ſufficient to prove, were ſuſtained as arguments for his exculpation; and it was believed that Alcibiades had made uſe of a ſtratagem moſt infamous in itſelf, but not unexampled among the Greeks, for deſtroying a man whom he deteſted [19].

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Progreſs of the conſpiracy againſt the democratical government.

The oppoſition of Phrynichus, though it retarded the deſigns of Alcibiades, prevented not the meaſures of Piſander and his aſſociates for aboliſhing the democracy. The ſoldiers at Samos were induced, by the reaſons above mentioned, to acquieſce in the reſolution of their generals. But a more difficult taſk remained; to deprive the people of Athens of their liberty, which, ſince the expulſion of the family of Piſiſtratus, they had enjoyed an hundred years. Piſander headed the deputation which was ſent from the camp to the city to effect this important revolution. He acquainted the extraordinary aſſembly, ſummoned on that

[19] Thucydid. p. 587 — 590.

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occaſion in the theatre of Bacchus, of the meaſures which had been adopted by their ſoldiers and fellow-citizens at Samos. The compact band [20] of conſpirators warmly approved the example, but loud murmurs of diſcontent reſounded in different quarters of that ſpacious theatre. Piſander aſked the reaſon of this diſapprobation. "Had his opponents any thing better to propoſe? If they had, let them come forward and explain the grounds of their diſſent: but, above all, let them explain how they could ſave themſelves, their families, and their country, unleſs they complied with the demand of Tiſſaphernes. The imperious voice of neceſſity was ſuperior to law; and when the actual danger had ceaſed, they might re-eſtabliſh their ancient conſtitution." The opponents of Piſander were unable or afraid to reply: and the aſſembly paſſed a decree, inveſting ten ambaſſadors with full powers to treat with the Perſian ſatrap.

Negociation with Tiſſaphernes. Olymp. xcii. 1. A. C. 412.

Soon after the arrival of the Peloponneſian fleet on the coaſt of Aſia, the Spartan commanders had concluded, in the name of their republic, a treaty with Tiſſaphernes; in which it was ſtipulated, that the ſubſidies ſhould be regularly paid by the king of Perſia, and that the Peloponneſian forces ſhould employ their utmoſt endeavours to recover, for

[20] Or rather bands, according to Thucydides. Piſander was at pains to gain over to his views τας ξυνωμοσιας, αἱπερ ετυγχανον προτερον εν τῃ πολει ουσαι επι δικαις και αρχαις: "The factions or juntos already formed in Athens, with a view to thruſt themſelves into the ſeats of judicature and the great offices of ſtate." Thucydid. p. 592.

that monarch, the dominions of his anceſtors, which had been long unjuſtly uſurped, and cruelly inſulted, by the Athenians. This treaty ſeemed ſo honorable to the great king, that his lieutenant could not venture openly to infringe it. It is poſſible, that in the interval between his intrigues with Alcibiades, and the arrival of the Athenian ambaſſadors at Magneſia, the place of his uſual reſidence, Tiſſaphernes might receive freſh inſtructions from his court to make good his agreement with the Spartans. Perhaps the crafty ſatrap never entertained any ſerious thoughts of an alliance with the Athenians, although he ſufficiently reliſhed the advice given him by Alcibiades to weaken both parties. But whatever motive determined him, it is certain that he ſhowed a diſinclination to enter into any negociation with the Athenian ambaſſadors. Alarmed at the decay of his influence with the Perſians, on which he had built the flattering hopes of returning to his country, Alcibiades employed all the reſources of his genius to conceal his diſgrace. By ſolicitations, entreaties, and the meaneſt compliances, he obtained an audience for his fellow-citizens. As the agent of Tiſſaphernes, he then propoſed the conditions on which they might obtain the friendſhip of the great king. Several demands were made, demands moſt diſgraceful to the name of Athens: to all of which the ambaſſadors ſubmitted. They even agreed to ſurrender the whole coaſt of Ionia to its ancient ſovereign. But when the artful Athenian (fearful leſt they ſhould, on any terms, admit the treaty which

Artifices of Alcibiades.

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Tiſſaphernes was reſolved on no terms to grant) demanded that the Perſian fleets ſhould be allowed to ſail, undiſturbed, in the Grecian ſeas, the ambaſſadors, well knowing that ſhould this condition be complied with, no treaty could hinder Greece from becoming a province of Perſia, expreſſed their indignation in very unguarded language, and left the aſſembly in diſguſt. This imprudence enabled Alcibiades to affirm, with ſome appearance of truth, that their own anger and obſtinacy, not the reluctance of Tiſſaphernes, had obſtructed the negociation, which was preciſely the iſſue of the affair moſt favorable to his views[21].

The democracy overturned in Athens. Olymp. xcii. 2. A. C. 411.

His artifices ſucceeded, but were not attended with the conſequences expected from them. The Athenians, both in the camp and city, perceived, by this tranſaction, that his credit with the Perſians was leſs than he repreſented it; and the ariſtocratical faction were glad to get rid of a man, whoſe reſtleſs ambition rendered him a dangerous aſſociate. They perſiſted, however, with great activity, in executing their purpoſe; of which Phrynichus, who had oppoſed them only from hatred of Alcibiades, became an active abettor. When perſuaſion was ineffectual, they had recourſe to violence. Androcles, Hyperbolus[22], and other

[21] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 593.

[22] Thucydides paints his character in few words: Ὑπερβολον τι τινα Αθηναιων, μοχθηρον ανθρωπον ωστρακισμενον ου δια δυναμεως και αξιωματος φοβον, αλλα δια πονηριαν και αισχυνην της πολεως. "One Hyperbolus, a worthleſs fellow, and banished by the Oſtraciſm, not from fear of his power and dignity, but on account of his extreme

licentious demagogues, were aſſaſſinated. The people of Athens, ignorant of the ſtrength of the conſpirators, and ſurpriſed to find in the number many whom they leaſt ſuſpected, were reſtrained by inactive timidity, or fluctuated in doubtful ſuſpenſe. The cabal alone acted with union and with vigor; and difficult as it ſeemed to ſubvert the Athenian democracy, which had ſubſiſted an hundred years with unexampled glory, yet this deſign was undertaken and accompliſhed by the enterpriſing activity of Piſander, the artful eloquence of Theramenes, the firm intrepidity of Phrynichus, and the ſuperintending wiſdom of Antiphon [23].

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Government of the four hundred.

He it was who formed the plan, and regulated the mode of attack, which was carried on by his aſſociates. In a deliberation concerning the means of retrieving the affairs of the public, Piſander propoſed the electing of ten men, who ſhould be charged with the important truſt of preparing and digeſting reſolutions, to be on an appointed day laid before the aſſembly of the people. When the day arrived, the commiſſioners had but one reſolution to propoſe: "That every citizen ſhould be free to offer his opinion, however contrary to law, without fear of impeachment or trial;" a matter eſſential to the intereſts of the cabal, ſince by a ſtrange contradiction in government, the

profligacy, and his being a diſgrace to the city." The Oſtraciſm was thought to be for ever diſgraced by being applied to ſuch an unworthy object, and thenceforth laid aſide. See Plut. in Nicia, and Ariſtoph. in Pac. ver. 680.

[23] Thucydid. ibid. et Lyſias adverſ. Agorat.

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Athenian orators and ſtateſmen were liable to proſecution [24] before the ordinary courts of juſtice, for ſuch ſpeeches and decrees as had been approved and confirmed by the aſſembly. In conſequence of this act of indemnity, Piſander and his party boldly declared, that neither the ſpirit nor the forms of the eſtabliſhed conſtitution (which had recently ſubjected them to ſuch a weight of misfortunes) ſuited the preſent dangerous and alarming criſis. That it was neceſſary to new-model the whole fabric of government; for which purpoſe five perſons (whoſe names he read) ought to be appointed by the people, to chuſe an hundred others; each of whom ſhould ſelect three aſſociates; and the four hundred thus choſen, men of dignity and opulence, who would ſerve their country without fee or reward, ought immediately to be inveſted with the majeſty of the republic. They alone ſhould conduct the adminiſtration uncontrolled, and aſſemble, as often as ſeemed proper, five thouſand citizens, whom they judged moſt worthy of being conſulted in the management of public affairs. This extraordinary propoſal was accepted without oppoſition: the partiſans of democracy dreaded the ſtrength of the cabal; and the undiſcerning multitude, dazzled by the impoſing name of five thouſand, a number far exceeding the ordinary aſſemblies of Athens, perceived not that they ſurrendered their liberties to the artifice of an ambitious faction [25].

[24] By the γραφη παρανομων. See Chap. xiii.

[25] Thucydid. et Lyſias, ubi ſupra.

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But the conduct of the four hundred tyrants (for hiſtorians have juſtly adopted the language of Athenian reſentment) ſoon opened the eyes and underſtanding of the moſt thoughtleſs. They aboliſhed every veſtige of ancient freedom; employed mercenary troops levied from the ſmall iſlands of the Ægean, to overawe the multitude, and to intimidate, in ſome inſtances to deſtroy, their real or ſuſpected enemies. Inſtead of ſeizing the opportunity of annoying the Peloponneſians, enraged at the treachery of Tiſſaphernes, and mutinous for want of pay and ſubſiſtence, they ſent ambaſſadors to ſolicit peace from the Spartans on the moſt diſhonorable terms. Their tyranny rendered them odious in the city, and their cowardice made them contemptible in the camp at Samos. Their cruelty and injuſtice were deſcribed, and exaggerated, by the fugitives who continually arrived in that iſland. The generous youth, employed in the ſea and land ſervice, were impatient of the indignities offered to their fellow-citizens. The ſame indignities might be inflicted on themſelves, if they did not vindicate their freedom. Theſe ſecret murmurs broke out into loud and licentious clamors, which were encouraged by the approbation of the Samians. Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, two officers of high merit and diſtinction, though not actually intruſted with a ſhare in the principal command[26], gave activity and boldneſs

Their tyranny renders them odious.

Their partiſans at Samos deſtroyed by Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus.

[26] Neither generals nor admirals; for Thraſybulus only commanded a galley; and Thraſyllus ſerved in the heavy-armed infantry.

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to the inſurgents. The abettors of the new government were attacked by ſurpriſe: thirty of the moſt criminal were put to death, ſeveral others were baniſhed, democracy was re-eſtabliſhed in the camp, and the ſoldiers were bound by oath to maintain their hereditary government againſt the conſpiracy of domeſtic foes, and to act with vigor and unanimity againſt the public enemy.

The former conducts Alcibiades to the Athenian camp.

Thraſybulus, who headed this ſucceſsful and meritorious ſedition, had a mind to conceive, a tongue to perſuade, and a hand to execute, the moſt daring deſigns. He exhorted the ſoldiers not to deſpair of effecting in the capital the ſame revolution which they had produced in the camp. But ſhould they fail in that deſign they ought no longer to obey a city which had neither wealth nor wiſdom, neither ſupplies nor good counſel to ſend them. They were themſelves more numerous than the ſubjects of the four hundred, and better provided in all things neceſſary for war. They poſſeſſed an iſland which had formerly contended with Athens for the command of the ſea, and which, it was hoped, they might defend againſt every foe, foreign and domeſtic. But were they compelled to forſake it, they had ſtill reaſon to expect that, with an hundred ſhips of war, and with ſo many brave men, they might acquire an eſtabliſhment not leſs valuable elſewhere, in which they would enjoy, undiſturbed, the invaluable

whether as an officer, or in the ranks, the expreſſion leaves uncertain. The ſcholiaſt, however, conſiders ὁπλιτεύοντι as ſynonymous with τῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ἀρχοντι. Thucydid. p. 604.

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poſſeſſion of liberty. Their moſt immediate concern was to recal Alcibiades, who had been deceived and diſgraced by the tyrants, and who not only felt with peculiar ſenſibility, but could reſent with becoming dignity, the wrongs of his country and his own. The advice of Thraſybulus was approved; ſoon after he ſailed to Magneſia, and returned in company with Alcibiades.

He addreſſes his countrymen.

Near four years had elapſed ſince the eloquent ſon of Clinias had ſpoken in an Athenian aſſembly. Being preſented by Thraſybulus to his fellow-citizens, he began by accuſing his fortune, and lamenting his calamities. "Yet his baniſhment ought not to affect him with permanent ſorrow, ſince it had furniſhed him with an opportunity to ſerve the cauſe of his country. This event, otherwiſe unfortunate, had procured him the acquaintance and friendſhip of Tiſſaphernes; who, moved by his entreaties, had withheld the ſtipulated pay from the Peloponneſian forces, and who, he doubted not, would continue his good offices to the Athenians, ſupply them with every thing requiſite for maintaining the war, and even ſummon the Phœnician fleet to their aſſiſtance." Theſe were magnificent but flattering promiſes. In making them, Alcibiades however did not conſult merely the dictates of vanity. They raiſed his credit with the army, who immediately ſaluted him general [27]; they widened the breach between

[27] Μετα των προτερων — They aſſociated him with the former commandere. But Thucydides immediately adds, και τα πραγματα παντα ανετιθεσαν, and referred every thing to his management, p. 609.

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Tiſſaphernes and the Spartans; and they ſtruck terror (when his ſpeech got abroad) into the tyrants of Athens, who had provoked the reſentment of a man capable to ſubvert their uſurpation.

His meſſage to the tyrants.

Alcibiades left the care of the troops to his colleagues Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, and withdrew himſelf from the applauſes of his admiring countrymen, on pretence of concerting with Tiſſaphernes the ſyſtem of their future operations. But his principal motive was to ſhow himſelf to the Perſian, in the new and illuſtrious character with which he was inveſted; for having raiſed his authority among the Athenians by his influence with the ſatrap, he expected to ſtrengthen this influence by the ſupport of that authority. Before he returned to the camp, ambaſſadors had been ſent by the tyrants, to attempt a negociation with the partiſans of democracy, who, inflamed by continual reports of the indignities and cruelties committed in Athens, prepared to ſail thither to protect their friends and take vengeance on their enemies. Alcibiades judiciouſly oppoſed this raſh reſolution, which muſt have left the Helleſpont, Ionia, and the iſlands, at the mercy of the hoſtile fleet. But he commanded the ambaſſadors to deliver to their maſters a ſhort but pithy meſſage: "That they muſt diveſt themſelves of their illegal power, and reſtore the ancient conſtitution. If they delayed obedience, he would ſail to the Piræus, and deprive them of their authority and their lives[28]."

[28] Thucydid. ibid. et Plut. ii. 54. in Vit. Alcibiad.

When

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When this meſſage was reported at Athens, it added to the diſorder and confuſion in which that unhappy city was involved. The four hundred, who had acted with unanimity in uſurping the government, ſoon diſagreed about the adminiſtration, and ſplit into factions, which perſecuted each other as furiouſly as both had perſecuted the people [29]. Theramenes and Ariſtocrates condemned and oppoſed the tyrannical meaſures of their colleagues. The perfidious Phrynichus was ſlain: both parties prepared for taking arms; and the horrors of a Corcyrean ſedition were ready to be renewed in Athens, when the old men, the children, the women, and ſtrangers, interpoſed for the ſafety of a city which had long been the ornament of Greece, the terror of Perſia, and the admiration of the world [30].

Tumults in Athens

Had the public enemy availed themſelves of this opportunity to aſſault the Piræus, Athens could not have been ſaved from immediate deſtruction. But the Peloponneſian forces at Miletus, long clamorous and diſcontented, had broken out into open mutiny, when they heard of the recal of Alcibiades, and the hoſtile intentions of Tiſſaphernes. To the duplicity of the ſatrap, and the treachery of their own captains, they juſtly aſcribed the want of pay and ſubſiſtence, and all the miſfortunes which they felt or dreaded. Their reſentment was violent and implacable. They deſtroyed the Perſian fortifications in the neighbourhood of

Mutiny in the Peloponneſian camp.

[29] Lyſias adv. Agorat. [30] Thucydid. p. 610.

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Miletus; they put the garriſons to the ſword; their treacherous commander, Aſtyochus, ſaved his life by flying to an altar; nor was the tumult appeaſed until the guilty were removed from their ſight, and Myndarus, an officer of approved valor and fidelity, arrived from Sparta to aſſume the principal command [11].

Amidſt the tumults in Athens, the Peloponneſian fleet appears on the coaſt.

The dreadful conſequences which muſt have reſulted to the Athenians, if, during the fury of their ſedition, the enemy had attacked them with a fleet of an hundred and fifty ſail, may be conceived by the terror inſpired by a much ſmaller Peloponneſian ſquadron of only forty-two veſſels, commanded by the Spartan Hegeſandridas. The friends of the conſtitution had aſſembled in the ſpacious theatre of Bacchus. Meſſengers paſſed between them and the partiſans of Antiphon and Piſander, who had convened in a diſtant quarter of the city. The moſt important matters were in agitation, when the alarm was given that ſome Peloponneſian ſhips had been ſeen on the coaſt. Both aſſemblies were immediately diſſolved. All ranks of men haſtened to the Piræus; manned the veſſels in the harbour; launched others; and prepared thirty-ſix for taking the ſea. When Hegeſandridas perceived the ardent oppoſition which he muſt encounter in attempting to land, he doubled the promontory of Sunium, and ſailed towards the fertile iſland of Eubœa, from which, ſince the fortification of Decelia, the Athenians had derived

[11] Thucydid. p. 611.

far more plentiful ſupplies than from the deſolated territory of Attica. To defend a country which formed their principal reſource, they ſailed in purſuit of the enemy and obſerved them next day near the ſhore of Eretria, the moſt conſiderable town in the iſland. CHAP. XXI.

Battle of Eretria.

The Eubœans, who had long watched an opportunity to revolt, ſupplied the Peloponneſian ſquadron with all neceſſaries in abundance; but inſtead of furniſhing a market to the Athenians, they retired from the coaſt on their approach. The commanders were obliged to weaken their ſtrength, by detaching ſeveral parties into the country to procure proviſions; Hegeſandridas ſeized this opportunity to attack them: moſt of the ſhips were taken; the crews ſwam to land; many were cruelly murdered by the Eretrians, from whom they expected protection; and ſuch only ſurvived as took refuge in the Athenian garriſons ſcattered over the iſland[11].

Democracy re-eſtabliſhed in Athens. Olymp. xcii. 2. A. C. 411.

The news of this misfortune were moſt alarming to the Athenians. Neither the invaſion of Xerxes, nor even the defeat in Sicily, occaſioned ſuch terrible conſternation. They dreaded the immediate defection of Eubœa; they had no more ſhips to launch; no means of reſiſting their multiplied enemies: the city was divided againſt the camp, and divided againſt itſelf. Yet the magnanimous firmneſs of Theramenes did not allow the friends of liberty to deſpair. He encouraged them

[11] Thucydid, p. 522.

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to diſburden the republic of its domeſtic foes, who had ſummoned, or who were at leaſt believed to have ſummoned, the aſſiſtance of the Lacedæmonian fleet, that they might be enabled to enſlave their fellow-citizens. Antiphon, Piſander, and others moſt obnoxious, ſeaſonably eſcaped; the reſt ſubmitted. A decree was paſſed, recalling Alcibiades, and approving the conduct of the troops at Samos. The ſedition ceaſed. The democracy, which had been interrupted four months, was reſtored; and ſuch are the reſources of a free government, that even this violent fermentation was not unproductive of benefit to the ſtate. The Athenians completed whatever had been left imperfect in former reformations[33]; and determined to defend, to the laſt extremity, the ancient glory of the republic.

The Athenians victorious at ſea. Olymp. xcii. 2. A. C. 411.

By the imprudent or perfidious conduct of their commanders, and the ſeditious ſpirit of their troops, the Peloponneſians loſt a ſeaſonable opportunity to terminate the war with equal advantage and honor; and having neglected the proſperous current of their fortune, they were compelled long and laboriouſly to ſtrive againſt an unfavorable ſtream.

[33] The government was brought back to its original principles, as eſtabliſhed by Solon. Among other ſalutary regulations, it was enacted, that no one ſhould receive a ſalary for any public magiſtracy. "And now," ſays Thucydides, for the firſt time, in the preſent age at leaſt, the Athenians modelled their government aright; and this enabled Athens again to raiſe her head." Thucydid. p. 623. It is remarkable, that neither Diodorus, Plutarch, nor any of the orators make the leaſt mention of thoſe ſalutary regulations, which, however, laſted not long after the return of Alcibiades.

The doubtful Tiſſaphernes heſitated between the part of an open enemy, or a treacherous ally; the Spartans, who had formerly rejected the friendſhip, now courted the protection, of his rival Pharnabazus; to whoſe northern province they ſailed with the principal ſtrength of their armament, leaving only a ſmall ſquadron at Miletus, to defend their ſouthern acquiſitions. The Athenians, animated by the manly counſels of Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, the generous defenders of their freedom, proceeded northwards in purſuit of the enemy; and the important ſtraits, which join the Euxine and Ægean ſeas, became, and long continued, the ſcene of conflict. In the twenty-firſt winter of the war, a year already diſtinguiſhed by the diſſolution and revival of their democracy, the Athenians prevailed in three ſucceſſive engagements, the event of which became continually more deciſive. In the firſt, which was fought in the narrow channel between Seſtos and Abydus, the advantages were in ſome meaſure balanced, ſince Thraſybulus took twenty Peloponneſian ſhips, with the loſs of fifteen of his own. But the glory remained entire to the Athenians, who repelled the enemy, and offered to renew the battle[14]. Not long afterwards, they intercepted a ſquadron of fourteen Rhodian veſſels, near Cape Rhegium. The iſlanders defended themſelves with their uſual bravery. Myndarus beheld the engagement from the diſtance of eight miles, while he performed his morning devotions to

[14] Thucydid. l. viii. p. 626.

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Minerva in the lofty temple of Ilium. Alarmed for the ſafety of his friends, he ruſhed from that ſacred edifice, and haſtened with great diligence to the ſhore, that he might launch his ſhips, and prevent, by ſpeedy aſſiſtance, the capture or deſtruction of the Rhodians [35]. The principal Athenian ſquadron attacked him near the ſhore of Abydus. The engagement was fought from morning till night, and ſtill continued doubtful, when the arrival of eighteen gallies, commanded by Alcibiades, turned the ſcale of victory. The eſcape of the Peloponneſians was favored by the bravery of Pharnabazus, who, at the head of his Barbarian troops, had been an impatient ſpectator of the combat. He gallantly rode into the ſea, encouraging his men with his voice, his arm, and his example. The Spartan admiral drew up the greateſt part of his fleet along the ſhore and prepared to reſiſt the aſſailants; but the Athenians, ſatisfied with the advantages already obtained, ſailed to Seſtos, carrying with them a valuable prize, thirty Peloponneſian gallies, as well as fifteen of their own, which they had loſt in the former engagement. Thraſyllus was ſent to Athens, that he might communicate the good news, and raiſe ſuch ſupplies of men and money as could be expected from that exhauſted city [36].

Alcibiades ſurpriſes, and takes the whole

The Spartans yielded poſſeſſion of the ſea, which they hoped ſoon to recover, and retired to the friendly harbours of Cyzicus, to repair their

[35] Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. Diodor. xiii. p. 354. [36] Id. ibid.

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Peloponnesian fleet.

shattered fleet; while the Athenians profited of the fame of their victory, and the terror of their arms, to demand contributions from the numerous and wealthy towns in that neighbourhood. The several divisions returned to Sestos, having met with very indifferent success in their design; nor, without obtaining more decisive and important advantages, could they expect to intimidate such strongly fortified places as Byzantium, Selembria, Perinthus, on the European, or Lampsacus, Parium, Chalcedon, on the Asiatic, coast. It was determined therefore, chiefly by the advice of Alcibiades, to attack the enemy at Cyzicus; for which purpose they sailed, with eighty gallies, to the small island of Proconnesus, near the western extremity of the Propontis, and ten miles distant from the station of the Peloponnesian fleet. Alcibiades surprised sixty vessels in a dark and rainy morning as they were manœuvring at a distance from the harbour, and skilfully intercepted their retreat. As the day cleared up, the rest sailed forth to their assistance; the action became general; the Athenians obtained a complete victory, and their valor was rewarded by the capture of the whole Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan ships, which were burned, in the face of a victorious enemy, by the enterprising Hermocrates. The circumstances and consequences of this important action were related in few, but expressive words, to the Spartan senate, in a letter written by Hippocrates, the second in command, and intercepted by the Athenians: "All is lost;

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our ſhips are taken; Myndarus is ſlain; the men want bread; we know not what to do[37]."

The Athenians diligently improve their advantages. Olymp. xcii. 3. A. C. 410.

The fatal diſaſter at Cyzicus prevented the Peloponneſians from obſtructing, during the following year, the deſigns of the enemy, who took poſſeſſion of that wealthy ſea-port, as well as of the ſtrong city Perinthus; raiſed a large contribution on Selembria; and fortified Chryſopolis, a ſmall town of Chalcedonia, only three miles diſtant from Byzantium. In this new fortreſs they placed a conſiderable body of troops; and guarded the neighbouring ſtrait with a ſquadron of thirty ſail, commanded by Theramenes and Eubulus, and deſtined to exact, as tribute, a tenth from all ſhips which ſailed through the Boſphorus into the Euxine ſea[38]. The Peloponneſians were aſſiſted by Pharnabazus in equipping a new fleet; but were deprived of the wiſe counſels of Hermocrates, whoſe abilities were well fitted both to prepare and to employ the reſources of war. The ſucceſs of the Aſiatic expedition had not correſponded to the ſanguine hopes of his countrymen; the inſolent populace accuſed the incapacity of their commanders; and a mandate was ſent from Syracuſe, depriving

[37] Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. et Plut. p. 60. in Alcibiad.

[38] It is well known, that Mahomet the Second obtained the ſame end, by fortifying two caſtles, one on the Aſiatic, and another on the European ſide. That near to Chryſopolis is called by the modern Greeks Neocaſtron; but the name of the town itſelf is now changed to Scutari, a place deemed by the Turks one of the ſuburbs of Conſtantinople.

TOURNEFORT, Lettre 15.

them of their office, and puniſhing them with baniſhment. The conduct of Hermocrates is worthy of admiration. Having called an aſſembly, he deplored his hard fortune, but recommended the moſt ſubmiſſive obedience to the authority of the republic. He then exhorted the ſailors to name temporary commanders, till the arrival of thoſe who had been appointed by their country. But the aſſembly, eſpecially the captains and pilots, tumultuouſly called out, "That he and his colleagues ought to continue in the command." Hermocrates then conjured them "not to rebel againſt the government. When they ſhould return home, they would then enjoy a fair opportunity to do juſtice to their admirals, by recounting the battles which they had won, by enumerating the ſhips which they had taken, and by relating how their own courage, and the conduct of their commanders, had entitled them to the moſt honorable place in every engagement by ſea and land." At the earneſt and unanimous entreaty of the aſſembly, he conſented, however, to retain his authority, till the arrival of his ſucceſſors. His colleagues imitated the example; and ſoon after this memorable ſcene, Demarchus, Myſco, and Potamis, the admirals named by the ſtate, took the command of the Syracuſan forces. Yet the ſoldiers and ſailors would not allow their beloved leaders to depart, before taking in their preſence a ſolemn oath to revoke their unjuſt baniſhment, whenever they themſelves returned to Syracuſe. On Hermocrates in particular, the captains and pilots beſtowed many

Admirable behaviour of Hermocrates the Syracuſan.

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distinguished tokens of their affection and respect, which his behaviour had justly merited; for every morning and evening he had called them together, communicated his designs, asked their opinion and advice, reviewed the past, and concerted the future operations of the war; while his popular manners and condescending affability secured the love of those who respected his skill, his vigilance, and his courage [19].

Thrasyllus, at first successful, is defeated in the battle of Ephesus. Olymp. xcii. 4. A. C. 409.

Meanwhile Thrasyllus obtained at Athens the supplies which he had gone to solicit; supplies far more powerful than he had reason to expect. They consisted in a thousand heavy-armed men, an hundred horse, and fifty gallies, manned by five thousand experienced seamen. That the sailors might be usefully employed on every emergency at sea or land, they were provided with the small and light bucklers, the darts, swords, and javelins, appropriated to the Grecian targeteers, who, uniting strength and velocity, formed an intermediate and useful order between the archers and pikemen. With these forces, Thrasyllus sailed to Samos, hoping to render the twenty-third campaign not less glorious than the preceding; and ambitious to rival, by his victories in the central and southern parts of the Asiatic coast, the fame acquired by Alcibiades and Thrasybulus in the north. His first operations were successful. He took Colophon, with several places of less note, in Ionia; penetrated into the heart of Lydia, burning the corn

[19] Xenoph. p. 431.

and villages; and returned to the ſhore, driving before him a numerous body of ſlaves, and other valuable booty. His courage was increaſed by the want of reſiſtance on the part of Tiſſaphernes, whoſe province he had invaded; of the Peloponneſian forces at Miletus; and of the revolted colonies of Athens. He reſolved, therefore, to attack the beautiful and flouriſhing city of Epheſus, which was then the principal ornament and defence of the Ionic coaſt. While his ſoldiers, in ſeparate diviſions, were making their approaches to the walls of that place, the enemy aſſembled from every quarter to defend the majeſty of Epheſian Diana. A vigorous ſally of the townſmen increaſed the ſtrength of Tiſſaphernes and the Peloponneſians, the latter of whom had been ſeaſonably reinforced by a conſiderable ſquadron from Sicily. The Athenians were defeated, with the loſs of three hundred men; and retiring from the field of battle, they ſought refuge in their ſhips, and prepared to ſail towards the Helleſpont [40].

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His ſoldiers regain their honor before the walls of Abydus.

During the voyage thither, they fell in with twenty Sicilian gallies, of which they took four, and purſued the reſt to Epheſus. Having ſoon afterwards reached the Helleſpont, they found the Athenian armament at Lampſacus, where Alcibiades thought proper to muſter the whole military and naval forces: but, on this occaſion, the northern army gave a remarkable proof of pride or ſpirit. They, who had ever been victorious,

[40] Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 434.

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refuſed to rank with the ſoldiers of Thraſyllus, who had been ſo ſhamefully foiled before the walls of Epheſus. They ſubmitted, however, though not without reluctance, to live in the ſame winter-quarters; from which they made a conjunct expedition againſt Abydus. Pharnabazus defended the place with a numerous body of Perſian cavalry. The diſgraced troops of Thraſyllus rejoiced in an opportunity to retrieve their honor. They attacked, repelled, and routed the enemy. Their victory decided the fate of Abydus, and their courage was approved by the army of Alcibiades, who embraced them as fellow-ſoldiers and friends.

Alcibiades takes Byzantium. His ſucceſs by ſea and land. Olymp. xciii. 1. A. C. 408.

For ſeveral years the meaſures of the Athenians had been almoſt uniformly ſucceſsful; but the twenty-fourth campaign was diſtinguiſhed by peculiar favors of fortune. The invaſion of Sicily by the Carthaginians prevented that iſland from ſending any effectual aſſiſtance to their Peloponneſian allies. The dangerous revolt of the Medes with-held the Perſian reinforcements, which were neceſſary to ſupport the arms of Pharnabazus [42]. Both nations were repeatedly defeated by the Athenians, driven from their encampments and fortreſſes near the ſhore, and purſued into the inland country, which was plundered and deſolated by the victors. The Athenians returned in triumph to attack the fortified cities, which ſtill declined ſubmiſſion; an undertaking in which Alcibiades diſplayed the wonderful reſources of his extraordinary genius.

[42] Diodorus, l. xiii.

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By gradual approaches, by ſudden aſſaults, by ſurpriſe, by treaſon, or by ſtratagem, he in a few months became maſter of Chalcedon, Selembria, and at laſt of Byzantium itſelf. His naval ſucceſs was equally conſpicuous. The Athenians again commanded the ſea. The ſmall ſquadrons fitted out by the enemy ſucceſſively fell into their power; and theſe multiplied captures, which were made with little difficulty, accumulated the trophies of the well-fought battles which we have already deſcribed. It was computed by the partiſans of Alcibiades, that, ſince aſſuming the command, he had taken or deſtroyed two hundred Syracuſan and Peloponneſian gallies; and his ſuperiority of naval ſtrength enabled him to raiſe ſuch contributions, both in the Euxine and Mediterranean, as abundantly ſupplied his fleet and army with every neceſſary article of ſubſiſtence and accommodation [42].

His triumphant return to Athens. Olymp. xciii. 2. A. C. 407.

While the Athenian arms were crowned with ſuch glory abroad, the Attic territory was continually haraſſed by king Agis, and the Lacedæmonian troops poſted at Decelia. Their bold and ſudden incurſions frequently threatened the ſafety of the city itſelf; the deſolated lands afforded no advantage to the ruined proprietors; nor could the Athenians venture without their walls, to celebrate their accuſtomed feſtivals. Alcibiades, animated by his foreign victories, hoped to relieve the domeſtic ſufferings of his country; and after an abſence of many years, diſtinguiſhed by ſuch a

[42] Xenoph. Hellen. Diodor. l. xiii. Plut. in Alcibiad.

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variety of fortune, eagerly longed to reviſit his native city, and to enjoy the rewards and honors uſually beſtowed by the Greeks on ſucceſsful valor. This celebrated voyage, which ſeveral ancient hiſtorians ſtudiouſly decorated with every circumſtance of naval triumph [41], was performed in the twenty-fifth ſummer of the war. Notwithſtanding all his ſervices, the cautious ſon of Clinias, inſtructed by adverſity, declined to land in the Piræus, until he was informed that the aſſembly had repealed the decrees againſt him, formally revoked his baniſhment, and prolonged the term of his command. Even after this agreeable intelligence he was ſtill unable to conquer his well-founded diſtruſt of the variable and capricious humors of the people; nor would he approach the crowded ſhore, till he obſerved, in the midſt of the multitude, his principal friends and relations inviting him by their voice and action. He then landed amidſt the univerſal acclamations of the ſpectators, who, unattentive to the naval pomp, and regardleſs of the other commanders, fixed their eyes only on Alcibiades. Next day an extraordinary aſſembly was ſummoned, by order of the magiſtrates, that he might explain and juſtify his apparent miſconduct, and receive the rewards due to his acknowledged merit. The public anticipated his apology, by contraſting the melancholy ſituation of affairs when Alcibiades aſſumed the command, with the actual condition of the republic. "At the former

[41] Duris apud Plut. in Alcibiad.

period Athens yielded the command of the ſea: the enemy were every where victorious; the ſtate was oppreſſed by foreign war, torn by ſedition, without reſources, and without hope. The addreſs and dexterity of Alcibiades were alone capable to have diſunited the councils, to have weakened and afterwards repelled the efforts, of a powerful confederacy; his activity and courage could alone have animated the dejection of the citizens to purſue the meaſures of offenſive war: his abilities, his virtue, and his fortune could alone have rendered thoſe meaſures ſucceſsful." CHAP. XXI.

His reception there.

Before judges ſo favorably diſpoſed to hear him, Alcibiades found no difficulty to make his defence; but it was difficult both for him and his friends to moderate the exceſſive tranſports of the people, who would have loaded their favorite with honors incompatible with the genius of a free republic, and which might, therefore, have proved dangerous to his future ſafety. He received, with pleaſure, the crowns and garlands, with other accuſtomed pledges of public gratitude and admiration; but he reſpectfully declined the royal ſceptre, expreſſing a firm reſolution to maintain the hereditary freedom of his country **. Athens required not a king, but a general with undivided power, capable of reſtoring the ancient ſplendor of the commonwealth. To this illuſtrious rank, which had been filled by Themiſtocles and Cimon, the ſon of Clinias might juſtly aſpire. He was

** Com. Iſocrat. Orat. pro Alcibiad. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

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appointed commander in chief by ſea and land [45]. An hundred gallies were equipped, and tranſports were prepared for fifteen hundred heavy-armed men, with a proportional body of cavalry.

The Eleuſinian myſteries.

Several months [46] had paſſed in theſe preparations, when the Eleuſinian feſtival approached; a time deſtined to commemorate and to diffuſe the temporal and ſpiritual gifts of the goddeſs Ceres, originally beſtowed on the Athenians, and by them communicated to the reſt of Greece [47]. Corn, wine, and oil, were the principal productions of Attica; each of which had been introduced into that country by the propitious intervention of a divinity, whoſe feſtival was diſtinguiſhed by appropriated honors. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was regarded as far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable ſolemnities. Various alſo were the profeſſions of gratitude expreſſed, in ſtated days of the ſpring and autumn, to the

[45] Αναιρηθεις απαντων ηγεμων αυτοκρατωρ. "He was choſen abſolute commander of all." Xenoph. p. 440.

[46] From the feſtivals Plynteria and Eleuſina, mentioned in the text, it appears that he arrived in July, and ſailed in November.

[47] Meurſius, apud Gronov. Theſaur. has collected all the paſſages in ancient writers reſpecting this feſtival. It is ſaid to have been celebrated in the month Boedromion, which, according to Father Petaut, anſwers to our November. But as the Attic year was lunar, the months of that year could not exactly correſpond to thoſe of ours. In the computation of their months, the Greeks agreed not with other nations, nor even among themſelves. Vid. Plut. in Vit. Romul. et Ariſtid.

generous

generous author of the vine. The worſhip of Ceres returned, indeed, leſs frequently; but was partly, on that account, the more ſolemn and awful; and partly, becauſe diſtinguiſhed by the Eleuſinian myſteries, thoſe hidden treaſures of wiſdom and happineſs, which were poured out on the initiated in the temple of Eleuſis. Fourteen [48] centuries before the Chriſtian æra, the goddeſs, it is ſaid, communicated theſe invaluable rites to Eumolpus and Keryx, two virtuous men, who had received her in the form of an unknown traveller with pious hoſpitality [49]. Their deſcendants, the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, continued the miniſters and guardians of this memorable inſtitution, which was finally aboliſhed by the great Theodoſius, after it had laſted eighteen hundred years [50]. The candidates for initiation were prepared by watching, abſtinence, ſacrifice, and prayer; and before revealing to them the divine ſecrets, the moſt awful ſilence was enjoined them. Yet enough tranſpired among the prophane vulgar to enable us ſtill to collect, from impartial [51] and authentic teſtimony, that the

[48] Marh. Arund. Epoch. 14.

[49] Diodor. l. v. Iſocrat. Panegyr. Pollux, l. viii. c. ix.

[50] Zoſim. Hiſt. l. iv.

[51] I ſay *impartial*, becauſe Iſocrates, the ſcholar of Socrates, cannot be ſuppoſed to exaggerate the merit of ceremonies, which his maſter is ſaid to have deſpiſed. The paſſage is remarkable: "Though what I am going to relate may be diſfigured by tradition and fable, the ſubſtance of it is not the leſs deſerving of your regard. When Ceres travelled to Attica in queſt of her daughter, ſhe received the moſt hoſpitable treatment, and thoſe particular good offices which are known to the initiated. The goddeſs was not ungrateful for ſuch

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myſteries of Ceres expreſſed by external ſigns the immortality of the human ſoul, and the rewards prepared in a future life for the virtuous ſervants of heaven. The ſecrecy enjoined by her miniſters, ſo unworthy the truths which they taught, might juſtify the indifference of Socrates [52], whoſe doctrines, not leſs divine, were inculcated with unreſerved freedom. But the fate of Socrates may juſtify in its turn, the circumſpection of the hierophants of Ceres.

Alcibiades conducts the Eleuſinian proceſſion.

Beſides the myſterious ceremonies of the temple, the worſhip of that bountiful goddeſs was celebrated by vocal and inſtrumental muſic, by public ſhows, and exhibitions, which continued during ſeveral days, and above all, by the pompous proceſſion, which marched for ten miles along the ſacred road leading from Athens to Eleuſis [53]. This important part of the ſolemnity had formerly been intermitted, becauſe the Athenians, after the loſs of Decelia, were no longer maſters of the road, and were compelled, contrary to eſtabliſhed cuſtom, to proceed by ſea to the temple of Ceres. Alcibiades determined to wipe off the ſtain of impiety

favors, but in return conferred on our anceſtors the two moſt valuable preſents which either heaven can beſtow, or mankind can receive; the practice of agriculture, which delivered us from the fierce and precarious manner of life, common to us with wild animals; and the knowledge of thoſe ſacred myſteries which fortify the initiated againſt the terrors of death, and inſpire them with the pleaſing hopes of an happy immortality. See Panegyr. p. 24. et Euſeb. Præpar. Evang. l. iii.

[52] Laert. in Diogene.

[53] Herodot. l. viii. c. lxv. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

which had long adhered to his character, by renewing, in all its luſtre, this venerable proceſſion. He prepared to defend, by an armed force, the peaceful miniſters and votaries of the gods, perſuaded that the Spartans would either allow them to paſs undiſturbed, which muſt leſſen the military fame of that people, or, if they attempted to interrupt the ceremony, muſt be expoſed not only to the dangerous reſiſtance of men animated by enthuſiaſm, but to the diſgraceful charge of irreligion, and the general deteſtation of Greece. The prieſts, the heralds, and the whole body of the initiated, were apprized of his intention, and requeſted to hold themſelves in readineſs by the appointed day. Early in the morning the cavalry explored the adjoining country; the eminences were occupied by the light infantry and targeteers; and, after ſufficient garriſons had been left to defend the Athenian walls and fortreſſes, the whole body of heavy-armed troops were drawn out to protect the Eleuſinian proceſſion, which marched along the uſual road to the temple, and afterwards returned to Athens, without ſuffering any moleſtation from the Lacedæmonians; having united, on this occaſion alone, all the ſplendor of war with the pomp of ſuperſtition [54].

His glory clouded by the inauſpicious return of the Plynteria.

Soon after this meritorious enterpriſe, Alcibiades prepared to ſail for Leſſer Aſia, accompanied by the affectionate admiration of his fellow-citizens, who flattered themſelves that the

[54] Plut. in Alcibiad.

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abilities and fortune of their commander would ſpeedily reduce Chios, Epheſus, Miletus, and the other revolted cities and iſlands. The general alacrity, however, was ſomewhat abated by the reflection, that the arrival of Alcibiades in Athens coincided with the anniverſary of the Plynteria [55], a day condemned to melancholy idleneſs, from a ſuperſtitious belief that nothing undertaken on that day could be brought to a proſperous concluſion. The celebrated Parthenon, whoſe remains ſtill atteſt the magnificence of Pericles, was conſecrated by the preſence of a goddeſs, who realized the inſpirations of Homer, as far as they were capable of being expreſſed by the genius of Phidias. Minerva, compoſed of gold and ivory, and twenty-ſix cubits high, was repreſented with the caſque, the buckler, the lance, and all her uſual emblems; and the warm fancy of the Athenians, enlivened and tranſported by the graceful majeſty of her air and aſpect, confounded the painful production of the ſtatuary with the inſtantaneous creation of Jupiter. To confirm this uſeful illuſion the crafty prieſts of the temple carefully waſhed and brightened the image, whoſe extraordinary luſtre increaſed the veneration of the multitude. The Plynteria, during which this ceremony was performed, required uncommon ſecrecy and circumſpection. The eyes and imagination of the vulgar might have become too

[55] Πλυνειν, to wash; πλυντηρια; and in the plural neuter, "the ceremony of ablution."

familiar with their revered goddeſs, had they beheld her ſtripped of her accuſtomed ornaments, and obſerved every part of her form brightening into new beauty under the plaſtic hands of the prieſts. To prevent this dangerous conſequence, the Plynteria was veiled in myſtic obſcurity; the doors of the temple were ſhut; that ſacred edifice was ſurrounded on all ſides to intercept the approach of indiſcretion or profanity; and the return of Alcibiades, the favorite hope of his country, happening on the inauſpicious day when Minerva hid her countenance, was believed by many to announce the dreadful calamities which ſoon afterwards befel the republic [56].

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[56] Xenoph. p. 438. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

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Character of Lyſander. — His Conference with Cyrus. — He defeats the Athenian Fleet. — Diſgrace of Alcibiades. — Lyſander ſucceeded by Callicratidas. — His Tranſactions with the Perſians — with the Spartan Allies. — Battle of Arginuſſæ. — Trial of the Athenian Admirals. — Eteonicus checks a Mutiny of the Peloponneſian Troops. — Lyſander reſumes the Command. — Battle of Ægos Potamos. — Spartan Empire in Aſia. — Siege and Surrender of Athens. — Humiliation of the Athenians.

CHAP. XXII. Lyſander takes the command of the Peloponneſian forces in the Eaſt. Olymp. xciii. 2. A. C. 407.

WHILE the ſuperſtitious multitude trembled at the imaginary anger of Minerva, men of reflection and experience dreaded the activity and valor of Lyſander, who, during the reſidence of Alcibiades at Athens, had taken the command of the Peloponneſian forces in the Eaſt. The forms of the Spartan conſtitution required a rapid ſucceſſion of generals; a circumſtance, which amidſt the numerous inconveniences with which it was attended, enlarged the ſphere of military competition, and multiplying the number of actors on the theatre of war, afforded an opportunity for the diſplay of many illuſtrious characters, which muſt otherwiſe have remained in obſcurity. In the rotation

of annual elections, offices of importance and dignity will often be intruſted to men unworthy to fill them; but in the vaſt variety of experiments, abilities of the moſt diſtinguiſhed order (if any ſuch exiſt in the community) muſt ſome time be called into exertion, honored with confidence, and armed with authority.

His character.

Such abilities the Spartans finally diſcovered in Lyſander; a ſhoot of the Herculean ſtock, but not deſcended from either of the royal branches. He had been educated with all the ſeverity of Spartan diſcipline; and having ſpent his youth and his manhood in thoſe honorable employments [1] which became the dignity of his birth, he approached the decline of life, when his ſuperior merit recommended him to the chief command in a ſeaſon of public danger. Years had added experience to his valor, and enlarged the reſources, without abating the ardor, of his ambitious mind. In his tranſactions with the world, he had learned to ſoften the harſh aſperity of his national manners; to gain by fraud what could not be effected by force; and, in his own figurative language, to "eke out the lion's with the fox's ſkin [2]." This mixed character admirably

[1] He had ſerved in the army and navy; had been employed as ambaſſador in foreign ſtates, etc. Plut. in Lyſand.

[2] This was ſaid, in alluſion to the lion's skin of Hercules, to one who asked Lyſander, "How he, who ſprang from that hero, could condeſcend to conquer his enemies by fraud?" His character is diffuſely deſcribed by Plutarch, l. iii. p. 4 — 15.

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ſuited the part which he was called to act. His enterpriſing courage was ſucceſsfully exerted in the hoſtile operations againſt the Greeks; his ſubtile and inſinuating addreſs gave him an aſcendant in every negociation with the Perſians; and the reunion of thoſe various qualities enabled him, in a few years, finally to terminate the war, and to produce an important and permanent revolution in the affairs of Athens, of Sparta, and of Greece.

His conference with Cyrus. Olymp. xciii. 2. A. C. 407.

Since the deciſive action at Cyzicus, the Peloponneſians, unable to reſiſt the enemy, had been employed in preparing ſhips on the coaſt of their own peninſula, as well as in the harbours of their Perſian and Grecian allies. The moſt conſiderable ſquadrons had been equipped in Cos, Rhodes, Miletus, and Epheſus; in the laſt of which the whole armament, amounting to ninety ſail, was collected by Lyſander. But the aſſembling of ſuch a force was a matter of little conſequence, unleſs proper meaſures ſhould be taken for holding it together, and for enabling it to act with vigor. It was neceſſary, above all, to ſecure pay for the ſeamen; for this purpoſe, Lyſander, accompanied by ſeveral Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors, repaired to Sardis, to congratulate the happy arrival of Cyrus, a generous and valiant youth of ſeventeen, who had been intruſted by his father Darius with the government of the inland parts of Leſſer Aſia; or, in the language of the Perſian court, with the command of the numerous troops, who rendezvouſed in the plains of

Kaſtolus [3]. Lyſander complained to the young and magnanimous prince, "of the perfidious duplicity of Tiſſaphernes, by which the Athenians had been enabled to re-aſſume that aſcendant in the Eaſt, which had formerly proved ſo dangerous and diſgraceful to the Perſian name. That ſatrap ſeemed, on one occaſion indeed, to have diſcovered the fatal tendence of his meaſures; and had attempted to check the victorious career of thoſe ambitious republicans, by ſeizing the perſon of Alcibiades [4]. Pharnabazus had more effectually ſerved the cauſe of his maſter, by his active valor in the field; by detaining the Athenian ambaſſadors, who had been ſent to ſurpriſe the unſuſpecting generoſity of Darius [5]; and by ſupplying the Peloponneſians, after the unfortunate engagement at Cyzicus, with the means of

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[3] This was the ſtyle of the letter, confirmed by the royal ſeal. Παταπεμπω Κυρον καρανον των ες Καστωλον αθροιζομενων. Xenoph. p. 438.

[4] This event, which happened in the twenty-firſt year of the war, is related by Xenophon, p. 429. It was omitted in the text, becauſe Alcibiades ſoon effected his eſcape; and the treachery of Tiſſaphernes only diſplayed his own worthleſſneſs, without hurting his enemies.

[5] This dishonorable tranſaction was approved even by Cyrus, which shows the diſregard of the Perſians to the laws of nations. He begged Pharnabazus to put the Athenians in his hands; at leaſt, not to ſet them at liberty, that their countrymen might be ignorant of the meaſures in agitation againſt them. But a remorſe of conſcience ſeized Pharnabazus, who had ſworn, either to conduct the ambaſſadors to the great king, or to ſend them to the Ionian coaſt; in conſequence of which, the Athenians were releaſed. Xenoph. p. 438.

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preparing a new fleet, and with the neceſſaries and conveniences of life, while they were employed in this uſeful undertaking. But Tiſſaphernes was unwilling, and Pharnabazus was perhaps unable, to diſcharge the ſtipulated pay, without which the Grecian ſeamen and ſoldiers could not be kept together, or engaged to act with vigor againſt the common enemy." Cyrus replied, "That he had been commanded by his father to aſſiſt the Lacedæmonians, and to pay their troops with the moſt exact punctuality. That, for this purpoſe, he had carried with him five hundred talents (near an hundred thouſand pounds ſterling); and if ſuch a ſum ſhould be found inſufficient, he would willingly expend his private fortune, and even melt down and coin into money the golden throne on which he ſat[6]."

The pay of the Grecian ſailors, and complement of their ſhips.

This diſcourſe gave extraordinary ſatisfaction to his Grecian auditors; and Lyſander endeavoured to avail himſelf of what, judging by his own character, he imagined might be nothing more than a ſudden tranſport of generoſity, by requeſting that the ſeamen's pay might be raiſed from three oboli to an Attic drachma a day. Cyrus anſwered, "That, on this ſubject too, he had received expreſs orders from his father[7]. That the pay ſhould

[6] Και τον θρονον κατακοψειν, εν ᾧ εκαθητο, ουτα αργυρεον και χρυσεον. Literally, "that he would cut in pieces the throne on which he ſat," which was compoſed of ſilver and gold.

[7] Xenophon makes Cyrus anſwer with more art than truth, "ὁ δε καλως μεν εφη αυτῳ λεγειν, ου δυνατον δε ειναι παρ' ἁ βασιλευς

continue on the ancient footing, and the Peloponneſians regularly receive thirty minæ (above ninety pounds ſterling) a month, for every ſhip which they fitted out." Lyſander acquieſced with ſome reluctance, determining to ſeize the firſt favorable opportunity to renew his petition. But this inſtructive converſation may enable us to diſcover an important matter of fact omitted by hiſtorians. As the military and naval officers of the Greeks were not diſtinguiſhed above the common men by the exceſſive inequality of their appointments, we may compute, from the monthly ſum of thirty minæ, diſtributed at the rate of three oboli of daily pay, that the complement of each ſhip amounted to about two hundred and forty ſailors; ſo that a fleet of ninety ſail employed twenty-one thouſand and ſix hundred men.

Lyſander is entertained at Sardis by the Perſian prince.

Before Lyſander returned to Epheſus, he was invited by the Perſian prince to a magnificent entertainment, at which, according to the cuſtom of the age, the moſt ſerious matters were diſcuſſed amidſt the freedom and intemperance of the table. This was a ſeaſonable occaſion for diſplaying the arts of inſinuation and flattery, in which the Spartan was a complete maſter. He repreſented, without moderation, and without decency, the injuſtice and incapacity of Tiſſaphernes, who, as he was naturally the rival, might be ſuſpected ſoon to become the

επιστειλεν αυτον αλλα ποιειν. " Cyrus anſwered, " that *they* (Lyſander and the Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors) ſpoke very reaſonably, but that *he* could not act otherwiſe than he was commanded by his father."

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perſonal enemy of Cyrus. He magnified the beauty, the ſtrength, and the courage, of the young prince. His addreſs in military exerciſes, and the extraordinary endowments of his mind (the fame of which had reached the moſt diſtant countries), were extolled with the moſt elaborate praiſe. It is not improbable that he might find a topic of panegyric in a quality of which Cyrus was not a little vain; the capacity of bearing, without intoxication, a greater quantity of liquor than any of his equals[s]; and he might poſſibly ſuggeſt, that of all the ſons of Darius, Cyrus was the beſt qualified to ſucceed his father, to fill with dignity the Perſian throne, and to emulate the glory of that illuſtrious hero whoſe name he bore, the immortal founder of the monarchy. But whatever were the topics of which he made uſe, it is certain that he excited the warmeſt emotions of friendſhip in the youthful breaſt of Cyrus, who drinking his health, after the Perſian faſhion, deſired him to aſk a boon, with full aſſurance that nothing ſhould be denied him. Lyſander replied, with his uſual addreſs, "That he ſhould aſk what it would be no leſs uſeful for the prince to give, than for him to receive: the addition of an obolus a day to the pay of the mariners; an augmentation which, by inducing the Athenian crews to deſert, would not only increaſe their own ſtrength, but enfeeble the common enemy." Struck with the apparent diſintereſtedneſs of this ſpecious propoſal, Cyrus ordered

His addreſs in procuring an addition to the ſeamen's pay.

[s] Plut. Sympoſ.

him immediately ten thouſand Daricks (above five thouſand pounds ſterling); with which he returned to Epheſus, diſcharged the arrears due to his troops, gave them a month's pay in advance, raiſed their daily allowance, and ſeduced innumerable deſerters from the Athenian fleet [9]. CHAP. XXII.

Defeats the Athenian fleet in the abſence of Alcibiades. Olymp. xciii. 2. A. C. 407.

While Lyſander was uſefully employed in manning his ſhips, and preparing them for action, Alcibiades attacked the ſmall iſland of Andros. The reſiſtance was more vigorous than he had reaſon to expect; and the immediate neceſſity of procuring pay and ſubſiſtence for the fleet, obliged him to leave his work imperfect. With a ſmall ſquadron he ſailed to raiſe contributions on the Ionian or Carian coaſt [10], committing the principal armament to Antiochus, a man totally unworthy of ſuch an important truſt [11]. Even the affectionate partiality of Alcibiades ſeems to have diſcerned the unworthineſs of his favorite, ſince he gave him ſtrict orders to continue, during his own abſence, in the harbour of Samos, and by no means to riſk an engagement. This injunction, as it could not prevent the raſhneſs, might perhaps provoke the vain levity of the vice-admiral, who, after the departure

[9] Plut. tom. iii. p. 7. Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 441. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 360

[10] Xenophon ſays, "Alcibiades ſailed to Phocæa," which is in Ionia; Plutarch ſays, "to the coaſt of Caria."

[11] Diodorus gives his character in few words: "Ὁ δὲ Αντιοχος ων τῃ Φυσει προχειρος, και σπευδων δια ἑαυτου τι πραξαι λαμπρον. Antiochos, naturally precipitate, and deſirous, by himſelf, to perform ſome ſplendid exploit."

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of his friend, ſailed towards Epheſus, approached the ſterns of Lyſander's ſhips, and with the moſt licentious inſults challenged him to battle. The prudent Spartan delayed the moment of attack, until the preſumption of his enemies had thrown them into ſcattered diſorder [13]. He then commanded the Peloponneſian ſquadrons to advance. His manœuvres were judicious, and executed with a prompt obedience. The battle was not obſtinate, as the Athenians, who ſcarcely expected any reſiſtance, much leſs aſſault, ſunk at once from the inſolence of temerity into the deſpondency of fear. They loſt fifteen veſſels, with a conſiderable part of their crews. The remainder retired diſgracefully to Samos; while the Lacedæmonians profited of their victory by the taking of Eion and Delphinium. Though fortune thus favored the prudence of Lyſander, he declined to venture a ſecond engagement with the ſuperior ſtrength of Alcibiades, who, having reſumed the command, employed every artifice and inſult that might procure him an opportunity to reſtore the tarniſhed luſtre of the Athenian fleet.

Alcibiades accuſed and diſgraced.

But ſuch an opportunity he could never again find. The people of Athens, who expected to hear of nothing but victories and triumphs, were mortified to the laſt degree, when they received intelligence of ſuch a ſhameful defeat. As they could not ſuſpect the abilities, they diſtruſted the fidelity, of their commander. Their ſuſpicions

[13] "Διεσπαρμένας τας ναυς." Xenoph. p. 441.

were increaſed and confirmed by the arrival of Thraſybulus [11], who, whether actuated by a laudable zeal for the intereſt of the public ſervice, or animated by a ſelfiſh jealouſy of the fame and honors that had been ſo liberally heaped on a rival, formally impeached Alcibiades in the Athenian aſſembly. "His miſconduct had totally ruined the affairs of his country. A talent for low buffoonery was a ſure recommendation to his favor. His friends were, partially, ſelected from the meaneſt and moſt abandoned of men, who poſſeſſed no other merit than that of being ſubſervient to his paſſions. To ſuch unworthy inſtruments the fleet of Athens was intruſted; while the commander in chief revelled in debauchery with the harlots of Abydus and Ionia, or raiſed exorbitant contributions on the dependent cities, that he might defray the expenſe of a fortreſs on the coaſt of Thrace, in the neighbourhood of Byzantium, which he had erected to ſhelter himſelf againſt the juſt vengeance of the republic." CHAP. XXII.

[11] Thraſybulus, we have ſeen, had a principal ſhare in bringing about the recal of Alcibiades. Nor was the latter ungrateful to his benefactor. When the Athenians committed to him their whole military and naval force, "ἁπασας τας δυναμεις," and allowed him to name his own colleagues, or rather ſubſtitutes, he named Thraſybulus and Adimantus, Diod. l. xiii. p. 368. Conſidering this interchange of good offices between Alcibiades and Thraſybulus, it is remarkable that no Greek writer aſſigns any reaſon for the animoſity that ſoon afterwards broke out between them. Plutarch ſays, that Thraſybulus was the hitteреſt of Alcibiades's enemies, and imputes his accuſation of him to enmity, not to patriotiſm.

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Ten commanders appointed in his ſtead.

Were it neceſſary to prove by examples the deceitful emptineſs of popular favor, this ſubject might be copiouſly illuſtrated from the hiſtory of the Athenians. The ſame man, whom a few months before they found it impoſſible ſufficiently to reward, was actually expoſed to the rage of diſappointment and the fury of revenge. They regretted the loſs of every moment which intervened between the rapid progreſs of their reſentment, and the execution of their vengeance. In the ſame aſſembly, and on the ſame day, Alcibiades was accuſed, and almoſt unanimouſly condemned; and, that the affairs of the republic might not again ſuffer by the abuſe of undivided power, ten commanders were ſubſtituted in his room; among whom were Thraſyllus, Leon, Diomedon, whoſe approved valor, and love of liberty, juſtly recommended them to public honors; Conon, a character as yet but little known, but deſtined, in a future period, to eclipſe the fame of his contemporaries; and Pericles, who inherited the name, the merit, and the bad fortune, of his illuſtrious father. The new generals immediately ſailed to Samos; and Alcibiades ſought refuge in his Thracian fortreſs [14].

Callicratidas ſent to command the Peloponneſian fleet. Olymp. xciii. 3. A. C. 406.

They had ſcarcely aſſumed the command, when an important alteration took place in the Peloponneſian fleet. Lyſander's year had expired, and Callicratidas, a Spartan of a very oppoſite character, was ſent to ſucceed him. The active, ambitious,

[14] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. ſub fin. Diodor. xiii. 67—74.

and

and intriguing temper of the former had employed as much aſſiduous and ſyſtematic policy during the ſhort term of his precarious power, as if his authority had never been to end. Though endowed with uncommon vigor of mind, and with conſummate prudence (if prudence can belong to a character deficient in juſtice and humanity), he poſſeſſed not thoſe amiable and uſeful qualities which alone deſerve, and can alone obtain, public confidence and reſpect. Lyſander, ſenſible of this imperfection, had recourſe to the ordinary expedient by which crafty ambition ſupplies the want of virtue. He determined to govern by parties [15]. The boldeſt of the ſailors were attached to his perſon by liberal rewards and more liberal promiſes. The ſoldiers were indulged in the moſt licentious diſorders. In every city and in every iſland, Lyſander had his partiſans, whom he flattered with the hopes of obtaining the ſame authority over their fellow-citizens, which the Spartans enjoyed over the inferior ranks of men in Laconia [16]. CHAP. XXII.

It was the general expectation at Epheſus, that the Spartans would, for once, depart from eſtabliſhed practice, in order to prolong the command of ſuch an able and ſucceſsful officer. An univerſal clamor aroſe, when Callicratidas diſplayed his His inſolent reception.

[15] His maxims breathed the odious party-ſpirit. "That it is impoſſible to do too much good to friends, or *too much evil to enemies*. That children are to be deceived by trinkets, men by oaths; and others equally flagitious." Plut. in Lyſand.

[16] Idem, ibid. et Xenoph. Helien.

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commiſſion in the council of the confederates. The friends of Lyſander affirmed, "That it was equally imprudent and ungenerous to check the victorious career of a deſerving and fortunate commander; that the important charge of the fleet ought not to be intruſted to men, who were deſtitute of experience, and perhaps of abilities; nor would it be juſt to ſacrifice the intereſt of ſuch a numerous and powerful confederacy to a punctilious obſervance of the Lacedæmonian laws." Lyſander maintained a decent ſilence concerning the character of his ſucceſſor, only obſerving that he reſigned to him a fleet which commanded the ſea. The noiſy acclamations of the aſſembly confirmed his aſſertion.

His honeſty and firmneſs confounds the partiſans of Lyſander.

But Callicratidas had a heart untainted with reproach, and incapable of fear. Unabaſhed by the ſeditious turbulence of his opponents, he replied, That he muſt with-hold his aſſent to the magnified ſuperiority of the Peloponneſian fleet, unleſs Lyſander ſhould ſet ſail from Epheſus, coaſt along the iſle of Samos (where the Athenians then lay), and ſurrender his victorious ſquadrons in the harbour of Miletus. The pride of Lyſander might have been confounded by this judicious and ſolid obſervation; but his ingenuity ſuggeſted a plauſible or rather an eluſive reply, "That he was no longer admiral."

Callicratidas then addreſſed the aſſembly, with the manly ſimplicity of an honeſt heart, which diſdains the artifice of words, defies the inſolence of power, and defeats the intrigues of policy.

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"Lacedæmonians and allies, I ſhould have been contented to ſtay at home; nor does it greatly affect me that Lyſander, or any other, ſhould be held a better ſeaman than myſelf. Hither I have been ſent by my countrymen to command the fleet, and *my* chief concern is to execute their orders, and to perform my duty. It is my earneſt deſire to promote the public intereſt; but you can beſt inform me whether I ought to continue here, or to return to Sparta." Wonderful is the power of honeſt intentions and unaffected firmneſs. The aſſembly liſtened with admiration; the partiſans of Lyſander were abaſhed; none ventured to object; and, after a conſiderable pauſe, all unanimouſly acknowledged that it became both Callicratidas and themſelves to obey the orders of the Spartan government[17]. CHAP. XXII.

He meets the arrogance of the Perſians with equal contempt.

Lyſander, not a little mortified by the language of the aſſembly, reluctantly reſigned his employment; but determined to render it painful, and, if poſſible, too weighty for the abilities of his ſucceſſor. For this purpoſe he returned to the court of Cyrus, to whom he reſtored a conſiderable ſum of money ſtill unexpended in the ſervice of the Grecian fleet, and to whom he miſrepreſented, under the names of obſtinacy, ignorance, and ruſticity, the unaffected plainneſs, the downright ſincerity, and the other manly, but uncomplying, virtues of the generous Callicratidas. When that commander repaired to Sardis to demand the

[17] Xenoph. Hellen. L. i. c. 5. et ſeqq. et Plut. in Lyſand.

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ſtipulated pay, he could not obtain admiſſion to the royal preſence. The firſt time that he viſited the palace he was told that Cyrus was at table. It is well, ſaid the unceremonious Spartan, I will wait till he has dined. The ſimplicity of this proceeding, confirmed the opinion which Lyſander had given the Perſians of his character; and his honeſt frankneſs, which was conſtrued into low breeding, ſeemed a proper object of ridicule to the proud retainers of the court. He returned on another occaſion, but without being admitted to ſee the young prince. The injuſtice of this treatment might have deſerved his reſentment, but it chiefly excited his contempt. He left the royal city, deſpiſing the pride and perfidy of his Perſian allies, whoſe accidental importance depended on the precarious advantage of riches, and lamenting the domeſtic diſſenſions of the Greeks, which obliged them to court the favor of inſolent Barbarians.

Obtains voluntary contributions from the Ionians.

But Callicratidas could not, with honor or ſafety, return to the fleet at Epheſus, without having collected money to ſupply the immediate wants of the ſailors. He proceeded, therefore, to Miletus and other friendly towns of Ionia; and having met the principal citizens, in their reſpective aſſemblies, he explained openly and fully the mean jealouſy of Lyſander, and the diſdainful arrogance of Cyrus[18]. "The unjuſt behaviour of

[18] It will appear, in the ſequel, that Callicratidas had formed a very falſe opinion of the Perſian prince, whoſe neglect of a worthy man was occaſioned by the perfidious ſuggeſtions of his retainers, the friends or creatures of Lyſander.

both compelled him, much againſt his inclination, to have recourſe to the confederate cities (already too much burdened) for the money requiſite to ſupport the war. But he aſſured them, that, ſhould his arms prove ſucceſsful, he would repay their favors with gratitude. Their own intereſt required a cheerful compliance with his demands, ſince the expedition had been principally undertaken to vindicate their freedom. He had, however, ſent meſſengers to require effectual ſupplies from Sparta; but until theſe ſhould arrive, it became the Greeks in general, but eſpecially the Ionians, who had ſuffered peculiar injuries from the uſurping tyranny of the great king, to prove to the world that, "without the ſordid aſſiſtance of *his* boaſted treaſures, they could proſecute their juſt deſigns, and take vengeance on their enemies." By thoſe judicious and honorable expedients, Callicratidas, without fraud or violence, obtained ſuch conſiderable, yet voluntary contributions, as enabled him to gratify the importunate demands of the ſailors, and to return with honor to Epheſus, in order to prepare for action[19].

His firſt operations were directed againſt the iſle of Leſbos, or rather againſt the ſtrong and populous towns of Methymna and Mitylené, which reſpectively commanded the northern and ſouthern diviſions of that iſland. Beſides the numerous citizens of an age to bear arms, Methymna was defended by an Athenian garriſon. The place

He takes Methymna.

[19] Xenoph. Hellen. p. 444.

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made a brave reſiſtance; but the perſevering efforts of Callicratidas exhauſted its ſtrength: Methymna was taken by ſtorm, and ſubjected to the depredations of the Peloponneſian troops. The garriſon and the ſlaves were treated as part of the booty. The confederates adviſed, that the Methymneans alſo ſhould be ſold into ſervitude; but Callicratidas aſſured them, that, while *he* enjoyed the command, there ſhould not any Grecian citizen be reduced to the condition of a ſlave, unleſs he had taken arms to ſubvert the public freedom[20].

Takes thirty ships, and blocks up the reſt of the fleet in the harbour of Mitylene.

Meanwhile Conon, the moſt active and enterpriſing of the Athenian commanders, had put to ſea with a ſquadron of ſeventy ſail, in order to protect the coaſt of Leſbos. But this deſign was attempted too late; nor, had it been more early undertaken, was the force of Conon ſufficient to accompliſh it. Callicratidas obſerved his motions, diſcovered his ſtrength, and, with a far ſuperior fleet, intercepted his retreat to the armament of Samos. The Athenians fled towards the coaſt of Mitylené, but were prevented from entering the harbour of that place by the reſentment of the inhabitants, who rejoiced in an opportunity to puniſh thoſe who had ſo often conquered, and ſo long oppreſſed, their city. In conſequence of this unexpected oppoſition, the Athenian ſquadron was overtaken by the enemy. The engagement was more ſharp and obſtinate than might have been expected in ſuch an inequality of ſtrength. Thirty

[20] Xenoph. ubi ſupra. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 373.

empty ſhips (for moſt of the men ſwam to land) were taken by the Peloponneſians. The remaining forty were haled up under the walls of Mitylené: Callicratidas recalled his troops from Methymna, received a reinforcement from Chios, and blocked up the Athenians by ſea and land[21]. CHAP. XXII.

The condition of Conon was moſt diſtreſsful. He was ſurrounded on all ſides by a ſuperior force; the town of Mitylené was hoſtile; his men were deſtitute of proviſions, incapable of reſiſtance, yet unwilling to ſurrender. In this melancholy ſituation he attempted the only enterpriſe which could promiſe a hope of relief. The braveſt and moſt experienced ſeamen were embarked in two ſwift-ſailing veſſels, one of which eluding the vigilance of the enemy, eſcaped in ſafety to the Helleſpont, and informed the Athenians of the misfortunes and blockade at Leſbos. The intelligence was immediately communicated to Samos and to Athens; and the importance of the object, which was no leſs than the ſafety of forty ſhips, and above eight thouſand brave men, excited uncommon exertions of activity. The Athenians reinforced their domeſtic ſtrength with the aſſiſtance of their allies; all able-bodied men were preſſed into the ſervice; and, in a few weeks, they had aſſembled at Samos an hundred and fifty ſail, which immediately took the ſea, with a reſolution to encounter the enemy. The Athenians fit out a new fleet.

Callicratidas did not decline the engagement. Having left fifty ſhips to guard the harbour of Battle of Arginuſſæ, in which Callicratidas

[21] Xenoph. ubi ſupra. Diodor l. xiii. p. 373.

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is defeated and ſlain. Olymp. xcii. 3. A. C. 406.

Mitylené, he proceeded with an hundred and twenty to Cape Malea, the moſt ſouthern point of Leſbos. The Athenians had advanced, the ſame evening, to the iſlands, or rather rocks, of Arginuſſæ, four miles diſtant from that promontory. The night paſſed in bold ſtratagems for mutual ſurpriſe, which were rendered ineffectual by a violent tempeſt of rain and thunder. At the dawn both armaments were eager to engage; but Hermon and Megareus, two experienced ſeamen, and the chief counſellors of Callicratidas, exhorted him not to commit the weakneſs of the Peloponneſians with the ſuperior ſtrength and numbers of the enemy. The generous and intrepid Spartan deſpiſed danger and death in compariſon of glory; but either his magnanimity had not overcome the laſt imperfection of virtuous minds, and was averſe to ſacrifice perſonal glory to public utility, or he imagined that this utility could not be ſeparated from an inflexible adherence to the martial laws of Lycurgus. He anſwered the prudent admonitions of his friends in theſe memorable words, which, according to the conſtruction that is put on them [22],

[22] Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. xxiv. takes the unfavorable ſide. "Inventi autem multi ſunt, qui non modo pecuniam, ſed vitam etiam profundere pro patriâ parati eſſent: iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne republicâ quidem poſtulante; ut Callicratidas, qui cum Lacedæmoniorum dux fuiſſet Peloponneſiaco bello, multaque feciſſet egregie; vertit ad extremum omnia, cum conſilio non paruit eorum, qui claſſem ab Arginuſſis removendam, nec cum Athenienſibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille reſpondit, Lacedæmonios, claſſe illâ amiſſâ, aliam parare poſſe; ſe fugere ſine ſuo dedecore non poſſe."

deſerve our admiration or our pity. "My death cannot be deſtructive to Sparta, but my flight would be diſhonorable both to Sparta and myſelf." So ſaying, he gave the ſignal for his ſhips to advance. The fight was long and bloody; paſſing, ſucceſſively, through all the different gradations, from diſciplined order and regularity to the moſt tumultuous confuſion. The Spartan commander was ſlain charging in the centre of the braveſt enemies. The hoſtile ſquadrons fought with various fortune in different parts of the battle, and promiſcuouſly conquered, purſued, ſurrendered, or fled. Thirteen Athenian veſſels were taken by the Peloponneſians; but, at length, the latter gave way on all ſides: ſeventy of their ſhips were captured, the reſt eſcaped to Chios and Phocæa[21].

Stratagem of Eteonicus;

The Athenian admirals, though juſtly elated with their good fortune, cautiouſly deliberated concerning the beſt means of improving their victory. Several adviſed that the fleet ſhould ſteer its courſe to Mitylené, to ſurpriſe the Peloponneſian ſquadron which blocked up the harbour of that city. Diomedon recommended it as a more immediate and eſſential object of their care to recover the bodies of the ſlain, and to ſave the wreck of twelve veſſels which had been diſabled in the engagement.

Nothwithſtanding the reſpectable authority of Cicero, whoever attentively conſiders the laws of Lycurgus and the character of Callicratidas, will be diſpoſed to believe, that an undeviating principle of duty, not the fear of loſing his glory, formed the ſublime motive of that accomplished Spartan.

[21] Xenoph. p. 446. et Diodor. p 334.

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Thraſybulus obſerved, that by dividing their ſtrength, both purpoſes might be effected. His opinion was approved. The charge of preſerving the dying, and collecting the bodies of the dead, was committed to Theramenes and Thraſybulus. Fifty veſſels were deſtined to that important ſervice, doubly recommended by humanity and ſuperſtition. The remainder ſailed to the iſle of Leſbos, in queſt of the Peloponneſians on that coaſt, who narrowly eſcaped deſtruction through the well-conducted ſtratagem of Eteonicus, the Spartan vice-admiral. Soon after the engagement a brigantine arrived at Mitylené, acquainting him with the death of Callicratidas, as well as with the defeat and flight of the Peloponneſian fleet. The ſagacity of Eteonicus immediately foreſaw the probable conſequences of thoſe events. The Athenians would naturally ſail from Arginuſſæ to purſue their good fortune, and Conon, who was ſhut up at Mitylené, would be encouraged to break through the harbour, that he might join his victorious countrymen.

which ſaves the Peloponneſian ſquadron at Mitylené.

In order to anticipate thoſe meaſures, and to facilitate his own retreat, the Spartan commander ordered the brigantine privately to leave the harbour, and to return, at the diſtance of a ſhort time, with joyous acclamations and muſic, the rowers crowned with garlands, and calling out that Callicratidas had deſtroyed the laſt hope of Athens, and obtained a glorious and deciſive victory. The contrivance ſucceeded; the Spartans thanked heaven for the good news by hymns and ſacrifices; the

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sailors were enjoined to refresh themselves by a copious repast, and to profit of a favorable gale to sail to the isle of Chios; while the soldiers burned their camp, and marched northward to Methymna, to reinforce the garrison there, which was threatened by a speedy visit of the enemy [24].

Disappointment of the Athenian admirals.

While the prudent foresight of Eteonicus saved the Peloponnesian squadron at Mitylené, the violence of a storm prevented Theramenes and Thrasybulus from saving their unfortunate companions, all of whom, excepting one of the admirals and a few others who escaped by their extraordinary dexterity in swimming, were overwhelmed by the waves of a tempestuous sea; nor could their dead bodies ever be recovered. The Athenians were likewise disappointed of the immediate advantages which ought to have resulted from the engagement. Methymna was too strongly fortified to be taken by a sudden assault; they could not spare time for a regular siege; and when they proceeded to Chios in quest of the Peloponnesian fleet, they found it carefully secured in the principal harbour of that island, which had been put in a vigorous posture of defence. These unforeseen circumstances were the more disagreeable and mortifying to the commanders, because, immediately after the battle, they had sent an advice-boat to Athens, acquainting the magistrates with the capture of seventy vessels [25]; mentioning their intended expeditions to

[24] Xenoph. Hellen. et Diodor. p. 384.

[25] Xenoph. says sixty-nine; Diodorus, seventy-seven.

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Mitylené, Methymna, and Chios, from which they had reaſon to hope the moſt diſtinguiſhed ſucceſs; and particularly taking notice that the important charge of recovering the bodies of the drowned or ſlain had been committed to Theramenes and Thraſybulus, two captains of approved conduct and fidelity.

Diſcontents in Athens.

The joy which the Athenians received from this flattering intelligence was converted into diſappointment and ſorrow, when they underſtood that their fleet had returned to Samos, without reaping the expected fruits of victory. They were afflicted beyond meaſure with the total loſs of the wreck, by which their brave and victorious countrymen had been deprived of the ſacred rites of funeral; a circumſtance viewed with peculiar horror, becauſe it was ſuppoſed, according to a ſuperſtition conſecrated by the belief of ages, to ſubject their melancholy ſhades to wander an hundred years on the gloomy banks of the Styx, before they could be tranſported to the regions of light and felicity. The relations of the dead lamented their private misfortunes; the enemies of the admirals exaggerated the public calamity; both demanded an immediate and ſerious examination into the cauſe of this diſtreſsful event, that the guilty might be diſcovered and puniſhed.

Amidſt the ferment of popular diſcontents, Theramenes ſailed to Athens, with a view to exculpate himſelf and his colleague Thraſybulus. The letter ſent thither before them had excited their fear and their reſentment; ſince it rendered

them reſponſible for a duty which they found it impoſſible to perform. Theramenes accuſed the admirals of having neglected the favorable moment to ſave the periſhing, and to recover the bodies of the dead; and, after the opportunity of this important ſervice was irrecoverably loſt, of having devolved the charge on others, in order to ſkreen their own miſconduct. The Athenians greedily liſtened to the accuſation, and caſhiered the abſent commanders. Conon, who during the action remained blocked up at Mitylené, was intruſted with the fleet. Protomachus and Ariſtogenes choſe a voluntary baniſhment. The reſt returned home to juſtify meaſures which appeared ſo criminal [26].

Trials of the admirals.

Among the ineſtimable rules of juriſprudence, invented by the wiſdom of Athens, we may remark that beneficial inſtitution which ſubjects the life, the character, and the fortune of individuals, not to the capricious will of an arbitrary judge, but to the equitable deciſion of the public. In every caſe, civil and criminal, the rights of an Athenian citizen were intruſted to the judgment of his peers; who, according as the queſtion was more or leſs important, conſiſted of a committee, more or leſs numerous, of the popular aſſembly. But, in order to unite the double advantages of law and liberty, the nine archons, or chief magiſtrates, men of approved wiſdom and fidelity, reſpectively preſided in the ſeveral courts of juſtice, received

[26] Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. vii. et ſeqq. Diodor. xiii. 76—97.

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complaints, examined the parties, directed proceſs, and regularly conducted the ſuit through its various ſteps and ſtages. In matters of general concernment, ſuch as the treaſon, perfidy, or malverſation of men in power, the ſenate of the five hundred, or rather the Prytanes, who preſided in the ſenate, performed the functions of the magiſtrate, and the whole body of the people, convened in full aſſembly, executed the office of judge and jury. It belonged to the Prytanes to preſcribe the form of action or trial, and to admit the accuſer to implead or impeach his antagoniſt. The cauſe was then referred to the people, who, as judges of the fact, gave their verdict, and, as judges of the law, paſſed their ſentence or decree. Such were the regulations which reaſon had eſtabliſhed, but which paſſion and intereſt commonly rendered ineffectual.

Artifices of their accuſers.

Archedemus, an opulent and powerful citizen, and Calixenus, a ſeditious demagogue, partly moved by the entreaties of Theramenes, and partly excited by perſonal envy and reſentment, denounced the admirals to the ſenate. The accuſation was ſupported by the relations of the deceaſed, who appeared in mourning robes, their heads ſhaved, their arms folded, their eyes bathed in tears, piteouſly lamenting the loſs and diſgrace of their families, deprived of their protectors, who had been themſelves deprived of thoſe laſt and ſolemn duties to which all mankind are entitled. A falſe witneſs ſwore in court, that he had been ſaved, almoſt by miracle, from the wreck, and that

his companions, as they were ready to be drowned, charged him to acquaint his country how they had fallen victims to the cruel neglect of their commanders. During theſe proceedings it happened that the people had met to celebrate the Apatouria, or feſtival in January, ſo named becauſe the Athenians then preſented their ſons, who had reached their ſeventh year, to be inſcribed in the regiſter of their reſpective tribes. Callixenus preſuming on the evidence given in the ſenate, and on the actual diſpoſition of the aſſembly, propoſed the following reſolution: "That the cauſe of the admirals ſhould be immediately referred to the people; that the ſuffrages ſhould be given by tribes, in each of which the criers ſhould make proclamation, having prepared two urns to receive the white and black beans; if the latter were more numerous, the admirals ſhould be delivered to the eleven men, the executioners of public juſtice, their eſtates confiſcated, and the tenth part conſecrated to Minerva."

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This unjuſt decree, which deprived the commanders of the benefits of a ſeparate trial, of an impartial hearing, and of the time as well as the means neceſſary to prepare a legal defence, was approved by a majority of the ſenate, and received with loud acclamations by the people, whoſe levity, inſolence, pride, and cruelty, all eagerly demanded the deſtruction of the admirals. In ſuch a numerous aſſembly, two men alone, Euryptolemus and Axiochus, defended the cauſe of law and juſtice. The former impeached Callixenus for propoſing a

Informality of the trial.

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reſolution inconſiſtent with all the forms of legal procedure. But the rabble made a violent uproar, calling out that none ſhould attempt, with impunity, to abridge their ſovereign power. The Prytanes, who attended, as uſual, to direct and controul the proceedings of the multitude, endeavoured to moderate the ferment: but they were licentiouſly told, that if they did not concur with the opinion of the majority, they ſhould be involved in the ſame accuſation with the admirals. This abſurd menace (ſuch was the popular frenzy) might be carried into immediate execution. The ſenators were intimidated into a reluctant compliance with meaſures which they diſapproved, and by which they were for ever to be diſgraced. Yet the philoſophic firmneſs of Socrates diſdained to ſubmit. He proteſted againſt the tameneſs of his colleagues, and declared that neither threats, nor danger, nor violence, could compel him to conſpire with injuſtice for the deſtruction of the innocent.

They are condemned and executed.

But what could avail the voice of one virtuous man amidſt the licentious madneſs of thouſands? The commanders were accuſed, tried, condemned; and, with the moſt irregular precipitancy, delivered to the executioner. Before they were led to death, Diomedon addreſſed the aſſembly in a ſhort but ever-memorable ſpeech. "I am afraid, Athenians! leſt the ſentence which you have paſſed on us, prove hurtful to the republic. Yet I would exhort you to employ the moſt proper means to avert the vengeance of heaven. You muſt carefully perform

perform the ſacrifices which, before giving battle at Arginuſſæ, we promiſed to the gods in behalf of ourſelves and of you. Our misfortunes deprive us of an opportunity to acquit this juſt debt, and to pay the ſincere tribute of our gratitude. But we are deeply ſenſible that the aſſiſtance of the gods enabled us to obtain that glorious and ſignal victory." The diſintereſtedneſs, the patriotiſm, and the magnanimity of this diſcourſe, muſt have appeaſed (if any thing had been able to appeaſe) the tumultuous paſſions of the vulgar. But their headſtrong fury defied every reſtraint of reaſon or of ſentiment. They perſiſted in their bloody purpoſe, which was executed without pity: yet their cruelty was followed by a ſpeedy repentance, and puniſhed by the ſharp pangs of remorſe, the intolerable pain of which they vainly attempted to mitigate by inflicting a well-merited vengeance on the worthleſs and deteſtable Callixenus[27].

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Character of their ſucceſſors.

The removal of the Athenian admirals, and the defeat and death of the Spartan Callicratidas, ſuſpended for ſeveral months the military and naval operations on both ſides. The behaviour of Philocles and Adimanthus, who had been joined in authority with Conon, were better fitted to obſtruct than promote the meaſures of that brave and prudent commander. The former was a man of a violent and impetuous temper, unaccuſtomed to reflection, deſtitute of experience, and incapable of governing others, or himſelf. The latter

[27] Xenoph. et Diodor. ibid.

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poſſeſſed perhaps the virtue of humanity, but was deſtitute of ſpirit and activity, qualities ſo uſual in his age and country. Though ready with his tongue, he was ſlow with his hand, careleſs of diſcipline, negligent of duty, and ſuſpected of a treaſonable correſpondence with the public enemy.

Eteonicus checks a mutiny among the Peloponneſian troops.

Eteonicus, who commanded the Spartans and their confederates, was a man of a very different character. But the diſtreſsful ſituation of affairs prevented him from diſplaying his abilities in any important enterpriſe. His armament was inferior in ſtrength; his ſailors were diſheartened by defeat; he had not money to pay them; even their ſubſiſtence at Chios was very ſparing and precarious. Theſe vexatious circumſtances increaſed the mutinous ſpirit by which the confederates were too naturally animated. They reproached the ungenerous parſimony of the Chians, whom they had taken arms to defend; they ſpurned the authority of their commander; and in order to obtain thoſe advantages which their ſervices deſerved, and which had been unjuſtly denied them, they determined to become rich at once by ſeizing and plundering the large and wealthy capital of that flouriſhing iſland. The deſign, though ſecretly formed, was avowed with open boldneſs. The conſpirators, whoſe numbers ſeemed to promiſe ſucceſs, or at leaſt to ſecure impunity, aſſumed a badge of diſtinction, that they might encourage each other, and intimidate their opponents. Eteonicus was juſtly alarmed with the progreſs of ſedition. It was dangerous to attack the inſurgents by force: if he

deſtroyed them by fraud, he might be expoſed to the reproach and obloquy of Greece. The conduct which he purſued was conceived with an enterpriſing courage, and executed with a reſolute firmneſs. With only fifteen faithful and intrepid followers, armed with concealed daggers, he patrolled the ſtreets of Chios. The firſt man whom they met diſtinguiſhed by a reed (for that was the badge of conſpiracy) was put to death, and a crowd collecting to know why the man had been ſlain, they were told it was for wearing a reed on his caſque. The report was immediately ſpread through every quarter of the city. The reed-men (as they were called) were confounded at diſcovering a conſpiracy more ſecret and more formidable than their own. They dreaded that every man whom they met might know and kill them; and, as they had not time to aſſemble for their mutual defence, they haſtily threw away the reeds, which expoſed them to the dangerous aſſault of their unknown enemies. CHAP. XXII.

The character of Eteonicus, as far as we can judge from his actions, juſtly entitled him to the command; but the partiality both of Cyrus and of the confederates eagerly ſolicited the return of Lyſander. The Spartans, though inclined to gratify them, were perplexed by an ancient law enacted in the jealouſy of freedom to prohibit the ſame perſon from being twice intruſted with the fleet. That they might not violate the reſpect due to the laws, while at the ſame time they complied with the requeſt of their powerful allies, they inveſted

Lyſander reſumes the command, and takes Lampſacus. Olymp. xciii. 3. A. C. 406.

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Aracus, a weak and obſcure man, with the name of admiral, and ſent out Lyſander as ſecond in command. The latter was received at Sardis by the Perſian prince, with the warmeſt demonſtrations of joy. He was ſupplied with money to ſatisfy the immediate wants of the troops; and, as Cyrus at that time happened to make a journey into Upper Aſia, the revenues of his wealthy province were conſigned, in his abſence, to the management of his Spartan friend. Such powerful reſources could not long remain unemployed in the active hands of Lyſander. His emiſſaries aſſiduouſly engaged or preſſed the Ionian and Carian ſeamen. The harbours of Aſia Minor, particularly the port of Epheſus, glowed with the ardor of naval preparation, and in a few months Lyſander ſailed to the Helleſpont with a hundred and fifty gallies, and attacked the important town of Lampſacus. The place, though vigorouſly defended by the natives as well as by the Athenian garriſon, was at length taken by ſtorm; and according to the barbarous practice of the age, abandoned to the licentious rapacity, the avarice, the luſt, and the fury, of the conquerors [28].

The Athenian commanders prepare to give him battle.

The languid and imprudent meaſures of the Athenians at Samos accuſe the abilities of Tydeus, Menander, and Cephiſodotus, who had been lately joined in command with Conon and his unworthy colleagues. They ſailed too late to ſave Lampſacus, but as they poſſeſſed an hundred and eighty

[28] Plut. in Lyſand.

gallies, a force ſuperior to Lyſander's, they anchored on the oppoſite, or European ſide of the Helleſpont, at the diſtance of fifteen furlongs, in order to provoke the enemy to an engagement. Their unfortunate ſtation was the mouth of the Ægos Potamos, or river of the goat, diſtinguiſhed by that name on account of ſome ſmall iſlands, which riſing high above the ſurface of the waters, exhibit to a lively imagination the appearance of that animal. This place was injudiciouſly choſen, ſince it afforded very inſecure riding; and was diſtant two miles from Seſtos, the neareſt town from which the fleet could be provided with neceſſaries. Alcibiades, who in his Thracian retirement was unable to withdraw his attention from the war in which he had long acted ſuch a diſtinguiſhed part, modeſtly admoniſhed his countrymen of their imprudence; but he was arrogantly reproached for preſuming, while an exile and an outlaw, to give advice to the admirals of Athens. Their ſubſequent conduct too faithfully correſponded with this inſolence and folly. Deſpiſing the inferiority of the Peloponneſian fleet, they advanced in order of battle to the harbour of Lampſacus; and when the enemy moved not from their ſtation, they returned in triumph as acknowledged maſters of the ſea. The prudence of Lyſander perceived and indulged their preſumption. During four days he bore, with extraordinary patience, their repeated inſults, affecting the utmoſt diſinclination to an engagement, carefully retaining his fleet in a place of ſecurity, and regularly diſpatching a few ſwift-ſailing

Their imprudence and inſolence.

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veſſels to obſerve the motions and behaviour of the Athenians when they returned from their daily cruiſe to the road of Ægos Potamos.

Deciſive battle of Ægos Potamos, in which the Athenians loſe their fleet. Olymp. xciii. 4. A. C. 405. December.

The fifth day they again bore up with the Peloponneſians, and provoked them to battle by more daring menaces than on any former occaſion. As they flattered themſelves with an undoubted proſpect of ſucceſs, they yielded without reſerve to all the petulance of proſperity, and debated in what manner they ſhould treat the Lacedæmonian priſoners who had the misfortune to fall into their power. The cruel Philocles propoſed to cut off their right hands, that thoſe enemies of Athens might be equally incapable to manage the oar and to brandiſh the ſpear; and this bloody reſolution, though oppoſed by Adimantus, was approved by the majority of his colleagues. After inſulting the enemy in a manner the moſt mortifying and diſgraceful, they retired with an air of exultation mingled with contempt. The Peloponneſian ſpy-boats followed them as uſual at a convenient diſtance, and obſerved that they had no ſooner reached their ſtations than the ſeamen landed, ſtraggled about the ſhore, advanced into the inland country in queſt of proviſions or amuſement, indulged in indolence, or revelled in diſorder. The advice-boats returned with uncommon celerity to convey the welcome intelligence to Lyſander, who had embarked the troops, cleared his ſhips, and made every neceſſary preparation to avail himſelf of the favorable opportunity to effect by ſtratagem what it might have been dangerous

to attempt by force. When his ſcouts approached the middle of the channel, they hoiſted their ſhields (for that was the appointed ſignal), and at the ſame moment the Peloponneſian ſquadrons were commanded to ſet ſail that they might ſurpriſe the hoſtile fleet, and indulge that reſentment and animoſity which had been rendered more violent and furious by the long and prudent reſtraint of their commander. The victory was complete, if that can be called a victory where there was ſcarcely any reſiſtance. The vigilant activity of Conon endeavoured ſeaſonably to aſſemble the ſtrength of the Athenians; but his advice was diſdained by officers incapable and unworthy of command, and his orders were deſpiſed by ſeamen unaccuſtomed and unwilling to obey. At length they became ſenſible of the danger when it was too late to avoid it. Their ſhips were taken, either altogether empty, or manned with ſuch feeble crews as were unable to work, much leſs to defend them. The troops and ſailors who flocked to the ſhore from indifferent quarters, and with diſordered precipitation, were attacked by the regular onſet and diſciplined valor of the Peloponneſians. Thoſe who fought were ſlain; the remainder fled into the inmoſt receſſes of the Cherſoneſus, or took refuge in the Athenian fortreſſes which were ſcattered over that peninſula. When Lyſander reviewed the extent of his well-merited ſucceſs, he found that of a fleet of an hundred and eighty ſail, only nine veſſels had eſcaped, eight of which were conducted by Conon to the friendly iſland of

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Cyprus, while the ninth carried to Athens the melancholy news of a diſaſter equally unexpected and fatal. A hundred and ſeventy-one gallies, and three thouſand priſoners (among whom were Philocles and Adimantus), rewarded the patience and fortitude of Lyſander, who returned with his invaluable ſpoil to Lampſacus, amidſt the joyous acclamations of naval triumph [29].

The Athenian priſoners executed.

Before purſuing the natural conſequences of an event the moſt important that had hitherto happened in all the Grecian wars, it was neceſſary for Lyſander to decide the fate of the Athenian priſoners, againſt whom the confederates were animated by all that unrelenting hatred which is congenial to the ſtern character of republicans exaſperated by continual provocation and recent inſult. The injuſtice and cruelty of that ambitious people

[29] Xenoph. p. 456, et ſeqq. et Plut. in Lyſand. By the battle of Ægos Potamos the Athenians loſt the *empire* of the ſea, which they had acquired by the conſent of their maritime allies in the fourth year of the ſeventy-fifth Olympiad. They enjoyed, therefore, that ſovereignty, or empire as they ſtyled it, from the year 477 till the year 405 before Chriſt; that is, a period of ſeventy-two years. This important computation is not to be found in any ancient writer; and no two authors agree in calculating the duration of the Athenian empire. Lyſias in his Funeral Oration, p. 93. ſays, "During ſeventy years in which the Athenians commanded the ſea." Diodorus Siculus (ad Olymp. 95. 1.) ſays, the Athenians commanded the ſea ſixty-five years. Iſocrates in one place (i. p. 174.) agrees with Lyſias; in another (ii. p 209) with Diodorus. Andocides (Orat. iii. p. 286.) ſtates it at eighty-five years. Lycurgus (adv. Leoc. p. 145.) at ninety. Dionyſius Halicarnaſſus (Ant. Rom. ſub init.) at ſixty eight. Demoſthenes, as we ſhall ſee below, ſtates it variouſly at forty-five, ſixty-five, and ſeventy-three years.

were carefully deſcribed and maliciouſly exagge- CHAP. rated in the dreadful tribunal of their enemies. XXII.
" It would be tedious to enumerate, though it was impoſſible ever to forget, their multiplied and abominable crimes, of which ſo many individuals, and ſo many communities, had been the innocent and unhappy victims. Even of late they had deſtroyed without remorſe, and without the ſhadow of neceſſity, the helpleſs crews of a Corinthian and an Andrian veſſel. The gods had averted the atrocious reſolution propoſed by the bloody Philocles, of which the author and the approvers were equally criminal; nor could thoſe deſerve pardon who were incapable of pity". Such diſcourſe, which reſounded from every quarter of the aſſembly, declared, without the neceſſity of the formal vote, the unanimous decree of the confederates. As the priſoners had been ſtripped of their arms, there was nothing to be feared from their numbers and deſpair. They were conducted into the preſence of their armed judges; and, as a prelude to the inhuman maſſacre, Lyſander ſternly demanded of Philocles what he deſerved to ſuffer for his intended cruelty. The Athenian replied with firmneſs, " Accuſe not thoſe whom you are entitled to judge, but inflict on us the ſame puniſhment which we, in a different fortune, would have inflicted on our enemies". The words were ſcarcely ended when Lyſander hacked him in pieces. The Peloponneſian ſoldiers followed the bloody example of their commander. Of three thouſand Athenians, Adimantus alone was ſpared either becauſe he had

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oppoſed the deteſtable reſolution of Philocles, or becauſe he had engaged in a treacherous correſpondence with the Spartans [19].

Views of Lyſander.

It might be expected, that immediately after an event which gave him the command of the ſea, Lyſander ſhould ſail to the Piræus, and aſſault the unfortunate city, which was already grievouſly oppreſſed by the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But the ſagacious Spartan foreſaw the numerous obſtacles that oppoſed his conqueſt of Athens, and prudently reſtrained the eagerneſs of the troops and his own. The ſtrongly fortified harbours of that capital, the long and lofty walls which ſurrounded the city on every ſide, the ancient renown and actual deſpair of the Athenians, muſt render the ſiege, if not altogether fruitleſs, at leaſt difficult and tedious; and the precious moments waſted in this doubtful enterpriſe might be employed in attaining certain, immediate, and moſt important advantages.

He eſtabliſhes the Spartan empire over the coaſts and islands of Aſia and Europe. Olymp. xciii. 4. A. C. 405.

On the coaſt neither of Greece nor of Aſia, nor of any of the intermediate iſlands, was there a naval force capable of contending with the fleet of Lyſander, nor any fortified place in all thoſe countries (except the city of Athens alone) ſufficient to reſiſt the impreſſion of his army. It was a deſign, therefore, which might well deſerve his ambition, and which was not condemned by his prudence, to eſtabliſh or confirm the Lacedæmonian empire over thoſe valuable and extenſive coaſts. The populous cities of Byzantium and Chalcedon were

[19] Xenoph. Hellen. Plutarch in Lyſand.

attacked and taken during the aſtoniſhment and terror occaſioned by the dreadful and irreparable misfortune of their Athenian allies. After theſe important acquiſitions, Lyſander ſailed to the iſland of Leſbos, reduced Mitylené, and confirmed the allegiance of Methymna. While he extended his arms over the neighbouring iſlands, as well as the maritime towns of Lydia and Caria, a powerful ſquadron, commanded by the enterpriſing valor of Eteonicus, ravaged the ſhores of Macedon, ſubdued the ſea-ports of Thrace, and rode victorious in the Helleſpont and Propontis, the Ægean and Euxine ſeas. In ſix or eight months after the Athenian diſaſter at Ægos Potamos, the faireſt portion of the ancient world, the moſt favored by nature, and the moſt adorned by art, reluctantly ſubmitted to the power, or voluntarily accepted the alliance of Sparta.

His meaſures for the reduction of Athens.

During this long ſeries of triumphs, Lyſander never loſt ſight of the reduction of Athens; an object important in itſelf, and neceſſary to the completion of his extenſive plan. The vigilance of the Peloponneſian ſquadrons prevented the uſual ſupplies of foreign grain from reaching the diſtreſſed city. In all the towns which ſurrendered, or which were taken by ſtorm, the Athenian garriſons were ſaved from immediate death, only on condition that they returned to their native country. By ſuch contrivances the crafty Spartan expected that the ſcarcity of proviſions would ſoon compel the growing multitude of inhabitants to ſubmit to the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But

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the Athenians, who deſpiſed the aſſaults of the enemy, braved the hardſhips of famine. Even after Lyſander had blocked up their harbours with an hundred and fifty ſail, they ſtill defended, with vigor, their walls and ramparts; patiently endured fatigue and hunger; and beheld with obſtinate unconcern, the affliction of their wives and children. Amidſt the ravages of death and diſeaſe, which advanced with increaſing horror, they puniſhed, with the utmoſt ſeverity, the ignoble cowardice of Archeſtratus, who firſt mentioned capitulation, and declared that the ſame moment ſhould put an end to their independence and their lives.

Siege of Athens; Olymp. xciv. 1. A. C. 404.

But notwithſtanding the melancholy firmneſs of the popular aſſembly, a numerous and powerful party in the ſtate was governed rather by intereſt than by honor; and the greateſt enemies of Athenian liberty flouriſhed in the boſom of the republic. The ariſtocratical leven of the Four Hundred had infected the whole body of the ſenate; and not only the inconſtant Theramenes, but ſeveral other men of abilities and influence, who had been moſt active in ſubverting that cruel tyranny, regretted the reſtoration of democracy to a people, who (as they had recently proved in many parts of their conduct) were unable to enjoy, without abuſing, the invaluable gift of freedom. In republican governments, the misfortunes, which ought to bind all ranks of men in the firmeſt and moſt indiſſoluble union, have often little other tendence than to exaſperate the political factions

which tear and diſtract the community. Amidſt every form of public diſtreſs, the Athenians caballed, clamored, accuſed, and perſecuted each other; and the faction of the nobles, who acted with ſuperior concert, vigor, and addreſs, deſtroyed, by dark inſinuations, falſe witneſſes, perjury, and every other ſpecies of legal fraud and cruelty, the ſeditious Cleophon; and other turbulent demagogues, who might moſt effectually have oppoſed their meaſures [31].

Negociation of Theramenes with the Spartans;

When theſe obſtacles were removed, Theramenes (whoſe recent merit prevented the ſuſpicion of the aſſembly) propoſed an embaſſy to Lacedæmon, which ſhould requeſt a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, and obtain, if poſſible, ſome moderate terms of accommodation. He named himſelf, with nine colleagues, as the perſons beſt qualified to undertake this important commiſſion; flattering the people in the cleareſt and leaſt ambiguous terms, with an undoubted proſpect of ſucceſs. A decree was immediately paſſed, inveſting the ambaſſadors with full powers. They aſſumed the ſacred badge of their inviolable character, reached in ſafety the Spartan camp, held a conference with king Agis, and afterwards repaired to the Lacedæmonian capital. During four months they carried on their pretended negociation with the ſenate, the kings, the ephori, and eſpecially with Lyſander, whoſe authority, being unknown to the ancient conſtitution of Sparta, was far more extenſive than that of

[31] Lyſias, p. 272.

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all the other magiſtrates together. With him, principally, the plan was concerted for compelling the Athenians to ſubmit to terms of peace, which they muſt have regarded as worſe, not only than war, but death [32]. The fortifications of their harbours were to be demoliſhed, as well as the long walls which joined them with the city: they were to ſurrender all their ſhips, but twelve; to reſign every pretenſion to their ancient poſſeſſions in foreign parts; to recal from baniſhment the ſurviving members of the late tyrannical ariſtocracy; to follow the ſtandard of Sparta in war; and, in peace, to mould their political conſtitution after the model which that victorious republic might think fit to preſcribe.

which is confirmed by the Athenians.

When Theramenes produced theſe unexpected fruits of his boaſted negociation, the Athenians had no longer either ſtrength or ſpirit to reſiſt, or even courage to die. During the long abſence of their ambaſſadors, the ſiege had been carried on with redoubled vigor. The Lacedæmonians, reinforced by the Thebans as well as by their numerous allies of Peloponneſus, had inveſted the city on every ſide, the harbours were cloſely blocked up by Lyſander, who had become maſter of Melos, Ceos, Ægina, and Salamis; iſlands ſo near to Athens that they were almoſt regarded as a part of the Attic territory. The greateſt miſery prevailed within the walls; the famine was intolerable, and the diſeaſes more intolerable than the

[32] Lyſias againſt Eratoſthenes, p. 273.

famine. The full period of thrice nine years had elapſed, which, if we may credit a moſt accurate and faithful hiſtorian [33], had been aſſigned by repeated oracles and predictions, as the deſtined term of the Peloponneſian war and of the Athenian greatneſs. The principal leaders of the democracy had been cut off by the perfidious ſnares of their opponents, who were prepared to bear a foreign yoke, provided they might uſurp domeſtic tyranny. That odious faction was ready to approve the meaſures of Theramenes, who might intimidate the dejected aſſembly by declaring (a moſt melancholy truth) that the ſeverity of the Lacedæmonians, exceſſive as it ſeemed, was yet moderation and lenity when compared with the furious and unextinguiſhable rage of the Thebans and Corinthians, who maintained that the Athenians deſerved not any terms of accommodation; that their crimes ought to be perſecuted with unrelenting vengeance; their proud city demoliſhed with ſuch perfect deſtruction, that not even its veſtige ſhould remain; and the inſolent inhabitants utterly extirpated from Greece, which they had ſo long diſturbed by their ambition, and provoked by their tyranny and cruelty. Such an argument Theramenes might have

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[33] The words of Thucydides, l. v. p. 362. are very remarkable. "He remembers, that from the firſt commencement of hoſtilities, it had been conſtantly propheſied that the war would laſt thrice nine years, which, of all predictions, was *alone* firm and ſtable;" or as the idiom of the Greek language will bear, "the moſt firm and ſtable."

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employed, if it had been neceſſary to employ any argument, to juſtify his negociation with the Spartans, which was confirmed and ratified by the voice of the ariſtocratical cabal, and ſubmitted to, rather than accepted, by the majority of the aſſembly, with the gloomy ſilence of deſpair.

Athens ſurrenders —its humiliation excites the compaſſion of its enemies. Olymp. xciv. 1. A. C. 404.

On the ſixteenth of May, the day on which the Athenians had been accuſtomed to celebrate the anniverſary of the immortal victory of Salamis, the hoſtile armament took poſſeſſion of their harbours; the combined army entered their gates. The walls and fortreſſes of the city of Minerva, which the generous magnanimity of its inhabitants, preferring the public ſafety to their own, had abandoned in defence of Greece to the fury of a barbarian invader, were ungratefully levelled to the ground by the implacable reſentment of the Greeks; who executed their deſtructive purpoſe with all the eagerneſs of emulation, boaſting, amidſt the triumphs of martial muſic, that the demolition of Athens would be regarded, in ſucceeding ages, as the true æra of Grecian freedom. Yet after they had ſatisfied their vengeance, they ſeemed to regret its effects. The day was concluded with a magnificent feſtival, in which the recitation of the poets formed, as uſual, the principal ornament of the entertainment. Among other pieces was rehearſed the Electra of Euripides, and particularly that affecting chorus, "We come, O daughter of Agamemnon! to thy ruſtic and humble roof". The words were ſcarcely uttered, when the whole aſſembly melted into tears, the

forlorn

forlorn condition of that young and virtuous princeſs, expelled the royal palace of her father, and inhabiting a miſerable cottage, in want and wretchedneſs, recalling the dreadful viciſſitude of fortune which had befallen Athens, once miſtreſs of the ſea, and ſovereign of Greece, but deprived, in one fatal hour, of her ſhips, her walls, and her ſtrength, and reduced from the pride of power and proſperity, to miſery, dependence, and ſervitude, without exerting one memorable effort to brighten the laſt moment of her deſtiny, and to render her fall illuſtrious [14]. CHAP. XXII.

[14] Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. c. i. et ſeqq. Diodor. l. xiii. 104—107. Plut. in Lyſand. p. 438. Lyſias in Eratoſth. et Agorat.

CHAP XXIII.

Rapacity and Cruelty of the Spartan Government. — The Thirty Tyrants in Athens. — Perſecution of Lyſias and his Family. — Theramenes oppoſes the Tyrants. — Sanguinary Speech of Critias. — Death of Theramenes. — Perſecution and Death of Alcibiades. — Thraſybulus ſeizes Phylé — Defeats the Tyrants. —. Memorable Speech of Thraſybulus. — Oath of Anneſty — not faithfully obſerved.

CHAP. XXIII. The rapacity and cruelty of the Spartan government.

THE conqueſt of Athens, and the acknowledged dominion of Sparta, terminated the memorable war of twenty-ſeven years. It ſtill remained for Lyſander to reduce the iſland of Samos [1], which enjoys the honorable diſtinction of being the laſt ſettlement in the Eaſt that defied the ambition of Pericles, and the laſt which ſubmitted to the arms of Lyſander. The conquered iſlands and cities ſuffered ſtill greater vexations under the Spartan, than they had done under the Athenian, empire. Among the hoſtile factions [2]

[1] Comp. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 461. et Plut. iii. p. 31. in Lyſand. Lyſias adv. Eratoſth. p. 274. et Diodor. p. 396. It is remarkable, that Xenophon and Lyſias, both contemporaries, ſhould differ in a matter of chronology; the one placing the conqueſt of Samos before, and the other after, Lyſander's voyage to Athens.

[2] Theſe were the *συνωμοσιαι επι δικαις και αρχαις*, mentioned by Thucydides and Xenophon; "aſſociations, or rather conſpiracies, for mutual defence in courts of juſtice, and for mutual aſſiſtance in obtaining offices of power."

which ambition or danger had formed in thoſe turbulent republics, Lyſander always preferred that party which poſſeſſed moſt craft and leaſt patriotiſm. At the head of this cabal, he placed a Spartan Harmoſtes, or governor, on whoſe obſequious cruelty he could depend. The citadels were garriſoned by mercenaries; a tyrannical faction inſulted as ſubjects, thoſe whom they had envied as rivals, or dreaded as enemies; and every ſpecies of licence and diſorder was exerciſed, with a preſumption that could be equalled only by the tameneſs with which it was endured.[s]. The Aſiatic Greeks regretted the diſhonorable yoke of Perſia; they regretted the ſtern dominion of Athens; both which ſeemed tolerable evils, compared to the oppreſſive cruelty of Sparta and Lyſander. The contributions, of which they had formerly ſo much complained, no longer appeared exorbitant. Lyſander was the firſt and the laſt conqueror who impoſed on thoſe feeble communities the enormous tribute of a thouſand talents [t].

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[s] Inſtead of the ſweet draught of Liberty, Sparta, according to Theopompus, gave Greece the bitter cup of Slavery. In the city of Miletus, he ſacrificed at once eight hundred men, of the democratical faction, to the implacable rage of their adverſaries. Plut. in Lyſand.

[t] Diodorus, p. 400. ſays, πλειω των χιλιων ταλαντων καθ' ἑνιαυτον, "more than a thouſand talents yearly;" that is, above two hundred thouſand pounds. It may be computed from Plut. in Lyſand. et Xenoph. p. 462. that Lyſander ſent home a ſtill larger ſum after the ſurrender of Samos. The law of Lycurgus reſpecting gold and ſilver, which had been long virtually, was now formally, abolished. The uſe of the precious metals was allowed to the ſtate, but forbidden to

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Cauſes to which aſcribed.

The unrelenting ſeverity of Sparta has uſually been aſcribed to the perſonal character of her general, whoſe natural arrogance and cruelty were heightened and confirmed by the ſudden exaltation of his fortune. From the ſimple citizen of a ſmall, and then unfortunate republic, he became, in a few years, the arbiter of Greece. Athens acknowledged his authority; the ſmaller cities courted his protection; venal poets and orators extolled him with odes and panegyrics; he was honored with crowns and ſtatues, and worſhipped by hymns and ſacrifices [5]. Yet it is obvious to remark, that whatever might be the temper and manners of Lyſander, his country is juſtly accountable for the wrongs which he was allowed to commit with impunity; and it is uncertain whether another general, placed in the ſame ſituation, would have acted on different principles; ſince the nature of the Spartan inſtitutions, and the ambitious views of the republic, ſeemed to demand and juſtify uncommon exertions of ſeverity. In the adminiſtration of their domeſtic government, five or ſix thouſand Spartans tyrannized over thirty thouſand Lacedæmonians; theſe tyrannized, with ſtill greater rigor, over thrice that number of ſlaves; and it was natural to expect, that when the ſlaves were aſſociated

individuals, under pain of death. The prohibition, however, was univerſally diſregarded; many Spartans poſſeſſed abundance of gold and ſilver; none incurred the penalty of the law. Compar. Plat. et Xenoph. loc. citat. et Iſocrat. in Archidam.

[5] Plut. in Lyſand.

with the troops [6], all theſe deſcriptions of men, Spartans, Lacedæmonians, and Helots, would tyrannize, with the emulation of cruelty, over their conquered ſubjects. CHAP. XXIII.

The deep impreſſion which they made on contemporaries.

The ſcanty materials of ancient hiſtory cannot enable us minutely to explain the humiliation and diſtreſs of the Aſiatic Greeks, oppreſſed by the double tyranny of the Spartans, and of their fellow-citizens. Contemporary writers, who beheld this ſcene of miſery and deſolation, ſeem at a loſs for words to impreſs its horror. Iſocrates endeavours to graſp the amplitude of the ſubject in the vague language of general deſcription; by ſtrokes of exaggeration and hyperbole, he ſupplies the place of clear and poſitive information; but all the copiouſneſs and energy of the Greek tongue ſink beneath the heavy afflictions of that unfortunate people, and the mind of the orator ſeems to labor with a thought which he is unable to expreſs [7]. It

[6] The Helots then took the title of νεοδαμωδεις, Libertini, δυναται δε το νεοδαμωδες ελευθερον πως ειναι. Thucydid. l. v. p. 533. From ſome paſſages in Iſocrates (Panegyr. at de Pace.), it ſhould ſeem that Lyſander often appointed theſe freed men to offices of great truſt and authority.

[7] See the oration of Iſocrates on the peace, p. 172, etc. In the panegyric of Athens, ſpeaking of the ariſtocratical factions ſupported by Lyſander and the Lacedæmonians, Iſocrates ſays, they conſiſted of wretches, "whoſe cruelty and injuſtice are unexampled in the hiſtory of mankind. From what indignity did they abſtain? Into what exceſſes were they not tranſported? They, who regarded the moſt factious as the moſt faithful; the moſt treacherous as the moſt deſerving. Their crimes proved infectious, and changed the mildneſs of human nature into ſavage ferocity," etc. See p. 53, etc.

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is not, however, from ſuch rhetorical deſcriptions that we can attain an adequate and ſatisfactory knowledge of the Spartan adminiſtration: hiſtory delights in plain and authentic facts; and the rigorous treatment of the Athenians themſelves, will beſt repreſent the hardſhips inflicted on their Aſiatic colonies and dependences.

The thirty tyrants in Athens. Olymp. xciv. 1. A. C. 404.

The Athenians had ſurrendered their fleet; their walls and harbours were demoliſhed; their citadel was occupied by a Lacedæmonian garriſon, commanded by Callibius, the friend of Lyſander; and their government was uſurped by thirty men, the dependants and creatures of Sparta. The furious and profligate Critias formed a proper head for this ariſtocratical council, whoſe members have been juſtly branded in hiſtory under the name of the Thirty Tyrants [8]. On pretence of delivering the ſtate from the malice of informers, and the turbulence of ſeditious demagogues, they deſtroyed the moſt valuable portion of the community [9]. Niceratus, the ſon of Nicias, and a ſon who inherited not only the opulence, but the virtues of his illuſtrious father, was condemned to death;

[8] Their names are preſerved in Xenophon, Hellen. ii. 3.

[9] Xenoph. p. 462. which Cæſar, ap. Salluſt. de Bello Catil. c. 51. evidently had in view, "Lacedæmonii devictis Athenienſibus, triginta viros impoſuere.... Hi primo cœpere peſſimum quemque, et omnibus inviſum, indemnatum necare. Eo populus lætari, et merito dicere fieri. Poſt ubi paullatim licentia crevit juxta bonos et malos libidinoſe interficere.... Ita civitas, ſervitute oppreſſa, ſtultæ lætitiæ graves pœnas dedit."

Leon, the moſt public-ſpirited, and Antiphon, the moſt eloquent of his contemporaries, ſhared the ſame fate; Thraſybulus and Anytus were baniſhed. Whoever was known to be powerful, was regarded as dangerous; whoever was ſuppoſed to be rich, was accuſed as criminal. Strangers and citizens were involved in one promiſcuous ruin [10]. CHAP. XXIII.

Illuſtrated by the perſecution of Lyſias and his family.

Amidſt this general wreck of whatever was moſt worthy and reſpectable, I ſhall ſelect the perſecution of Lyſias and his family, the only tranſaction of that kind, recorded with ſuch circumſtances as anſwer the ends of hiſtory. Cephalus, the father of that ingenious orator, was by birth a Syracuſan. The friendſhip of Pericles perſuaded him to ſettle in Athens, where, under the protection of that powerful ſtateſman, he obtained wealth and honors. His inoffenſive and generous character eſcaped the enmity and perſecution to which the opulent Athenians were commonly expoſed; and he enjoyed the rare felicity of living thirty years in the midſt of continual trials and impeachments, without being obliged to appear as plaintiff or defendant in any litigation. His ſons, Lyſias and Polemarchus, inherited his innocence, his generoſity, and his good fortune. Though poſſeſſed of the moſt valuable accompliſhments, natural and acquired, the brothers prudently kept aloof from the dangerous paths of public life; contented

[10] Xenoph. l. ii. p. 463, et ſeqq.

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with their domeſtic felicity, they aſpired not to the rank of Athenian citizens; but liberally contributed to ſupply the exigences of the ſtate, from the profits of a flouriſhing manufacture of ſhields, which they carried on by the labor of an hundred and twenty ſlaves. The cruelty of the thirty tyrants, from whoſe rapacious eye neither obſcurity could conceal, nor merit defend, occaſioned the death of Polemarchus; and the immediate misfortunes, as well as the future glory of Lyſias, who acted a diſtinguiſhed part in overturning that deteſtable tyranny, and in bringing its authors and abettors to condign puniſhment [11].

The orator's account of that matter.

The hiſtory is related by himſelf with perſpicuous preciſion and graceful ſimplicity: "The tyrants Theognis and Piſo acquainted their aſſociates, that many ſtrangers eſtabliſhed at Athens were diſaffected to the government. This was a plauſible pretence for rifling the effects of theſe unhappy men; a meaſure to which the thirty were not only excited by avarice, but prompted by fear. Money was become neceſſary for the preſervation of their power, which, being founded on uſurpation, and tyrannically adminiſtered, could only be maintained by the influence of corruption, and the mercenary aid of foreign troops. The life of man, therefore, they regarded as a matter of little moment; the amaſſing of wealth was the principal object of their deſire; to gratify which, ten ſtrangers were at once devoted to deſtruction. In this number,

[11] See the Life of Lyſias, and the Orations there referred to, p. 110, et ſeqq.

indeed, were two poor men; a baſe and cruel artifice to perſuade you, Athenians! that the remaining eight had been condemned, not for the ſake of their riches, but in order to preſerve the public tranquillity; as if the intereſt of the public had ever been the concern of that tyrannical cabal! Their infamous deſign was executed with inhuman cruelty. Their victims were taken in their beds, at ſupper, in the privacy of domeſtic retirement. Me they ſeized exerciſing the rites of hoſpitality; my gueſts were rudely diſmiſſed; I was delivered into the cuſtody of the worthleſs Piſo. While his accomplices continued in the workſhop, taking a liſt of our ſlaves and effects, I aſked him, "Whether money could ſave my life?" "Yes, a conſiderable ſum." "I will give you a talent of ſilver." This he conſented to accept, as the price of my ſafety; and to ſuch a melancholy ſituation was I reduced, that it afforded me a momentary conſolation to depend on the precarious faith of a man, who (as I well knew) deſpiſed every law, human and divine. But my comfort was of ſhort duration; for I had no ſooner opened my coffer to pay him the talent, than he ordered his attendant to ſeize the contents, conſiſting of three talents of ſilver, an hundred Daricks, three hundred Cyzicenes, and three ſilver cups. I entreated Piſo to allow me a ſmall ſum to defray the expenſe of my journey. But he deſired me to be thankful to eſcape with my life. Going out together, we met the tyrants Melobius and Mneſitheides, returning from the workſhop. They

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CHAP. XXIII. inquired, where we were going? Piſo anſwered, to examine the houſe of my brother Polemarchus. They deſired him to proceed; but commanded me to follow them to the houſe of Damaſippus. Piſo whiſpered me to be ſilent, and to fear nothing, becauſe he would immediately come there. Upon our arrival, we found Theognis guarding ſeveral of my companions in calamity. I increaſed the number of his priſoners; but obtained an opportunity to repreſent my innocence and misfortunes to Damaſippus, entreating him, by our paſt friendſhip, to employ his influence in my behalf. He aſſured me of his intention to intercede with Theognis, whoſe avarice would eaſily perſuade him to betray his truſt. While they converſed on this ſubject, I took advantage of my knowledge of the houſe to eſcape through three ſecret paſſages, which all happened to be open and unguarded; and fortunately reaching the country-houſe of my friend Archimaus, a ſhip-maſter, ſent him to the city, that he might bring me intelligence of my brother. He diſcovered, that the tyrant Eratoſthenes had dragged him from the road, and conducted him to priſon, where he was ordered to drink hemlock. At this melancholy news, I ſailed to Megara, under cover of the night. Our effects became the property of the tyrants, whoſe mean avarice ſpared not the ſmalleſt trifle belonging to us. Even the gold ear-rings of Polemarchus's wife were forcibly torn away by the brutal Melobius [12]."

[12] See the diſcourſes of Lyſias againſt Agoratus and Eratoſthenes, p. 218, et ſeqq.

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Theramenes oppoſes the tyrants.

The Thirty juſtified theſe abominable acts of cruelty by the authority of a ſervile ſenate, which they ſtill allowed to ſubſiſt as the inſtrument and accomplice of their tyranny. It could not be expected, however, that in a city accuſtomed to the utmoſt liberty of opinion and freedom of debate, a body of five hundred, or even of thirty men, ſhould continue to agree in the ſame odious and oppreſſive meaſures. The firſt ſeeds of diſcord, or rather the firſt ſymptoms of repentance, appeared in the ſpeeches and behaviour of the bold and active Theramenes; who, though the principal author of the uſurpation, was already diſpoſed by the humanity of his nature, or by the ſingular inconſtancy of his temper [13], to deſtroy the work of his own hands. His ſtrenuous endeavours were uſed to ſave the innocent and unhappy victims whom his furious colleagues daily devoted to deſtruction; under his protection the citizens aſſembled, and expreſſed their reſentment or deſpair; and it was juſtly apprehended that the government of the Thirty might be diſſolved by the ſame means, and by the ſame man, who had ſet on foot and ſubverted the ſhort-lived tyranny of the four hundred. The preſent uſurpation, indeed, was defended by a Lacedæmonian garriſon; but the Thirty dreaded the influence of Theramenes over

[13] Thucydid. viii. 68, et ſeqq. Lyſias adverſ. Eratoſth. Xenophon paints him more favorably; and Ariſtot. apud Plut. iii. 337. et Diodor. p. 350, et ſeqq. ſtill more favorably than Xenophon.

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the foreign troops; they dreaded ſtill more his influence over the Athenian citizens. When they conſidered the precarious tenure of their authority, and the unjuſt violence of their adminiſtration, they reflected on the paſt with pain, and viewed the future with terror. But they had gone too far to retreat, and nothing remained but to prop the tottering fabric of their power by enlarging its baſe. Three thouſand citizens were invited to participate in the advantages and dangers of their government. The reſt were diſarmed and treated with an increaſe of ſeverity.

He is accuſed by Critias.

Theramenes vainly oppoſed the criminal deſigns of his colleagues, who implicitly ſubmitted their opinions to the implacable fury of Critias. He it was who chiefly encouraged them boldly to perſevere, and to remove every obſtacle to the unlimited gratification of their paſſions. The ſafety of Theramenes, he aſſured them, was no longer compatible with their own. His delicacy, real or affected, was totally inconſiſtent with the ſpirit of the preſent adminiſtration; nor could the government of Thirty, any more than that of *one* tyrant, admit of being curiouſly canvaſſed, or faſtidiouſly oppoſed. Theſe ſentiments being received with approbation, we might expect that Theramenes ſhould have been deſtroyed by that ſudden and open violence which had proved fatal to ſo many others. But as the moſt daring violators of the laws of ſociety are obliged to eſtabliſh and obſerve ſome rules of juſtice, in their conduct towards each other, it had been reſolved by the Thirty,

that, amidſt the violent and capricious outrages which they committed againſt their ſubjects, none of their own number ſhould be put to death without the benefit of a trial before the ſenate; a privilege extending to the three thouſand intruſted with the uſe of arms, and ſufficiently denoting the miſerable condition of the other citizens. The ſenate was aſſembled to try Theramenes; but this tribunal was ſurrounded by armed men. When the pretended criminal appeared, Critias addreſſed the court in a ſpeech too remarkable ever to be forgotten.

Sanguinary ſpeech of Critias.

"Should you imagine, O ſenators! conſidering the great numbers who have ſuffered death, that we have been guilty of unneceſſary cruelty, you will alter that opinion on reflecting that revolutions of government muſt always be attended with bloodſhed; but particularly when a populous city like Athens, which has been long pampered with liberty, is reduced under the dominion of a few. The actual form of adminiſtration was impoſed by the Lacedæmonians as the condition of the public ſafety. In order to maintain its authority we have removed thoſe ſeditious demagogues, whoſe democratical madneſs hath occaſioned all our paſt calamities. It is our duty to proceed in this uſeful work, and to deſtroy, without fear or compaſſion, all who would diſturb the public tranquillity. Should a man of this dangerous diſpoſition be found in our own order, he ought to be puniſhed with double rigor, and treated not only as an enemy but as a traitor. That Theramenes is liable

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to this accuſation appears from the whole tenor of his conduct. He concluded the treaty with the Lacedæmonians; he diſſolved the popular government; he directed and approved the firſt and boldeſt meaſures of our adminiſtration: but no ſooner did difficulties ariſe than he deſerted his aſſociates, declared his oppoſition to their deſigns, and undertook the protection of the populace. When the weather was fair and favorable, he purſued the ſame courſe with his companions, but, on the firſt change of wind, he thought proper to alter his navigation. With ſuch an irreſolute ſteerſman it is impoſſible to govern the helm of the republic, and to guide the veſſel to her deſtined harbour. This dangerous inconſiſtency ought, indeed, to have been expected from a man to whoſe character perfidy is congenial. He began his political career under the direction of his father Hagnon, a violent partiſan of democracy. He afterwards changed his ſyſtem, in order to obtain the favor of the nobles. He both eſtabliſhed and diſſolved the government of the four hundred; and the whole ſtrain of his behaviour proves him unfit to govern, and unworthy to live[34]."

Therameneſ's defence.

Therameneſ made a copious and perſuaſive defence; acknowledging, "That he had often changed his conduct, but denying that he had ever varied his principles. When the democracy flouriſhed, he had maintained the juſt rights, but repreſſed the inſolence, of the people. When it

[34] Xenoph. p. 464 — 466.

became neceſſary to alter the form of the republic, in compliance with the command of the Spartans, he had ſupported the legal power, but oppoſed the tyranny, of the magiſtrates. Under every adminiſtration of government he had approved himſelf the friend of moderation and juſtice, which he ſtill continued, and ever would continue, to recommend and enforce, convinced that thoſe virtues alone could give ſtability and permanence to any ſyſtem of government, whether ariſtocratical or popular."

Theramenes dragged to execution.

The ſenators murmured applauſe, unawed by the preſence of Critias and his aſſociates. But this furious tyrant made a ſignal to the armed men, who ſurrounded the ſenate-houſe, to ſhow the points of their daggers; and then ſtepping forward, ſaid, "It is the duty, O ſenators! of a prudent magiſtrate, to prevent the deception and danger of his friends. The countenance of thoſe brave youths (pointing to his armed partiſans) ſufficiently diſcovers that they will not permit you to ſave a man who is manifeſtly ſubverting the government: I, therefore, with the general conſent, ſtrike the name of Theramenes from the liſt of thoſe who have a right to be tried before the ſenate; and, with the approbation of my colleagues, I condemn him to immediate death." Rouſed by this unexpected and bloody ſentence, Theramenes ſtarted from his ſeat, and ſprang to the altar of the ſenate-houſe, at once imploring the compaſſion, and urging the intereſt of the ſpectators, whoſe names, he obſerved, might be ſtruck out,

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and whoſe lives might be ſacrificed, as unjuſtly and cruelly as his own. But the terror of armed violence prevented any aſſiſtance or interceſſion; and the eleven men (for thus the Athenian delicacy ſtyled the executioners of public juſtice) dragged him from the altar, and hurried him to execution.

His death.

In proceeding through the market-place the unhappy victim of tyranny invoked the favor and gratitude of his fellow-citizens, who had often been protected by his eloquence, and defended by his valor. But the impudent Satyrus, the chief miniſter of vengeance both in authority and cruelty, ſternly told him, that if he continued his lamentations and uproar he ſhould ſoon cry in good earneſt[15]: "And ſhall I not," ſaid Theramenes, "though I remain ſilent?" When he drank the fatal hemlock, he poured a libation on the ground with a health to the honeſt Critias; circumſtances unworthy to relate, if they proved not, that even in his laſt moments, he was forſaken neither by his facetiouſneſs nor by his fortitude[16].

[15] Ὅτι οἰμώξεται, εἰ μὴ σιωπήσειεν. Literally, that he would cry out unleſs he were ſilent. The inaccurate language of the executioner furniſhed occaſion to the ſmart reply of Theramenes.

[16] Xenoph. p. 470. The glorious death of Theramenes cancelled the imperfections of his life. That his character was inconſtant, moſt writers allow. Lyſias adverſus Eratoſthen. accuſes him of many deliberate crimes; but he died in a virtuous cauſe, and, however he acted, left the ſcene gracefully. "Quam me delectat Theramenes! quam elato animo eſt! Etſi enim flemus, eum legimus, tamen non miſerabiliter vir clarus moritur." CIC. Tuſc. Quæſt.

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The death of Theramenes delivered the tyrants from the only reſtraint which tended to control their inſolence, and to moderate their cruelty. They might now indulge in all the licentiouſneſs of outrage, without the fear of reproach or the danger of reſiſtance. Their miſerable ſubjects were driven from the city, from the Pyræus, from their houſes, their farms, and their villages, which were divided among the deteſtable inſtruments of an odious uſurpation. Nor did the tyrants ſtop here. A mandate was publiſhed, enforced by the authority of the Spartan ſenate, prohibiting any Grecian city to receive the unfortunate fugitives. But this inhuman order was almoſt univerſally diſobeyed; the ſacred laws of hoſpitality prevailed over the terror of an unjuſt decree; Thebes, Argos, and Megara, were crowded with Athenian exiles [97].

Exceſſive cruelty of the tyrants.

In exerciſing thoſe abominable acts of cruelty, the Thirty probably conſulted the immediate ſafety of their perſons, but they precipitated the downfal of their power. The oppreſſed Athenians, whoſe ſufferings ſeemed no longer tolerable, required only a leader to rouſe them to arms, and to conduct them to victory and to vengeance. This danger the tyrants had greater reaſon to apprehend, ſince they could not expect a reinforcement to the garriſon, while the efforts of Lyſander and the Spartans were principally directed towards the extenſion of their Aſiatic conqueſts. The abilities

They dread the machinations of Alcibiades.

[97] Diodor. l. xiv. p. 236.

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and reſentment of Alcibiades pointed him out as the perſon beſt qualified to undertake the arduous and honorable deſign of reaſſembling the fugitives, and of animating them with courage to recover their loſt country. That illuſtrious exile had been driven from his Thracian fortreſs by the terror of the Lacedæmonians, then maſters of the Helleſpont, and had acquired a ſettlement under the protection of Pharnabazus, in the little village of Grynium in Phrygia, where, undiſturbed by the dangerous contentions of war and politics, he enjoyed an obſcure happineſs in the boſom of love and friendſhip. But the cruel fears of the tyrants purſued him to this laſt retreat.

His death.

Lyſander told Pharnabazus that the ſacrifice of Alcibiades was neceſſary for the ſafety of that form of government which had been recently eſtabliſhed in Athens, and which it was the intereſt both of Sparta and of Perſia to maintain. A private reaſon (which will afterwards appear) prevailed with the ſatrap to pay immediate attention to this bloody advice. A band of armed Phrygians was ſent to ſurpriſe and deſtroy Alcibiades. Such was the fame of his proweſs, that theſe timid aſſaſſins durſt not attack him in broad day, or by open force. They choſe the obſcurity of night to ſurround and ſet fire to his houſe, which, according to the faſhion of the country, was chiefly compoſed of light and combuſtible materials. The crackling noiſe of the flames alarmed Alcibiades, whoſe own treacherous character rendered him always ſuſpicious

of treachery. He ſnatched his ſword, and, twiſting his mantle round his left arm, ruſhed through the flaming edifice, followed by his faithful Arcadian friend, and by his affectionate miſtreſs Timandra [28]. The cowardice of the Phrygians, declining to meet the fury of his aſſault, covered him with a ſhower of javelins. But even theſe Barbarians ſpared the weakneſs and the ſex of Timandra, whoſe tears and entreaties obtained the melancholy conſolation of burying her unfortunate lover; a man whoſe various character can only be repreſented in the wonderful viciſſitudes of his life and fortune; and who, though eminently adorned with the advantages of birth, wealth, valor, and eloquence, and endowed with uncommon gifts of nature and acquirements of art, yet deficient in diſcretion and probity, involved his country and himſelf in inextricable calamities. CHAP. XXIII. and character

Although the life of Alcibiades had been highly pernicious to his country, his death, at this particular juncture, might be regarded as a misfortune, if the Athenian exiles at Thebes had not been headed by a man who poſſeſſed his excellences, unmingled with his defects and vices. The enterpriſing courage of Thraſybulus was animated by the love of liberty; and while he generally followed [29] the rules of juſtice and humanity, he had magnanimity to conceive, abilities to conduct, and perſeverance to accompliſh, the boldeſt and moſt Thraſybulus, with a handful of fugitives, ſeizes Phylé.

[28] Corn. Nepos, et Plut. in Alcibiad.

[29] His conduct, as will appear hereafter, was not uniform.

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arduous deſigns. Having communicated his intentions to the unhappy fugitives in Thebes and Megara, he encouraged a body of ſeventy intrepid followers to ſeize the important fortreſs of Phylé, ſituate on the Bœotian and Athenian frontier. This daring enterpriſe alarmed the tyrants, who marched forth with the flower of their troops to diſlodge the new garriſon. But the natural ſtrength of the place baffled their aſſault; and, when they determined to inveſt it, the unexpected violence of a tempeſt, accompanied with an extraordinary fall of ſnow [20], obliged them to deſiſt from their undertaking. They returned with precipitation to Athens, leaving behind part of their attendants and baggage, which fell a prey to the garriſon of Phylé; the ſtrength of which continually augmented by the confluence of Athenian exiles, and ſoon increaſed from ſeventy, to ſeven hundred, men.

The tyrants baffled in their attempts to diſlodge them.

The tyrants had juſt reaſon to apprehend that theſe daring invaders might ravage the ſurrounding country, and even attack the capital. Alarmed by this danger they diſpatched ſeveral troops of horſe, with the greater part of their Lacedæmonian mercenaries, who encamped in a woody country, at the diſtance of fifteen furlongs from Phylé, in order to watch the motions and repreſs the incurſions of the enemy. But theſe forces, which had been ſent to guard the territory and city from ſurpriſe,

Thraſybulus ſurpriſes and defeats the enemy.

[20] Επιγιγνεται της νυκτος χιων παμπληθης. Xenoph. p. 471.

were themſelves ſurpriſed by Thraſybulus, who ſilently marched forth in the night, poſted his men amidſt the concealed intricacies of the foreſt, and ſuddenly attacked the Lacedæmonians before they had time to recollect themſelves, or even to ſtand to their arms. The dread of an ambuſh probably prevented the wary general from following them to any great diſtance from the garriſon. An hundred and twenty men were ſlain in the purſuit; a trophy was erected; the baggage and arms were conveyed in triumph to Phylé [21].

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The news of this diſaſter inſpired the Thirty with ſuch terror that they no longer regarded a demoliſhed city like Athens as proper for their reſidence. They determined to remove to the neighbouring town of Eleuſis, which, in caſe of extremity, ſeemed more capable of defence. The three thouſand, who were intruſted with the uſe of arms, accompanied them thither, and aſſiſted them in treacherouſly putting to death all ſuch of the Eleuſinians as were thought diſaffected to the uſurpation. Under pretence of muſtering the inhabitants, thoſe unhappy men were ſingly conducted through a narrow gate leading to the ſhore, where they were ſucceſſively diſarmed, bound, and executed, by the cruel inſtruments of tyranny [22].

The tyrants remove to Eleuſis.

Meanwhile the garriſon of Phylé continually received new reinforcements. The orator Lyſias, whoſe domeſtic ſufferings have been recently

Thraſybulus marches to the Piræus.

[21] Xenoph. p. 471. [22] Id. ibid.

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deſcribed, collected three hundred men to take vengeance on the murderers of his brother, and the authors of his own baniſhment[21]. Theſe uſeful ſupplies encouraged Thraſybulus to attempt ſurpriſing the Piræus, the inhabitants of which, conſiſting chiefly of tradeſmen, merchants, and mariners, bore with great impatience and indignation the injuries of a ſubordinate council of Ten, the obſequious imitators of the Thirty. This enterprife was crowned with ſucceſs, although the tyrants brought forth their whole force to oppoſe it. Having intercepted their march to the place, Thraſybulus occupied a riſing ground, which gave him a deciſive advantage in the engagement.

Addreſſes his followers in ſight of the enemy.

Before leading his men to action, he animated their valor and reſentment, by reminding them, that the enemy on the right conſiſted of thoſe Lacedæmonians whom only five days before they had ſhamefully routed and put to flight; that the troops on the left were commanded by the Thirty tyrants, who had unjuſtly driven them into baniſhment, confiſcated their property, and murdered their deareſt friends. "But the gods have finally given us the opportunity (long ardently deſired) to face our oppreſſors with arms in our hands, and to take vengeance on their multiplied wickedneſs and cruelty. When they inveſted us at Phylé, the gods, conſulting our ſafety, ruffled the ſerenity

[21] Juſtin. l. v. c. ix. The compiler, with his uſual inaccuracy, ſays, Lyſias *Syracuſanus* orator.

of the ſky with an unexpected tempeſt. The aſſiſtance of Heaven enabled us, with a handful of men, to raiſe a trophy over our numerous foes; and the ſame divine Providence ſtill favors us with the moſt manifeſt marks of partiality. The enemy are drawn up in a deep and cloſe array; they muſt be obliged to aſcend the eminence; the javelins of their rear cannot reach beyond their van; while, from the reverſe of theſe circumſtances, no weapon of ours needs be diſcharged in vain. Let us avail ourſelves, therefore, of an arrangement evidently produced by the favor of Heaven; each ſoldier remembering, that he never can atchieve a more honorable victory, or obtain a more glorious tomb [24]." CHAP. XXIII.

The tyrants defeated.

The revered authority of the prieſt enforced the exhortation of the general. He promiſed them complete ſucceſs, provided they forbore to charge till one of their men were killed or wounded: "Then," added he, "I will conduct you on to victory, though I myſelf ſhall fall." He had ſcarcely ended, when the enemy threw their javelins; upon which, as if guided by a divine impulſe, he ruſhed forward to the attack. Both parts of his prediction were accompliſhed. The battle was neither long nor bloody; but Critias and Hippomachus, the two moſt violent of the tyrants, were left among the ſlain. Thraſybulus judiciouſly avoided to purſue the ſcattered fugitives, who

[24] Xenoph. p. 473. et Diodor. l. xiv. p. 414.

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being ſuperior in number, might ſtill rally and renew the battle, if he quitted the advantage of the ground. But having proceeded to the foot of the hill, he ſtopped the ardor of his troops, and commanded the herald Cleocritus to proclaim with a loud voice, "Wherefore, Athenians! would you fly from your countrymen? Wherefore have you driven them from the city? Why do you thirſt for their blood? We are all united by religious, civil, and domeſtic ties. Often, with combined arms, have we fought, by ſea and land, to defend our common country and common freedom. Even in this unnatural civil war, excited and fomented by the ambition of impious and abominable tyrants, who have ſhed more blood in eight months, than the Peloponneſians, our public enemies, in ten years. We have lamented your misfortunes as much as our own; nor is there a man whom you have left on the field of battle, whoſe death does not excite our ſympathy, and increaſe our affliction." The tyrants, dreading the effect of a proclamation well calculated to ſow the ſeeds of diſaffection, led off their troops with great precipitation; and Thraſybulus, without ſtripping the dead, marched to the Piræus[25].

His proclamation to the vanquished.

Next day the Thirty, ſhamefully diſcomfited in the engagement, and deprived of Critias, their furious but intrepid leader, took their melancholy ſeats in council with ſtrong indications of expected ruin. Their unfortunate ſubjects accuſed their

Government of the Decemvirs,

[25] Xenoph. p. 474.

commanders, and each other; a new ſedition aroſe; nor was the ferment allayed, until the tyrants had been deprived of their dignity, and ten magiſtrates (one elected from each tribe) appointed in their room [26]. The ſurviving tyrants, with thoſe who were too cloſely united with them in guilt, not to be united in intereſt, fled to Eleuſis. CHAP. XXIII.

as violent as that of the Thirty.

It might be expected that the Decemvirs, who now aſſumed the government, ſhould have been deterred from injuſtice by the fatal example of their predeceſſors. But in the turbulent republics of Greece, however free in theory, men were little acquainted with the benefits of practical liberty. Whether the nobles, or people, or a prevailing faction of either; whatever party in the ſtate obtained the chief adminiſtration, their authority was almoſt alike oppreſſive and tyrannical. Alternately maſters and ſlaves, thoſe fierce republicans were either unable or unwilling to draw that deciſive and impervious line between the power of government, and the liberty of the ſubject; a line which forms the only ſolid barrier of a uniform, conſiſtent, and rational freedom.

Lyſander marches to the Piræus.

The Ten had no ſooner been inveſted with the enſigns of command, than they ſhowed an equal inclination with the Thirty to obey the Lacedæmonians, and to tyrannize over their fellow-citizens [27]. After various ſkirmiſhes, which happened in the

[26] Xenoph. p. 474. et Iſocrat. ii. p. 426.

[27] Lyſias adverſ. Eratoſth. p. 212, et ſeqq.

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course of two weeks, and generally proved honorable to the bravery and conduct of Thrasybulus, the tyrants both in Eleusis and in Athens dispatched messengers to solicit farther assistance from Sparta and Lysander. That active and enterprising leader employed his usual diligence to protect the government which he had established. At the head of a powerful body of mercenaries, he marched to the Piræus, which he invested by land; while his brother Libys, who commanded a considerable squadron, blocked up the harbour [28].

His measures thwarted by Pausanias.

These vigorous exertions restored the hopes and courage of the tyrants; nor can it be doubted that Thrasybulus and his followers must have speedily been compelled to surrender, had the Spartan commanders been allowed to act without control. But the proud arrogance of Lysander, and the rapacious avarice of his dependants, provoked the indignation and resentment of whatever was most respectable in his country. The kings, magistrates, and senate, conspired to humble his ambition; and, lest he should enjoy the glory of conquering Athens a second time, Pausanias, the most popular and beloved of the Spartan princes, hastily levied the domestic troops, and a considerable body of Peloponnesian allies, and marching through the Isthmus of Corinth encamped in the neighbourhood of Athens; little solicitous to increase

[28] Xenoph. p. 476. et Diodor. ubi supra.

the diſſenſions in that city, provided he could anticipate and thwart the meaſures of Lyſander. CHAP. XXIII.

Pauſanias eſpouſes the intereſt of Thraſybulus and his adherents. Olymp. xciv. 2. A. C. 403.

While the two Lacedæmonian armies diſcovered, in the diſtance of their encampments, a diſunion of their views and intereſts, an incident happened which determined Pauſanias to undertake the protection of Thraſybulus and his adherents; a reſolution to which he was naturally inclined from oppoſition to an envied and odious rival. Diognotus, an Athenian of an amiable and reſpectable character, brought him the children of Niceratus and Eucrates; the former the ſon, the latter the brother, of the great Nicias, with whom the Spartan king was connected by the hereditary ties of hoſpitality and friendſhip. Having placed the helpleſs infants on his knees, he conjured him, by his religious regard for the memory of their much-reſpected anceſtor, to pity their innocence and weakneſs, and to defend them againſt the cruel tyranny of a worthleſs faction, ambitious to cut off and deſtroy whatever was diſtinguiſhed by birth, wealth, or virtue [29]. This affecting ſcene, had it failed to touch the heart of Pauſanias, muſt at leaſt have afforded him a plauſible pretence for embracing the party of Thraſybulus, which numbered among its adherents the friends and family of Nicias, who had long been ſuſpected of an undue attachment to the Spartan intereſt.

[29] Lyſias adv. Polinchum, p. 323. and the tranſlation of Lyſias, p. 231.

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Commissioners appointed to settle the affairs of Athens.

Before he could fully persuade the enemy of his favorable intentions, several bloody skirmishes were fought, in which the partisans of democracy defended the Piræus with unequal force, but with uncommon resolution [10]. At length Pausanias made them understand, that, instead of destroying their persons, he wished to protect their liberties. In Athens his emissaries made known this unexpected revolution, which excited a numerous party to throw off the yoke of the tyrants, and to desire a reconciliation with their fellow-citizens in the Piræus. The deputies were favorably received by the Spartan king, and sent, under his protection, to propose overtures of accommodation to the ephori and senate. The messengers of Lysander and the tyrants endeavoured to traverse this negociation; but notwithstanding *their* opposition, the Spartans appointed fifteen commissioners, who, in conjunction with Pausanias, were empowered to settle the affairs of Athens [11].

This happily effected.

With the approbation, or rather by the command, of those ministers, the Athenian factions ceased from hostility; the tyrants were divested of their power; the foreign garrison was withdrawn; and the popular government re-established. This important revolution was remarkable for its singular mildness. The authors and instruments of the most oppressive usurpation recorded in the annals of any people were allowed to retire in safety to

[10] Xenoph. Diodor. Lysias, ubi supra.
[11] Xenoph. p. 478.

Eleuſis. Thraſybulus conducted a military pro- CHAP. XXIII.
ceſſion to the temple of Minerva in the citadel, where the acknowledgments of thanks and ſacrifice were offered to that protecting divinity, who had reſtored the virtuous exiles to their country, and healed the diviſions of the ſtate. The citizens who had been baniſhed, and thoſe who had driven them into baniſhment, joined in this ſolemn exerciſe of religious duty; after which, convening in full aſſembly, they were addreſſed by Thraſybulus in theſe memorable words:

Memorable ſpeech of Thraſybulus.

"The experience of your paſt tranſactions may enable you, men of Athens! to know each other, and to know yourſelves. On what pretence could you, who drove us from the city, abet a tyrannical faction? Why would you have enſlaved your fellow-citizens? On what ſuperiority of merit could you found your claim of dominion? Is it that you are more honeſt and virtuous? Yet the people whom you inſulted never relieved their poverty by unjuſt gain; whereas the tyrants, whom you ſerved, increaſed their wealth by the moſt oppreſſive rapacity. Is it that you are more brave and warlike? Yet this injured people; alone and unaſſiſted, and almoſt unarmed, have overcome your ſuperior numbers, reinforced by the Lacedæmonian garriſon, the powerful ſuccours of Pauſanias, and the experienced mercenaries of Lyſander. As you muſt yield the prize both of probity and of proweſs, ſo neither can you claim the honor of ſuperior prudence and ſagacity. You

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have been not only conquered in war, but overcome in negociation, by the people whom you deſpiſed; to whom your Lacedæmonian maſters have delivered you, like biting curs [32], bound and muzzled, to be juſtly puniſhed for your unprovoked inſolence and audacity. But as to you, my fellow-ſufferers and fellow-exiles! you, who ſhared the hardſhips of my baniſhment, and who now ſhare the triumph of my victorious return, I exhort you to forgive and forget our common injuries. Let the dignity of your ſentiments adorn the ſplendor of your actions. Prove yourſelves ſuperior to your enemies, not only in valor but in clemency, that moderation may produce concord, and concord ſtrength."

The amneſty

The effect of this generous enthuſiaſm, excited and diffuſed by Thraſybulus, appeared in a very extraordinary reſolution of the aſſembly. During the uſurpation of the Thirty, a hundred talents had been borrowed from the Lacedæmonians, to ſupport the rigorous cruelty of a government which had baniſhed five thouſand [33], and put to death, untried, fifteen hundred citizens. The repayment of this ſum was not to be expected from the people at large, againſt whoſe intereſt and ſafety it had been ſo notoriouſly employed. Yet the Athe-

[32] Ὥσπερ τους δακνοντας κλοιω δησαντες παραδιδασιν. Xenoph. Hellen. ii. ſub fin. In their compariſons the ancients, it is well known, regarded juſtneſs more than dignity.

[33] Iſocrat. in Areopag. p. 346. ſays upwards of five hundred. Diodorus ſays the one-half of the citizens.

nians unanimouſly reſolved, on this occaſion, that the money ſhould be charged indiſcriminately on them all [34]. This unexampled generoſity might have encouraged even the enfeebled party of the tyrants to return from Eleuſis. But they were too ſenſible of their guilt to expect forgiveneſs or impunity. Having fortified their inſecure reſidence, in the beſt manner that their circumſtances could permit, they began to prepare arms; to collect mercenaries; and to try, anew, the fortune of war. But their unequal hoſtility, the effect of rage and deſpair, was eaſily defeated by the vigor of the new republic. The moſt obnoxious leaders ſealed, with their blood, the ſafety of their adherents, who ſubmitted to the clemency of Thraſybulus. That fortunate and magnanimous commander generouſly undertook their cauſe, and obtained a decree of the people for reſtoring them to the city, for reinſtating them in their fortunes and privileges, and for burying in oblivion the memory of their paſt offences [35]. The aſſembly even ratified, by oath, this

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[34] Iſocrates, ibid. et p. 495 of the tranſlatioo.

[35] Among theſe offences were reckooed the arbitrary laws enaeted during their uſurpation. All theſe laws were annulled, aod thoſe of Solou, Cliſthenes, Pericles, etc. re-eſtablished. It appears that the Athenians embraced the ſame opportunity of examining their aocient laws, abolishing ſuch as oo longer ſuited the coodition of the times, and eoacting ſome oew ones. Aodocid. Orat. i. de Myſter. p. 212. et Demoſt. adv. Timocrat. p. 469. The year in which the democracy was reſtored, or, in other words, the arconship of Euclides, was regarded, therefore, as an important æra io Athcian juriſprudence. The only material alteratioos oo record cooſiſt, 1. Io the law confining the right of voting io the aſſembly to thoſe born of Athenian mothers. Formerly it ſufficed that the father was a citizen, the condition of the

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act of amneſty, of which both the idea and the name have been adopted by moſt civilized nations, and extolled by all hiſtorians, ancient and modern; who, dazzled by the ſplendor of a tranſaction ſo honorable to Thraſybulus and to Athens, have univerſally forgot to mention, that the conditions of the amneſty were not faithfully obſerved. Yet there is the fulleſt evidence to prove [16], that, when the tyrants were no more, the abettors of their uſurpation were accuſed, convicted, and puniſhed, for crimes of which they had been promiſed indemnity by a ſolemn oath. So true is it, that the Athenians had wiſdom to diſcern, but wanted conſtancy to practiſe, the leſſons of ſound policy, or even the rules of juſtice.

not obſerved.

mother not being regarded. Athenæus, xiii. p. 285. et Mark. in Vit. Lyſiæ, p. 55. 2. In the law of Demophantus, requiring the citizens to take an oath that no perſonal danger ſhould prevent them from doing their utmoſt to deliver their country from tyrants. Vid. Licurg. adv. Leocr. p. 180. et Andoc. de Myſt. p. 220.

[16] See Lyſias's Orations againſt Agoratus and Eratoſthenes, from p. 233. to p. 280.

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Accuſation of Socrates. — Artifices of his Accuſers. — His Defence. — Condemnation. — Addreſs to the Judges. — His Converſation in Priſon — and Death. — Tranſient Perſecution of his Diſciples. — Writings of Cebes — Æſchines. — State of Philoſophy. — Of the Fine Arts. — Of Literature. — Herodotus — Thucydides — Xenophon. — Tranſition to the public Tranſactions of Greece. — The Spartans invade Elis. — The Meſſenians driven from Greece. — Hiſtory of Cyrene — Of Sicily. — War with Carthage. — Siege of Agrigentum. — Reign of Dionyſius. — Sicily the firſt Province of Rome.

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IT were well for the honor of Athens, if none but the cruel abettors of an ariſtocratical faction had experienced the unjuſt rigor of its tribunals. But among the firſt memorable tranſactions, after the re-eſtabliſhment of democracy, happened the trial and condemnation of Socrates; a man guiltleſs of every offence but that of diſgracing, by his illuſtrious merit, the vices and follies of his contemporaries. His death ſealed the inimitable virtues of his uſeful and honorable life; it ſeemed to be beſtowed as a favor, not inflicted as a puniſhment; ſince, had Socrates,

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who had already paſſed his ſeventieth year, yielded to the decays of nature, his fame would have deſcended leſs ſplendid, certainly more doubtful, to poſterity.

Principal cauſes of that meaſure.

The remote cauſe of his proſecution was the ludicrous farce of Ariſtophanes, entitled the Clouds; to which we had occaſion formerly to allude. In this infamous performance, Socrates is introduced denying the religion of his country, corrupting the morals of his diſciples, and profeſſing the odious arts of ſophiſtry and chicane. The envy of a licentious populace, which ever attends virtue too independent to court, and too ſincere to flatter them, gradually envenomed the ſhafts of the poet, and malignantly inſinuated that the pretended ſage was really ſuch a perſon as the petulance of Ariſtophanes had deſcribed him. The calumny was greedily received, and its virulence embittered by the craft of deſigning prieſts and ambitious demagogues, as well as by the reſentment of bad poets and vain ſophiſts, whoſe pretended excellences the diſcernment of Socrates had unmaſked, and whoſe irritable temper his ſincerity had grievouſly offended [1]. From ſuch a powerful combination it ſeems extraordinary that Socrates ſhould have lived ſo long, eſpecially ſince, during

[1] The cauſes of his perſecution, which are hinted at in Xenophon's Apology for Socrates, are more fully explained in that written by Plato. Vid. Plat. Apolog. Socrat. ſect. vi. From theſe two admirable treatiſes of practical morality, together with the firſt chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia, and Plato's Phædo, the narrative in the text is principally extracted.

the democracy, he never diſguiſed his contempt for the capricious levity, injuſtice, and cruelty of the multitude, and during the uſurpation of the Thirty openly arraigned the vices, and defied the authority of thoſe odious tyrants. His long eſcape he himſelf aſcribed to his total want of ambition. Had he intermeddled in public affairs, and endeavoured, by arming himſelf with authority, to withſtand the corruptions of the times, his more formidable oppoſition would have expoſed him to an earlier fate [2]. Notwithſtanding his private ſtation, it ſeems ſtill to have appeared remarkable to his diſciples, that amidſt the litigious turbulence of democracy, his invidious fame and merit ſhould have eſcaped perſecution during a long life of ſeventy years. CHAP. XXIV.

When his enemies finally determined to raiſe an accuſation againſt him, it required uncommon Artifices of his accuſers.

[2] The memorable words of Socrates will for ever brand the ſtern unfeeling ſpirit of democracy. Ευ γαρ ισι ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, ει εγω παλαι επιχειρησα τα πολιτικα πραγματα, παλαι αν απολωλειν, και ουτε αν υμας ωφελησειν ουδεν ουτε αν εμαυτον. και τοι μη αχθεσθε λεγοντι τ'αληθη, ουδ γαρ εσιν ὁστις σωθησεται, ουτε υμιν ουτε αλλῳ ουδενι πληθει γνησιως εναντιουμενος, και διακωλυων πολλα αδικα και παρανομα εν τη πολει γιγνεσθαι. αλλα αναγκαιον εστι τῳ οντι μαχουμενον ὑπερ της δικαιης, και ει μελλει ολιγον χρονον σωθησεσθαι, ιδιωτευειν, αλλ μη δημοσιευειν. Plut. Apolog. Socrat. c. xiii. "You well know, Athenians! that had I formerly intermeddled in public affairs, I ſhould formerly have periſhed, without benefiting either you or myſelf. Be not offended; but it is impoſſible that *he* ſhould live long who arraigns and manfully oppoſes the injuſtice and licentiouſneſs of you, Athenians! or of any other multitude. A champion for virtue, if he would ſurvive but a few years, muſt lead a private life, and not interfere in politics."

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addreſs to give their malignant calumnies the appearance of probability. Socrates converſed in public with every deſcription of men, in all places, and on all occaſions. His opinions were as well known as his perſon, and ever uniform and conſiſtent; he taught no ſecret doctrines; admitted no private auditors; his leſſons were open to all; and that they were gratuitous, his poverty, compared with the exorbitant wealth of the ſophiſts who accuſed him, furniſhed abundant proof. To balance theſe ſtubborn circumſtances, his enemies confided in the hatred of the jury and judges, compoſed of the meaneſt populace, and the perjury of falſe witneſſes, which might be purchaſed at Athens for the ſmall ſum of a few drachmas. They truſted, however, not leſs in the artifices and eloquence of Miletus, Anytus [3], and Lycon; the firſt of whom appeared on the part of the prieſts and poets; the ſecond, on that of the politicians and artiſts; the third, on that of the rhetoricians and ſophiſts [4].

Informality of the trial.

From the nature of an accuſation, which principally reſpected religion, the cauſe ought to have been regularly tried in the leſs numerous but more enlightened tribunal of the Areopagus; yet it was immediately carried before the tumultuary aſſembly,

[3] Some perſonal reaſons are glanced at why Miletus and Anytus ſtepped forth as accuſers. Vid. Andocid. Orat. i. et Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. Libanius has ſwelled to a long ſtory, and ſtrangely diſfigured the hint of Xenophon. Apol. Soc. p. 642, et ſeqq.

[4] Plato Apol. Soc. c. x.

or rather mob of the Heliæa [1], a court, for ſo it was called, conſiſting of five hundred perſons, moſt of whom were liable, by their education and way of life, to be ſeduced by eloquence, intimidated by authority, and corrupted by every ſpecies of undue influence. CHAP. XXIV.

Uncomplying integrity of Socrates.

In a degenerate age and nation, few virtuous or able men ever acquired popularity merely by their virtues or abilities. In ſuch a nation, ſhould a perſon, otherwiſe eſtimable, be unfortunately curſed with ambition, he muſt endeavour to gratify it at the expenſe of his feelings and his principles, and can attain general favor only in proportion as he ceaſes to deſerve it. Uncomplying integrity will meet with deriſion; and wiſdom, diſdaining artifice, will grovel in obſcurity, while thoſe alone will reach fame, or fortune, or honor, who, though endowed with talents juſt beyond mediocrity, condeſcend to flatter the prejudices, imitate the manners, gratify the pride, or adopt the reſentments, of an inſolent populace.

His defence.

The ſuperior mind of Socrates was incapable of ſuch mean compliances. When called to make his

[1] This appears from innumerable circumſtances, ſome of which are mentioned below, though Meurſius, in his treatiſe on the Areopagus (vid. Grnnov. Theſaur. vol. v.), maintains that Socrates was tried in that court; an opinion which has been generally followed, but which the ſlighteſt attention to the works of the Athenian orators is ſufficient to diſprove. Vid. Iſoc. Orat. Areopag. Lyſias adv. Andocid. p. 108. et Andocid. Orat. i. p. 215. The oath to which Socrates alludes in Xenophon's Apology, c. iv. can only apply to the Heliæa. It is recited at length by Demoſthenes, Orat. cont. Timocrat.

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defence, he honeſtly acknowledged that he himſelf was much affected by the perſuaſive eloquence of his adverſaries; though, in truth, if he might uſe the expreſſion, they had ſaid nothing to the purpoſe [6]. He then obſerved, that the fond partiality of his friend Chærephon, having aſked the Delphic oracle, whether any man was wiſer than Socrates? —the oracle replied, that Socrates was the wiſeſt of men. In order to juſtify the anſwer of that god, whoſe veracity they all acknowledged, he had converſed with every diſtinction of perſons, moſt eminent in the republic; and finding that they univerſally pretended to know many things of which they were ignorant, he began to ſuſpect, that in this circumſtance he excelled them, ſince he pretended to no ſort of knowledge of which he was not really maſter. What he did know, he freely communicated, ſtriving, to the utmoſt, to render his fellow-citizens more virtuous and more happy; an employment to which he believed himſelf called by the god, "whoſe authority I reſpect, Athenians! ſtill more than yours".

Provokes the anger of his judges.

The judges were ſeized with indignation at this firm language from a man capitally accuſed, from whom they expected that, according to the uſual practice, he would have brought his wife and children to intercede for him by their tears [7], or

[6] The ſimplicity of the original is inimitable — Και τοι αληθες γε, ως επος ειπειν, ουθεν ειρηκασι. Plut. Apol.

[7] Theſe circumſtances, which are mentioned both by Xenophon and Plato, prove that Socrates was tried before a popular tribunal.

even have employed the elaborate diſcourſe which his friend Lyſias, the orator, had compoſed for his defence; a diſcourſe alike fitted to detect calumny, and to excite compaſſion. But Socrates, who conſidered it as a far greater misfortune to commit, than to ſuffer an injuſtice, declared, that he thought it unbecoming his fame, and unworthy his character, to employ any other defence than that of an innocent and uſeful life. Whether to incur the penalties of the delinquency with which he was falſely charged ought to be regarded as an evil, the gods alone knew. For his part he imagined that he ſhould have no reaſon for ſorrow at being delivered from the inconveniences of old age, which were ready to overtake him, and at being commanded to quit life [s] while his mind, ſtill active and vigorous, was likely to leave behind him the moſt agreeable impreſſion in the remembrance of his friends. CHAP. XXIV.

Socrates is condemned.

The firm magnanimity of Socrates could not alter the reſolution of his judges; yet ſuch is the aſcendency of virtue over the worſt of minds, that he was found guilty by a majority of only

It is well known that the Areopagus rigorouſly proſcribed all ſuch undue methods of biaſſing the judgment and ſeducing the paſſions. Vid. Demoſth. in Neær. et Ariſtocrat. Æſchin. in Timarch. Lucian. Hermotim. et Iſocrat. Areopag.

[s] Xenophon ſays, that he writes Socrates's Defence, after ſo many others, who had already executed that taſk with ſufficient ſkill and fidelity, in order to illuſtrate one point much inſiſted on by Socrates, "That it was better for him to die than to live." Xenoph. Apol. ſub. init.

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three voices [9]. The court then commanded him, agreeably to a principle which betrays the true ſpirit of democratical tyranny, to paſs ſentence of condemnation on himſelf, and to name the puniſhment which ought to be inflicted on him. The puniſhment, ſaid Socrates, which I deſerve for having ſpent my whole life in endeavouring to render my fellow-citizens wiſer and better, and particularly in ſtriving to inſpire the Athenian youth with the love of juſtice and temperance, is, "To be maintained, during the remainder of my life, in the Prytanæum; an honor due to *me*, rather than to the victors in the Olympic games, ſince, as far as depended on me, I have made my countrymen more happy *in reality*; they only in *appearance*". Provoked by this obſervation, by which they ought to have been confounded, the judges proceeded to paſs ſentence, and condemned Socrates to drink hemlock [10].

His addreſs to the judges who voted in his favor.

This atrocious injuſtice excited the indignation of his numerous friends and diſciples, moſt of whom had accompanied him to the court; but it awakened no other paſſion in the illuſtrious ſage than that of pity for the blind prejudices of the Athenians. He then addreſſed that part of the court who had been favorable to him, or rather to themſelves, ſince they had avoided the misfortune of paſſing an unjuſt ſentence, which would have diſgraced and embittered the lateſt moment

[9] Plato Apol. [10] Idem, ibid.

of their lives. "He conſidered them as friends with whom he would willingly converſe for a moment, upon the event which had happened to him, before he was ſummoned to death. From the commencement of the proſecution, an unuſual circumſtance, he obſerved, had attended all his words and actions, and every ſtep which he had taken in the whole courſe of his trial. The dæmon, who on ordinary occaſions had ever been ſo watchful to reſtrain him, when he prepared to ſay or do any thing improper or hurtful, had never once withheld him, during the whole progreſs of this affair, from following the bent of his own inclination. For this reaſon he was apt to ſuſpect that the fate which the court had decreed him, although they meant it for an evil, was to him a real good. If to die was only to change the ſcene, muſt it not be an advantage to remove from theſe pretended judges to Minos, Rhadamantus, and other real judges, who, through their love of juſtice, had been exalted by the divinity to this important function of government? What delight to live and converſe with the immortal heroes and poets of antiquity! It becomes you alſo, my friends! to be of good comfort with regard to death, ſince no evil, in life or death, can befal virtuous men, whoſe true intereſt is ever the concern of heaven. For my part, I am perſuaded that it is better for me to die than to live, and therefore am not offended with my judges. I entreat you all to behave towards my ſons, when they attain the years of reaſon, as I have done to you, not ceaſing to

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blame and accuſe them, when they prefer wealth or pleaſure, or any other frivolous object, to the ineſtimable worth of virtue. If they think highly of their own merit, while in fact it is of little value, reproach them ſeverely, Athenians! as I have done you. By ſo doing you will behave juſtly to me and to my ſons. It is now time for us to part. I go to die, you to live; but which is beſt, none but the Divinity knows [11].

The execution of the ſentence deferred on account of the Delian feſtival

It is not wonderful that the diſciples of Socrates ſhould have believed the events of his extraordinary life, and eſpecially its concluding ſcene, to be regulated by the interpoſition of a particular providence [12]. Every circumſtance conſpired to evince his unalterable firmneſs, and diſplay his inimitable virtue. It happened, before the day of his trial, that the high-prieſt had crowned the ſtern of the veſſel, which was annually ſent to Delos, to commemorate, by grateful acknowledgments to Apollo, the triumphant return of Theſeus from Crete, and the happy deliverance of Athens from a diſgraceful tribute [13]. This ceremony announced the commencement of the feſtival, which ended with the return

[11] Plato Apol. ſub fin.

[12] According to Plato nothing happened in this tranſaction *ανευ θειας μοιρας*. Plat. Apol. Yet in the Phædo. ſub. init. he ſays, *τυχη τις αυτω, ω Ελεκρατες! συνεβη*. But *τυχη* here refers not to the cauſe, but to the effect; not to blind chance, but to an unaccountable diſpoſition of events produced by a particular interpoſition of the divinity. In this ſenſe the word is uſed not only by philoſophers but orators, particularly Demoſthenes, as we ſhall ſee below.

[13] See vol. i, p. 32.

of the veſſel; and, during the intervening time, which was conſecrated to the honor of Apollo, it was not lawful to inflict any capital puniſhment. Contrary winds protracted the ceremony thirty days, during which Socrates lay in priſon, and in fetters. His friends daily viſited him, repairing, at the dawn, to the priſon-gate, and impatiently waiting till it opened. Their converſation turned on the ſame ſubjects which had formerly occupied them; but afforded not that pure unmixed pleaſure which they uſually derived from the company of Socrates. It occaſioned, however, nothing of that gloom which is naturally excited by the preſence of a friend under ſentence of death. They felt a certain pleaſing melancholy, a mixed ſenſation of ſorrow and delight, for which no language has aſſigned a name [14].

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When the fatal veſſel arrived in the harbour of Sunium, and was hourly expected in the Piræus, Crito, the moſt confidential of the diſciples of Socrates [15], firſt brought the melancholy intelligence;

He refuſes to eſcape from priſon.

[14] This is admirably deſcribed by Plato: Αλλα ατεχνως ατοπον τι μοι παθος παρην, και τις ακηδης κρασις — απο τε της ηδονης συγκεκραμενη οιμαι και της λυπης. The following circumſtances are inimitable: Και παντες οι παροντες σχεδον τι ουτω διεκειμεθα, ποτε μεν γελωντες, ενιοτε δε δακρυοντες. εις δε ημων διαφερεντως Απολλωδορος. οισθα γαρ τον ανδρα και τον τροπον αυτου. Phædo, viii. c. ii. Socrates alone felt none of theſe ſenſations; but as Montaigne, who had ſeized his true character, ſays, Et qui ne reconnoiſſe en luy, non ſeulement de la fermeté et de la conſtance (c'étoit ſon aſſiette ordinaire que celle là) mais je ne ſçay quel contentement nouveau et une allegreſſe enjouée en ſes propos et façons dernieres.

[15] Finding Socrates in a profound ſleep, he repoſed himſelf by his ſide till he awoke. Plat. ibid.

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[36] Xenoph. et Plat. ibid.

the injuries of our parents or our country; and to teach, by our example, diſobedience to the laws." The ſtrength of his arguments, and ſtill more, the unalterable firmneſs and cheerful ſerenity that appeared in his looks, words, and actions [17], ſilenced the ſtruggling emotions of his diſciples. The dignity of virtue elevated their ſouls; they parted with tears of inexpreſſible admiration, and with a firm purpoſe to ſee their maſter earlier than uſual on the fatal morning.

His behaviour during the laſt day of his confinement.

Having arrived at the priſon-gate, they were deſired to wait without, becauſe the Eleven (ſo the delicacy of Athens ſtyled the executioners of public juſtice) unlooſed the fetters of Socrates, and announced to him his death before the ſetting of the ſun. They had not waited long, when they were deſired to enter. They found Socrates juſt relieved from the weight of his bonds, attended by his wife Xantippé, who bore in her arms his infant ſon. At their appearance, ſhe exclaimed, "Alas! Socrates, here come your friends, whom you for the laſt time behold, and who for the laſt time behold you!" Socrates, looking at Crito, deſired ſome one to conduct her home. She departed, beating her breaſt, and lamenting with that clamorous ſorrow natural to her ſex [18] and her character.

[17] Και ομμασι και σχημασι και βαδισμοις Φαιδρος. Xenoph. Apol.

[18] Βοωσαν τε και κοπτομενην; and a little above, "οια δη ειωθασι αι γυναικες." Phædo, ſect. iii.

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Socrates, meanwhile, reclining on the couch with his uſual compoſure, drew his leg towards him, and gently rubbing the part which had been galled by the fetters, remarked the wonderful connexion between what men call pleaſure, and its oppoſite, pain. The one ſenſation, he obſerved (as juſt happened to his leg after being delivered from the ſmart of the irons), was generally followed by the other. Neither of them could long exiſt apart; they are ſeldom pure and unmixed; and whoever feels the one, may be ſure that he will ſoon feel the other. "I think, that had Æſop the fabuliſt made this reflection, he would have ſaid, that the Divinity, deſirous to reconcile theſe oppoſite natures, but finding the deſign impracticable, had at leaſt joined their ſummits; for which reaſon pleaſure has ever ſince dragged pain after it, and pain pleaſure."

Why he compoſed verſes in priſon, having never done it before.

The mention of Æſop recalled to Cebes, the Theban, a converſation which he had recently had with Euenus of Paros, a celebrated elegiac poet, then reſident in Athens [19]. The poet aſked Cebes, "Why his maſter, who had never before addicted himſelf to poetry, ſhould, ſince his confinement, have written a hymn to Apollo, and turned into verſe ſeveral of Æſop's fables?" The Theban ſeized the preſent opportunity to ſatisfy himſelf in this particular, and to acquire ſuch information as

[19] The following narrative, to the death of Socrates, is entirely borrowed from the Phædo, to which it is therefore unneceſſary at every moment to refer.

might ſatisfy Euenus, who, he aſſured Socrates, would certainly repeat his queſtion. The illuſtrious ſage, whoſe inimitable virtues were all tinged, or rather brightened, by enthuſiaſm, deſired Cebes to tell Euenus, "That it was not with a view to rival him, or with a hope to excel his poetry (for *that*, he knew, would not be eaſy), that he had begun late in life this new purſuit. He had attempted it in compliance with a divine mandate, which frequently commanded him in dreams to cultivate muſic. He had, therefore, firſt applied to philoſophy, thinking *that* the greateſt muſic; but ſince he was under ſentence of death, he judged it ſafeſt to try likewiſe the popular muſic, leſt any thing ſhould on his part be omitted, which the gods had enjoined him. For this reaſon, he had compoſed a hymn to Apollo, whoſe feſtival was now celebrating; and not being himſelf a mythologiſt, had verſified ſuch fables of Æſop as happened moſt readily to occur to his memory. Tell this to Euenus—bid him farewel; and farther, that if he is wiſe, he will follow me; for I depart, as it is likely, to day; ſo the Athenians have ordered it."

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His opinion concerning ſuicide, and the immortality of the ſoul.

The laſt words introduced an important converſation concerning ſuicide, and the immortality of the ſoul. Socrates maintained, that though it was better for a wiſe man to die than to live, becauſe there was reaſon to believe that he would be happier in a future than in the preſent ſtate of exiſtence, yet it could never be allowable for him to periſh by his own hand, or even to lay down life

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without a ſufficient motive, ſuch as that which influenced himſelf, a reſpectful ſubmiſſion to the laws of his country. This intereſting diſcuſſion conſumed the greateſt part of the day. Socrates encouraged his diſciples not to ſpare his opinions from delicacy to his preſent ſituation. Thoſe who were of his mind he exhorted to perſevere. Intwining his hand in the long hair of Phædo, "Theſe beautiful locks, my dear Phædo, you will this day cut off [20]; but were I in your place, I would not again allow them to grow, but make a vow (as the Argives did in a matter of infinitely leſs moment) never to reſume the wonted ornament of my beauty, until I had confirmed the doctrine of the ſoul's immortality."

Concerning death, burial, and the duties of friends to the deceaſed.

The arguments of Socrates convinced and conſoled his diſciples, as they have often done the learned and virtuous in ſucceeding times. "Thoſe who had adorned their minds with temperance, juſtice, and fortitude, and had deſpiſed the vain ornaments and vain pleaſures of the body, could never regret their ſeparation from this terreſtrial companion. And now," continued he, in the language of tragedy, "the deſtined hour ſummons me to death; it is almoſt time to bathe, and ſurely it will be better that I myſelf, before I drink the poiſon, ſhould perform this ceremony, than occaſion unneceſſary trouble to the women after I am dead." "So let it be," ſaid Crito; "but firſt

[20] The ceremony of cutting off the hair at funerals was mentioned above, vol. I. c. vii. p. 324. where the tranſaction of the Argives, alluded to in the text, is related.

inform

inform us, Socrates, in what we can do you pleaſure, reſpecting your children, or any other concern." "Nothing new, O Crito! but what I have always told you. By conſulting your own happineſs, you will act the beſt part with regard to my children, to me, and to all mankind; although you bind not yourſelves by any new promiſe. But if you forſake the rules of virtue, which we have juſt endeavoured to explain, you will benefit neither my children, nor any with whom you live, although you ſhould now ſwear to the contrary." Crito then aſked him, "How he choſe to be buried?" "As you pleaſe, provided I don't eſcape you." Saying this, he ſmiled, adding, that as to his *body*, they might bury it as ſeemed moſt decent, and moſt ſuitable to the laws of his country. CHAP. XXIV.

He then retired into the adjoining chamber, accompanied only by Crito; the reſt remained behind, like children mourning a father. When he had bathed and dreſſed, his ſons (one grown up, and two children), together with his female relations [21], were admitted to him. He converſed with them in the preſence of Crito, and then returned to his diſciples near ſun-ſet, for he tarried long within. Before he had time to begin any new He bathes;

[21] The ο.κειαι γυναικες of Plato. This expreſſion ſeems to have given riſe to the abſurd fable, that Socrates had two wives, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, and others; and the abſurd explication of that irregularity, "that the Athenians, after the peſtilence, had allowed polygamy, at leaſt bigamy, to repair the ravages of that dreadful malady."

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is addreſſed by the meſſenger of death.

ſubject, the keeper of the priſon entered, and ſtanding near Socrates, "I cannot," ſaid he, "accuſe you, O Socrates! of the rage and execrations too often vented againſt me by thoſe here confined, to whom, by command of the magiſtrates, I announce that it is time to drink the poiſon. Your fortitude, mildneſs, and generoſity exceed all that I have ever witneſſed; even now I know you pardon me, ſince I act by compulſion; and as you are acquainted with the purport of my meſſage, farewel and bear your fate with as much patience as poſſible." At theſe words the executioner, hardened as he was in ſcenes of death, diſſolved in tears, and, turning from Socrates, went out. The latter following him with his eye, replied, "And you alſo farewel; as to me, I ſhall obey your inſtructions." Then looking at his diſciples, "How truly polite," ſaid he, "is *the man*[22]! During my confinement, he often viſited and converſed with me; and now, how generouſly does he lament my death! But let the poiſon be brought, that we may obey his orders."

His converſation before drinking the poiſon.

Crito then ſaid, "Still, O Socrates! there is time; the ſun ſtill brightens the tops of the mountains. Many have I known, who have drank the poiſon late in the night, after a luxurious ſupper and generous wines, and laſtly, after enjoying the embraces of thoſe with whom they were enamoured[23].

[22] Ὁ *ανθρωπος*, the term for the executioner.

[23] Συγγενομενους γ' ενιους ὡν *αν τυχωσι επιθυμουντες*. Phæd. c. xlviii. What an extraordinary picture of Athenian manners!

But haſten not; it is yet time." "With good reaſon," ſaid Socrates, "theſe perſons did what you ſay, becauſe they believed thereby to be gainers; and with good reaſon I ſhall act otherwiſe, becauſe I am convinced that I ſhould gain nothing but ridicule by an over-anxious ſolicitude for life, when it is juſt ready to leave me." Crito then made a ſign to the boy who waited; he went, ground the hemlock, and returned with him who was to adminiſter it. Socrates perceiving his arrival, "Tell me," ſaid he, "for you are experienced in ſuch matters, what have I to do?" "Nothing farther than to walk in the apartment till your limbs feel heavy; then repoſe yourſelf on the couch." Socrates then taking the cup in his hand, and looking at him with ineffable ſerenity, "Say, as to this beverage, is it lawful to employ any part of it in libation?" The other replied, "There is no more than what is proper to drink." "But it is *proper*," rejoined Socrates," and neceſſary, if we would perform our duty, to pray the gods, that our paſſage hence may be fortunate." So ſaying, he was ſilent for a moment, and then drank the poiſon with an unaltered countenance. Mingling gentleneſs with authority, he ſtilled the noiſy lamentations of his friends, ſaying, that in order to avoid ſuch unmanly complaints, he had before diſmiſſed the women. As the poiſon began to gain his vitals, he uncovered his face, and ſaid to Crito, "We owe a cock to Æſculapius, ſacrifice it, and neglect it not." Crito aſked, if he had

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His prayer and death.

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any thing further to command? But he made no reply. A little after, he was in agony—Crito ſhut his eyes. Thus died Socrates; whom, his diſciples declared, they could never ceaſe to remember, nor remembering, ceaſe to admire. "If any man," ſays Xenophon inimitably, "if any man, a lover of virtue, ever found a more profitable companion than Socrates, I deem that man the happieſt of human kind"."

Tranſient perſecution of his diſciples.

The current of popular paſſions appears nowhere more uniform than in the hiſtory of Athens. The factitious reſentment excited againſt Socrates by ſuch improbable calumnies, as even thoſe who were the readieſt to receive and to diſſeminate, could never ſeriouſly believe, extended itſelf with rapidity to his numerous friends and adherents. But fortunately for the intereſt of letters and humanity, the endemic contagion was confined within the Athenian frontiers. Plato, Antiſthenes, Æſchines, Critobulus, and other Athenians, wiſely eluded a ſtorm which they had not ſtrength to reſiſt. Some took refuge in Thebes with their fellow-diſciples, Simmias, Cebes, and Phædondas; others found protection in Megara from Euclid and Terpſion. This perſecution of philoſophy, however, was accidental and tranſient. Mingled ſentiments of pity, ſhame, and reſentment, ſoon gave a new direction to the popular

The Athenians repent, and honor the memory of Socrates.

[24] Plato ſpeaks with equal feeling, or rather enthuſiaſm. Και γαρ το μεμνησθαι, και αυτον λεγοντα, και αλλως ακουοντα, ημιν αει παντων ηδιστον.. Phæd. c. ii.

fury, which raged with more deſtructive, yet far juſter cruelty, againſt the accuſers and judges of Socrates[25]. Many were driven into exile; many were put to death; ſeveral periſhed in deſpair, by their own hands. The illuſtrious ſage was honored by ſignal monuments of public admiration[26]; his fame, like the hardy oak, derived vigor from years[27]; and increaſed from age to age, till the ſuperſtition of the Athenians at length worſhipped, as a god[28], him whom their injuſtice had condemned as a criminal. CHAP. XXIV.

The perſecution, the death, and the honors of Socrates, all conſpired to animate the affection, and to increaſe the zeal, of his diſciples. Their number had been great in his lifetime: it became greater after his death; ſince thoſe who followed, and thoſe who rejected his doctrines, alike ſtyled themſelves Socratic philoſophers. His name was thus adopted and profaned by many ſects, who, while they differed widely from each other, univerſally changed, exaggerated, or perverted the tenets of their common maſter. Among the genuine followers of Socrates, Xenophon, as will appear hereafter, unqueſtionably merits the firſt place. Plato comes next, yet ſeparated by a long The writings of his diſciples.

[25] Plutarch. de Invid. p. 538.

[26] Statues, altars, even a chapel, called Socrateion. Vide Diogen. in Socrat.

[27] Creſcit occulto, velut arbor, ævo
Fama Marcelli — HORACE.

[28] Or rather as a demi-god; but the boundaries were not very accurately aſcertained, though *that* is attempted by Arrian, in Expedit. Alexand. l. iv. p. 86.

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interval. In the ſame claſs may be ranked Cebes the Theban, Æſchines, Crito, and Simon, Athenians. The table of Cebes, which has been tranſmitted to modern times, contains a beautiful and affecting picture of human life, delineated with accuracy of judgment, and illuminated by the ſplendor of ſentiment. Three remaining dialogues of Æſchines breathe the ſame ſublime ſpirit, and abound in irreſiſtible perſuaſions to virtue: "That happineſs is attained, not by gratifying, but by moderating the paſſions; that he alone is rich and powerful, whoſe faculties exceed his deſires; that virtue is true wiſdom, and being attended with the only ſecure happineſs which can be enjoyed in the preſent life, muſt, according to the unalterable laws of Providence, be crowned with immortal felicity hereafter."

Cebes.

Æſchines.

The philoſophers who miſrepreſented his opinions.

The remains of Cebes and Æſchines, and far more, as will appear in the ſequel, the copious writings of Plato and Xenophon, may enable us to diſcriminate the philoſophy of Socrates, from that of the various ſects who miſrepreſented or adulterated his opinions. The eſtabliſhment of theſe ſects belongs not to the period of hiſtory now under our review. But the foundation of their reſpective tenets, which had been laid in a former age, was confirmed by the philoſophers who flouriſhed in the time of Socrates. Of theſe, the moſt diſtinguiſhed were Euclid of Megara, Phædo of Elis, Ariſtippus of Cyrené, Antiſthenes of Athens. The two firſt reſtored the captious logic of the ſophiſts; Ariſtippus embraced their licentious

Euclid and Phædo, Ariſtippus and Antiſthenes.

morality. While the ſchools of Elis and Megara ſtudied to confound the underſtanding, that of Cyrené labored to corrupt the heart. Antiſthenes ſet himſelf to oppoſe theſe pernicious ſects, deriding the refined ſubtilties of the ſceptics, and diſdaining the mean pleaſures of the Epicureans[29]. To prefer the mind to the body, duty to intereſt, and virtue to pleaſure, were the great leſſons of Antiſthenes. Yet this ſublime philoſophy he carried to extravagance[30], affecting not only to moderate and govern, but to ſilence and extirpate the paſſions, and declaring bodily pleaſure not only unworthy of purſuit, but a thing carefully to be avoided, as the greateſt and moſt dangerous of evils. His rigid ſeverity of life deceived not the penetration of Socrates. The ſage could diſcern, that no ſmall ſhare of ſpiritual pride lurked under the tattered cloak of Antiſthenes. CHAP. XXIV.

While philoſophy, true or falſe, thus flouriſhed in Greece, a propitious deſtiny watched over the imitative arts, which continued, during half a

State of the fine arts during the period under review.

[29] I anticipate theſe names. The *ſcepticiſm* of Pyrrho, as will be explained hereafter, aroſe from the quibbling ſophiſms of the ſchools of Elis and Megara. *Epicurus*, having adopted and refined the ſelfish philoſophy of Ariſtippus, had the honor of diſtinguiſhing by his name, the *Epicurean* ſect.

[30] His follower, Diogenes, as will appear in the ſequel, pushed this extravagance ſtill farther. They both taught in the ſuburb of Athens called the *Cynoſarges*, from which they and their diſciples were called *Cynics*. In a ſubſequent part of this work, it will be explained how the *Cynical philoſophy* gave riſe to *Stoiciſm*, ſo called, becauſe Zeno and his followers taught at Athens in the "*Stoa* pœcile," the painted portico.

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century of perpetual wars and revolutions, to be cultivated with equal aſſiduity and ſucceſs. The moſt diſtinguiſhed ſcholars of Phidias were Alcamenes of Athens, and Agoracritus of the iſle of Paros. They contended for the prize of ſculpture in their reſpective ſtatues of Venus; and the Athenians, it is ſaid, too partially decided in favor of their countryman. Agoracritus, unwilling that his work ſhould remain in a city where it had met with ſo little juſtice, ſold it to the borough of Rhamnus. There it was beheld with admiration, and ſoon paſſed for a production of Phidias[31] himſelf. The ſculptor Cteſelaus excelled in heroes. He choſe noble ſubjects, and ſtill farther ennobled them by his art[32]. His contemporary Patrocles diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his ſtatues of Olympic victors, and particularly of celebrated wreſtlers. Aſſiſted by Canachus, he made the greateſt work mentioned during the period now under our review, thirty-one figures of bronze, repreſenting the reſpective commanders of the ſeveral cities or republics, who, under the conduct of Lyſander, obtained the memorable victory of Ægos Potamos. They were erected in the temple of Delphian Apollo, together with the ſtatue of Lyſander himſelf, crowned by Neptune. Inferior artiſts[33] were employed to copy the ſtatues of various divinities, dedicated at the ſame time, and in the ſame place, by the Lacedæmonian conqueror.

[31] Vid. Suid. et Heſych. voc. Φειδιας. [32] Plin. l. xxxv.
[33] See their names in Pauſan. l. x. p. 625, et ſeqq.

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It appears not however that, during the Peloponneſian war, any new ſtyle was attempted either in ſculpture or painting. The artiſts of that period contented themſelves with walking in the footſteps of their great predeceſſors. The ſame obſervation applies to muſic and poetry; but eloquence, on the contrary, received a new form, and flouriſhing amidſt the tumults of war and the contentions of active life, produced that conciſe, rapid, and manly character of compoſition which thenceforth diſtinguiſhed the Attic writers. The works of Homer, Sophocles, and Pindar, left few laurels to be gained by their ſucceſſors. It was impoſſible to excel, it was dangerous to rival them. Great genius was required to ſtart, without diſgrace, in a career where ſuch candidates had run. But great genius is rare, and commonly diſdains imitation, and the firſt poetical prizes being already carried off, men who felt the animation and vigor of their own powers, naturally directed them to objects which poſſeſſed the charms of novelty, and promiſed the hope of excellence.

Principal authors in proſe preceding this period.

Even in proſaic compoſition the merit and fame of Herodotus and Democritus[34] (not to mention authors more ancient) oppoſed very formidable

[34] Itaque video viſum eſſe nonnullis Platonis et Democriti locutionem, etſi abſit a verſu, tamen quod iocitatius feratur, et clariſſimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poëma putandum, quàm comicorum poëtarum. Cicero ad M. Brutum Orator. c. xx. See alſo de Orator. l. i. c. xl. It is impoſſible to read Lucretius, without fancying, if we recollect Cicero's criticiſms on Democritus, that we are peruſing the long loſt works of that great philoſopher.

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Character of Herodotus as an hiſtorian.

obſtacles to the ambition of their ſucceſſors. In a work no leſs ſplendid than important, the father of profane hiſtory had deduced the tranſactions between the Greeks and Barbarians, from the earlieſt accounts till the concluſion of the Perſian war; a work including the hiſtory of many centuries, and comprehending the greateſt kingdoms and empires of the ancient world. This extenſive ſubject was handled with order and dignity. The epiſodes were ingeniouſly interwoven with the principal action. The various parts of the narrative were ſo ſkilfully combined, that they mutually reflected light on each other. Geography, manners, religion, laws, and arts, entered into the plan of his work; and it is remarkable that the earlieſt of hiſtorians agrees more nearly, as to the deſign and form of his undertaking, with the enlightened writers of the preſent century, than any hiſtorical author in the long ſeries of intervening ages.

His language was the picture of his mind; natural, flowing, perſuaſive; lofty on great occaſions[15], affecting in ſcenes of diſtreſs[16], perſpicuous in narration, animated in deſcription. Yet this admired writer has ſometimes inſerted reports romantic and incredible. Of many, indeed, of the fables of Herodotus, as ignorance conceited of its knowledge long affected to call them, ſubſequent experience has proved the reality;

[15] Longinus cites as an example of the ſublime, Herodot. l. vii. c. lx. The whole expedition of Xerxes is written with an elevation becoming the ſubject.

[16] See the affecting ſtory of Adraſtus, l. i. c. xxxv.

modern diſcoveries and voyages ſeem purpoſely directed to vindicate the fame of a writer, whom Cicero [17] dignifies with the appellation of Prince of Hiſtorians. Of other wondrous tales which he relates, his own diſcernment ſhowed him the futility. Whatever is contrary to the analogy of nature he rejects with ſcorn. He ſpeaks with contempt of the Ægepodes, and of the one-eyed Arimaſpi, and of other ridiculous and abſurd fictions which have been adopted, however, by ſome credulous writers even in the eighteenth century. But Herodotus thought himſelf bound in duty to relate what he had heard, not always to believe what he related [18]. Having travelled into Egypt and the Eaſt, he recounts, with fidelity, the reports current in thoſe remote countries. And his mind being opened and enlarged by an extenſive view of men and manners, he had learned to ſet bounds to his diſbelief, as well as to his credulity. Yet it muſt not be diſſembled that the fabulous traditions, in which he too much abounds, give the air of romance to his hiſtory. Though forming, comparatively, but a ſmall part of the work, they aſſume magnitude and importance, when invidiouſly detached from it [19]. It thus ſeems as if

[17] L. ii. de Orator.

[18] Εγω δε οφειλω λεγειν τα λεγομενα, πειθεσθαι γε μην α πανταπασι οφειλω. Herodot. l. vii. c. cliii. p. 433.

[19] The reprnaches which Juvenal (Satyr. 10.) and Plutarch (in his treatiſe entitled the Malignity of Herodotus) make to this great hiſtorian, are fully anſwered by Aldus Manutius, Camerarius, and Stephanus. Plutarch, forſooth, was offended that his countrymen

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this moſt inſtructive author had written with a view rather to amuſe the fancy than to inform the underſtanding. The lively graces of his diction tend to confirm this ſuppoſition. His mode of compoſition may be regarded as the intermediate ſhade between epic poetry and hiſtory. Neither conciſe nor vehement, the general character of his ſtyle is natural, copious, and flowing [40]; and his manner throughout breathes the ſoftneſs of Ionia, rather than the active contention of Athens.

Of Thucydides.

In this light Herodotus appeared to the Athenians in the age immediately ſucceeding his own. At the Olympic games he had read his work with univerſal applauſe. Thucydides, then a youth, wept mixed tears of wonder and emulation [41]. His father was complimented on the generous ardor

made ſo bad a figure in the hiſtory of Herodotus. The criticiſm of Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, a writer of more taſte and diſcernment than Plutarch, does ample juſtice to the father of hiſtory.

[40] Ariſtotle, in his Rhetoric, l. iii. c. ix. diſtinguiſhes two kinds of ſtyle; the continuous and the periodic. The former flows on without interruption, until the ſenſe is complete. The latter is divided, by ſtops, into due proportions of duration, which are eaſily felt by the ear, and meaſured by the mind. The former ſtyle is tireſome, becauſe in every thing men delight to ſee the end; even racers, when they paſs the goal, are quickly out of breath. Herodotus is the moſt remarkable inſtance of the continuous ſtyle. In his time ſcarcely any other was in uſe; but it is now entirely laid aſide. So far Ariſtotle, who ſeems rather unjuſt to Herodotus, ſince many parts of his work are ſufficiently adorned by periods, although the looſe ſtyle in general prevails. But the partiality of his countryman Dionyſius completely avenges the wrongs of Herodotus.

[41] Suidas, Photius, Marcellinus.

of a ſon, whoſe early inquietude at another's fame announced a character formed for great deſigns and illuſtrious exertions. But Herodotus had preoccupied the ſubjects beſt adapted to hiſtorical compoſition; and it was not till the commencement of the memorable war of twenty-ſeven years, that Thucydides, amidſt the dangers which threatened his country, rejoiced in a theme worthy to exerciſe the genius, and call forth the whole vigor of an hiſtorian. From the breaking out of this war, in which he proved an unfortunate actor, he judged that it would be the greateſt, the moſt obſtinate, and important that had ever been carried on. He began therefore to collect, and treaſure up, ſuch materials as were neceſſary for deſcribing it; in the ſelection, as well as in the diſtribution of which, he afterwards diſcovered an evident purpoſe to rival and ſurpaſs Herodotus. Too much indulgence for fiction had diſgraced the narrative of the latter: Thucydides profeſſed to be animated purely by the love of truth. "His relation was not intended to delight the ears of an Olympic audience. By a faithful account of the paſt, he hoped to aſſiſt his readers in conjecturing the future. While human nature remained the ſame, his work would have its uſe, being built on ſuch principles as rendered it an everlaſting poſſeſſion, not a contentious inſtrument of temporary applauſe [42]." The execution correſponded with this noble deſign. In his introductory diſcourſe

[42] Thucydid. in proem.

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he runs over the fabulous ages of Greece, carefully ſeparating the ore from the droſs. In ſpeaking of Thrace, he touches, with proper brevity, on the fable of Tereus and Progne [41]; and in deſcribing Sicily, glances at the Cyclops and Leſtrigons. But he recedes, as it were, with diſguſt, from ſuch monſtrous phantoms, and immediately returns to the main purpoſe of hiſtory. In order to render it a faithful picture of the times, he profeſſes to relate not only what was done, but what was ſaid, by inſerting ſuch ſpeeches of ſtateſmen and generals as he had himſelf heard, or as had been reported to him by others. This valuable part of his work was imitated by all future hiſtorians, till the improvement of military diſcipline on the one hand, and the corruption of manners on the other, rendered ſuch ſpeeches ſuperfluous. Eloquence once ſerved as an incentive to courage, and an inſtrument of government. But the time was to arrive, when the dead principles of fear and intereſt ſhould alone predominate. In moſt countries of Europe, deſpotiſm had rendered public aſſemblies a dramatic repreſentation, and in the few, where men are not enſlaved by a maſter, they are the ſlaves of pride, of avarice, and of faction.

Compariſon between them.

Thucydides, doubtleſs, had his model in the ſhort and oblique ſpeeches of Herodotus; but in this particular he muſt be acknowledged far to ſurpaſs his patron. In the diſtribution of his ſubject,

[41] Ovid. Metam. l. vi.

however, he fell ſhort of that writer. Thucydides, aſpiring at extraordinary accuracy, divides his work by ſummers and winters, relating apart the events comprehended in each period of ſix months. But this ſpace of time is commonly too ſhort for events deſerving the notice of hiſtory, to be begun, carried on, and completed. His narrative, therefore, is continually broken and interrupted: curioſity is raiſed without being ſatisfied, and the reader is tranſported, as by magic, from Athens to Corcyra, from Leſbos to Peloponneſus, from the coaſt of Aſia to Sicily. Thucydides follows the order of time; Herodotus the connexion of events: in the language of a great critic, the ſkill and taſte of Herodotus have reduced a very complicated argument into one harmonious whole; the prepoſterous induſtry of Thucydides has divided a very ſimple ſubject into many detached parts and ſcattered limbs of hiſtory, which it is difficult again to reduce into one regular body [*]. The ſame critic obſerves, that Herodotus's hiſtory not only poſſeſſes more art and variety, but diſplays more gaiety and ſplendor. A ſettled gloom, doubtleſs, hangs over the events of the Peloponneſian war; but what is the hiſtory of all wars, but a deſcription of crimes and calamities? The auſtere gravity of Thucydides admirably correſponds with his ſubject. His majeſty is worthy of Athens, when ſhe commanded a thouſand tributary republics. His conciſe, nervous, and energetic ſtyle, his

[*] Dionyſ. Halicarn. de Herodot. et Thucydid.

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abrupt brevity, and elaborate plainneſs, admirably repreſent the contentions of active life, and the tumult of democratical aſſemblies. Demoſthenes, whom Dionyſius himſelf extols above all orators, tranſcribed eight times, not the elegant flowing ſmoothneſs of Herodotus, but the ſententious, harſh, and often obſcure annals of Thucydides [45].

Tranſition to the military tranſactions of Greece.

Thucydides left his work unfiniſhed in the twenty-firſt year of the Peloponneſian war. It was continued by Xenophon, who deduced the revolutions of Greece through a ſeries of forty-eight years to the battle of Mantinæa; a work which enables us to purſue the important ſeries of Grecian hiſtory.

To a reader accuſtomed to contemplate the uniform and conſiſtent operations of modern policy, it muſt appear extraordinary that, at the diſtance of leſs than two years from the ſubverſion of the Athenian democracy by a Spartan general, the ſame turbulent form of government ſhould have been re-eſtabliſhed with new ſplendor, by the approbation, and even the aſſiſtance, of a Spartan king. The reaſons explained in the preceding chapter may leſſen, but cannot altogether remove, his ſurpriſe; and, in order fully to comprehend the cauſes of this event, it is neceſſary to conſider not only the internal factions which diſtracted the councils of Sparta, but the external objects of ambition or revenge which ſolicited and employed her arms.

[45] Dionyſ. Halicarn. de Herodot. et Thucydid.

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The Elians incur the displeasure of Sparta.

While the fortune of the Peloponneſian war ſtill hung in doubtful ſuſpenſe, the peaceful inhabitants of Elis often teſtified an inclination to preſerve an inoffenſive neutrality, that they might apply, with undivided attention, to their happy rural labors, to the adminiſtration of the Olympian feſtival, and to the indiſpenſable worſhip of thoſe gods and heroes to whom their territory was peculiarly conſecrated. The continual ſolicitation of Sparta, and the unprovoked violence of Athens, determined the Elians to declare for the former republic; but of all the Spartan allies they were the moſt lukewarm and indifferent. In time of action their aſſiſtance was languid and ineffectual, and when the regular return of the Olympic ſolemnity ſuſpended the courſe of hoſtilities, they ſhowed little partiality or reſpect for their powerful confederates, whoſe warlike and ambitious ſpirit ſeemed incompatible with the enjoyment of their own contemplative tranquillity. This omiſſion of duty was followed by the actual tranſgreſſion of the Elians. In conjunction with the Mantinæans and Argives they deſerted the alliance of Sparta; defended themſelves by arms againſt the uſurpations of that republic; and excluded its members from conſulting the oracle, and from partaking of the games and ſacrifices celebrated at Olympia [44]. Theſe injuries paſſed with impunity until the ſucceſsful iſſue of the war of Peloponneſus diſpoſed the Spartans to feel with ſenſibility, and enabled them ſeverely to chaſtiſe every inſult that had been

[44] Thucydid. l. v.

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offered them during the leſs proſperous current of their fortune.

The Spartans invade Elis. Olymp. xciv. 2. A. C. 403.

While Pauſanias and Lyſander ſettled the affairs of Athens and of Aſia, Agis the moſt warlike of their princes, levied a powerful army, to inflict a late, but terrible, vengeance on the Elians. That he might attack the enemy unprepared, he led his forces through the countries of Argolis and Achaia, entering the Elian territory by the way of Lariſſa, and intending to march by the ſhorteſt road to the devoted capital. But he had ſcarcely paſſed the river Lariſſus, which gives name to the town and ſeparates the adjoining provinces of Elis and Achaia, when the invaders were admoniſhed, by repeated ſhocks of an earthquake, to abſtain from ravaging a country which enjoyed the immediate protection of Heaven. Into ſuch a menace, at leaſt, this terrible phænomenon was interpreted by the ſuperſtition of the Spartan king, who immediately repaſſed the river, and, returning home, diſbanded his army. But the hoſtility of the Spartans was reſtrained, not extinguiſhed. Having offered due ſupplications and ſacrifices to ſanctify their impious invaſion, the ephori, next year, commanded Agis again to levy troops, and to enter the Elian territory. No unfavorable ſign checked the progreſs of his arms. During two ſummers and autumns, the country was deſolated; the villages burned or demoliſhed; their inhabitants dragged into captivity; the ſacred edifices were deſpoiled of their moſt valued ornaments; the porticoes, gymnaſia, and temples, which

adorned the city of Jupiter, were many of them reduced to ruins. CHAP. XXIV.

The Spartans neither alone incurred the guilt, nor excluſively enjoyed the profits of this cruel devaſtation. The Elian invaſion furniſhed a rich harveſt of plunder to the Arcadians and other communities of Peloponneſus, whoſe rapacious luſt was enflamed by the virgin bloom of a country which had long been protected by religion againſt the ravages of war. When the principal property of the Elians was deſtroyed or plundered, the Spartans at length granted them a peace, on condition that they ſurrendered their fleet, acknowledged the independence of the inferior towns and villages, which were ſcattered along the delightful banks of the Peneus and the Alpheus, and modelled their internal government according to the plan preſcribed by their conquerors [47].

The Spartans drive the Meſſenians from Greece. Olymp. xcv. 4. A. C. 401.

The war of Elis occupied, but did not engroſs, the attention of the Spartans; nor did the puniſhment of that unfortunate republic divert them from other projects of revenge. The Meſſenians were not their accidental and temporary, but their natural and inveterate, foes; and might juſtly expect to feel the unhappy conſequences of their triumph. After the deſtruction of Meſſené, and the long wanderings and miſery of its perſecuted citizens, the town of Naupactus, ſituate on the northern ſhore of the Corinthian gulph, furniſhed a ſafe retreat to a feeble remnant of that ancient

[47] Xenophon Hellen. l. iij. c. 2. Diodor. l. xiv. p. 404.

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community; which, flouriſhing under the protection of Athens, ſpread along the weſtern coaſt, and planted a conſiderable colony in the neighbouring iſland of Cephalenia. We have already deſcribed the memorable gratitude of the Meſſenians, who were the moſt active, zealous, and, according to their ability, the moſt uſeful, allies of Athens in the Peloponneſian war. But *their* aſſiſtance (and aſſiſtance far more powerful than theirs) proved ineffectual; and the time was now arrived when they were to ſuffer a ſevere puniſhment for their recent as well as ancient injuries. The reſentment of Sparta drove them from Naupactus and Cephalenia. The greater part eſcaped to Sicily; above three thouſand ſailed to Cyrenaica, the only countries inhabited by the Hellenic race, which lay beyond the reach of the Lacedæmonian power [11].

Cauſes which withdrew Cyrenaica and Sicily from the ſphere of Grecian politics.

From the æra of this important migration, the names of Sicily and Cyrenaica will ſeldom occur in the preſent hiſtory; on which account it may not be improper briefly to explain the cauſes which withdrew from the general ſphere of Grecian politics a fruitful and extenſive coaſt, and an iſland not leſs fruitful and extenſive, and far more populous and powerful. The inſulated ſituation of thoſe remote provinces, while it rendered it extremely inconvenient for Greece to interfere in their affairs, peculiarly expoſed them to two evils, which rendered it ſtill more inconvenient for them to interfere in the affairs of Greece. Removed from the

[11] Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.

protection of their Peloponneſian anceſtors, both the Cyreneans and Sicilians often endured the oppreſſion of domeſtic tyrants, and often ſuffered the ravages of foreign barbarians. CHAP. XXIV.

Subſequent hiſtory of Cyrenaica.

The inhabitants of Cyrenaica alternately carried on war againſt the Libyans and Carthaginians[49]. They were actually oppreſſed by the tyrant Ariſton. Soon afterwards they recovered their civil liberty[50]; but were compelled frequently to ſtruggle for their national independence. Though often invaded, their country was never ſubdued by any barbarian enemy; and their liberties ſurvived the republics of their European brethren, ſince they reluctantly ſubmitted, for the firſt time, to the fortunate general of Alexander, who, in the diviſion of his maſter's conqueſts, obtained the fertile and wealthy kingdom of Egypt[51].

Of Sicily.

The revolutions of Sicily are far better known than thoſe of Cyrené, and ſtill more worthy to be remembered. During the latter years of the Peloponneſian war, the aſſiſtance given by Syracuſe to the Lacedæmonians became gradually more faint and imperceptible, and at length it was totally withdrawn. This was occaſioned by the neceſſity of defending the ſafety of the whole iſland, in which that of the capital was involved, againſt the formidable deſcents of the Carthaginians, whom the invitation of Segeſta and ſeveral inferior cities at

[49] Ariſtot. Polit. Salluſt. de Bell. Jugurth.

[50] Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.

[51] Diodor. l. xix. p. 715. et Strabo, l. xvii. p. 836.

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variance with their powerful neighbours, the hopes of acquiring at once thoſe valuable commodities, the annual purchaſe of which drained Africa of ſuch immenſe treaſures, and, above all, the deſire of revenging the death of Hamilcar, and the diſhonor of the Carthaginian name in the unfortunate ſiege of Himera, encouraged to undertake and carry on various expeditions for the entire ſubjugation of Sicily.

which is long haraſſed by the Carthaginians; Olymp. xcii. 3. Olymp. xciv. 1. A. C. 410. —404.

Hannibal, the grandſon of Hamilcar, was intruſted with the conduct of the war, which commenced the four hundred and tenth, and continued, with little intermiſſion, till the four hundred and fourth year before the Chriſtian æra. The domeſtic troops of Carthage were reinforced by their African allies. Conſiderable levies were made among the native Spaniards and Italians, who had long envied the ſplendor, and dreaded the power of the Greeks, to whoſe conqueſts and colonies they ſaw no bounds. The united army exceeded an hundred thouſand men, and was conveyed to the ſouthern ſhore of Sicily in a proportionable number of tranſports and gallies [53].

whoſe conqueſts are interrupted by peſtilence.

A. C. 409.

The deſign of Hannibal, as far it appears from his meaſures, was to conquer ſucceſſively the ſmaller and more defenceleſs towns, before he laid ſiege to Syracuſe, whoſe natural ſtrength, recently improved by art, bidding defiance to aſſault, could only be taken by blockade. The firſt campaign was rendered memorable by the conqueſt of

[53] Diodor. Sicul. l. xiii. c. 43, et ſeqq.

Selinus and Himera; the ſecond by the demolition of Agrigentum; the third by the taking of Gela. The inferior cities of Solas, Egeſta, Motya, Ancyra, Entelta, and Panormus, either invited the Carthaginian arms, or ſurrendered without reſiſtance. The invaders might have proceeded to the ſiege of Syracuſe, the main object of their expedition; but peſtilence followed the bloody havoc of war, and ſwept off, in undiſtinguiſhed ruin, the victors and the vanquiſhed. Not only the general, but the moſt numerous portion of his troops, had fallen a prey to this calamity; and Hamilcar, who ſucceeded to the command, contented himſelf with leaving garriſons in the towns which had been conquered, and returned to Africa with the enfeebled remains of his armament, which communicated the peſtilential infection to Carthage, where it long raged with deſtructive fury [51].

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A. C. 406.

A. C. 405.

Exceſſive cruelty of the Carthaginians.

According to the genius of Grecian ſuperſtition, it was natural to aſcribe the ſufferings of the Carthaginians to the unexampled cruelty and impiety with which, in their ſucceſſive ravages, they had deformed the fair face of Sicily. It would be uſeleſs and diſguſtful to deſcribe the horrid ſcenes of bloodſhed and ſlaughter tranſacted in the ſeveral places which preſumed to reſiſt their power. Whatever atrocities could be invented by the unprincipled licence of the Italians, approved by the ſtern inſenſibility of the Spaniards, and inflicted by the implacable revenge of the Africans, were com-

[51] Diodor. l. xiii. c. 70, et ſeqq.

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mitted in the miſerable cities of Selinus, Himera, Gela, and Agrigentum. After the taking of Himera, Hannibal ſacrificed in one day, three thouſand of its inhabitants to the manes of his grandfather, who, in the firſt Carthaginian invaſion, had periſhed before its walls; and the lot of theſe unhappy victims, dreadful as it was, might juſtly be an object of envy to the long tormented natives of Gela and Selinus.

Ancient magnificence of Agrigentum.

Yet of all Sicilian cities, the fate of Agrigentum ſeemed the moſt worthy to be deplored, from the ſtriking contraſt of its fallen ſtate with its recent ſplendor and proſperity. The natural beauties [54] of Agrigentum were ſecured by ſtrength, and adorned with elegance; and whoever conſidered, either the innumerable advantages of the city itſelf, or the gay cultivation of the ſurrounding territory, which abounded in every luxury of the ſea and land, was ready to pronounce the Agrigentines the moſt favored inhabitants of the earth. The exuberant fertility of the ſoil, particularly the rich luxuriance of the vines and olives [55], exceeded every thing that is related of the happieſt climates, and furniſhed the materials of a lucrative commerce with the populous coaſt of Africa; which was very ſparingly provided in thoſe valuable plants. The

[54] The following particulars in the text, concerning Agrigentum, we learn from Diodorus Siculus, p. 374—379. Valer. Maxim. l. iv. 8. Athenæus, l. i. c. 3.

[55] Diodorus celebrates the height of the vines, which we are not uſed to conſider as a proper ſubject of panegyric.

extraordinary wealth of the Agrigentines was diſplayed in the magnificence of public edifices, and in the ſplendid enjoyment of private fortunes. They had begun, and almoſt completed, the celebrated temple of Jupiter, built in the grandeſt ſtyle of architecture employed by the Greeks on the greateſt and moſt ſolemn occaſions. Its walls were encompaſſed by pillars without, and adorned by pilaſters within; and its magnitude far exceeded the ordinary dimenſions of ancient temples, as it extended three hundred and forty feet in length, ſixty in breadth, and an hundred and twenty in height, without including the lofty and ſpacious dome. The grandeur of the doors and veſtibule correſponded with the ſimple majeſty of the whole edifice, whoſe ſculptured ornaments repreſented, with finiſhed elegance, and with a laborious accuracy that diſtinguiſhed each particular figure, the defeat of the Giants, and the taking of Troy; reſpectively, the moſt illuſtrious exploits of Grecian gods, and Grecian heroes.

The temple of Jupiter.

This noble monument, conſecrated to piety and patriotiſm, might be contraſted, by a philoſophic mind, with others deſtined to a very different purpoſe. Without the walls of Agrigentum an artificial pond, or rather lake, thirty feet deep and near a mile in circumference, was continually repleniſhed with a rare variety of the moſt delicate fiſhes, to furniſh a ſure ſupply to the ſumptuous extravagance of public entertainments. But nothing could rival the elegance and beauty of the

Their luxury.

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tombs and ſepulchres erected by the Agrigentines, to perpetuate the fame of their courſers which had obtained the Olympic prize; and, if we believe the teſtimony of an eye-witneſs [16], to commemorate the quails and other delicate birds, which were cheriſhed with an affectionate and partial fondneſs by the effeminate youth of both ſexes. Such capricious and abſurd abuſes of opulence and the arts might be expected amidſt the mortifying diſcrimination of ranks, and the enormous ſuperabundance of private riches, which diſtinguiſhed the Agrigentines. The labor of numerous and active ſlaves cultivated agriculture and manufactures with extraordinary ſucceſs. From the profit of theſe ſervile hands many citizens attained, and exceeded, the meaſure not only of Grecian, but of modern wealth. A ſhort time before the ſiege of the town, Hexenitus returned in triumph from Olympia, with three hundred chariots, each drawn by two milk-white horſes of Sicilian blood. Antiſthenes had eclipſed this magnificence in celebrating the marriage of his daughter. But every native of Agrigentum yielded the fame of ſplendor to the hoſpitable Gellias, whoſe palace could entertain and lodge five hundred gueſts, who had been clothed from his wardrobe, and whoſe cellars, conſiſting of three hundred ſpacious reſervoirs, cut in the ſolid rock, daily invited the joyous feſtivity of ſtrangers and citizens.

Exceſſive wealth of individuals.

[16] Timæus apud Diodor. l. xiii.

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Before the ſecond Carthaginian invaſion, the Agrigentines, warned by the fate of Selinus and Himera, had prepared whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for their own defence. Their magazines were ſtored with proviſions, their arſenals with arms. Elevated by the confidence of proſperity, they had courage to reſiſt the firſt impreſſions of their enemies; but, corrupted by the vices of wealth and luxury, they wanted fortitude to perſevere. Their allies in Sicily and Italy ſhowed not that degree of ardor which might have been expected in a war which ſo deeply concerned them all: yet, by the partial aſſiſtance of Syracuſe, Gela, and Camerina, as well as ſeveral Grecian allies in Italy, the Agrigentines ſtood the ſiege eight months, during which, the Carthaginians employed every reſource of ſtrength and ingenuity. At length the place was reduced to great difficulties by means of immenſe wooden machines, drawn on wheels, which enabled the beſiegers to fight on equal ground with thoſe who defended the walls. But before any breach was effected, the greater part of the inhabitants determined to abandon the city.

Siege of Agrigentum.

In the obſcurity of night, they departed with their wives and families, and many of them fortunately eſcaped to Gela, Syracuſe, and Leontium. Others, wanting courage for this dangerous reſolution, or unwilling to ſurvive the fate of their country, periſhed by their own hands. A third claſs, more timid, or more ſuperſtitious, ſhut themſelves up in the temples, expecting to be ſaved by the

Unhappy fate of its inhabitants.

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protection of the gods, or by the religious awe of the enemy. But the Barbarians no more reſpected what was ſacred, than what was profane. The conſecrated ſtatues, and altars, and offerings, were confounded with things the moſt vile, and plundered or deſtroyed in the promiſcuous ruin. One memorable act of deſpair may repreſent the general horror of this dreadful ſcene. With his numerous friends, and moſt valued treaſure, the humane and hoſpitable Gellias had taken refuge in the temple of Minerva; but when he underſtood the univerſal deſolation of his country, he ſet fire to that ſacred edifice, chuſing to periſh by the flames rather than by the rage of the Carthaginians [57].

Amidſt the tumults of war and faction Dionyſius riſes to eminence. Olymp. xciii. 1. A. C. 408.

Near fourſcore years before the demolition of Agrigentum, Sicily had acquired immortal glory, by defeating more numerous invaders; but, at that time, the efforts of the whole iſland were united and animated by the virtues and abilities of Gelon; whereas, amidſt the actual dangers and trepidation of the Carthaginian war, the Sicilians were diſtracted by domeſtic factions. Syracuſe had baniſhed the only man whoſe conſummate wiſdom, and approved valor and fidelity, ſeemed worthy to direct the helm in the preſent tempeſtuous juncture. In the interval between the ſiege of Himera and that of Agrigentum, the patriotic Hermocrates had returned to Sicily; and, at the head of his numerous adherents, had attempted to gain

[57] Diodorus, p. 379.

admiſſion into the capital. But the attempt was immediately fatal to himſelf; and, in its conſequences, deſtructive of the public freedom. His partiſans, though diſcomfited and baniſhed, ſoon found a leader qualified to avenge their cauſe, and to puniſh the ingratitude of Syracuſe. CHAP. XXIV.

His character.

This was the celebrated Dionyſius, a youth of twenty-two years; of mean parentage, but unbounded ambition; deſtitute (if we believe hiſtorians) of almoſt every virtue, and poſſeſſed of every talent; and whoſe fortune it was, to live and flouriſh amidſt thoſe perturbed circumſtances of foreign war and civil diſſenſion, which are favorable to the elevation of ſuperior minds. Though eſteemed and intruſted by Hermocrates, who could more eaſily diſcern the merit of his abilities, than diſcover the danger of his ambition, Dionyſius had gained friends in the oppoſite faction, by whoſe intereſt he was recalled from exile. His ſervices in the Carthaginian war raiſed him to eminence. He excelled in valor; he was unrivalled in eloquence; his ends were purſued with ſteady perſeverance; his means were varied with convenient flexibility; the appearance of patriotiſm rendered him popular, and he employed his popularity to reſtore his baniſhed friends.

Means by which he uſurped the government of Syracuſe. Olymp. xciii. 4. A C. 405.

The gratitude of one party, and the admiration of both, enabled him to attain the command of the mercenaries, and the conduct of the war. But he was leſs ſolicitous to conquer the Carthaginians than to enſlave his fellow-citizens, whoſe factious turbulence rendered them unworthy of liberty.

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By the affected dread of violence from his enemies, he obtained a guard for his perſon, which his artful generoſity eaſily attached to his intereſt; and the arms of his troops, the influence and wealth of Philiſtus, the hiſtorian of Sicily, who was honored with the appellation of the ſecond Thucydides [51], above all his own crafty and daring ambition, enabled him, at the age of twenty-five, to uſurp the government of Syracuſe, which he held for thirty-eight years.

His ſucceſsful reign. Olymp. xciii. 4. A. C. 405. Olymp. ciii. 2. A. C. 367.

During his long and active reign he was generally engaged in war; ſometimes with the Carthaginians, ſometimes with his revolted ſubjects. Yet in both conteſts he finally prevailed, having reduced the Carthaginian power in Sicily, and appeaſed, or intimidated, domeſtic rebellion. His actual condition, however ſplendid, he regarded only as a preparation for higher grandeur. He beſieged and took Rhegium, the key of Italy: nor could the feeble confederacy of the Italian Greeks have prevented the conqueſt of that country, had not the renewed hoſtilities of the Carthaginians, and freſh diſcontents at home, interrupted the progreſs of his arms. This growing ſtorm he reſiſted as ſucceſsfully as before, and tranſmitted, to a degenerate ſon, the peaceful inheritance of the greateſt part of Sicily; after having ſtrengthened, with wonderful art, the fortifications of the capital; enlarged the ſize, and improved the form of the

[51] Cicero de Orator. l. xi.

Syracuſan gallies; invented the military catapults, an engine of war which he employed, with great advantage, in the ſiege of Motya and Rhegium; and not only defended his native iſland againſt foreign invaſion, but rendered its power formidable to the neighbouring countries. CHAP. XXIV.

His poetical labors were the leaſt uniformly ſucceſsful of all his undertakings. His verſes, though rehearſed by the moſt ſkilful *rhapſodiſts* of the age, were treated with ſignal contempt at the Olympic games. A ſecond time he renewed his pretenſion to literary fame in that illuſtrious aſſembly; but his ambaſſador was inſulted by the moſt humiliating indignities; and the orator Lyſias pronounced a diſcourſe, in which he maintained the impropriety of admitting the repreſentative of an impious tyrant to aſſiſt at a ſolemnity conſecrated to religion, virtue, and liberty [59]. The oration of Lyſias leaves room to ſuſpect that the plenitude of Dionyſius's power, rather than the defect of his poetry, expoſed him to the cenſure and deriſion of the Olympic ſpectators; and this ſuſpicion receives ſtrong confirmation by conſidering, that, in the laſt year of his reign, he deſerved and obtained the poetic crown at Athens; a city renowned for the impartiality of its literary deciſions [60]. His literary ambition. A. C. 387.

It is remarkable, that, with ſuch an active, vigorous, and comprehenſive mind; with ſuch a variety of talents, and ſuch an accumulation of Reaſons why the character of Dionyſius ap-

[59] Life of Lyſias, p. 117. Dionyſ. Halicar. de Demoſth.

[60] Iſocrat. Panegyr.

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peared ſo odious to ancient hiſtorians.

glory, Dionyſius ſhould be univerſally held out and branded, as the moſt conſpicuous example of an odious and miſerable tyrant, the object of terror in his own, and of deteſtation in ſucceeding ages. Yet the uncorrupted evidence of hiſtory will prove, that the character of Dionyſius was not deciſively flagitious. His ſituation rendered it artificial; and he is acknowledged often to have aſſumed the ſemblance of virtue. Always crafty and cautious; but by turns, and as it ſuited his intereſt, mild, affable, and condeſcending; or cruel, arrogant, and imperious: nor did the Syracuſans feel the rigor of his tyranny, until they had juſtly provoked it by an inſurrection, during which they treated his wife and children with the moſt barbarous and brutal fury. But there are two circumſtances in the character of Dionyſius which peculiarly excited the indignation of the moraliſts of Greece and Rome, and which the moderation or the ſoftneſs of modern times will be diſpoſed to conſider with leſs ſeverity. He had uſurped the government of a free republic; a crime neceſſarily heinous in the ſight of thoſe who held the aſſaſſination of a tyrant to be the moſt meritorious exertion of human virtue; and he profeſſed an open contempt for the religion of his country; a crime of which the bare ſuſpicion had brought to death the moſt amiable and reſpected of men. Yet the impiety of Dionyſius was only the child of his intereſt, and ſometimes the parent of his wit. He ſtripped a celebrated ſtatue of Jupiter of a golden robe, obſerving, that it was too heavy

in

in ſummer, and too cold in winter. For a reaſon equally ingenious he deprived Æſculapius of his golden beard; aſſerting, that ſuch a venerable ornament ill became the ſon of the beardleſs Apollo. But if he deſpoiled the altars and ſtatues, he increaſed and improved the fleets and armies, of Syracuſe, which were ſucceſsfully employed againſt the public enemy. And to the general current of ſatire and declamation againſt this extraordinary man [61], may be oppoſed the opinion of Polybius and Scipio Africanus, the moſt illuſtrious characters of the moſt illuſtrious age of Rome: "That none ever concerted his ſchemes with more prudence, or executed them with more boldneſs, than Dionyſius the Elder." CHAP. XXIV.

His ſon, Dionyſius the Younger, exceeded his vices without poſſeſſing his abilities. The reign of this ſecond tyrant was diſtracted and inglorious. His kinſman Dion, the amiable diſciple of Plato, endeavoured to correct the diſorders of his ungoverned mind. But the taſk was too heavy for Dion, and even for Plato himſelf. The former, unable to reſtrain the exceſſes of the prince, undertook the defence of the people. His patriotiſm interrupted, but did not deſtroy, the tyranny of Dionyſius, which was finally aboliſhed, twenty-two

Inglorious reign of Dionyſius the Younger. Olymp. civ. 3. A. C 362. Olymp. cx. 1. A. C. 340.

[61] The antheotic hiſtory of the reign of Dionyſius is copiouſly recorded by Diodorus Siculus, l. xiv. et xv. To relate the numerous and improbable ſtories told of him by Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, and other moraliſts, would be to tranſcribe what it is not eaſy to believe. The reader may conſult, particularly, Plut. ex edit. Paris, in Moral. pp. 78 et 83. De Garrul. p. 508. In Dion. p. 961; and various paſſages of Cicero de Officiis, et Tuſculan. Quæſt.

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years after he firſt mounted the throne, by the magnanimity of Timoleon [63]. This revolution happened only two years before Corinth, the country of Timoleon, as well as the other republics of Greece, ſubmitted to the arms of Philip of Macedon; and, having loſt their own independence, became incapable of aſſerting the freedom of their colonies.

Sicily becomes a province of Rome. Olymp. cxliii. 1. A. C. 212.

New tyrants ſtarted up in Syracuſe, and almoſt in every city of Sicily, and held a precarious ſway under the alternate protection of the Carthaginians and Romans. The citizens of Syracuſe, mindful of their ancient fame, dethroned their uſurpers, and enjoyed conſiderable intervals of liberty. But at length the Romans gained poſſeſſion of the place; the perſevering valor of Marcellus, aſſiſted by the treachery of the garriſon, prevailing, after a ſiege of three years, over the bold efforts of mechanical power, directed by the inventive genius of Archimedes [64]. The reduction of the capital was immediately followed by the conqueſt of the adjoining territory; and Sicily came thus to be regarded as the eldeſt province of Rome, and the firſt country, without the limits of Italy, which had taught that victorious republic to taſte and enjoy the ſweets of foreign dominion [65].

[63] Corn. Nepos. Diodorus Sicul. Plut. Dion.

[64] Polyb. Excerpt. l. viii. Plut. in Marcell.

[65] Livy, l. xxiv, et Cicero in Verrem in few words — Omnium exterarum gentium princeps Sicilia ad amicitiam fidemque, P. R applicuit; primaque omnium, id quod ornamentum Imperii eſt, provincia eſt appellata: prima docuit majores noſtros, quàm præclarum eſſet exteris gentibus imperitare.

CHAP XXV.

Death of Darius Nothus. — Cyrus diſputes the Succeſſion with his elder Brother Artaxerxes. — Character of Cyrus. — State of Lower Aſia under his adminiſtration. — His Strength and Reſources. — His Expedition into Upper Aſia. — Deſcries the vaſt army of his Brother. — Battle of Cunaxa. — Death of Cyrus. — His Grecian Auxiliaries victorious. — Their Treaty with Tiſſaphernes. — Perfidious Aſſaſſination of the Grecian Generals. — Artaxerxes ſends to the Greeks to demand their Arms. — Conference on that Subject.

CHAP. XXV. Death of Darius Nothus. Olymp. xciv. 1. A. C. 404.

WHILE the operations of war conſpired with the revolutions of government, to detach the Grecian colonies in Italy, Sicily, and Cyrené, from the general intereſts and politics of the mother-country, a ſeries of events, not leſs curious than important, connected, in the cloſeſt intimacy, the hiſtory of Greece with the annals of the Perſian empire. The ſame memorable year which terminated the deſtructive war of Peloponneſus brought to a concluſion the active and proſperous reign of Darius Nothus. He named as his ſucceſſor Artaxerxes, ſtyled Mnemon, from the ſtrength of his memory; and perſiſted in this choice, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of the artful

The ſucceſſion of Artaxerxes is diſputed by his younger brother Cyrus.

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and ambitious Paryſatis, who employed her extenſive influence over the mind of an old and uxorious huſband, to obtain the kingdom for Cyrus, the younger brother of Artaxerxes, and the peculiar favorite of his mother. The rivalſhip of the young princes, both of whom were at court during the laſt illneſs of Darius, unhappily degenerated into enmity; and a circumſtance, which would be thought immaterial in the preſent age, increaſed the indignation of Cyrus. The birth of Artaxerxes had happened before the acceſſion of his father to the throne, but Cyrus was born the ſon of a king; a diſtinction which, however frivolous it may appear in modern times, had engaged Darius Hyſtaſpes to prefer Xerxes, the younger of his ſons, to his elder brother Artabazanes[1].

Cauſe of his reſentment againſt Artaxerxes.

The precedent eſtabliſhed by ſuch an illuſtrious monarch might have enforced the partial arguments of Paryſatis, and both might have been confirmed by the ſtrong claim of merit, ſince Cyrus early diſcovered ſuch talents and virtues, as fitted him to fill the moſt difficult, and to adorn the moſt exalted, ſtation. At the age of ſeventeen, he had obtained the government of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia; and the ſame mandate of Darius, which deſtroyed his hopes of ſucceſſion to the Perſian throne, rendered him hereditary ſatrap of thoſe valuable provinces. On the demiſe of that monarch, Cyrus prepared to return to Aſia

[1] Herodot. l. vii. c. ii.

Minor, attended by the ſame eſcort with which he had come to Suſa; a faithful body of three hundred heavy-armed Greeks, commanded by Xenias, an Arcadian. But when he prepared to leave the court, a very criminal and unfortunate incident retarded his departure. The ſelfiſh and perfidious Tiſſaphernes, who expected to divide the ſpoils of the young prince, accuſed him of treaſon. He was apprehended by order of Artaxerxes; but the powerful protection of Paryſatis, who, though ſhe loved only one, was beloved, or at leaſt feared, by both of her ſons, defended his life, vindicated his honor, and reſtored him in ſafety to his government.

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Circumſtances favorable to his ambition.

The danger that had threatened his perſon could not much affect the heroic fortitude of Cyrus; but the affront offered to his dignity ſunk deep into his heart; and from the moment that he recovered his freedom, he determined to revenge his injuries [2], or to periſh in the attempt. In the deſpotic countries of the Eaſt, as there is ſcarcely any intermediate gradation between the prince and people, and ſcarcely any alternative but that of dominion or ſervitude, a diſcontented or rebellious ſubject muſt either ſtifle his animoſity, ſubmit to die, or aſpire to reign [3]. The magnanimity of Cyrus

[2] Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. i. c. i. This was the origin of his reſentment, which Xenophon expreſſes with great delicacy; ὁ δε κινδυνευσας και ατιμασθεις, βουλευεται ὁπως μηποτε ετι εϛαι επι τω αδελφω, etc. He aſſerted independence, the firſt wish of every great mind.

[3] "Cyrus determined no longer," ſays Xenophon, "to depend "on his brother; αλλα ην δυνηται βασιλευσειν αντ' εκεινου, but, if "poſſible, to reign in his ſtead."

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naturally preferred the road of danger and glory; he prepared not only to puniſh the injuſtice, but to uſurp the throne of Artaxerxes, defended as it was by a million of armed men, and protected both by the power of ſuperſtition, and by the ſplendor of hereditary renown. This deſign would have been great, but romantic, if the young prince had not enjoyed very extraordinary reſources in the powers of his own mind, in the affectionate attachment of his Barbarian ſubjects, and, above all, in the fidelity and valor of his Lacedæmonian allies.

Character of Cyrus;

Whether we conſider what he ſaid, or what he did, the teſtimony of his contemporaries, or the more unerring teſtimony of his life and actions, Cyrus appears to have been born for the honor of human nature, and particularly for the honor of Aſia, which, though the richeſt and moſt populous quarter of the globe, has never, in any age, abounded in great characters. From the age of ſeven years, he had been trained, at the gate of the palace, to ſhoot with the bow, to manage the horſe and to ſpeak truth; according to the diſcipline inſtituted by the great founder of the monarchy, and well adapted, in an age of ſimplicity, to form the princes and nobles of Perſia. But in the courſe of two centuries, the progreſs of refinement and luxury, the infectious example of a corrupt court, and the perfidious leſſons of the world, had perverted, or rendered ineffectual, a very ſalutary ſyſtem of education; and the grandees of Perſia, whatever proficiency they made in their exerciſes,

contraſted with that of the Perſian nobles.

felt ſo little regard for veracity, that (as will abundantly appear in the ſequel) they ſeldom ſpoke but with a view to deceive, and rarely made a promiſe which they did not break, or took an oath which they did not violate. The behaviour of Cyrus was totally the reverſe. He equalled, and ſurpaſſed his companions in all exterior accompliſhments. But while his manly beauty, his bodily activity and addreſs, and the ſuperior courage, as well as ſkill, which he diſplayed in hunting, horſemanſhip, and every military exerciſe, commanded the admiration of the multitude, he himſelf ſeems not to have eſtimated ſuch ſuperficial advantages beyond their real worth. He regarded integrity of heart as the only ſolid baſis of a great character. His probity was uniform, his word ſacred, his friendſhip inviolable. In the giddy ſeaſon of youth, he yielded, with uncommon docility, to the admonitions of experience. Neither wealth, nor birth, nor rank, but age and virtue, were the objects of his reſpect: and his behaviour, equally meritorious and ſingular, was juſtly and univerſally admired. CHAP. XXV.

State of Lower Aſia during his adminiſtration.

His ſubjects in Leſſer Aſia, in particular, were ſeized with the moſt pleaſing aſtoniſhment, when, inſtead of a greedy and voluptuous ſatrap, eager only to ſqueeze, to amaſs, and to enjoy, they beheld a prince who preferred the public intereſt to his own; who alleviated the weight of taxes, that he might encourage the operations of induſtry; whoſe own hands gave the uſeful example of rural

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labor[4]; whoſe deciſions united juſtice and mercy; and whoſe active vigilance introduced (what neither before nor ſince the government of Cyrus has been known in the Aſiatic peninſula) ſuch regularity of police, as rendered intercourſe ſafe, and property ſecure.

His popular acts.

The virtues of juſtice and integrity, when accompanied with diligence and abilities, muſt procure ſuch a degree of reſpect for the adminiſtration, as will naturally be extended to the perſon, of a prince. But ſomething farther is required, not to obtain the public gratitude and eſteem, but to excite the affectionate ardor of ſelect and devoted friends; without the aſſiſtance of whom, it is ſeldom poſſible to accompliſh any great and memorable deſign. Cyrus excelled all his contemporaries in the art both of acquiring and of preſerving the moſt valuable friendſhips. His gratitude overpaid every favor; his liberality was large, yet diſcerning; and his donatives were always enhanced by the handſome and affectionate manner in which they were beſtowed. When he diſcovered a man really worthy of his confidence and eſteem, he was not ſatisfied with giving him a partial ſhare of his affections; he gave his heart entire; and it was his conſtant prayer to the gods, that he might live to requite and ſurpaſs the good offices of his friends, and the injuries of his enemies.

[4] Xenoph. ibid. Cic. in Senect. Plut. in Lyſand. have all celebrated this part of his character.

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With ſuch ſentiments and character, Cyrus acquired the firm attachment of a few, and the willing obedience of all his Barbarian ſubjects, in the populous provinces which he commanded, whoſe united ſtrength exceeded a hundred thouſand fighting men; who, unwarlike as they were, yet excelled, both in bravery and in ſkill, the effeminate troops of Upper Aſia.

Amount of his barbarian troops.

They were probably indebted for this advantage to their intercourſe with the Greeks, whoſe diſciplined valor, far more than the numbers of his Barbarians, encouraged Cyrus to undertake an expedition for acquiring the empire of the Eaſt. By the moſt important ſervices he had deſerved the gratitude of the Lacedæmonian republic; which had been raiſed, chiefly by his aſſiſtance, to the head of Greece, and to the command of the ſea. In return for that favor, ſo ineſtimable in the ſight of an ambitious people, the Spartans readily complied with his requeſt, by ſending into Aſia eight hundred heavy-armed men, under the command of the intrepid Cheiriſophus; and they charged their admiral, Samius, who had ſucceeded Lyſander in the government of the Ionian coaſt, faithfully to co-operate with Cyrus, by employing his powerful fleet in whatever ſervice the Perſian prince might think proper to recommend[5]. Had they done nothing more than this, Cyrus might well have approved their uſeful gratitude; eſpecially as their alliance, ſecuring him on the

His chief confidence in the gratitude and valor of the Greeks.

[5] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii.

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Amount of his Grecian troops.

ſide of Europe, enabled him, without danger, to drain his weſtern garriſons, and to augment the ſtrength of his army. But the friendſhip of the Spartans carried them ſtill farther. They allowed him to recruit his forces in every part of their dominions; and the generous munificence of Cyrus had acquired numerous partiſans well qualified to raiſe and to command thoſe valuable levies. Clearchus the Spartan, Menon the Theſſalian, Proxenus the Bœotian, Agias the Arcadian, and Socrates the Achæan, all alike devoted to the intereſt and glory of the Perſian prince, collected, chiefly from their reſpective republics, above ten thouſand heavy-armed men, and near three thouſand archers and targeteers.

Secrecy of his preparations.

Theſe preparations, which were carried on with ſilence and celerity, deceived the haughty indolence of the Perſians; but they could not eſcape the vigilance of Alcibiades, who then reſided at Grynium, a town of Phrygia, under the protection of Pharnabazus. Moved by reſentment againſt the Lacedæmonians, or ambitious of gaining merit with the great king, he deſired an eſcort from the ſatrap, that he might undertake with ſafety a journey to Suſa, in order to acquaint Artaxerxes with the hoſtile deſigns of his brother. Pharnabazus, who poſſeſſed not the merit, deſired the reward of the diſcovery; and therefore (as we formerly had occaſion to relate[e]) readily gratified the requeſt of Lyſander, by the deſtruction of Alcibiades.

[e] See above, p. 258.

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But neither the intelligence conveyed by the Perſian governor, nor the repeated ſolicitations of Tiſſaphernes, nor the conſciouſneſs of his own injuſtice and cruelty, could rouſe Artaxerxes from the profound ſecurity of his repoſe. Cyrus completed his levies without moleſtation, and almoſt without ſuſpicion; and prepared, in the beginning of the year four hundred before Chriſt, to march from the Ionian coaſt into Upper Aſia, at the head of a hundred thouſand Barbarians, and above thirteen thouſand Greeks. His journey towards Babylon, his defeat and death in the plain of Cynaxa, the retreat and diſperſion of his followers, and the memorable return of the Greeks to their native country, have been related by the admired diſciple of Socrates (whom the friendſhip of Proxenus, the Bœotian, recommended to the ſervice and eſteem of Cyrus), with ſuch deſcriptive beauty, with ſuch profound knowledge of war and of human nature, and with ſuch inimitable eloquence, as never were re-united in the work of any one man but that of Xenophon the Athenian. The retreat was principally conducted by Xenophon himſelf; which has enabled him to adorn his narrative with ſuch an affecting variety of incidents and characters, as will always ſerve to prove that the force of truth and nature is far ſuperior to the powers of the moſt fertile fancy. It would be an undertaking not only hardy, but preſumptuous, to invade the province of ſuch an accompliſhed writer, if the deſign of the preſent work did not oblige us to ſelect the principal circumſtances which illuſtrate

Cyrus undertakes his expedition into Upper Aſia. Olymp. xcv. 1. A. C. 400.

Xenophon's account of the expedition.

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the condition of the times, and connect the expedition of Cyrus with the ſubſequent hiſtory of Greece.

Rapidity of his march.

Having aſſembled his forces at Sardis, the Perſian prince was carried, by the activity of his reſentment or ambition, with the utmoſt celerity, towards Upper Aſia. In ninety-three marches he travelled through the central provinces of Lydia, Phrygia, Cappadocia; traverſed the mountains of Cilicia; paſſed unreſiſted through Syria; croſſed the Euphrates at Thapſacus; and after penetrating the deſert, entered the confines of Babylonia. In a journey of above twelve hundred miles, his numerous army experienced fewer difficulties than might naturally be expected. The fertile territory of Aſia Minor ſupplying them abundantly with proviſions, enabled them to proceed commonly at the rate of fifteen or ſixteen miles a-day; and almoſt every ſecond day brought them to a large and populous city. The dependent ſatraps or viceroys of Lycaonia and Cilicia were leſs ſolicitous to defend the throne of Artaxerxes, than anxious to protect their reſpective provinces from plunder and devaſtation. But the former experienced the ſeverity of an invader whom he had the weakneſs to oppoſe, without the ſtrength or courage to reſiſt[7].

Cilicia defended by the beauty of Epyaxa.

Syenneſis, governor of Cilicia, had reaſon to fear that his country might be plundered with equal rapacity. He endeavoured, therefore, to avail

[7] Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. i. p. 248.

himſelf of the natural ſtrength of a province whoſe ſouthern boundaries are waſhed by the ſea, and which is defended on other ſides by the winding branches of Mount Taurus[8]. Towards the weſt there is but one paſs, called by Arrian the Gates of Cilicia[9]; ſufficient to admit only one chariot at a time, and rendered dark and difficult by ſteep and almoſt inacceſſible mountains. Theſe were occupied by the troops of Syenneſis, who, had he maintained his poſt, might have eaſily prevented the paſſage of an army. But the timid Cilician had not truſted in arms alone for the defence of his country. By the order, or at leaſt with the permiſſion of her huſband, his queen, the beautiful Epyaxa, had met Cyrus at Cylenæ, on the frontiers of Phrygia; and, according to the cuſtom of the Eaſt, preſented her acknowledged liege-lord and ſuperior with gold, ſilver, and other coſtly gifts. But the greateſt gift was her youth and beauty, which ſhe ſubmitted, it is ſaid, to the enamoured prince, who, after entertaining her with the utmoſt magnificence and diſtinction[10], reſtored CHAP. XXV.

[8] Xenoph. p. 248.

[9] Arrian. exped. Alexand. l. ii. p. 31.

[10] She requeſted Cyrus to ſhow her his troops. He complied; and attended her coach, in an open car. But the curioſity of Epyaxa had almoſt coſt her dear. "When the Barbarians were reviewed, the Greeks were ordered to their arms, and commanded to advance, as to a charge; after which, the ſoldiers, of their own accord, ran with ſhouts to their tents. The Barbarians were thrown into conſternation; Epyaxa quitted her coach; the Greeks returned laughing to their tents; and Cyrus rejoiced at ſeeing the terror with which the Greeks had inſpired the Barbarians." Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. i. p. 247.

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her to Cilicia by a near, but difficult road, which led acroſs the mountains.

The Greeks plunder Tarſus.

To the eſcort which accompanied her, Cyrus added a conſiderable body of Greeks commanded by Menon the Theſſalian. The greater part arrived at Tarſus, the capital, before the army of Cyrus reached the gates of Cilicia; but two companies, amounting together to a hundred men, were miſſing, and ſuppoſed to have been deſtroyed by the mountaineers, while they wandered in queſt of booty. Syenneſis was mortified at hearing that the enemy had already entered his province. But when he likewiſe received intelligence that the Peloponneſian fleet had ſailed round from Ionia, in order to co-operate with the army, the diſagreeable news totally diſconcerted the meaſures of his defence. He fled in precipitation, abandoning his tents and baggage to the invaders. Cyrus croſſed the mountains without oppoſition, and traverſed the beautiful irriguous plains of Cilicia, which were adorned with trees and vines, and abounded in ſeſame, panic, millet, wheat, and barley. In four days he arrived at the large and rich city of Tarſus, which was plundered by the reſentment of the Greeks, for the loſs of their companions.

Cyrus exchanges preſents with Syenneſis of Cilicia.

Cyrus immediately ſent for the governor, who had removed from his palace, and, attended by the greater part of the inhabitants, had taken refuge among the faſtneſſes in the neighbouring mountains. By the aſſurances of Epyaxa, her

timorous[11] husband was with much difficulty persuaded to put himself in the power of a superior, to whom, as the price of his safety, he carried large sums of money. Cyrus courteously accepted the welcome supply, which the demands of his troops rendered peculiarly seasonable; and, in return, honored Syennesis with such presents as were deemed of great value by the kings of the East. They consisted in a Persian robe, a horse with a golden bit, a chain, bracelets, and scimitar of gold, the restoration of prisoners, and the exemption of Cilicia from farther plunder[12].

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Mutiny in the Grecian camp.

During their luxurious residence at Tarsus, the Greeks were corrupted by prosperity. They disdained to obey their commanders, and refused to continue their journey. The design of marching to Babylon, though it was not unknown to Clearchus, or to the Spartan senate, had been concealed from the soldiers, lest their impatience or their fears might be alarmed by the prospect of such a long and dangerous undertaking. At Tarsus they first discovered their suspicions of the deceit, which immediately broke out into licentious clamors. They insulted the majesty of Cyrus; they reproached the perfidy of their generals; and their

[11] Pride, as well as fear, seems to have actuated Syennesis; ὁ δε ȣδε προτερον ȣδενι πω κρειττονι ἑαυτȣ εις χειρας ελθειν εφη, ȣδε τοτε Κυρω ιεναι ηθελε, πριν ἡ γυνη αυτον επεισε; "Syennesis declared that he had never formerly put himself in the power of a man in any respect superior to himself; nor would he then go to Cyrus, till his wife persuaded him," etc. A true picture of oriental manners, meanness varnished with pride!

[12] Xenophon. Anabas. p. 249.

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Appeaſed by the addreſs of Clearchus.

anger was ready to vent itſelf in open ſedition, when the ferment was appeaſed by the addreſs and prudence of Clearchus. While he privately aſſured Cyrus of his beſt endeavours to make the affair take a favorable turn, he openly embraced the cauſe of the ſoldiers, affected deeply to feel their grievances, and eagerly concurred with every meaſure that ſeemed proper to remove them. His eloquence and his tears diverted the deſign of immediate hoſtility. An aſſembly was ſummoned to deliberate on the actual poſture of affairs. Several, of their own accord, offered their opinion; others ſpoke as they had been directed by Clearchus. One counſellor, who was heard with applauſe, adviſed them to pack up their baggage, and to demand guides or ſhips from Cyrus, to facilitate their return. Another ſhowed the folly of this requeſt from a man whoſe meaſures they had traverſed, and whoſe purpoſe they had endeavoured to defeat[13]. They ſurely could not truſt in guides

[13] This paſſage is tranſlated as follows by Mr. Spelman: "After him another got up, showing the folly of the man who adviſed to demand the ships, as if Cyrus would not reſume his expedition. He shŏwed alſo how weak a thing it was to apply for a guide to that perſon whoſe undertaking we had defeated." If Cyrus reſumed his expedition, it could oot be ſaid that his undertaking was defeated, nor is this the proper meaoing of the word λυμαινεσθαι, which ſignifies to hurt or weaken. I am ſenſible that by ao eaſy tranſition, it ſometimes ſignifies to corrupt, to deſtroy, to defeat; but in the paſſage before us, if a tranſlator ſhould chuſe to explain it by any of thoſe words, he muſt ſay, "whoſe undertaking we had begun, endeavoured, or purpoſed, to defeat; an explanation of λυμαινεσθαι, which is juſtified by the aoalogy of the Greek language, and which the

given

given them by an enemy; nor could it be expected that Cyrus ſhould part with his ſhips, which were evidently ſo neceſſary to the ſucceſs of his expedition. At length it was determined to ſend commiſſioners to treat with Cyrus, that he might either, by granting the demands of the Greeks, prevail on them to follow him, or be himſelf prevailed on to allow them to return home; and the difference was thus finally adjuſted, by promiſing each ſoldier a darick and a half, inſtead of a darick, of monthly pay [14]. CHAP. XXV.

When this ſtorm was happily appeaſed, the enemy left Tarſus, and marched five days through the fertile plains of Cilicia, till they arrived at Iſſus, the laſt town of the province; large, rich, and populous; and only fifteen miles diſtant from the frontier of Syria. This wealthy province was defended by two fortreſſes, called the Gates of Syria and Cilicia. They extended from the mountains to the ſea. The interval of three furlongs between them contained ſeveral paſſes, narrow and intricate, beſides the rapid Kerſas, which flowed in the middle, one hundred feet in breadth. It was on this occaſion that Cyrus experienced the full advantage of the Lacedæmonian aſſiſtance. A fleet of ſixty ſail, conducted by Pythagoras the Spartan, who had ſucceeded Samius in the naval command, prepared to land the Greeks on the Cyrus paſſes the Syrian gates.

ſenſe abſolutely requires. " This is one of the few minute miſtakes which I have diſcovered in Mr. Spelman's moſt accurate tranſlation.

[14] Xenoph. ibid. p. 250, et ſeqq.

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eaſtern ſide of the Gates, which muſt have expoſed the Syrian works to a double aſſault; but the cowardice of Abrocomas, who commanded the numerous forces of Syria and Phœnicia, rendered the execution of this meaſure unneceſſary. The deſign, alone, was ſufficient to terrify him. He abandoned his forts, and fled with precipitation before the approach of an enemy[15].

The army wade the Euphrates.

Cyrus thenceforth proceeded without meeting with any appearance of oppoſition, and in fifteen days march, reached the banks of the Euphrates. At Thapſacus, which in ſome eaſtern languages ſignifies the ford[16], this noble river is above half a mile in breadth, but ſo ſhoaly that the navigation is reckoned dangerous even for boats which draw very little water. The ſhallowneſs increaſes in the autumnal ſeaſon, which happened to be the time that the army paſſed the Euphrates, which no where reached above the breaſt. This favorable circumſtance furniſhed an opportunity to the inhabitants of Thapſacus to flatter Cyrus, that the great river had viſibly ſubmitted to him as its future king[17]. Elevated by this auſpicious prediction, he purſued his journey through Meſopotamia, part of which was anciently comprehended under the name of Syria[18]. While he proceeded through this fertile country he did not forget that a laborious march of ſeventeen days, through a barren

[15] Xenoph. p. 253.

[16] Foſter's Geographical Diſſertation on Xenophon's Retreat.

[17] Xenoph. p. 255.

[18] So it is called by Xenoph. ibid.

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desert, must conduct him to the cultivated plains of Babylon.

Traverse the desert, and enter Babylonia.

Having amply provided for this dangerous undertaking, he performed it with uncommon celerity, both in order to avoid risking the want of provisions, and, if possible, to take his enemy unprepared. For several days the army marched, without interruption, through the province of Babylonia; and, on the fifth, came to a deep and broad ditch, which had been recently dug to intercept, or retard, their passage. But as this defence was left altogether unguarded, and the great king had taken no measures to protect the most valuable portion of his dominions, it was generally believed that he had laid aside the design of venturing an engagement. The troops of Cyrus, therefore, who had hitherto maintained their ranks with circumspection, no longer observed any order of march; their arms were carried in waggons, or on sumpter-horses; and their general, in his car, rode in the van with few armed attendants. While they proceeded in this fearless contempt of the enemy, and approached the plain of Cynaxa, which is with in a day's journey of Babylon [19], Patagyas, a Persian, and confidential friend of Cyrus, came riding towards

[19] I have used an indeterminate expression to denote the uncertain situation of those places as described by Strabo, l. ii. et Plut. in Artaxerx. Mr. Spelman justly observes, that the error of Xenophon (unnoticed by any former translator), who makes the distance between Babylon three thousand and sixty stadia, is so enormous, that it can only be owing to a mistake of the transcriber.

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them in full ſpeed, his horſe all in a foam, calling aloud ſucceſſively in his own language, and in Greek, that the king was at hand with a vaſt army [20].

Cyrus deſcries the immenſe army of his brother.

The experienced Greeks, who beſt knew the danger of being attacked in diſorder, were moſt ſenſibly alarmed by this ſudden ſurpriſe. Cyrus, leaping from his car, put on his corſlet, mounted his horſe, ſeized his javelin, commanded the troops to arm, and ordered every man to his poſt. His orders were readily obeyed; and the army advanced, ſeveral hours, in order of battle. It was now mid-day; yet no enemy appeared: but in the afternoon they perceived a duſt like a white cloud, which gradually thickened into darkneſs, and overſpread the plain. At length the brazen armor flaſhed; the motion, the ranks, and ſpears, were diſtinctly ſeen. In the front were innumerable chariots, armed with ſcythes in a downward, and in an oblique direction. The cavalry, commanded by Tiſſaphernes, were diſtinguiſhed by white corſlets; the Perſians by wicker bucklers; the Egyptians by wooden ſhields reaching down to their feet. Theſe formed the chief ſtrength of Artaxerxes; but the various multitude of nations, marching in ſeparate columns according to their reſpective countries, had ſcarcely any armor of defence, and could annoy the enemy only at a diſtance, with their ſlings, darts, and arrows [21].

[20] Xenoph. p. 263.

[21] Xenoph. p. 263, et ſeqq.

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While the hoſtile battalions approached, Cyrus, accompanied by Pigres the interpreter, and a few choſen attendants, all mounted on horſes of extraordinary ſwiftneſs, rode through the intermediate ſpace, obſerving the numbers and diſpoſition of the enemy. He had learned from deſerters, that the troops of the great king amounted to twelve hundred thouſand, divided into four equal bodies of men, reſpectively commanded by the four generals Tiſſaphernes, Gobrias, Arbaces, and Abracomas. The laſt, however, had not yet joined; nor did he reach Babylonia till five days after the battle. But, notwithſtanding this defect, the numbers of Artaxerxes were ſtill ſufficient to perform whatever numbers can accompliſh. According to the cuſtom of the Eaſt, the king, ſurrounded by a choſen body of cavalry, occupied the centre of the army, as the place of greateſt ſecurity, and moſt convenient for iſſuing his orders with promptitude and effect. But ſuch was the extent of ground covered by the various nations whom he commanded, that even his centre reached beyond the left wing of the army of Cyrus; who, therefore, called aloud to Clearchus to advance oppoſite to the king's guard, becauſe, if that ſhould be broken, the work would be done. But Clearchus was unwilling to withdraw the Greeks from the Euphrates, leſt they ſhould be ſurrounded by the enemy; he therefore kept his poſt, aſſuring Cyrus of his utmoſt care to make all go well.

Its number and diſpoſition.

The diſobedience of Clearchus, and the diſtruſt of Cyrus, threw away the fortune of the day,

The battle of Cynaxa.

CHAP. XXV. Olymp. xcv. 1. A. C. 400.

which involved the fate of Perſia, and the renown of Greece. For although, by ſkilful evolutions, Clearchus eluded the armed chariots and cavalry of the enemy; though the Greeks, by their countenance and ſhouts alone, put to flight the oppoſing crowd, who could not endure the ſight of their regular array, their burniſhed arms, or hear without terror the martial ſounds of their harmonious Pœans, intermixed with the clanging of their ſpears againſt their brazen bucklers; yet the great king, perceiving the rapid purſuit of the Greeks, and that nothing oppoſed him in front, commanded his men to wheel to the left, and advanced with celerity in order to attack the rear of the enemy. If this deſign had been carried into execution, it is probable that the Greeks, having prevailed on the firſt onſet, would immediately have faced about, and, animated by the joy of victory, and their native ardor, have repelled and routed the troops of Artaxerxes.

Rash impetuoſity of Cyrus.

But the impatience of Cyrus defeated this favorable proſpect. He obſerved the movement of his brother, and eagerly rode to meet him, at the head of only ſix hundred horſe. Such was the rapid violence of his aſſault, that the advanced guards of the king were thrown into diſorder, and their leader Artagerſes fell by the hand of Cyrus, who, with all his great qualities, had not learned to diſtinguiſh between the duties of a ſoldier and a general. By a ſeaſonable retreat he might ſtill, perhaps, have ſaved his life, and gained a crown. But his eye darting along the ranks, met that of

his brother. He ruſhed forward, with a blind inſtinctive fury, crying out, "I ſee the man!" and, penetrating the thick globe of attendants, aimed his javelin at the king, pierced his corſlet, and wounded his breaſt. His eagerneſs to deſtroy the enemy prevented proper attention to ſave himſelf. From an uncertain hand he received a ſevere wound in the face, which, however, only increaſed the fury with which he aſſaulted his brother. Various and inconſiſtent accounts were given of the death of Cyrus, even by thoſe who aſſiſted in this memorable engagement. The crowd of hiſtorians thought it incumbent on them to make him die like the hero of a tragedy, after many viciſſitudes of fortune, and many variations of miſery. Dinon and Cteſias [22], the longer to ſuſpend the curioſity of their readers, kill him as with a blunted weapon; but Xenophon is contented with ſaying, that he fell in the tumultuary conflict of his attendants with the guards of Artaxerxes, who zealouſly defended their reſpective maſters; and that eight of his moſt confidential friends lay dead upon him, thus ſealing with their blood their inviolable affection and fidelity [23].

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His death.

Such was the cataſtrophe of this audacious and fatal enterpriſe; after which the troops of Artaxerxes advanced, in the ardor of ſucceſs, and proceeded, without encountering any reſiſtance, to the hoſtile camp; Ariæus leading off the forces of

The Perſian troops plunder the camp of Cyrus.

[22] Apud Plutarch. in Artaxerx. [23] Xenoph. p. 266.

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Leſſer Aſia, dejected and diſmayed by the loſs of their prince and general. Among the valuable plunder in the tents of Cyrus, the Barbarians found two Grecian women, his favorite miſtreſſes, the elder of Phocæa, the younger of Miletus. The former, whoſe wit and accompliſhments heightened the charms of her beauty, received and deſerved the name of Aſpaſia, from the celebrated miſtreſs of Pericles, whoſe talents ſhe rivalled, and whoſe character ſhe too faithfully reſembled. The young Mileſian likewiſe fell into the hands of the enemy; but while careleſsly guarded by the Barbarians, intent on more uſeful plunder, eſcaped unobſerved, and arrived naked in the quarter of the Greeks, where a ſmall guard had been left to defend the baggage.

The Greeks, victorious in their quarter of the field, purſue the enemy.

Meanwhile Clearchus, at the head of the Grecian phalanx, purſuing the fugitives, had been carried above the diſtance of three miles from Artaxerxes. But when he heard that the Barbarians were in his tent; and perceived, that, tired with plunder, they advanced to attack his rear, he faced about in order to receive them. The time was ſpent, till ſun-ſet, in various diſpoſitions made by the cavalry of Artaxerxes; but neither the ſoldiers, nor their commanders, had courage to come within the reach of the Grecian ſpear. They fled in ſcattered diſorder, wherever the Grecians advanced; who, wearied with marching againſt an enemy that ſeemed incapable to fight, at length determined to return to their camp; wondering that neither Cyrus himſelf appeared, nor any of

his meſſengers [24]. They arrived in the beginning of the night, but found their tents in diſorder, their baggage plundered, their proviſions deſtroyed or ſpent. They chiefly regretted the loſs of four hundred carriages filled with wine and flour, which had been provided by the foreſight of Cyrus, as a reſource in time of want. Even theſe were rifled by the king's troops; and the Greeks, whom the ſudden appearance of the enemy had not allowed to dine, were obliged to paſs the night without ſupper; their bodies exhauſted by the fatigue of a laborious day, and their minds perplexed by the uncertain fate of their allies [25]. CHAP. XXV.

Behaviour of the Greeks when informed of Cyrus's death.

At the approach of light, they prepared to move their camp, when the meſſengers of Ariæus arrived, acquainting them with the death of Cyrus. The new commander, they ſaid, had aſſembled the troops of Leſſer Aſia in their former encampment, about twelve miles from the field of battle; where he intended to continue that day, that the Greeks might have time to join him; but if they delayed, he would next day proceed, without them, towards Ionia, with the utmoſt expedition. When

[24] In relating this battle, I have followed the advice of Plutarch in Artaxerxes, who ſays, "that Xenophon has deſcribed it with ſuch perſpicuity, elegance, and force, as ſets the action before the eyes of his reader, and makes him aſſiſt with emotion at every incident, not as paſt, but as preſent. A man of ſenſe, therefore, will deſpair to rival Xenophon; and, inſtead of relating the action in detail, will ſelect ſuch circumſtances only as are moſt worthy of notice."

[25] Xenoph. p. 270, et ſeqq.

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the Greeks recovered from the conſternation into which they were thrown by theſe unexpected and melancholy tidings, Clearchus replied, "Would to God Cyrus were alive! but ſince he is dead, let Ariæus know, that we have conquered the king; that his troops have every where fled before us; and that now no enemy appears to reſiſt our arms. You may, therefore, aſſure Ariæus, that if he will come hither, we will place him on the Perſian throne, which is the juſt reward of our victory." With this propoſal the meſſengers departed, and Clearchus led his troops to the field of battle, to collect proviſions, which were prepared by uſing for fuel the wooden bucklers, ſhields, and arrows, of the Barbarians [26].

Their anſwer to the heralds of Artaxerxes, who demanded their armor.

Next morning heralds arrived from Artaxerxes, who entertained a very different opinion from that expreſſed by Clearchus, concerning the iſſue of the battle. Among theſe reſpected miniſters was Philinus, a fugitive Greek, a man eſteemed by Tiſſaphernes, both as a ſkilful captain and as an able negociator When the chiefs were aſſembled, Philinus, ſpeaking for his colleagues, declared it to be the will of the great king, who had defeated and killed Cyrus, "That the Greeks, who had now become the ſlaves of the conqueror, ſhould ſurrender their arms." The demand was heard with univerſal indignation. One deſired him to tell the king "to come and take them;" another, "that it was better to die, than to deliver up their arms."

[26] Xenoph. p. 272.

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Xenophon ſpoke to the following purpoſe: "We have nothing, as you ſee, O Philinus! but our arms, and our valor. While we keep poſſeſſion of the one, we can avail ourſelves of the other: but, if we deliver up our arms, we alſo ſurrender our perſons. Do not therefore expect that we ſhall throw away the only advantages which we ſtill enjoy; on the contrary, be aſſured, that, relying on our arms and our valor, we will diſpute with you thoſe advantages which you poſſeſs." Clearchus enforced the ſentiments of Xenophon, which were confirmed by the army; and Philinus, after a fruitleſs attempt to diſcover the immediate deſigns of the Greeks, returned with his colleagues to the Perſian camp [27].

Their plan of retreat concerted with Ariæus.

Meanwhile, Ariæus replied to the honorable embaſſy which had been ſent him, "That there were many Perſians of greater conſideration than himſelf, who would never permit him to be their king; he repeated his deſire that the Greeks ſhould join him; but, if they declined to come, perſiſted in his reſolution of returning with all haſte to Ionia." This propoſal was approved by the propitious indications of the victims: the army marched in order of battle to the encampment of Ariæus; who, with the moſt diſtinguiſhed of his captains, entered into treaty with the Grecian commanders, binding themſelves by mutual oaths to perform to each other the duties of faithful and affectionate allies. Having ratified this engagement by a

[27] Xenoph. p. 273.

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ſolemn ſacrifice, they proceeded to deliberate concerning their intended journey. It was determined, that inſtead of traverſing the deſolated country by which they had arrived at the field of battle, they ſhould direct their courſe towards the north, by which means they would avoid the deſert, acquire proviſions in greater plenty, and croſs the great rivers, which commonly diminiſh near their ſource, with leſs difficulty and danger. They reſolved alſo to perform their firſt marches with all poſſible expedition, in order to anticipate the king's approach; ſince with a ſmall force he would not dare to follow, and with a great army he would not be able to overtake, them [28].

They accept a truce from Artaxerxes.

This plan of retreat propoſed by Ariæus, had the diſhonorable appearance of flight; but fortune proved a more glorious conductor. Such was the effect of the Grecian courage and firmneſs on the counſels of Artaxerxes, that he, who had ſo lately commanded the ſoldiers to ſurrender their arms, ſent heralds to them the day following to treat of a truce. This memorable agreement, the conſequences of which were ſo calamitous, yet ſo honorable to the Greeks, was concluded by the intervention of Tiſſaphernes; who engaged, on the part of his maſter, to furniſh them with a market, to cauſe them to be treated as friends in the countries through which they marched, and to conduct them without guile into Greece. For the Greeks, on the other hand, Clearchus and the generals ſwore,

[28] Xenoph. p. 276.

that they ſhould abſtain from ravaging the king's territories; that they ſhould ſupply themſelves with meat and drink only, when, by any accident, the market was not provided; but when it was, that they ſhould purchaſe whatever they wanted for a reaſonable price [29]. CHAP. XXV.

When this buſineſs was tranſacted, Tiſſaphernes returned to the king, promiſing to come back as ſoon as poſſible. But on various pretences, he delayed twenty days; during which the Perſians had an opportunity to practiſe with Ariæus. By the dread of puniſhment, if he perſiſted in rebellion; by the promiſe of pardon, if he returned to his allegiance; and, above all, by the warm ſolicitation of his kinſmen and friends, that unſteady Barbarian was totally detached from the intereſt of his Grecian allies. His conduct gave juſt ground to ſuſpect this diſpoſition, which became fully evident after the return of Tiſſaphernes. From that moment Ariæus no longer encamped with the Greeks, but preferred the neighbourhood of that perfidious ſatrap. Yet, for three weeks, no open hoſtility was committed; the armies, fearing, and feared by each other, purſued the ſame line of march; Tiſſaphernes led the way; and, according to agreement, furniſhed the Greeks with a market; but treacherouſly increaſed the difficulty of their journey, by conducting them by many windings through the canals and marſhes between the Tigris and Euphrates. When they had croſſed the Treachery of Tiſſaphernes and Ariæus.

[29] Xenoph. p. 281, et ſeqq.

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former river, they continued to march northward along its eaſtern banks, always encamping at the diſtance of two or three miles from the Barbarians. Yet this precaution was unable to prevent the parties ſent out to provide wood or forage from quarrelling with each other. From reproachful words, they ſoon proceeded to hoſtile actions; and theſe partial encounters were likely to produce the worſt conſequences, by inflaming the latent, but general animoſity, which it had been ſo difficult to ſtifle or conceal [30].

Perfidious ſeizure of the Grecian generals.

At length they arrived at the fatal ſcene, where the river Zabatus, flowing weſtward from the mountains of Media, pours its tributary waters into the broad ſtream of the Tigris. The Grecian generals, and particularly Clearchus, who had long ſeen and lamented the unfortunate jealouſies prevailing among thoſe who had ſworn mutual fidelity, propoſed a conference between the commanders, in order amicably to explain and remove every ground of hatred and complaint. Tiſſaphernes and Ariæus, as well as their colleague Orontes, eagerly deſired the conference, though their motives were very different from thoſe which actuated Clearchus. A meaſure ſo agreeable to both parties was, without difficulty, carried into execution; and the Greeks, on this occaſion alone, forſook that prudence and caution, which, both before and after, uniformly governed their conduct. Five generals, and twenty captains, repaired to the

[30] Xenoph. p. 282.

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tent of Tiſſaphernes; only two hundred ſoldiers followed them, under pretence of going to market. Clearchus, with his colleagues, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were conducted into the ſatrap's apartment; the reſt, whether captains or ſoldiers, were not allowed to enter. This ſeparation occaſioned fear and diſtruſt. The appearance of armed Barbarians increaſed the terror. A gloomy ſilence prevailed; when, on a given ſignal, thoſe within the tent were apprehended, and thoſe without cut to pieces. At the ſame time the Perſian cavalry ſcoured the plain, deſtroying whomever they encountered. The Greeks were aſtoniſhed at this mad excurſion, which they beheld from their camp; until Nicarchus, an Arcadian, came, miſerably mangled, and informed them of the dreadful tragedy that had been acted [31].

Artaxerxes ſends to the Greeks to demand their arms.

Upon this intelligence they ran to their arms; expecting an immediate aſſault. But the cowardly Barbarians, not daring to engage in open and honorable war, endeavoured to accompliſh their deſigns by the ſame impious treachery with which they had begun them. Inſtead of advancing in a body to attack the Grecian camp, they ſent Ariæus, Arteazus, and Mithridates, perſons whoſe great credit with Cyrus might prevent their intentions from being ſuſpected by the enemy. They were attended by three hundred Perſians, clad in complete armor. When they drew near to the Greeks, a herald called out, "That, if any of

[31] Xenoph. p. 286, et ſeqq.

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the generals or captains were preſent, they ſhould advance, in order to be made acquainted with the king's pleaſure." Cheiriſophus the Lacedæmonian, who, next to Clearchus, had hitherto maintained the greateſt influence over the army, happened to be abſent with a party of foragers. But the remaining generals, Cleanor the Orchomenian, and Sophonetus the Stymphalian, proceeded with caution from the camp, accompanied by Xenophon the Athenian, who (though only a volunteer) followed the commanders, that he might learn what was become of his friend Proxenus [32]. When they came within hearing of the Barbarians, Ariæus ſaid, "Clearchus, O Greeks! having violated his oath, and the articles of peace, is puniſhed with juſt death; but Proxenus and Menon, who gave information of his crimes, are rewarded with the king's favor. Of you the king demands your arms, which, he ſays, are now his property, becauſe they belonged to Cyrus, who was his ſlave." Cleanor the Orchomenian, ſpeaking in the name of the reſt, replied to this demand with the utmoſt indignation, reproaching the perfidy of Ariæus, who had betrayed the friends and benefactors of his maſter Cyrus; and who co-operated with the enemy of that maſter, the deceitful and impious Tiſſaphernes. The Perſian endeavoured to juſtify himſelf, by repeating his accuſation of Clearchus. Upon which Xenophon obſerved, "That Clearchus, if guilty of perjury, had been juſtly puniſhed;

Conference on that ſubject.

[32] Xenoph. p. 228, et ſeqq.

but

but where are Proxenus and Menon, who are *your* benefactors, and *our* commanders? Let them, at leaſt, be ſent to us, ſince it is evident that their friendſhip for both parties will make them adviſe what is beſt for both." This reaſonable requeſt it was impoſſible to elude; and the Barbarians, after long conferring together, departed without attempting an anſwer [33]. Their mean duplicity in this interview ſufficiently indicated the unhappy treatment of the Grecian commanders, who were kept in cloſe captivity, and afterwards ſent to Artaxerxes, by whoſe order they were put to death.

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[33] Xenoph. p. 289.

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Conſternation of the Greeks. — Manly Advice of Xenophon. — Their Retreat. — Difficulties attending it — Surmounted by their Skill and Perſeverance. — Their Sufferings among the Carduchian Mountains. — They traverſe Armenia. — Firſt behold the Sea from Mount Thecbes. — Defeat the Colchians. — Deſcription of the ſouthern Shore of the Euxine. — Tranſactions with the Greek Colonies there. — The Greeks arrive at Byzantium. — Enter into the Service of Seuthes. — His Hiſtory. — Conjunct Expeditions of the Greeks and Thracians. — The Greeks return to the Service of their Country.

CHAP. XXVI. Conſternation of the Greeks.

THE perfidious aſſaſſination of their commanders converted the alarm and terror, that had hitherto reigned in the Grecian camp, into conſternation and deſpair. This dreadful cataſtrophe completed the afflictions of men diſtant above twelve hundred miles from their native land; ſurrounded by craggy mountains, deep and rapid rivers; by famine, war, and the treachery of their allies, ſtill more formidable than the reſentment of their enemies. The ſoldiers reflected, that it was dangerous to depart, yet more dangerous to remain; proviſions could be acquired only by the point of the ſword; every country was hoſtile;

although they conquered one enemy, another would be ſtill ready to receive them; they wanted cavalry to purſue the Barbarians, or to elude their purſuit; victory itſelf would be fruitleſs; defeat, certain ruin. CHAP. XXVI.

Amidſt theſe melancholy reflections they had ſpent the greater part of the night; when Xenophon the Athenian, inſpired, as he acknowledges, by a favorable dream, and animated, as his conduct proves, by the native vigor of a virtuous mind, rouſed and emboldened by adverſity, undertook, amidſt the general dejection and diſmay, the care of his own and of the public ſafety. Having aſſembled the captains belonging to the diviſion of his beloved Proxenus, he faithfully repreſented to them their ſituation, which dangerous as it was, ought not to ſink brave men to deſpair. Even in the worſt circumſtances, fortitude, and fortitude alone, could afford relief. They had been deceived, but not conquered, by the Barbarians; whoſe perfidious violation of faith, friendſhip, and hoſpitality, rendered them odious and contemptible to men and gods; the gods, who were the umpires of the conteſt, and whoſe aſſiſtance could make the cauſe of juſtice and valor prevail over every ſuperiority of ſtrength and numbers [1]. Manly advice of Xenophon;

The manly piety of Xenophon was communicated, by a generous ſympathy, to the breaſts of his hearers; who, diſperſing through the various quarters of the camp, ſummoned together the who, together with Cheiriſophus the Spartan, is

[1] Xenoph. p. 295.

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principal officers in the army. To them Xenophon addreſſed a ſimilar diſcourſe, encouraging them by every argument that religion, philoſophy, experience, and particularly their own experience, and that of the Grecian hiſtory, could afford, to expect ſucceſs from their own bravery, and the favor of Heaven, and to diſdain the offers of accommodation (if ſuch ſhould be made) from their impious foes, whoſe inſidious friendſhip had always proved more hurtful than their open enmity. The hearty approbation of the Spartan Cheiriſophus added weight and authority to the perſuaſive eloquence of the Athenian; who farther exhorted them to ſubſtitute commanders in the room of thoſe whom they had loſt; to diſentangle themſelves from every ſuperfluous encumberance that might obſtruct the progreſs of their march, and to advance with all expedition towards the ſources of the Tigris and Euphrates, in the form of a hollow ſquare, having the baggage and thoſe who attended it in the middle, and preſenting the valor of their battalions on every ſide to the enemy. Theſe reſolutions were unanimouſly approved by the council, after which they were referred to the aſſembled troops, by whom they were readily confirmed, and carried into immediate execution [a]. Timaſion, Xanthicles, Cleanor, Philyſias, ſucceeded to the late commanders; Xenophon ſupplied the place of Proxenus; and ſo ably was the aſcendant of Spartan and Athenian virtue maintained

[a] Xenoph. p. 299.

by him and Cheiriſophus, that the names of their unequal colleagues will ſeldom occur in the following narrative of their retreat. CHAP. XXVI.

The greater part of the day had been employed in theſe neceſſary meaſures; and in the afternoon, the troops having paſſed the Zabatus, purſued their march in the diſpoſition recommended by Xenophon. But they had not proceeded far, before their rear was haraſſed by the Perſian archers and cavalry, which afforded them a very inauſpicious preſage of the hardſhips to which they muſt be continually expoſed in eighteen days journey along the level frontiers of Media. It was difficult to repel theſe light ſkirmiſhers, and impoſſible to attack them without being expoſed to conſiderable loſs; becauſe a detachment of heavy-armed men, or even of targeteers, could not overtake them in a ſhort ſpace, nor could they continue the purſuit without being cut off from the reſt of the army. Xenophon, with more valor than prudence, tried the unfortunate experiment; but was obliged to retreat fighting, and brought back his men wounded, diſheartened, and diſgraced [1].

The Greeks haraſſed in their retreat by the Perſian archers and cavalry.

But this unfortunate event neither diſheartened nor diſgraced the commander. He ingenuouſly acknowledged his error, which, pernicious as it was, had taught the Greeks their wants. They wanted cavalry and light-armed troops; the former of which might be obtained by equipping for war the baggage-horſes which had been taken from

They equip their ſhmpter-horſes for war, and furniſh the Rhodians with ſlings.

[1] Xenoph. p. 305, et ſeqq.

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the enemy; and the latter might be ſupplied by the Rhodians (well ſkilled in the ſling), of whom there were great numbers in the army. This advice was approved; a company of fifty horſemen was ſoon raiſed, the men vying with each other to obtain the honor of this diſtinguiſhed ſervice; and two hundred Rhodians were drawn from the ranks, who furniſhed themſelves with ſlings and leaden balls, which they threw twice as far as the ſtones employed by the Barbarians. The horſemen wore buff coats and corſlets; they were commanded by Lycius the Athenian [e].

Their ſucceſs in conſequence of theſe meaſures.

The utility of theſe preparations was diſcovered as ſoon as the enemy renewed their aſſaults, with a thouſand horſe, and four thouſand ſlingers and archers. The newly-raiſed troops advanced with boldneſs and celerity, being aſſured that their unequal attack would be ſuſtained by the targeteers and heavy-armed men. But the Perſians, not waiting to receive them, fled in ſcattered diſorder; the Greeks purſued, took many priſoners, made great ſlaughter, and mangled the bodies of the ſlain, in order to terrify, by ſuch a dreadful ſpectacle of revenge, their cowardly and perfidious enemies [f].

New difficulties with which they had to ſtruggle.

After this advantage, the army continued to march along the banks of the Tigris, and the weſtern boundaries of Media, meeting with many rich and populous villages, from which they were ſupplied with proviſions; and admiring, as they

[e] Xenoph. p. 307. [f] Ibid. p. 308.

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paſſed along, the immenſe walls, the lofty and durable pyramids, the ſpacious but deſerted cities, which teſtified the ancient greatneſs of that flouriſhing kingdom, before the Medes reluctantly ſubmitted to the oppreſſive government of Perſia. The Barbarians ſtill endeavoured to annoy them, but with very little ſucceſs, unleſs when they paſſed a bridge, or any narrow defile. On ſuch occaſions, the ſquare form, in which they had hitherto marched, was found doubly inconvenient [f]. In order to traverſe ſuch a paſſage, the ſoldiers were obliged to cloſe the wings, and to crowd into a narrow ſpace, which diſordered the ranks, and made them obſtruct each other. When they had croſſed the bridge or defile, they were again obliged to run with all haſte, in order to extend the wings, and reſume their ranks, which occaſioned a void in the centre, and much diſheartened the men, thus expoſed to the ſudden attack of the purſuers.

Surmounted by their military skill.

To obviate both inconveniences, the Greeks ſeparated from the army ſix companies, each conſiſting of an hundred men. Theſe were ſubdivided into ſmaller bodies, of fifty and twenty-five, each diviſion of the company, as well as the whole, commanded by proper officers. When it became neceſſary to cloſe the wings, in order to paſs a defile, theſe troops ſtaid behind, thus diſburdening the army of a ſuperfluous maſs, and thereby enabling them to proceed without confuſion

[f] Xenoph. p. 310.

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in their ranks. After the paſſage was effected, the army might again extend the wings, and aſſume the ſame looſe arrangement as before, without expoſing the centre to danger; becauſe the vacuity left there was immediately ſupplied by the detached companies; the opening, if ſmall, being filled up by the ſix diviſions of an hundred men each; if larger, by the twelve diviſions of fifty, and if very large, by the twenty-four diviſions of twenty-five[7]; as the ſame number of men, in proportion to the number of columns into which they were divided, would occupy a wider extent of ground[8].

The Greeks approach the country of the Carduchians.

With this uſeful precaution the Greeks performed a ſucceſsful march to the mountains of the Carduchians, where the enemy's cavalry could no longer annoy them. But here they found new difficulties, far more formidable than thoſe with which they had hitherto been obliged to contend. The Tigris, on their left, was ſo deep and rapid, that the paſſage appeared abſolutely impracticable. Before them roſe the high and craggy mountains, which overſhadowed the river, inhabited by a

[7] Xenoph. p. 310.

[8] I have explained this matter minutely, becauſe the words of Xenophon are miſtaken by great military writers. Major Mauvillon, a skilful engineer and excellent ſcholar, propoſes a tranſpoſition of the words of Xenophon, that the greater gaps may be filled up by the greater diviſions. He juſtly obſerves, that no tranſlator or commentator has taken notice of the difficulty that naturally preſents itſelf on reading the paſſage, which however, I hope is ſufficiently perſpicuous in the text. See l'Eſſai ſur l'Influence de la Poudre à Canon, etc. a work which, I believe, no military man can read without receiving from it inſtruction and entertainmeot.

warlike race of men, whoſe barbarous independence had always defied the hoſtilities [9] of Perſia, as that of their ſucceſſors, the modern Curdes, does the arms of the Turk, to whom they are but nominally ſubject [10]. While the Greeks doubted what courſe to purſue, a certain Rhodian undertook to deliver them from their perplexity, provided they gave him a talent, to reward his labor. "I ſhall want, beſides," continued he, "two thouſand leather bags, which may be obtained by flaying the ſheep, goats, oxen, and aſſes, which the country affords in ſuch numbers as we ſee around us. The ſkins may be blown, tied at the ends, and faſtened together by the girts belonging to the ſumpter-horſes, then covered with faſcines, and laſtly with earth. I ſhall uſe large ſtones inſtead of anchors; every bag will bear two men, whom the faſcines and earth will prevent from ſlipping, and whom, with very little labor on their part, the rapidity of the current will waft acroſs the river [11]."

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Ingenious contrivance of a Rhodian for paſſing the Tigris.

This ingenious contrivance was commended, but not carried into execution; the Grecians having learned from ſome priſoners recently taken, that the road through the country of the Carduchians would ſoon conduct them to the ſpacious and plentiful province of Armenia. Thither they fearleſsly penetrated, regardleſs of the report, that under a former reign, a Perſian army of a hundred

The ſufferings of the Greeks among the mountains of the Carduchians.

[9] Xenoph. p. 315.
[10] Rauwolf's Travels.
[11] Xenoph. p. 314.

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and twenty thouſand men had been cut off by thoſe fierce barbarians, whoſe manners were more rude and inhoſpitable than the mountains which they inhabited. At the approach of the Greeks, the Carduchians retired to their faſtneſſes, leaving the villages in the plain at the mercy of the invaders. The troops were reſtrained from injury; but their inoffenſive behaviour, and kind invitations to peace, were regarded with contempt by the common enemies of the Greeks, of the Perſians, and of human kind. They ſeized every opportunity to obſtruct the march of the army; and though unprepared for a cloſe engagement, uſed with extraordinary effect their bows, three cubits long, which they bent by preſſing the lower part with their left foot. The arrows were near as long as the bows; and their irreſiſtible points pierced the firmeſt ſhields and corſlets. The Greeks employed their ſkill in tactics, and their valor, to elude, or to repel, the aſſault of theſe dangerous foes, from whom they ſuffered more in ſeven days than they had done in as many weeks from the braveſt troops of Artaxerxes [12]. At length they arrived at the river Centrites, two hundred feet broad, which forms the ſouthern boundary of Armenia, having juſt reaſon to rejoice that they had eſcaped the weapons of the Carduchians, whoſe poſterity, the Parthians [13], with the ſame arms and addreſs, became formidable to Rome, when Rome was formidable to the world [14].

[12] Xenoph. p. 218—226. [13] Strabo, l. xvi. p. 515.
[14] Plut. in Craſſo et Marc. Anton.

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They traverſe Armenia.

The month of January was employed in traverſing the fruitful plains of Armenia [15], which are beautifully diverſified by hills of eaſy aſcent. Teribazus, the Perſian governor of the province, entered into an agreement with the generals, that if they abſtained from hoſtilities, he would not obſtruct their march, but furniſh them plentifully with proviſions. But this league was perfidiouſly violated. The Greeks had recourſe to arms; purſued Teribazus; aſſaulted and plundered his camp [16]. Next day they were expoſed to a more dangerous conteſt, in which neither ſkill nor valor could avail. The ſnow fell in ſuch quantities during the night, as completely covered the men with their arms. Their bodies were benumbed and parched with the piercing coldneſs of the north-wind. Many ſlaves and ſumpter-horſes periſhed, with about thirty ſoldiers. The reſt could ſcarcely be perſuaded by Xenophon to put themſelves in motion, which was known to be the only remedy for their diſtreſs; and as the ſeverity of the weather ſtill continued during the remainder of their march through Armenia, ſeveral ſoldiers loſt their ſight by the glare of the ſnow, and their toes and fingers by the intenſeneſs of the cold [17]. The eyes were beſt defended by wearing ſomething black before

In danger of periſhing by the intenſe cold of that country.

[15] There the Greeks found παντα τα επιτηδεια, ὁσα εϛιν αγαθα, ἱερεια, σιτον, οἰνους παλαιους ευωδεις, αϛαφιδας, οσπρια παντοδαπα; "all kinds of neceſſaries, and even luxuries, victims, corn, old fragrant wines, dried grapes, and all ſorts of pulſe."

[16] Xenoph. p. 328. [17] Ibid. p. 329, et ſeqq.

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them; the feet were preſerved by conſtant motion in the day, and by ſtripping bare in the night.

Proceed through the territories of the Taochians.

From Armenia they proceeded to the country of the Taochians, who, alarmed by the approach of an unknown enemy, had abandoned the vallies, and taken refuge on the mountains, with their wives, children, and cattle. Hither alſo they had conveyed all their proviſions; ſo that the Greeks were obliged to attack theſe faſtneſſes, otherwiſe the army muſt have been ſtarved. The Barbarians boldly defended them, by letting fly innumerable vollies of ſtones down the precipices. But this artillery was at length exhauſted; the Greeks became maſters of the heights; and a dreadful ſcene followed. The women firſt threw their children down the rocks, and then themſelves. The men imitated this frantic example of deſpair; ſo that the aſſailants made few priſoners; but took a conſiderable quantity of ſheep, oxen, and aſſes [11].

The fierce and fearleſs character of the Chalybeans.

From thence the army proceeded with uncommon celerity through the bleak and rocky country of the Chalybeans; marching, in ſeven days, about an hundred and fifty miles. The Chalybeans were the fierceſt nation in all thoſe parts. They wore, for their defence, linen corſlets, greaves, and helmets; they carried a ſhort falchion at their girdles; and attacked with pikes fifteen cubits long. Inſtead of diſcovering any ſymptoms of flight or fear, they ſang, danced, and rejoiced, at the approach of an enemy. They boldly defended

[11] Xenoph. p. 338.

their villages; not declining even a cloſe engagement with the Greeks; who could ſupply themſelves with nothing from this inhoſpitable and warlike country, but, in their dangerous march through it, ſubſiſted entirely on the cattle lately taken from the Taochians [19].

The river Harpaſus, four hundred feet broad, ſeparated the territories of the Chalybeans and Scythinians. From the latter the Greeks met with little reſiſtance, in a march of thirteen days, which brought them to the lofty mount Theches, a place held in particular devotion by the inhabitants of the neighbouring territory. The vanguard had no ſooner aſcended this ſacred mountain, than the army were alarmed by loud ſhouts, which continued to redouble with increaſing violence. It was imagined that ſome new form of danger had appeared, or that ſome new enemy was ready to aſſail them. The rear advanced with all poſſible expedition to the aſſiſtance of their companions; but having arrived within hearing, were ſeized with the moſt pleaſing aſtoniſhment, when their ears were ſaluted from every quarter with the repetition, "The ſea! the ſea!" the ſight of which, a ſight ſo long wiſhed in vain, at firſt filled them with tranſports of tumultuous joy, and afterwards recalled more diſtinctly the remembrance of their parents, their friends, their country, and every object of their moſt tender concern [20]. The ſoldiers, with tears in their eyes, embraced

The Greeks arrive at mount Theches, from which they behold the ſea.

[19] Xenoph. p. 338. [20] Ibid. p. 339.

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each other, and embraced their commanders; and then, as by a hidden conſent of ſympathy (for it was never known by whoſe orders), heaped up a mount of ſtones, which they covered with barbaric arms, as a trophy of their memorable journey through ſo many fierce and hoſtile nations.

They paſs through the country of the Macronians.

The diſtant proſpect of the Euxine made them forget that they had not yet attained the end of their labors. A ſpace, indeed, of leſs than ſixty miles intervened; but it was covered by the trackleſs foreſts of the Macronians, and by the abrupt and intricate windings of the Colchian mountains. A fortunate circumſtance enabled them without difficulty to ſurmount the firſt of thoſe obſtacles. Among the Grecian targeteers was a man who underſtood the language of the Barbarians. He had been carried to Athens in his youth, where he had ſerved as a ſlave. At the ſight of the Macronians, he recogniſed his long-forgotten countrymen; and having addreſſed them in terms of friendſhip and reſpect, engaged them to exchange preſents, and to enter into alliance with the Greeks [21], whom they plentifully ſupplied with proviſions, and having cut down the trees that interrupted their paſſage, conducted them in three days to the weſtern frontier of Colchos.

Enter Colchos.

This country, ſo famous in the fables of antiquity [22], was inhabited by an ancient colony of Egyptians, who long preſerved pure from any foreign admixture, not only their original language,

[21] Xenoph. p. 340. [22] See Vol. I. p. 19, et ſeqq.

but the ſingular manners; and the more ſingular rites and ceremonies, of their mother-country [23]. Though diſtinguiſhed in other reſpects from the neighbouring nations, whom they deteſted, and to whom they ſeemed deteſtable, they agreed with them in their jealouſy of the Greeks, whoſe flouriſhing colonies along the ſouthern ſhores of the Euxine threatened the ſafety of their dominions. They aſſembled therefore from all quarters, occupied the heights, and prepared to diſpute the paſſage with obſtinacy. Their numbers, their diſcipline, their arms, but, ſtill more, their ſituation, rendered them formidable. If the Greeks advanced in a phalanx, or full line, their ranks would be broken by the inequalities of the ground, the centre would be diſordered, and the ſuperior numbers of the enemy would outreach either wing [24]. Theſe inconveniences might partly be remedied by making ſuch parts of the line, as had an eaſy aſcent, wait for the ſlow and difficult progreſs of their companions through more abrupt and inacceſſible mountains; and, by extending the phalanx in length, and leaving very few men in file, their front might be rendered equal to that of the Colchians But the firſt of theſe operations would have too long expoſed the army to the darts and arrows of the Barbarians, and the ſecond would have ſo much enfeebled the line, as muſt have rendered it liable to be penetrated. Amidſt this choice of difficulties,

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[23] Herodot. l. xi. c. civ. [24] Idem, p. 341.

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Xenophon propoſed, and the propoſal was readily approved by his colleagues, that the heavy-armed men ſhould be divided into companies of an hundred each, and that each diviſion ſhould be thrown into a ſeparate column. The wide intervals between the columns might thus enable the ſmaller army to extend on the right and left beyond the enemy's line; each company or diviſion might aſcend the mountain wherever they found it moſt convenient; the braveſt men might be led firſt to the charge; the depth of the columns [25] could not poſſibly be penetrated; nor could the enemy fall into the intervals between them, without being cut off by the diviſions on either ſide, which might be arranged in ſuch a manner as to relieve, encourage, and ſupport each other.

Defeat the Colchians.

This judicious diſpoſition was attended with the expected ſucceſs. The heavy-armed men formed eighty companies; the targeteers and archers, divided into three bodies, each of about ſix hundred men, flanked the army on the right and left. Their third diviſion, conſiſting chiefly of Arcadians, occupied a diſtinguiſhed place in the centre. Thus diſpoſed for battle, the wings of the Grecian army, and particularly the targeteers and archers, who were moſt capable of expedition, advanced with

[25] The λοχος ορθιος is defined by Arrian to be a body of men, with the files longer than the ranks; that is, with more men in depth than in front. The Φαλαγξ, without any epithet, means the contrary. But the Φαλαγξ ορθια is an army, as the ſame author tells us, ὁταν επι κερως πορευνται, that is, having more men in depth than in front, and employing, for ſome extraordinary reaſon, what is naturally the line of march as an order of battle.

celerity

celerity to the attack. The enemy, who ſaw them approach, and who perceived that on either hand they outreached their line, filed to the right and left in order to receive them. By this movement they left a void in their centre, towards which the Arcadian targeteers, ſupported by the neareſt columns, advanced with rapidity, and ſoon gained the ſummit. They could thus fight on equal terms with the Barbarians, who, thinking they had loſt all when they loſt the advantage of the ground, no longer offered reſiſtance, but fled on every ſide with diſordered trepidation, leaving the Greeks maſters of the field of battle, as well as of the numerous villages in that neighbourhood [26], and within two days march of the Euxine ſea, without any other enemy to oppoſe their long-diſputed paſſage thither. CHAP. XXVI.

Deſcription of the ſouthern ſhore of the Euxine.

The ſouthern ſhore of the Euxine, which actually preſents one uniform ſcene of effeminate indolence and ſullen tyranny, anciently contained many barbarous but warlike tribes, totally independent on each other, and ſcarcely acknowledging any dependance on the king of Perſia. That part which extends towards the eaſt and the borders of Mount Caucaſus, and which afterwards formed the kingdom of the great Mithridates, was inhabited by the Colchians, Drillians, Myſonæcians, and Tybarenians; the middle diviſion was poſſeſſed by the Paphlagonians, who gloried in the irreſiſtible proweſs of their numerous cavalry; and the weſtern parts, extending two hundred miles from Heraclea

[26] Xenoph. p. 342.

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to the Thracian Boſphorus, were occupied by the inhoſpitable Bithynians; a colony of Thrace, who excelled and delighted in war, which, like their anceſtors in Europe, they carried on with a ſavage fury [27].

The Greek colony of Sinopé.

Amidſt the formidable hoſtility of thoſe numerous nations aroſe, at wide intervals, ſeveral Grecian cities, which enlivened the barbaric gloom, and diſplayed the peculiar glory of their arts and arms. Sinopé, the mother and the queen of thoſe cities, was advantageouſly ſituated on a narrow iſthmus which joined its territory, conſiſting in a ſmall but fertile peninſula [28], to the province of Paphlagonia. The foundation of Sinopé remounted to the higheſt antiquity, and was aſcribed to Antolycus, one of the Argonauts [29]. The city was afterwards increaſed by a powerful acceſſion of Mileſians. It poſſeſſed convenient harbours on either ſide of the iſthmus. The peninſula was ſurrounded by ſharp rocks, which rendered it inacceſſible to an enemy; and the ſea abounded with the tunny-fiſh, which flow in ſhoals from the Palus Mæotis, where they are ſuppoſed to be bred [30], to the Euxine and Propontis.

[27] See Dionyſius Periegetes, and Arrian's Periplus.

[28] Tournefort, v. iii. p. 46. ſays it is about ſix miles in circumference.

[29] See the account of the Argonautic expedition, vol. i. p. 89. et ſeqq. Strabo, l. xii. p. 546. who gives us this information, ſays farther, that Lucullus, when he took the town, carried away the ſtatue of Antolycus.

[30] Tournefort, Voyage au Levant.

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Such multiplied advantages rendered the Sinopians populous and powerful. They diffuſed their colonies to the eaſt and weſt. It is not improbable that they founded Heraclea [11], on the frontier of Bithynia; and it is certain that they built Cotyora in the territory of the Tybarenians, Ceraſus in that of the Myſonæcians, and Trapezus in that of the Drillians.

The Sinopians found new colonies on that coaſt.

Trapezus, or Trebizond, was the firſt friendly city at which the Grecians arrived, after ſpending more than a twelvemonth in almoſt continual travelling and war. The numerous inhabitants of this flouriſhing ſea-port, which has now decayed into the much-neglected harbour of Platana [12], received them with open arms, generouſly ſupplied their wants, and treated them with all that endearing yet reſpectful hoſpitality of kinſmen, who commiſerated their ſufferings and admired their virtue. The Grecians, on their part, diſplayed a very juſt and becoming ſenſe of the evils which they had eſcaped, and of their actual ſecurity. In the fervor of religious gratitude they paid the ſolemn vows and ſacrifices which they had promiſed to

The Greeks are hoſpitably received at Trebizond, one of theſe colonies.

[11] Strabo, l. xii. p. 542. calls Heraclea a colony of the Mileſians, by whom we may underſtand the Sinopians, who were themſelves a colony of that people. Xenophoo, however, called Heraclea a colony of Megarenos. Xenoph. Anabaſ. p. 358.

[12] Tournefort, l. xvii. This place, however, is ſtill large, but depopulated; containing more woods and gardens than houſes, and thoſe only of one ſtory; yet the town retains the form of an oblong ſquare, the modern walls being built on the ruins of the ancient, the ſhape of which occaſioned the name of Trapezus, from the Greek word ſignifying a table. Tournefort, ibid.

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Jupiter the preſerver, and the other gods and heroes, whoſe bountiful protection had hitherto conducted them through ſo many known, and ſo many concealed dangers. They afterwards celebrated, with much pomp and feſtivity, the gymnaſtic games and exerciſes; an entertainment equally agreeable to themſelves, to the citizens of Trebizond, and to the divinities whom they both adored. When theſe eſſential duties, for ſuch the Greeks deemed them, had been performed with univerſal ſatisfaction, the ſoldiers, who were unwilling to be burdenſome to their Trebizontian friends, found ſufficient employment in providing for their own ſubſiſtence, and that of their numerous attendants. For ſeveral days they ravaged the neighbouring villages of the Colchians and Drillians; and while they cruelly haraſſed the enemies, they carefully reſpected the allies of Trebizond. Their repeated devaſtations at length deſolated the country immediately around them, ſo that the foraging parties could no longer ſet out and return on the ſame day; nor could they penetrate deep into the territory, without being endangered by the nocturnal aſſaults of the Barbarians. Theſe circumſtances rendered it neceſſary for them to think of leaving Trebizond; on which account an aſſembly was convened to fix the day of their departure, and to regulate the mode and plan of their future journey[31].

Cheiriſophus ſails to the

In this important deliberation the ſoldiers very generally embraced the opinion of Antileon of

[31] Xenoph. 343, et ſeqq.

Thuria, who told them that, for his part, he was already tired with packing up his baggage, marching, running, mounting guard, and fighting, and now wiſhed, after all his labors, to perform the remainder of the journey like Ulyſſes, and, ſtretched out at his eaſe, to be carried aſleep[34] into Greece. That this pleaſing propoſal might be put in execution, Cheiriſophus ſailed to the Helleſpont, hoping to obtain ſhips from Anaxibius, who commanded the Spartan fleet in that ſea. But in caſe ſuch a requeſt could not be conveniently granted, the ſoldiers determined to demand a few ſhips of war from the inhabitants of Trebizond, with which they intended to put to ſea, and to capture whatever merchantmen they could meet with in the Euxine; in order to employ them as tranſports[35].

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Helle. ſpont to demand tranſports from the Spartan admiral.

Several weeks elapſed without bringing any news of Cheiriſophus, or promiſing any hope of aſſiſtance

Mean- while the Greeks

[34] Thus was Ulyſſes tranſported by the Phæacians, who placed him ſleeping on the ſhore of Ithaca:

Οἱ δε ευδοντ' εν νηι θοῃ επι ποντον αγοντες
Κατθεσαν εν ιθακῃ, etc Odyſſ. xiii. 133.

The beautiful images which the poet, in the ſame book, gives of the pleaſures of reſt, after immoderate labor, played about the fancy of Antileon:

Και τῳ νηδυμος ὑπνος επι βλεφαροισι επιπτη
Νηγρετος ἡδιστος θανατῳ αγχιστα εοικως. v. 80.

And again, "The ſhip cut the waves with a rapidity, which tha flight of the ſwifteſt hawk could not accompany, carrying a man.

Ὁς πριν μεν μαλα πολλα παῤ αλγεα ὃν κατα θυμον
Ανδρων τε πτολεμους, αλεγεινα τε κυματα πειρων.
Δη τοτε γ' ατρεμας ευδε, λελασμενος ὁσσ' επεπονθει."

[35] Xenoph. p. 345.

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from the Spartan admiral. Meanwhile the Grecian pirates, for they deſerve no better name, infeſted the Euxine ſea. Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian, with a degree of perfidy worthy of his commiſſion, betrayed his companions, and ſailed off with the galley which he commanded[36]. But Polycrates, the Athenian, behaved with an ardor and fidelity which even robbers ſometimes diſplay in their tranſactions with each other; and his ſucceſsful diligence ſoon collected ſuch a number of veſſels as ſerved to tranſport to Ceraſus the aged, the infirm, the women and baggage; while the ſtrength of the army, conſiſting of men below forty years of age, reached the ſame place in three days march[37].

capture the merchantmen in the Euxine; in which they tranſport their ſick, &c. to Ceraſus.

The colony of Ceraſus, or Cerazunt, was delightfully ſituated near the ſea, among hills of eaſy aſcent, covered in every age[38] with whole woods of cherry-trees, from which, in all probability, the place derived its name[39]. From thence the voluptuous Lucullus, in the ſix hundred and eightieth year of Rome, firſt brought into Italy this delicious fruit, which ancient naturaliſts ſcarcely believed capable of thriving in an Italian ſky; but which actually adorns the bleakeſt and moſt northern

Tranſactions of the Greeks at that place.

[36] Xenoph. p. 345. [37] Xenoph. p. 349.

[38] Tournefort.

[39] Κερασος, ceraſus, ceriſe, cherry. For a ſimilar reaſon Tadmor in the deſert was called Palmyra, *à palmis*, the palm-tree. Tournefort mentions it as the opinion of St. Jerom, that the place gave name to the fruit. The difference is not material.

regions of our own iſland. At Ceraſus the Greeks remained ten days, diſpoſing of their booty, ſupplying their wants, and reviewing the army, which ſtill amounted to eight thouſand ſix hundred men, the reſt having periſhed by fatigue, war, cold, and ſickneſs[40]. CHAP. XXVI.

They traverſe the territories of the Moſynæcians;

After this neceſſary delay, the leſs active portion again embarked, while the vigorous youth purſued their journey through the romantic country of the Moſynæcians; a barbarous, yet powerful tribe, who received their ſingular denomination from the wooden houſes, or rather towers, which they inhabited[41]; and which, either by chance or deſign, were ſcattered in ſuch a manner among the hills and vallies, that at the diſtance of eight miles, the villages could hear and alarm each other[42]. The army next proceeded through the dark and narrow diſtrict of the Chalybians, who ſubſiſted by the working of iron; and whoſe toilſome labors, rugged mountains, and more rugged manners[43], muſt have formed a ſtriking contraſt with the ſmiling plains, the paſtoral life[44], the innocent and hoſpitable character of their Tybarenian neighbours; who treated the Greeks with every mark of friendſhip and reſpect, and conducted them, with attentive civility, to the city of Cotyora.

Chalybians;

and Tybarenians.

It might be expected, that the army, having reached the country of their friends and kinſmen,

Diſſenſions in the camp.

[40] Xenoph. p. 349. [41] Μοσυν et τιχεω.

[42] Xenoph. p. 351. [43] Idem, p. 354.

[44] Dionyſius Periegetes qualifies them by the epithet πολυμηλους, abounding in sheep.

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Soon after their arrival in Cotyora.

ſhould have been diſpoſed peaceably to enjoy the fruits of their paſt labors and dangers. If they were unwilling to expoſe themſelves to freſh hoſtilities from the warlike inhabitants of Paphlagonia and Bithynia, they might have waited the arrival of ſhips from Sinopé and Heraclea, or from the Spartan admiral in the Helleſpont, who would either retain them in his own ſervice, or tranſport them to the Cherſoneſus, to Byzantium, and to other cities and territories, which, being lately conquered by Sparta, required the vigilant protection of brave and numerous garriſons. But it is more eaſy for men to repel the aſſaults of external violence, than to elude the effects of their own ungovernable paſſions. The Greeks were involved in real danger, in proportion as they attained apparent ſecurity. During the long courſe of their laborious journey, the terror of unknown Barbarians hanging over them, preſerved their diſcipline and their union. But the air of a Grecian colony at once diſſolved both. They, who in the remote regions of the Eaſt had acted with one ſoul, and regarded each other as brethren, again felt the unhappy influence of their provincial diſtinctions. The army was divided by ſeparate intereſts, as well as by partial attachments. Thoſe who had acquired wealth, deſired to return home to enjoy it. Thoſe who were deſtitute of fortune, longed to plunder friends and foes, Greeks and Barbarians. The commanders deſpiſed and deceived the troops; the troops clamored againſt, and inſulted the commanders. Both were really in the wrong;

and both ſuſpected and accuſed each other of imaginary crimes, of which none were guilty.

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Xenophon's great views defeated by the mean jealouſy of his enemies.

Xenophon, who, with wonderful addreſs, has juſtified himſelf from every reproach[45] that can reflect either on his underſtanding or his heart, does not deny an imputation to which he was expoſed by diſcovering (ſomewhat, perhaps, unſeaſonably) the juſt and extenſive views of a philoſopher. When he ſurveyed the ſouthern ſhores of the Euxine, covered in ancient times, as well as they are at preſent, with tall and majeſtic foreſt-trees, admirably adapted to ſhip-building; when he conſidered the convenience of the harbours, and the productions of the neighbouring territory, conſiſting in flax, iron, and every commodity moſt neceſſary in raiſing a naval power, he was ambitious of eſtabliſhing a new ſettlement, which the numbers, the valor, and the activity of his followers, muſt ſoon render ſuperior to the other Grecian colonies on the Euxine, or perhaps in any part of Aſia. But this noble deſign, which might have proved ſo uſeful and honorable to the army, was blaſted by the mean jealouſy of his enemies. Xenophon was reproached with forming projects equally romantic and dangerous; and accuſed of an intention to keep the ſoldiers from home, that they might continue dependent on himſelf, and that he might increaſe his own fame and fortune at the riſk of the public ſafety[46].

[45] Xenoph. p. 367. [46] Idem, p. 369, et ſeqq.

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Sufferings of the Greeks in their march through Bithynia.

The mutinous and diſtracted ſpirit of the troops rendered all their future meaſures weak and wavering. The terror which they inſpired, and their wants, which it was neceſſary to ſupply, made them very unwelcome gueſts at Cotyora, Sinopé, and Heraclea, at which places they continued ſeveral months, under pretence of waiting for tranſports, but meanwhile plundering the neigbouring country, laying the cities under contribution, and threatening them with burdens that exceeded their faculties. The inhabitants of Heraclea, while they affected to conſider thoſe unreaſonable demands, removed their effects from the villages, ſhut the gates of their city, and placed armed men on the walls. Cheiriſophus had by this time returned with veſſels from Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral, but not ſufficiently numerous to tranſport ſo great an army. The ſoldiers thus diſappointed of their hopes, and diſcontented with their commanders, and with each other, raſhly undertook, in ſeparate bodies, the dangerous journey through Bithynia, a country extending two hundred miles from Heraclea to Byzantium, and totally inhabited, or rather waſted, by the Thynians, a Thracian tribe, the moſt cruel and inhoſpitable of the human race. In this expedition they loſt above a thouſand men; and the deſtruction muſt have been much greater, had not the generous activity of Xenophon ſeaſonably led his own diviſion to the aſſiſtance of thoſe who had deſerted his ſtandard. Cheiriſophus was ſoon afterwards killed by a medicine which he had taken in a fever. The ſole command

devolved on Xenophon; not by appointment, but by the voluntary ſubmiſſion of the troops to his ſuperior mind. He at length taught them to defeat the irregular fury of the Thynians; and, after taking many ſlaves, and much uſeful booty, conducted them in ſafety to Chryſopolis [47], which is now known by the name of Scutari, and conſidered as the Aſiatic ſuburb of Conſtantinople.

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After the death of Cheiriſophus, are conducted by Xenophon to Byzantium.

The neighbourhood of a Grecian colony ſeemed infectious to the temper of the troops. At Byzantium their mutinous ſpirits were again thrown into fermentation. Cleander, the governor of that city, who had come to meet them, narrowly eſcaped death during the fury of a military ſedition. Their behaviour rendered them the objects of terror to all the inhabitants of thoſe parts. The Lacedæmonians dreaded the aſſiſtance of ſuch dangerous allies; and the ſatrap Pharnabazus, alarmed for the ſafety of his province, practiſed with Anaxibius, who commanded in the Helleſpont, to allure them, by fair promiſes, into Europe. Gained by the bribes of the Perſian, not only Anaxibius, but his ſucceſſor Ariſtarchus, made propoſals of advantage to the army, which he had not any intention to fulfil. The troops, enraged at this diſappointment, and ſtill more at the treachery of the Spartan commanders, would have attacked and plundered Byzantium, had they not been reſtrained by the wiſdom and authority of Xenophon, who, ſtruggling like a ſkilful pilot againſt the violence

The mutinous ſpirit of the troops breaks out afreſh at Byzantium.

[47] Xenoph. p. 277, et ſeqq.

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of a tempeſt, prevented the execution of a meaſure which muſt have expoſed them to immediate danger, and covered them with eternal infamy [41].

Xenophon diſſuades them from plundering that place.

With tears and prayers, he conjured them "not to tarniſh, by the deſtruction of a Grecian city, the glory of a campaign ſignalized by ſo many illuſtrious victories over the Barbarians. What hopes of ſafety could they entertain, if, after unſucceſsfully attempting to dethrone the king of Perſia, they ſhould provoke the reſentment of Sparta? Deſtitute as they were of friends, of money, of ſubſiſtence; and reduced by their miſconduct to a handful of men, could they expect to inſult, with impunity the two greateſt powers in the world? The experience of late years ought to correct their folly. They had ſeen that even Athens, in the zenith of her greatneſs, poſſeſſed of four hundred gallies, an annual revenue of a thouſand talents, and ten times that ſum in her treaſury; Athens, who commanded all the iſlands, and occupied many cities both in Aſia and Europe, among which was Byzantium itſelf, the preſent object of their frantic ambition, had yielded to the arms of Sparta, whoſe authority was actually acknowledged in every part of Greece. What madneſs, then, for men in their friendleſs condition, a mixed aſſemblage of different nations, to attack the dominions of a people whoſe valor was irreſiſtible, and from whoſe vengeance it was impoſſible for them to fly, without flying from their country, and taking refuge

[41] Xenoph. p. 399, et ſeqq.

among thoſe hoſtile Barbarians, from whom, for near two years paſt, they had met with nothing but cruelty, injuſtice, perſecution, and treachery?" CHAP. XXVI.

The judicious repreſentations of Xenophon ſaved Byzantium; but it is probable that neither the weight of argument, nor the power of eloquence, would have long reſtrained the diſcontented and needy troops from attempting other enterpriſes of a ſimilar nature, if an opportunity had not fortunately preſented itſelf of employing their dangerous activity in the ſervice of Seuthes, a bold and ſucceſsful adventurer of Lower Thrace. Mæſades, the father of Seuthes, reigned over the Melandeptans, the Thynians, and the Thranipſans, who inhabited the European ſhores of the Propontis and Euxine ſea. The licentious turbulence of his ſubjects compelled him to fly from his dominions. He took refuge with Medocus, king of the Odryſians, the moſt powerful tribe in Upper Thrace, with whoſe family his own had long been connected by the ſacred ties of hoſpitality. Medocus kindly received, and generouſly entertained, the father; and, after his deceaſe, continued the ſame protection and bounty to his ſon, Seuthes. But the independent ſpirit of the young prince diſdained, as he expreſſes it, to live like a dog at another man's table. He deſired horſes and ſoldiers from Medocus, that he might acquire ſubſiſtence for himſelf. His requeſt was granted; his incurſions were ſucceſsful; the terror of his name filled all the maritime parts of Thrace; and there was

The Greeks invited into the ſervice of Seuthes;

his hiſtory.

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reaſon to believe that if he could join the Grecian forces to his own, he might eaſily regain poſſeſſion of his hereditary dominions [49].

Their agreemrnt with that prince.

For this purpoſe he ſent to Xenophon Medoſades, a Thracian, who, underſtanding the Greek language, uſually ſerved him as ambaſſador. The terms of the treaty were ſoon agreed on. Seuthes promiſed each ſoldier a Cyzicene (about eighteen ſhillings ſterling), the captains two Cyzicenes, and the generals four, of monthly pay. The money, it was obſerved, would be clear gain, as they might ſubſiſt by plundering the country; yet ſuch of the booty as was not of a periſhable nature, Seuthes reſerved for himſelf, that by ſelling it in the maritime towns, he might provide for the pay of his new auxiliaries [50].

The Grecian commanders entertained in the camp of Seuthes.

Having communicated their deſigns to the army, the Grecian commanders followed Medoſades to the camp of Seuthes, which was diſtant about ſix miles from the coaſt of Perinthus, a city of conſiderable note in the neighbourhood of Byzantium. They arrived after ſun-ſet, but found the Barbarians awake and watchful. Seuthes himſelf was poſted in a ſtrong tower; horſes ready bridled ſtood at the gate; large fires blazed at a diſtance, while the camp itſelf was concealed in darkneſs; precautions, however ſingular, yet neceſſary againſt the Thynians, who were deemed, of all men, the moſt dangerous enemies in the

[49] Xenoph. p. 393, et ſeqq. [50] Idem ibid.

night. The Greeks were permitted to enter. Seuthes received them with ruſtic hoſpitality; before entering on buſineſs, challenged them to drink in large horns full of wine; then confirmed the promiſes of his ambaſſadors; and ſtill farther allured Xenophon by the hopes of receiving, beſides the ſtipulated pay, lands and cattle, and an advantageous eſtabliſhment on the ſea-ſhore. CHAP. XXVI.

Next day the Grecian army joined the camp of their new maſter. The commanders were again entertained with a copious feaſt, in which Seuthes diſplayed all his magnificence. After ſupper, the buffoons and dancers were introduced, the cup went briſkly round, and the whole aſſembly were diſſolved in merriment. But Seuthes knew how far to indulge, and when to reſtrain, the joys of feſtivity. Without allowing his revels to diſturb the ſtillneſs of the night, he roſe with a martial ſhout, imitating a man who avoided a javelin; and then addreſſing the Grecian captains without any ſign of intoxication, deſired them to have their men ready to march in a few hours, that the enemy, who were as yet unacquainted with the powerful reinforcement which he had received, might be taken unprepared, and conquered by ſurpriſe [51]. The army joins his ſtandard.

The camp was in motion at midnight; it was the middle of winter, and the ground was in many parts covered with a deep ſnow. But the Thracians, clothed in ſkins of foxes, were well prepared for ſuch nocturnal expeditions. The Greeks Conjunct expeditions of the Greeks and Thracians.

[51] Xenoph. p. 406. et ſeqq.

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suffered much [52] by the cold; but the rapidity of their march, animated by the certain prospect of success, made them forget their sufferings. Wherever they arrived, the villages were attacked and plundered, the houses were burned, many captives and cattle were taken, and the ravages of that bloody night sufficiently represent the uniform scene of cruelty, by which, in the course of a few weeks, Seuthes compelled into submission the inhabitants of that fertile and populous slip of land that lies between the Euxine and Propontis. But the possession of this territory, which formed the most valuable portion of his hereditary dominions, could not satisfy his ambition. He turned his arms northwards, and over-ran the country about Salmydessus, a maritime city situate at the mouth of a river of the same name, which flows from the southern branch of mount Hæmus into a spacious bay of the Euxine. There the allied army repeated the same destructive havoc which they had already made in the south; and avenged, by their cruel incursions, the cause of violated hospitality; for the Barbarians of those parts were so much accustomed to plunder the vessels which were often shipwrecked on their shoaly coast, that they had distinguished it by pillars, in the nature of

By the assistance of the Greeks, Seuthes recovers his hereditary dominions.

[52] Ην δε χιων πολλη, και ψυχος ουτως ωστε το υδωρ, ὁ εφερουτο επι δειπνον, επηγνυτο, και ὁ οινος εν τοις αγγειοις. και των Ἑλληνων πολλων και ῥινες απεκαιροντο και ωτα. There was much snow, and the cold so intense, that the water froze as they were carrying it to supper, and the wine in the vessels. Many of the Greeks also lost their ears and noses. Xenoph. p. 408.

land-marks

land-marks, to prevent inteſtine quarrels, by aſcertaining the property of the ſpoil [53].

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In the ſpace of two months after his junction with the Greeks, Seuthes extended his poſſeſſions ſeveral days march from the ſea; his numerous, but unſkilful enemies, fighting ſingly, were ſucceſſively ſubdued; each vanquiſhed tribe increaſed the ſtrength of his army; the Odryſians, allured by the hopes of plunder, flocked to his ſtandard, and the growing proſperity of his fortune, no longer requiring the ſupport, diſpoſed him to neglect the ſervices, of his Grecian auxiliaries [54]. The ungrateful levity of the Barbarian was encouraged by the perfidious counſels of his favorite Heraclides of Maronea, one of thoſe fugitive Greeks, who having merited puniſhment at home for their wickedneſs, obtained diſtinction abroad by their talents; men ſullied with every vice, prepared alike to die or to deceive, and who having provoked the reſentment of their own countrymen by their intrigues and their audacity, often acquired the eſteem of foreigners by their valor and eloquence, their ſkill in war, and dexterity in negociation. Heraclides ſtrongly exhorted his maſter to defraud the Greeks of their pay, and to deliver himſelf from their troubleſome importunities, by diſmiſſing them from his ſervice. But the fears, rather than the delicacy of Seuthes, prevented him from complying with this advice; he loſt his honor

His ſignal ingratitude.

[53] Xenoph. p. 408. [54] Idem, p. 414 et ſeqq.

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The Greeks return to the ſervice of their country.

without ſaving his money; and the Grecian generals had an early opportunity to reproach his perfidy and ingratitude, being ſoon called to engage in a more honorable war[55], kindled by the reſentment of Artaxerxes againſt the preſumption of the Spartans, who had ſo ſtrenuouſly ſupported the unfortunate rebellion of Cyrus.

[55] Xenoph. p. 427.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

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